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FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE GAMBIA, 1981-91 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
Formal and informal financial markets in The Gambia are made up of many 
segments. Banks, cooperatives, village savin~ and credit associations, non-governmental 
organizations, private traders, suppliers, and microentrepreneurs all operate as 
intermediary /agents in The Gambia and are investigated in varying degrees of detail in this 
study. Each is important in providing some financial services to businesses or households. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed on the activities of these 
financial agents. The major questions addressed· are the magnitudes of these financial 
activities, the nature of the financial services offered, the markets in which they operate, the 
clientele served, the terms and conditions of their financial services, and the efficiency of 
their financial operations. Of particular interest here is documentation of the performance 
of these agents and identifying factors that have shaped their performance in the past 
decade. How has the hberalization of financial markets and the introduction of a treasury 
bill market altered the composition of assets in the banking industry? What implications 
emerge from this restructuring of the banking sector? Finally, what alternative networks of 
financial intermediaries and agents currently operate in rural financial markets and what is 
their potential for supplying financial services to rural Gambia? 
1. The Formal Financial System 
The formal banking system in The Gambia is reviewed in the first chapter. At the 
same time, we analyze how monetary policy has conditioned the performance of this system 
by changing the structure of interest rates and reallocating assets between loan and non-loan 
activity. The trends in total credit balances and the shifting roles of public and private 
sector credit activity are also documented. Term lending and interest rate controversies are 
also explored along with the financial performance of the banking industry. 
The principal findings of this chapter can be summarized in five major areas: (1) the 
predominant changes in the pattern of financial balances in the past decade; (2) the high 
social costs of institutional failures growing out of an unstable market structure for banking 
in The Gambia; (3) the impact of the stabilization and privatization drives on financial 
deepening and financial intermediation; (4) the issue of savings mobilization; and (5) the 
collapse of rural finance and the implications of this urban bias for future donor 
development policy. 
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A Decadal Patterns 
Dramatic changes occurred in financial markets in the past decade as the overall 
financial market shrank dramatically over this period. This was largely due to the rapid 
decline of lending in the country's largest bank, the Gambia Commercial and Development 
Bank (GCDB). The remaining private commercial banks experienced approximately a one-
third decline in their outstanding balances in real terms over this period. There was also 
a shift from public to private sector banking and from long to much shorter term lending. 
In the early 1980s, a supply leading financial development strategy predominated and 
created a preponderance of public sector credit flows in the formal financial markets of that 
time. By the early 1990s, public sector loans through the GCDB and its downstream 
network had largely disappeared, and private commercial bank lending emerged as the only 
viable financial intermediaries functioning in the country. 
Agricultural lending collapsed from its predominant role of 30 to 35 percent of total 
lending in the early 1980s to 7 to 8 percent by the early 1990s. In contrast, loans for trading 
enterprises rose from around 20 percent to about 30 percent of total outstanding balances 
within the smaller scale financial market of the early 1990s. The decline of agricultural 
lending was directly associated with the decline of the GCDB and the failure of the supply 
leading financial development strategy. 
In recent years, large interest rate margins have emerged in Gambian financial 
markets along with high rates of return on assets and equity by financial institutions. With 
the liberalization of financial markets freeing interest rates, a wide margin emerged between 
average loan and deposit rates creating one of the widest gross interest rate margins in 
Africa (19 points). Among other things, this increased the profitability of banking and 
attracted a number of international banks to apply for charters in The Gambia. At the 
same time, these wide margins created a high loan rate milieu that some allege discouraged 
investment lending. Hypotheses are tested on the determination of interest rates in The 
Gambia and associated implications explored. 
B. Market Structure and Institutional Instability 
Bank instability and institutional failure stands out as the second major issue in The 
Gambia's financial markets. Four banks failed in the past 10 years and a fifth is under 
litigation. Only two banks have passed through the past 10 years free of financial problems. 
Oearly, the bank charter review process of the Central Bank and its supervisory functions 
could be strengthened to reduce this market instability. 
The failure of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the Gambia 
Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) were costly to Gambian society in two ways. 
First, the defaults and frequent write-offs during the decade have been substantial. While 
low income beneficiaries comprised some of this failed portfolio, nevertheless, a relatively 
small number of borrowers with substantial loan size obligations also made up an important 
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part of this defaulted portfolio, thereby contributing to a regressive distribution of income 
and wealth in the country through these defaults. Second, to clean up the books of the 
GCDB, the Gambian government has been forced to issue approximately 80 million dalasis 
of treaswy bills to induce an international bank to take over the deposit obligations of the 
GCDB in 1992. In addition to handsomely benefiting the new bankers, this action imposed 
future burdens for Gambian taxpayers. 
When the income distribution implications of these transfers are added to the income 
distribution implications of a negative real rate of interest environment for savers for most 
of the past decade, one bas to conclude that the net impact of the formal financial markets 
in The Gambia was to generate a regressive distribution of income in the country. 
The impact of the Economic Recovery Program (and ensuing structural reforms) on 
financial markets bas been dramatic and constitutes another important issue in financial 
market development. Reforms liberated interest rates and caused a reduced demand for 
loans. Institutional reforms to reduce subsidies and the fiscal deficit reduced lending to 
perennially heavy borrowers such as the Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) and 
the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) further scaling back the loan market. Both these 
reforms were legitimate and long overdue and, in the process, reduced the loan market to 
a size more commensurate with a solvent clientele. 
C. Impact of Stabilization and Financial liberalization 
Stabilization measures to control the inflationary impact of donor grants and loans, 
however, have caused a crowding out effect in the asset portfolio of banks. The attractive 
interest rates negotiated to induce banks to purchase risk free T-bills bas reduced their 
willingness to pursue borrowers. Loans account for only 25 percent while T-bills represent 
around 42 percent of total assets for the private commercial banks operating in The Gambia 
in the early 1990s. Thus, financial liberalization and economic stabilization have not 
promoted financial deepening; crowding out has reduced the scale of financial intermedia-
tion through the loan market. However, one must recognize that the size of the loan market 
was exaggerated in the early eighties. Much of the volume of outstanding balances at that 
time were implicit grants that later became defaults. In short, the financial market of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s more accurately reflects the true size of a solvent loan market. 
Still, the crowding out effect discussed above is a real concern. It represents a continuing 
process reducing the scale of the private sector loan market in The Gambia. This process 
could be ameliorated by drawing more on domestic taxes rather than foreign donor grants 
to cover budget deficits and introducing more competition in the T-bill market. 
D. Lack of Incentives for Savings 
Another problem of financial development during this period was the weak incentives 
for savings mobilization. To the extent that loan markets remain limited, there will be little 
incentive for banks to encourage savings mobilization. Savers have been penalized with 
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negative real rates of interest for most of the past 10 years and savers in rural areas have 
been largely excluded from formal financial services altogether. Some savers reported losses 
due to the failure of the ADB and the savings cooperatives of the GCU in the late 1980s. 
E. Urban Bias in Banking 
Finally, an extreme urban bias became apparent in financial markets by the early 
1990s. Agricultural lending has declined precipitously; the major rural bank had 
disappeared as an active lender; the agricultural linkages to the banking sector through the 
Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) have been substantially reduced through downscaling. 
Finally, the natural heirs to the financial system, the private commercial banks, have no 
extensive branch network in rural areas to service rural depositor-savers, nor any direct 
agricultural loan portfolio. · 
Restructuring the banking system and liberalizing financial markets have produced 
a much smaller, leaner, and more resilient system dominated by private commercial banks. 
While this is in many ways a necessary and inevitable step toward sound banking in The 
Gambia, this change does very little to help rural Gambia. Private commercial banks 
located in Banjul cannot be expected to supply rural Gambians with financial services except 
as a wholesaler working through other agents. 
The challenge facing Gambian authorities now is to expand and broaden financial 
intermediation beyond the mere transfer of private deposits into government securities. 
More attention must be given to promoting the institutional innovations and strengthening 
the supervision and regulatory functions necessary to broaden the market for financial 
services. In this regard, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a possible option. 
NGOs have begun to fill the vacuum in rural areas created by the disappearance of formal 
finance. The degree to which NGOs can satisfactorily fill this vacuum and supply these 
services is an open question, explored in some detail in the rest of the report. 
2. The Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
A The Setting 
The second chapter documents the financial activities of non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), especially in rural areas. The large number of NGOs with diverse operating 
policies and financial technologies has created confusion in rural financial markets. At the 
same time, uncertainty permeates the discussion of appropriate coordination and regulatory 
measures required to shape the growth of these institutions as fledgling financial 
intermediaries in rural Gambia. Chapter Two explores these issues at length. 
vi 
The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) is the appropriate institution to regulate 
and monitor financial institutions in The Gambia. Although the CBG has the power to 
regulate the NGOs, current prudential regulations have been formulated more for banks 
than for client-owned institutions without an equity base. The laissez-faire approach to 
NGOs has resulted in negative externalities in financial markets and increased the potential 
long-run social costs of institutional failure. In the past, the inconsequential role of the 
NGOs as financial intermediaries led to a lack of interest by the CBG toward regulating 
these small and scattered organiz.ations. Since the NGOs are becoming increasingly active 
in financial markets and since their share of lending in financial markets has become more 
significant, it is time to reconsider this position. 
B. Regulatory Issues 
The Agricultural Credit Unit (ACU) of the Central Bank does conduct regular 
dialogues with NGOs to explain and promulgate its policies on interest rates, linking loans 
to savings and encouraging coordination among the various NGOs. This has been a 
valuable service, however, recently the ACU has taken actions that go beyond the role of 
regulator and counselor by designing and promoting a number of local level associations. 
While one can sympathize with the ACU's concern to help these fledgling associations start 
out on the right track, it has to avoid pushing this role in the future. Designing and assisting 
in the promotion of local level savings and credit associations is clearly an inappropriate role 
for a regulatory unit to be engaged in. This activity would create a conflict of interest The 
regulator is expected to act impartially and objectively in its regulatory responsibility. It 
would be contradictory to expect a regulator to act impartially in its regulatory action 
concerning an association it has been partially responsible for having created in the first 
place. It would appear that the Central Bank has recently reviewed these initiatives and has 
correctly resisted any further moves in this direction. 
On the other hand, TANGO (the Association of Non-Government Organizations) 
along with parent NGOs should have a comparative advantage in carrying out the 
developmental role that is currently needed to promote local level client owned savings and 
credit associations. At the same time, TANGO could eventually function as a second level 
federation, as a lobby for NGOs, and as a forum for discussing problems and lessons learned 
through diverse NGO financial programs. TANGO should not be a regulator. To ask 
TANGO to regulate NGOs (as distinct from training, technical assistance, and information 
dissemination) is, in effect, allowing regulatees (those who are regulated) to be the 
regulator. The conflict of interest inherent in letting TANGO serve as a regulator is 
obvious. Therefore, while the CBG should perform the role of regulator, TANGO or a 
comparable institution should assume the developmental responsibilities mentioned above. 
It is clear that TANGO is not currently equipped with a staff (in number or in training) to 
carry out these comprehensive responsibilities adequately. It would be helpful if donor 
agencies would commit themselves to a more serious effort to strengthen the staff of 
TANGO to carry out these service functions. Chapter Two concludes with a detailed set 
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of recommendations for regulatory criteria for the CBG and operational guidelines for 
NGOs in The Gambia. 
3. The Gambian Cooperative Union (GCU) 
Chapter Three summarizes the recent history of the multipurpose Gambia 
Cooperative Union (GCU). Particular attention is paid to its performance in input supplies, 
lending and savings mobilization since its reorganization in 1988. It's strengths and 
weaknesses are identified. 
A Implicit Strengths 
The GCU has undergone several changes since its reorganization in 1988 and the 
results have been noteworthy. On the one hand, it has an established widespread marketing 
network in the country, has instituted tighter loan qualification criteria, has reduced its staff 
and has charged market rates on loans made in the recent liberalized environment. Its spe-
cialization in output, input and financial markets has produced some comparative advan-
tages to allow it to record a better performance in some areas over competitors such as the 
Gambian Produce Marketing Board (GPMB), the FAQ fertilizer distribution network, and 
the NGOs. On the other hand, with its continuing loan recovery problems, its reliance on 
subsidies in the form of interest-free Agricultural Development Program II (ADP) loans, 
and the challenge of continued subsidized competition in groundnut marketing from 
Senegal, it is not clear that it can become a viable and self-sustaining source of financial 
services. 
Its long experience as an output buyer combined with an established infrastructure 
in transport and manpower are the strong points of the GCU. Furthermore, access to exter-
nal funds from the local banks aids its output marketing operations because it can imple-
ment marketing strategies which pay farmers in cash with a minimum of delays and with low 
transaction costs. The large number of local multi-village Cooperative Produce Marketing 
Societies ( CPMSs) create a large network with a wide geographic coverage that also miti-
gates the covariance risks of crop failure. Indeed, these strengths helped the GCU to retain 
its position as the major domestic buyer of groundnuts in 1992 relative to Gambian traders 
and the GPMB, a rather unusual year for Gambian output markets. However, the GCU 
could not compete with the subsidized Senegalese traders due to large groundnut price 
differentials and this fact undoubtedly contributed to some of its loan recovery problems. 
The GCU's ability to provide access to high quality inputs is facilitated by its large 
retail network, transport and other facilities, such as storage depots and access to interest 
free loans from the World Bank's ADP II revolving fund. In 1992, these factors helped 
reduce its fixed costs so it could supply inputs at a lower price than its major competitor, 
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the FAO. Furthermore, its recent entry into import markets allowed it to import fertilizer 
from Senegal and offer competitive input prices to its clientele. 
More strict credit discipline has been introduced under its new credit program. The 
number of CPMSs and village branches, that qualified for the credit program by repaying 
more than 95 percent of their overdues, has increased. The village committees formed 
under the Village Responsibility System (VRS) have been active in borrower screening, loan 
disbursement and enforcing contracts. As a result, the loan recovery rates have been high 
in years with good weather and less Senegalese intervention in groundnut markets. The 
charging of market interest rates to CPMSs and to farm borrowers compare favorably to 
those charged by the FAO and NGOs engaged in fertilizer loans. 
B. Problem Areas and Weaknesses 
In spite of these strengths, the GCU has several weaknesses and problems. For 
example, the absence of crop diversification increases the covariance risks inherent in 
concentrating its activities in groundnuts; therefore, it is more vulnerable to weather and 
other risks than it would be if it had more diversified activities. Also, its sales of seed, 
fertilizer and other inputs are weakened by a heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, 
especially for fertilizer. It may not be remunerative to reduce foreign dependency by 
building fertilizer production or mixing plants in The Gambia; however, it should be possible 
to develop seed multiplication units to engage in research and multiplication of quality 
seeds. 
The credit activities of the GCU were the primary focus of this study and they reveal 
several problems. While the number of CPMSs and village branches that qualified for the 
credit program increased over the past four years, their geographic distribution has been 
skewed and this affects access to loans by members in less politically influential areas. 
There are problems in enforcing loan contracts due to droughts and intense competition for 
groundnuts from Senegal, along with limited emphasis on collateral and borrower education. 
The GCU has not developed risk reducing mechanisms, such as crop and enterprise 
diversification and collateral substitutes other than output-tied contracts. Therefore, while 
recovery rates were high during the one good year after the 1988 reorganization, they have 
been relatively low in the two successive years. Although the loans consist of in-kind and 
cash components, they are supplied only for production, storage or processing purposes 
without considering the fungible nature of credit Furthermore, the cash component is 
uniform across all borrowers regardless of risk or the area or crops cultivated. 
The serious constraint that the GCU has faced in its supply of funds for lending has 
required it to ration its loans. But the criteria used to ration loans among new and old 
CPMSs have been ambiguous and it is not clear how loans are rationed among individual 
borrowers. In other words, it is not clear if the GCU has successfully adopted a "learning 
by doing" technique in supplying loans to old and new clients whereby repaying borrowers 
get new and larger loans while those with poor repayment receive no loans or only small 
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loans. The emphasis on groundnuts has rationed access to women clients that traditionally 
engage in growing food crops. To ease its resource problem, the GCU has initiated a 
deposit program to improve local participation in GCU's activities. Awareness is being 
created among farmers regarding the mobilization of deposits, but the GCU has yet to 
develop attractive operational procedures to mobilize deposits. The current program that 
offers only an eight percent annual interest rate for fixed deposits and zero percent for 
current accounts is not an attractive program for savers. Whereas it may not be possible 
for the GCU to offer higher rates than this with its current risky portfolios and trends in 
loan recovery rates, it could emphasize nonprice services including assured loans for savers. 
These problems of operating losses and poor loan recovery pose a serious problem 
for the survivability of the credit program of the GCU. H these problems are not resolved, 
the ADP II fund will be exhausted. There will be no balances left to revolve into new loans. 
This will force the GCU to modify its operations, limit its scope, and perhaps drop its 
lending operations entirely. This would likely further erode its support among farmers. 
Our scope of work was limited to GCU financial activities so we could not undertake 
a comprehensive review of its operations. It appears, however, that the GCU has a serious 
income problem. The audited financial statements of the GCU during the 1979 /80 to the 
1989 /90 period reveal that losses were reported in 9 out of 11 years. The cumulative total 
losses were 043,181,000 compared to 04,110,800 in cumulative profits (10 percent of the 
total losses). Therefore, it must be the case that an important factor explaining the GCU's 
cash flow problems and its need to ration loans to CPMSs and farmers is its continuous 
losses. This factor plus the loan recovery problem means that the GCU simply does not 
have the resources to service the loan demand for its members. This problem has at least 
two important implications. The first is that farmers and CPMSs are likely to stop repaying 
loans if they conclude they will be rationed out of new ones or will receive much smaller 
loans than desired. This may be an important factor explaining the decline that has 
occurred in loan recovery. The second is that the savings mobilized from members will be 
lost as they are channeled into paying GCU operating costs. Given the limited opportunities 
to save in rural areas, it would be logical to recommend that the GCU use its network to 
aggressively mobilize deposits. With its operating losses, however, that would not be a 
prudent recommendation because of a possible loss of savings. 
The GCU has recently made an effort to become a viable and efficient operation in 
the post reorganization period, but it has not been able to overcome certain obstacles. Two 
major problem areas are subsidized foreign competition and drought. In the post 
reorganization period, the GCU competed well against several domestic agents, (NGOs, the 
GPMB and the FAO), but has been unable to overcome drought related production 
problems and aggressive subsidized competition from Senegal. Put differently, if there 
would have been no reorganization, the old GCU would likely have collapsed much earlier 
in the face of these adverse conditions. 
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C. Recommendations 
Given the various output buyers and input suppliers that sell on credit, and the 
unviability of several CPMSs, the GCU should consider scaling down its operations, reducing 
its overhead expenses, and limiting itself to a smaller number of well-functioning CPMSs 
and village branches. This downscaling implies that all nonperforming CPMSs out of the 
present 54 CPMSs would be closed. Otherwise, with declining ADP funds, the GCU will 
be forced to supply ever smaller sized loans with declining purchasing power, thereby 
reducing the value of its loan services. This would very likely negatively affect the incentives 
for good repayment from early qualifiers who, in effect, might feel they are not being 
properly rewarded for being the best CPMSs in the network. The nondiscretionary 
expansion of the CPMS network based only on the 95 percent recovery rule has in recent 
years brought in weaker CPMSs from the pre 1988/89 period who took three or four years 
to pay off their pre-1988 debts, and thereby penalized early qualifiers through a reduced 
volume of lending from 1988 onwards. This has introduced moral hazard into the system. 
The criteria to select the CPMSs that remain with the GCU should, therefore, be based on: 
(i) the ability of the CPMS to recover at least 95 percent of its current loans made after 
reorganization for at least two years; (ii) the CPMS capability to purchase groundnuts from 
the GCU at least to some break-even level; and, (iii) the capacity to mobilize deposits. 
To survive, the GCU must develop a reserve fund during good years to be drawn 
upon in the event that high Senegalese prices and/or poor harvests are encountered again. 
It is unfortunate this had not been done earlier. The GCU needs some assurance of access 
to groundnuts if it is to be able to compete and ensure the recovery of its fertilizer loans. 
Otherwise, with porous borders and informal trading arrangements, it is not possible to 
prevent cross-border trade between The Gambia and Senegal. The 1991/92 situation is 
evidence of this. The large groundnut cross-border sales into Senegal could have been 
prevented if the GCU or the GPMB would have offered higher prices to compete with the 
Senegalese through drawing down a previously built up reserve fund. While the 
GCU /GPMB need not necessarily exactly meet the Senegalese prices to compete due to 
transport cost differences and uncertainties in the timeliness of Senegalese payment 
practices, the price differential in 1991/92 almost reached 50 percent. As a result, although 
the farmers were not affected, the GCU suffered because of low output purchases. 
Furthermore, loan recovery rates were estimated to be 53 percent, lower than in previous 
years since the input-credit operations are linked to output marketing to ensure loan 
repayment. In short, the GCU lost its comparative advantage to enforce loan contracts tied 
to output marketing. 
If the GCU accepts the challenge of launching a savings mobilization program to 
improve the GCU's internal funding position, it should adopt the following practices. While 
linking savings proportionately to loans received by members is not required, it should be 
mandatory for farmer members to save with the GCU. The GCU should, however, pay 
positive real interest rates on the deposits held as fixed deposits irrespective of the amounts 
deposited. The village branches and the CPMSs should be given authority to use the funds 
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held at their levels, although the GCU should monitor and supervise them. The village 
branches and the CPMSs, especially those that are unqualified for the credit program, might 
use these funds to buy fertilizer from the GCU on a cash basis to sell to their members. 
The GCU should also explore ways to attract non-member deposits, including NGOs and 
women, to expand its pool of funds. In the absence of formal bank branches in the rural 
areas, the GCU could consider repositioning itself to operate as an alternative formal 
financial intermediary. 
While the GCU must continue to tighten its internal operations and bear the 
consequences of its mistakes, it is obvious that it faces serious external challenges over 
which it has little control. There is no level playing field among institutions operating in 
various markets in The Gambia. In particular, the GCU cannot be expected to compete on 
an uneven playing field caused by policies in neighboring countries over which it has no 
control. Although the GCU has received subsidies, especially interest-free ADP II funds, 
and enjoys an infrastructure and a network of CMPSs that gives it some advantages, it is 
faced by subsidized competition from the NGOs and the FAQ fertilizer program in the 
input and credit markets and Senegalese traders from the output market side. Not only 
does this affect the volume of GCU's marketing operations, but it also has a spillover effect 
in reducing the recovery rate on input loans by weakening its contract enforcement 
mechanism through its marketing role. It cannot continue as a financial institution if it 
cannot enforce its loan contracts. Although it's performance is problematic in spite of 
recent reforms, it would be premature to try to decide now whether or not it is appropriate 
to close the GCU or provide it with additional government or donor support. It would be 
preferable to monitor its performance for another two or three years until the ADP funds 
are exhausted. In the meantime, ways need to be explored to address the issue of groundnut 
pricing between The Gambia and Senegal. H The Gambia is to pursue a market economy, 
donor pressure should be exerted on Senegal to encourage it to also follow competitive and 
unsubsidized pricing policies. 
4. The FAO Agricultural Input Office (AIO) Supply System 
The FAQ in collaboration with the Agricultural Input Office (AIQ) of the Ministry 
of Agriculture has developed an extensive role in fertilizer importation and distribution. 
This is evaluated in Chapter Four. Its role in facilitating privatization of the distribution 
network is reviewed along with its attempt to introduce a loan program through its private 
dealer network. The FAQ has played an extensive role in developing fertilizer sales. It is 
anticipated that the FAQ project that has supported this work will end as part of the 
privatization process for the fertilizer sector. H that happens, it is important to consider the 
policy options that may exist for the government. Two scenarios are considered in our 
evaluation. Scenario one represents a rapid shift to a completely privatized sector. The 
second scenario represents more of a gradual reduction in the intensive role that the FAQ/ 
AIQ have played, but assumes that the MQA (Ministry of Agriculture) will continue some 
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level of support to the private sector agents involved in the sector. The selection of which 
scenario to pursue depends on governmental decisions about: 1) how much of the fertilizer 
trade it will leave to the private sector; 2) what capability the GCU has and/ or will develop 
in supplying inputs to farmers; and 3) the investment the government will make in 
supporting public sector involvement in some aspect of the fertilizer sector. The nature and 
extent of future donor involvement, especially the PAO, will undoubtedly shape these 
decisions. 
A The First Scenario 
The objective of scenario one is to get the PAO/ AIO out of fertilizer importation 
and distribution as soon as possible, and attempt to accelerate full privatization of the 
sector. No assumptions are made about the nature of the primary agents that will evolve 
in the sector. They could be cooperative; they could be private. It only assumes that the 
governmental agencies do not have a comparative advantage in the fertilizer trade. There 
are three primary components to this scenario. 
First, the current balance of the revolving fund might be converted into a Guarantee 
Fund perhaps located and managed by one of the local commercial banks to encourage 
banks to make loans to private traders who would be expected to move into fertilizer 
marketing. Strong efforts will be made to collect the balances due by the PDs. However, 
this may not be very successful if the PDs learn that there is no assurance that they will get 
new fertilizer stocks if under this scenario they pay their current obligations. Therefore, the 
government and/ or the donors should review the possibility of augmenting the size of the 
Fund if, as reported, the revolving fund balance is small. The donors might want to support 
a project to absorb a specific portion of the potential losses of the guarantee fund 
The Fund would be used by the domestic bank to guarantee loans made to any agent 
(GCU, PDs, private groundnut traders, NGOs) that operates in the fertilizer sector: 
importer, wholesaler, retailer. Any commercial bank in The Gambia that agree to the terms 
and conditions of the Fund could receive guarantees for the loans made. The objective of 
the Fund would be to accelerate the learning process of the domestic banks by reducing 
their risk of lending to these borrowers. The expectation is that because of the guarantees 
banks will use their existing resources (discussed in Chapter I) to make some fertilizer loans 
that otherwise they would not make because of their risk perceptions. The guarantee should 
also encourage banks to charge a lower risk premium in their loan rates for the fertilizer 
loans made. 
Specific terms and conditions would need to be established for use of the Fund, 
including the percentage of guarantee cover, procedures to access the guarantee fund, the 
standards that guaranteed loans must meet, and a fee structure designed to make the Fund 
self-sufficient. An Advisory Committee to the Bank could be created including representa-
tives of the banks, traders, MOA, and donors, if they provided funds and shared the risk. 
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Farm loans could be guaranteed but because of the limited bank branch network in 
the country, it is not expected that many farmers would incur the transaction costs of trying 
to get a loan. Rather it is expected that by lending for the working capital requirements of 
agents in the marketing channel this liquidity will pass down the channel so that retailers 
will be encouraged to sell fertilizer to farmers on credit. The retailers are located close 
enough to the farmers so they have a better chance than banks to successfully screen 
farmers and determine creditworthiness. Obviously, retailers will have to learn to do a 
better job of lending than has been done by many of the PDs to date. 
This scenario does not contemplate an ongoing role by AIO in developing and main-
taining the PDs and the PDA, because there is no certainty that any of the agents (private 
dealers or cooperatives) that will expand into the fertilizer trade will choose to use any of 
the PDs to form part of their retail network. The fertilizer importers and wholesalers will 
each need to develop their own markets. They may decide to do business with some of the 
better PDs or start from scratch with their own agents. They may decide to accept the risk 
of continuing the consignment approach, or reduce their risks by choosing to sell fertilizer 
on credit to those dealers they determine are most creditworthy. 
Since this scenario assumes that the AIO will not actually handle input stocks in the 
future, the current fertilizer inventory should be auctioned off along with any equipment that 
might have been acquired for this program. The bookkeeping accounts will need to be 
evaluated for each PD, an attempt will need to be made to collect delinquent payments, and 
a determination made to write-off uncollecuble debts. Any substantial inventories with PDs 
should either be paid for or returned to AIO depots for sale. 
There are several activities that the Department of Agriculture should continue to 
implement and some of them could be logically supported by the FAQ and/ or other donors. 
First, strong programs are needed to acquire and test seed varieties, measure fertilizer yield 
response, and evaluate optimum rates and types of fertilizer application. This information 
should be disseminated to farmers to help them with their fertilizer use. It should also be 
disseminated to the dealers so that they can augment the extension function by transmitting 
information to their farmer customers. Second, it may be useful to implement business 
development programs for private dealers in the fertilizer sectors. These programs could 
disseminate information about the FAQ/ AIO experience in importing and distributing 
fertilizer. They could also teach the basic rudiments of business management (accounting, 
finance, etc.) to small sale firms. 
There are several implications with this scenario. There may be temporary 
disruptions in fertilizer supplies as the current distribution system is replaced by the new 
privatized one. Fertilizer prices and interest rates for fertilizer loans will rise as the 
remaining subsidies are eliminated. Some of the current PDs will no longer be involved in 
fertilizer rewiHng. The losses that have occurred in operating the current program, which 
are currently difficult to observe, will become transparent when the size of the remaining 
revolving fund is known. 
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B. The Second Scenario 
The objective of a possible second scenario is to privatize parts of the fertilizer sector 
but leave a more active role for an appropriate entity in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). 
The guarantee fund is created in the same way as proposed in scenario one but there may 
be a possibility for some remnants of the PDN to receive guaranteed loans in addition to 
the other agents already identified. 
This part of the scenario is most problematic. The fundamental issue is whether or 
not the Department of Agricultural Services will decide to more fully integrate the AIO into 
its operations and provide it with adequate staff and resources once the FAO project ends. 
As described above, the AIO currently seems to be largely a donor-funded appendage that 
is not fully integrated into the Department. The Department must also decide if it wants 
to support the PDN as currently designed, in which fertilizer is supplied on consignment, or 
if it wants to convert the PDs into truly private dealers who will buy and sell inputs 
according to their market opportunities. The former implies that the AIO would continue 
to bear the risk of acquiring and distributing inputs. The latter alternative would transfer 
much of this risk to the private sector. Hit chooses the latter alternative, the AIO will have 
to maintain a capacity to store and transport inputs and distribute them to a strengthened 
PDN. The PDs, however, would be developed to operate as viable, independent retailers 
that could acquire inputs from any source. Presumably, the AIO would acquire inputs 
through traditional lender operations. Resources would need to be acquired to pay for the 
fertilizer stocks and the operational costs of the office, either through budged allocations or 
donor funds. The AIO would need to develop a capacity to undertake all the tasks now 
done by the FAO personnel. 
Regardless of which scenario is chosen, the importation and distribution system for 
fertilizer will have to undergo substantial changes. Privatization implies that the private 
sector will have to play a more significant role, and will have to be renumerated for the 
resources used and the risks faced. This implies higher fertilizer prices in the future. As 
will be argued in Chapters VII and VIII, there are some reasons for optimism about the 
future role of the private sector. There are, however, serious problems that must be 
addressed before a completely self-sufficient privatized system will emerge. 
S. The VISACAs 
Chapter Five documents the performance of the Village Savings and Credit 
Associations (VISACAs) in the Sapu region. These associations are affiliated in part with 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jahally Pacharr Rice Project in this region. They are 
further assisted by a Resident Advisor supported through a French NGO (Centre Interna-
tional de Developpement et de Recherche, CIDR) in cooperation with the Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KFW) of Germany. Important organizational and operational technologies 
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are highlighted in analyzing the functioning of these associations which successfully supply 
a range of financial services. The unique form of donor intervention is discussed and the 
prospects for new directions for the future are outlined. 
Local savings mobilization was the single most important feature behind the 
VISACAs success from its inception in 1988. This feature quickly established the legitimacy 
of these young associations. It meant that villagers controlled their own association, guaran-
teed their autonomy in decision making and introduced a moral authority for responsible 
loan administration and loan recovery of their own funds. These locally mobilized funds 
created the environment for local village assemblies to meet and discuss such questions as 
the composition and responsibilities of the management committees, interest rate policies, 
and savings instruments. The results of these efforts are clear as all VISACAs have 
recorded loan recovery rates between 92 and 97 percent and as a group earned an annual 
rate of return of 26 percent on their loan portfolios. 
Six important operational features have shaped the positive performance of the 
VISACAs since their inception. First, the depositors were paid positive real rates of interest 
on their savings and borrowers have paid positive rates on their loans. Moreover, the 
effective interest rates are higher than those earned and paid in the formal financial markets 
of The Gambia in Banjul. This is an important lesson underscoring the fact that rural 
borrowers in fact can and will pay 20 to 30 percent interest rates on 6 month loans (based 
on 40 to 60 percent annualized rates). On the savings side, depositors in the VISACAs earn 
substantially more on their savings than do depositors in formal banks. Six month deposits 
(the most commonly held deposit instrument) earn either 10 or 15 percent interest (based 
on annualized deposit rates of 20 to 30 percent). Banks at best pay 12 to 14 percent 
annualized interest on time deposits. 
Second, VISACA loans are not targeted. Since outside money played no initial role 
in the funding base for on-lending, villages had the autonomy to decide whether loans 
should be targeted in any way or remain untargeted with management committees servicing 
loan requests on a first come, first serve basis. They decided on the latter course of action 
with positive results in the end as a diversified loan portfolio contributed to high loan 
recovery rates. 
. Third, short-term loans of six months or less have predominated in the VISACAs. 
Just a few loans beyond 9 months have been made. Among other things, this implies that 
trading activity, artisan activities and handicrafts, and other non-agricultural activities will 
necessarily have to play an important role in any village banking initiative. These activities 
generate value added in their own right, are more suited to shorter term finance and can 
cover the interest rate charges with their earnings. Nevertheless, some farming loans are 
made, especially to the rice irrigated farmers who benefit from a two harvest season. More 
importantly, farm families are involved in many of the off-farm and non-farm activities 
mentioned above and clearly benefit from VISACA loans. Forcing targeted loans into what 
are misleadingly called "productive" activities is a misplaced and counterproductive effort 
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often pushed by donors. It is refreshing to see the VISACAs have not been subject to this 
form of donor intervention. 
Fourth, the VISACAs have managed their assets and liabilities intelligently by 
carefully matching the term structure of loans and deposits to meet liquidity demand. This 
is an extremely important lesson that should be followed by all village based savings and 
loan initiatives. These organizations must calibrate the cash flow derived from their loan 
repayment schedules to meet the term schedule of deposit withdrawals. Among other 
things, this implies that several deposit instruments should be offered so that several loan 
term maturities can be offered to meet loan demand. The VISACAs have shown that a 
safety cushion should also be programmed into this term matching to allow for the fact that 
some loans may be repaid with delays. Hence, loan maturities are typically issued for 
slightly shorter terms (usually by about one month) than the deposit term obligation 
supporting them. 
The fifth operational feature that comes out of the VISACA experience is the impor-
tant role of collateral. Farm equipment and livestock were the typical forms of collateral 
pledged by borrowers. Management committees take these pledges responsibly and will 
take possession of the collateral of seriously delinquent borrowers. The important lesson 
here is that the credibility of local enforcement of collateral obligations will only work when 
loans are based on local savings and when local officials support these actions as ethical and 
proper. It would appear that the threat of taking collateral is sufficiently credible in the 
VISACA villages to encourage responsible loan repayment behavior. The sixth feature is 
the self management approach followed in all the VISACAs. This successful experience has 
proven that with proper training and promotion activities, villagers can be given substantial 
if not full responsibility for managing their own finances. 
An important lesson of program design in the VISACA experience is to appreciate 
the logic of a two stage sequence of donor involvement in promoting local savings and credit 
associations. In the first stage, donor support was focused on promotion, technical 
assistance, and training, with a long term resident advisor working closely with the 
VISACAs. No external funding was provided for on-lending. The objective was to promote 
properly remunerated local savings deposits as the exclusive base for on-lending, thereby 
ensuring local identity and local control and autonomy in decision making, both of which 
are essential ingredients for promoting responsible loan recovery. 
The second stage, some three to four years later, involved some donor funding that 
was used for on-lending through the vehicle of 9 month or 1 year deposits. This expands 
the base for on-lending beyond the limits set by the local deposit base. More importantly, 
it extends term transformation into longer term loans than would be possible from local 
deposits. The lending activity that grows out of this action is untargeted and therefore 
blends into the generalized practices used for other loans. An important caveat to this 
second stage is to limit the volume of outside funding for on-lending to a small portion of 
total lending. Otherwise, the image of local identity, local control and, most importantly, 
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local deposits could become jeopardized as a donor virus contaminates the portfolio with 
an entitlement or dole psychology. 
6. The Indigenous Business Advisory Services (IBAS) 
A The IBAS Program 
The sixth chapter documents and evaluates the performance of IBAS in promoting 
microentrepreneurs in The Gambia. In particular, its role as an intermediary of loan 
services is reviewed critically. The IBAS microenterprise program of the mid to late 1980's 
recorded substantial defaults. As of June 1991, 44 percent of the total portfolio comprised 
of two donor and one government funding sources· were in default Factoring this finding 
into a risk premium which in turn was incorporated into total lending costs concludes that 
the program could only have broken even if it had charged interest rates as high as 92 
percent to make up for the default losses or conversely, it could only break even at present 
interest rates on loans with a default of no more than 4 percent of its portfolio. These 
dramatic results highlight the severe financial shortcomings of the program and underscore 
the fact that the interest rates charged in the programs were mere token gestures at pricing 
loans to cover default losses. H we subtract the government program from our risk premium 
calculations, the remaining two donor programs together would have to charge 66 percent 
to break even (i.e. covering default and operating costs). Such a program can only function 
through sustained subsidies from donors or the government since loan recoveries are 
insufficient to maintain the revolving funds behind the program, or cover the costs incurred 
in servicing the program. Not surprisingly, high arrears were associated with large, long 
term loans as compared to other loan characteristics. 
Recent attempts at program reforms were undertaken to improve program 
performance. IBAS has assumed complete responsibility for loan recovery, a function 
previously carried out under a guarantee program by the former GCDB. Political 
intervention in the allocation of funds have allegedly been lessened. Collateral in the form 
of a guarantor's bank account is presumably able to be assessed in the event of default 
However, interest rates (14 percent) are still substantially below market rates (e.g. 20-26 
percent), risk-prone longer terms loans are still emphasized, and administrative costs of the 
program are still covered by subsidies issued through the government's budget. It is unlikely 
that the program could even cover its costs with such a low interest rate (14 percent) even 
if the default problem is reduced substantially. In addition to raising its interest rates to 
market levels, IBAS should also be granted greater administrative autonomy than its current 
status confers. Its management should be given the power to hire, promote, or discharge 
employees outside conventional civil service regulations. This could create a leaner and 
higher quality human capital base to introduce stricter portfolio management criteria. 
One strategy to reduce default would be to introduce a loan tracking information 
system. This approach quickly identifies shortfalls in installment repayments over amounts 
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due for long term loans and then correlates this with loan properties and borrower 
characteristics. This contributes to risk management in two ways. First, one could 
immediately address the problem of default early in the history of the loan and immediately 
confront borrowers before any delinquent habits have been locked in place by inertia. 
Second, management could easily generate valuable information on the aggregate profile 
of loan arrears by borrower and loan type. This could create a risk/return profile by 
borrower type and business characteristics that could be used by loan officers evaluating new 
loan proposals. Such a system would allow IBAS to engage in more efficient risk manage-
ment, thereby lowering its default losses and prolonging the life of its revolving funds. 
The government should determine whether the program is at least cost effective, i.e. 
whether it is economizing in the most efficient manner the budgeted resources per loan 
issued and recovered and secondly, whether there are a sufficient number of deserving non-
delinquent beneficiaries to justify the budgetary costs involved. In short, authorities would 
have to estimate the opportunity cost of using public monies in this fashion rather than in 
some alternative use, recognizing that there is a substantial default problem in this loan 
program. 
A controversial issue in the current IBAS program is the fact that a large majority 
of the borrowers are one-time only clients. While there are no explicit restrictions limiting 
borrowers to one loan, only a handful of entrepreneurs have received two loans in the 
current portfolio. IBAS authorities try to reach as large a number of microentrepreneurs 
as possible. They should be more interested in inculcating good loan habits over time and 
training their borrowers to manage financial flows in a sustained fashion with a more slowly 
growing clientele. The "one-shot" philosophy can develop a "tum-key" flavor in that the goal 
is to quickly allow the microentrepreneurs to buy some investment goods and then abruptly 
turn them loose to get on with business of production without any further access to finance 
from the program. This philosophy overlooks the equally important role that financial 
services should play in the process of modernizing small scale manufacturing activities. 
Once investment loans have been issued to a responsible borrower and her or his equipment 
is in place, smaller working capital loans could play a useful role in allowing 
microentrepreneurs to generate a higher stream of retained earnings for future investment 
Another weakness of this one shot approach is the impact it has on loan recovery. 
H a borrower does not gain a reward of continuing access to financial services through 
repaying his/her loan, then there is little incentive to do so. One suspects this may have 
played a role in the high arrears of the earlier programs described in this chapter. Given 
the fact that poor loan recovery quickly erodes a revolving fund, thereby hastening the end 
of the loan program, it would be in the interest of IBAS authorities to build more tangible 
incentives for loan repayment into their current program by permitting follow-up working 
capital loans to previous borrowers in good standing. In the end, IBAS would be servicing 
a smaller number of clients, but the program would be servicing these clients over a longer 
period of time with more sustained financial services (for those responsible borrowers 
repaying their loans) thereby graduating them into more secure business growth in the 
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future. At the same time, the revolving fund would not be eroded through negative 
incentives creating poor loan recovery. In addition, IBAS gains additional valuable 
information on the borrowers performance that can allow it to screen its clientele more 
efficiently for future loan services. In conclusion, we recommend that IBAS continue 
working with the remaining volume of the revolving fund at their disposal to implement the 
above suggestions for a trial period of one to two years. In the meantime, no new funding 
for credit should be permitted until results can be determined from these new program 
guidelines. 
B. The OSU Microenterprise Survey 
Finally, a random sample survey carried by the OSU team in Greater Banjul 
underscored many revealing operational characteristics and financial channels servicing 
micro and small scale entrepreneurs in the Gambia. One hundred and fifty three 
entrepreneurs were interviewed divided equally into four key subsectors: bakeries, metal 
workshops, tailors, and tie and dye producers. Most were owner-operated with an average 
of 5 employees and a modest physical asset base of D 128, 727. A majority of these small 
scale operators were working for someone else before launching their own business. Most 
were illiterate (59 percent) with an average age of 38 years and were members of fairly 
large households (10 members on average). Seventy percent were men and about 30 
percent women entrepreneurs. Further, there was a distinct gender profile with female 
entrepreneurs accounting for a majority of the tailoring establishments and tie-dye 
operations unlike male operators who were predominant as bakers and metal workers. 
A substantial majority of these entrepreneurs launched their businesses with personal 
savings rather than with external loans. The single exception to this rule was the subset of 
modem bakers who received off-shore financing for their equipment. All owner-operators 
drew heavily on retained earnings for their working capital. Next in order of priority was 
informal borrowing from family and friends. In third rank were advances from customers. 
These stood out in tailoring enterprises and metal workshops. last in rank order was 
suppliers credit and formal loans. The former was most visible in the bakeries subsector 
and the later in the modem bakeries subsector. This descending rank order of funding 
sources follows the pecking order theory common to businesses in developed countries in 
which the safest source of finance (that does not jeopardize the entrepreneur's ownership 
control over her /his business), retained earnings, is used first, followed by various external 
sources in descending order of increased risk to the entrepreneur's control over her/his 
business. 
All operators used both formal and informal savings instruments with formal bank 
savings accounts standing out for the relatively modem bakeries and tailoring subsectors and 
informal group savings or moneykeeper services used by the other more traditional 
subsectors. Women entrepreneurs more commonly operated through group savings vehicles 
(Osusus) while traditional male operators used moneykeepers. 
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Given the meager presence of formal loans through IBAS or through banks in this 
random sample of small scale operators, large expensive microenterprise programs can only 
hope to reach a vecy small subset of these producers. Therefore, it is all the more impor-
tant to keep in mind that these producers can only be reached by more broad based macro-
economic and trade policies. They are all universally impacted by any government regula-
tions or policies that affect their costs or revenues such as tariffs, taxes, registration fees, 
access to foreign exchange, price controls, etc. Generally speaking the more open and liber-
alized the economy, the better the economic environment for microentrepreneurs. In con-
clusion, the recent liberalization of the Gambian economy has produced a more positive 
environment for such small scale operators. It is to be hoped that such policies continue 
and the transaction costs of registration and licensing be held at a minimum for these 
operations. 
7. Commodity and Financial Flows Through the Fertilizer Sector 
This chapter examined the evolution of the fertilizer sector in The Gambia from the 
early 1970s up to the present. Two points stand out in this analysis: fertilizer consumption 
increased dramatically up to the mid 1980s, then stagnated; and the marketing channels have 
become more complex and diverse. Although the private sector has played a more promi-
nent role in recent years, the countcy is a long way from having a reliable self-sustaining pri-
vatized fertilizer sector that provides regular access to a large number of farmers. It is 
difficult to forecast or proscribe the future configuration of the sector given the large 
number of developments that are taldng place in restructuring groundnut processing and 
marketing, in restructuring and strengthening the GCU (see Chapter III), in the rapid 
expansion of the NGOs (see Chapter II), in restructuring the FAO dealer network (see 
Chapter IV), and in the efforts of the government and the donors to create a more vibrant 
private sector. 
A more prominent role for the private sector is not likely to develop because of the 
implementation of some governmental plan or program for fertilizer. Rather it is likely to 
occur through trial and error by private businessmen attempting to make a profit in an 
uncertain environment The government and donors need to identify the few strategic 
actions they can take to facilitate the process of change, then step back and monitor 
developments. There appear to be four sets of activities that can be undertaken to facilitate 
privatization of the fertilizer sector. They are identified and briefly described below. 
• Make a clear commitment to get the government, donors and NGOs out of the 
business of importing and distributing fertilizer. Private entrepreneurs will not undertake 
risky and expensive investments if they think they might be destroyed by the unexpected 
dumping of cheap fertilizer into the market as can occur when a well-intentioned donor 
panics because of supposed inadequate supplies or high prices. Occasional shortages and 
high prices are to be expected as a privatized fertilizer sector works out the wrinkles in 
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importation and distribution. The private sector is likely to "sit on the sidelines" until it is 
certain of the commitment to privatize the sector. So far, the entrepreneurs are not yet 
convinced enough to risk investing large amounts of their own capital. 
• Improve the yield response of important crops. The uncertainties surrounding yield 
response need to be clarified. H, as appears to be the case, yield response is low for many 
crops, then the problems need to be identified and solved. In a regime with reduced 
fertilizer subsidies, a necessary condition for fertilizer use is that the yield response must be 
high enough to compensate for production and marketing risks. This is a logical task for 
donors to undertake because they have ready access to foreign scientists and research 
centers with the expertise to deal with the problem. 
• Improve product pricing and access to markets. This is a large topic and is beyond 
the scope of this study. Suffice to say that completion of the reforms of the groundnut sec-
tor and any other action that improves access to markets and the prices received by farmers 
will stimulate fertilizer demand and improve the conditions for privatized fertilizer trade. 
• Stimulate domestic lending to the fertilizer sector with a guarantee fund for fertilizer 
loans. The analysis presented in Chapter I demonstrated that there are substantial resources 
in the domestic banks to finance the fertilizer sector. As the private demand for fertilizer 
loans begins to expand, however, the learning process that the domestic banks will have to 
go through in serving this sector may be accelerated by a guarantee fund that reduces the 
risk to the bank of incurring a loss due to a bad fertilizer loan. The liquidity of the banks 
eHminates the justification for donor funds for on-lending but foreign resources could play 
a strategic role in sharing the risk and expense of operating the guarantee and thereby 
reduce the financial constraints that private sector firms may face. 
8. The Food Commodity Traders: Possible Agents for Fertilizer Marketing 
The eighth and final chapter focuses on the nature of the informal financial 
arrangements servicing the food commodity sector in The Gambia and the marketing 
channels through which they operate. In short, the analysis provides information about both 
the importation and distribution of these commodities, and the financial arrangements that 
facilitate this trade. It underscores important lessons about how the system operates and 
allows us to speculate about how these traders may respond to the possibility of becoming 
more actively involved in the privatization of the fertilizer sector. 
With the liberalized market environment in The Gambia, in which private trading 
has become more dynamic, food commodities, and especially flour and rice, are being 
imported and sold in large quantities and apparently at competitive prices. The existence 
of multiple agents at each level of the marketing channel contributes to competition. Part 
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of the dynamism and efficiency is due to the large reexport trade which allows these traders 
to achieve large scale operations. 
The financial contracts associated with the flow of commodities seem to be working 
fairly efficiently and the prices and interest rates for financial services are reasonably 
competitive. Offshore banks and suppliers credit provide most of the liquidity in the system 
because of the lethargic response of the domestic banking system. H the large importers 
could not access offshore funds, they would be faced with paying higher costs from domestic 
banks, while small and medium size firms without proven records of loan repayment would 
probably find it difficult to obtain loans at all. 
The large private traders have accumulated experience and knowledge over time in 
their trading activities. They have market contacts, storage and transportation facilities, 
knowledge about international trading, and established relations with offshore financial 
institutions. As noted in Chapter VII, two firms have been involved with fertilizer imports 
for the FAO. Given that the government and donors are trying to privatize the marketing 
of agricultural imports, especially fertilizer, a logical question is whether or not and under 
what conditions the traders of food commodities would expand into fertilizer. Several things 
learned in the course of this study allow us to speculate about the possibilities of this 
occurring. 
There are important differences and similarities between food commodities and 
fertilizer that affect the private sector response to the fertilizer sector in The Gambia They 
can be grouped into possibilities for a) scale economies, b) scope economies, and c) access 
to finance. 
A Scale Economies 
The food commodity trade operates on a fairly large scale but there are several limits 
to the scale of operations in the fertilizer sector. 
• The total volume of domestic fertilizer demand is much smaller than for food 
commodities, as discussed in Chapter VII. 
• The production cycle for crops for which fertilizer would be used is much longer than 
the shorter-term consumption cycle for food commodities, so there is a slower turnover of 
inventory. Therefore, sellers have fewer contacts with buyers and have less opportunity to 
monitor their businesses. 
• There is great uncertainty about reexport demand for fertilizer. Fertilizer has been 
imported into The Gambia from Senegal. It is unclear what conditions would be required 
in neighboring countries for The Gambia to serve as an entrepot for regional fertilizer 
imports. 
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• The amounts of food aid entering The Gambia with potential distortionary effects 
on prices is fairly small. However, the subsidized role of the government and donors has 
been very large in the fertilizer sector; therefore, the possibility of their future involvement 
creates considerable uncertainty for private traders who would be unable to complete 
against a subsidized public sector distribution channel. 
• The demand for food commodities that are important staples in The Gambia diet is 
likely to be quite inelastic. As a result, consumption is probably fairly stable, even when 
prices change. On the other hand, manure may be a fairly good substitute for chemical 
fertilizer or farmers may simply not use fertilizer if the price rises too much. Therefore, the 
quantity of fertilizer demand (i.e. sales) may become quite volatile in a privatized market 
if prices fluctuate widely as may occur in the international market, in which The Gambia 
is clearly a price taker. 
These five factors suggest that private traders will find it difficult to achieve scale 
economies in the fertilizer trade and this will make them cautious about investing in it, 
especially if they expect that there may be several agents competing for a small market 
B. Scope Economies 
If food traders decide to enter the fertilizer trade, there are four factors that suggest 
they might achieve scope economies. 
• The dealers could probably use many of their existing transportation and warehousing 
facilities for fertilizer if they have sufficient capacity, or even reduce their food trade if 
profits were sufficient to justify using more facilities for fertilizer. 
• The trade linkages established between importers, wholesalers, and retailers in the 
food trade may be used for the fertilizer business. Retailers in villages and towns are 
accustomed to selling a variety of products and they may find it profitable to handle 
fertilizer and acquire it from the same channels as their food commodities. 
• The large scale importers may be able to use their recognized creditworthiness with 
offshore financial institutions to acquire needed letters of credit and working capital for the 
fertilizer trade. 
• The food traders with multiproduct businesses have the flexibility of shifting among 
commodity lines and therefore may be able to make a profit and survive better in a dynamic 
market than a undiversified, single produce a fertilizer business. 
C. Financing the business 
Food traders have established ways to finance their businesses which appear to be 
reliable and reasonably priced. There are several differences with the fertilizer trade, 
xxiv 
however, that may make it difficult to transfer these same techniques to the fertilizer 
business. These problems may exist either a) in the acquisition of capital for the business, 
or b) in the granting and recovery of credit given to customers. 
• The large scale importers finance their businesses generally with short-term offshore 
letters of credit. Because of the rapid sales turnover, they can sell their stock on credit to 
their customers, yet get repaid in time to pay their credit obligations. The crop production 
season is several months long, however, so credit given to customers for fertilizer must be 
for a longer term. This means that the importer must get longer term credit which may not 
be as readily available or may be more expensive even from offshore sources. H they do 
not get longer term credit, there will be a mismatch in term structure: a trader would 
borrow short but would provide longer term suppliers credit to wholesalers/retailers who 
would provide seasonal credit to farmers. Interest charges (or foregone discounts) for credit 
sales would have to be higher for fertilizer credit to compensate for the larger interest 
expense. 
• It is more risky for wholesalers to make loans to retailers or retailers to make loans 
to their customers (farmers) for longer term fertilizer credit than for shorter term food 
commodity credit. They do not see their customers as frequently, cannot monitor their 
activities as well, and cannot as effectively use the threat of cutting off future loans (and 
therefore access to the commodities) if current loans are not repaid. This problem is 
somewhat less severe if the agent making the fertilizer loan also sells food commodities to 
the same customer. Then access to food loans can be made conditional on good repayment 
of fertilizer loans. 
• Fertilizer loans are made for an inherently risky farming activity which is several 
months in duration. The size of the typical fertilizer loans made by a retailer to a farmer 
is likely to be larger than a food loan. The capacity to repay the fertilizer loan may be 
dependent on agricultural production, while the food consumption loan may be paid from 
any source of household income. H the retailer must cut off future credit because of 
nonrepayment of past credit, his total loss will likely be higher on a fertilizer than a food 
loan. This higher probability of a large loss makes credit sales of fertilizer riskier for the 
retailer than food credit sales. This is similarly true for suppliers credit at all levels in the 
fertilizer trade channel. 
• The repayment of fertilizer loans made to farmers in some countries is facilitated 
through input-output linkages. For example, food processors, traders, cooperatives, etc. 
purchase farm commodities so they deduct the cost of fertilizer advanced from the purchase 
price of the commodities acquired. Unless the food commodity traders in The Gambia 
begin to acquire farm products, they will not be able to develop these linkages. 
This analysis suggests that agents at all levels in the food commodity trade channels 
may enjoy some economies of scope if they expand into the fertilizer sector. But problems 
of smaller scale and more complicated financial arrangements may discourage them from 
:xxv 
doing so. New specialized fertilizer traders would experience problems in all three areas, 
and it is unclear if they would enjoy any major offsetting advantages. 
There is little that policymakers can do outside of direct subsidies or granting a ferti-
lizer monopoly to some dealer that will improve the prospects for privatizing the fertilizer 
trade under the particular circumstances faced by The Gambia. The best recommendation 
is to create a private bank guarantee fund, as described in Chapter IV, that will increase the 
probability that private traders who decide to enter this risky business will have reasonable 
access to working capital. This analysis also suggests that the outcome of the current efforts 
to restructure the GCU and the groundnut processing industry will have a crucial bearing 
on the future of the fertilizer sector. The agents, private or cooperative, that procure and 
process farm commodities will have the best chance of successfully developing the fertilizer 
trade. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A REVIEW OF GAMBIAN FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
1981- 1991 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Gambia presents a revealing case study of financial excess and financial reform 
in the past decade.1 The first half of the decade witnessed an expansion of credit accom-
panied by all the signs of distorted financial markets, i.e. growing negative real rates of 
interest, interest rate ceilings, credit ceilings, targeted and subsidized credit, dependence on 
outside funding sources, rising deficits in parastatal institutions and rising arrears in the 
Gambian Commercial and Development Bank and the termination of the Agric;ultural 
Development Bank. The second half of the decade through 1991 saw a disciplined 
economic stabilization program first initiated by Gambian authorities with the Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP), followed up with international donor structural adjustment 
programs. In this period, the expansion of credit was curtailed substantially, macroeconomic 
stabilization instituted, and the fiscal deficit reduced The growth of GDP averaged roughly 
3.3 percent for the period 1986-91. The hberalization of financial markets was an integral 
part of the reform period from 1986 to the present 
This first chapter reviews important dimensions of this financial history. First, the 
changing structure of the banking industry is laid out This is followed by a brief review of 
the principal reform measures undertaken in financial markets. With the structure of 
banking and the degree of financial hberalization clarified, the following sections of Chapter 
one document the trends in real credit balances over time and their sectoral allocation. 
Financial deepening is explored along with the issue of crowding out The structure of 
interest rates and interest rate margins are documented and the controversy surrounding the 
allegedly high interest rates are explored through a model testing the determination of 
interest rates in The Gambia. The financial performance of the banks is established for 
recent years and the issue of development banking discussed in a review of the recent 
demise of the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB). Finally, one appendix 
presents a formal model of the demand for money in Gambian financial markets while the 
second appendix explores possible alternative forms of term finance in The Gambia. 
This analysis of formal finance is undertaken for three reasons. First, it is important 
to understand the impact of key policies on the financial sector. Second, it is equally 
1 The authors would like to thank the staff of the Central Bank and members &om the banking community 
for their cooperation in sharing information and discussing the many issues treated here. Also, Charles Mann 
and the lDID staff has interacted fruitfully with the OSU Research Team. They of course should not be held 
respoDSt'ble for any opinions expressed or errors remaining in the work. 
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important to determine the availability of financial services for private businesses and 
households. Third, it is necessary to understand why so many non-bank intermediaries and 
programs have been undertaken in recent years .. This latter issue will be explored further 
in later chapters. 
II. THE CHANGING MARKET STRUCTURE FOR BANKING IN THE GAMBIA IN 
THE 1980S. 
Table 1-1 presents the market structure of the banking industry over the past decade. 
For most of this period The Gambia was served by only three to four banks. The number 
of bank branches ranged from 12 to 14 in number but most of these were located in Greater 
Banjul. Only three branches were consistently functioning outside Greater Banjul; one in 
Farafeni, and two in Basse. The most relevant finding for this period, however, is visible 
in Table 1-2. There has been a significant turnover of banks in a relatively short period of 
time (10 years). Five banks have been opened during this period and four have been closed 
with one undergoing litigation. 
The most significant bank closing occurred in June 1992 with the termination of the 
20 year history of the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB). At the end 
of June a part of the bank's assets were turned over to the Meridien Bank, an international 
commercial bank with a growing network in Africa. This action effectively closed the 
chapter on development banking in The Gambia, a capstone of the h"beralization and 
privatization movement launched by the Economic Recovery Program in 1985. By late 1992, 
all banking was being conducted in private commercial banks with a short term loan 
portfolio largely restricted to trading activities. As will be seen later, this lending activity 
comprised only a minority of their assets as the T-bill market and foreign exchange 
operations began to predominate in their banking operations. 
The most disturbing feature of this profile is the relatively high turnover of banks for 
such a small market in such a short period of time. Beginning in 1981/82, the General 
Merchants Finance Institution (GMFI) was closed after one year of operation. In 1985/86, 
the International Bank of West Africa (a branch of the BIAO) closed after three years of 
operation. In 1988/89, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) terminated operations 
after seven years. Finally, in 1991/92 the GCDB terminated operations while the 
Continental Bank, within months after its license to operate was approved in 1991, was 
fighting Central Bank action in court to prevent its closure. Only two banks, the Standard 
Chartered Bank of Gambia (SCB) and the International Bank of Commerce and Industry-
BICI (a branch of a Senegalese Bank) have maintained uninterrupted service throughout 
this entire period. It is of interest to note that one of these banks originated in the Colonial 
period (SCB) and the other in the early independence period (BICI). 
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In light of these developments, it would appear that Central Bank authorities were 
inexperienced in reviewing applications for bank charters. To have two banks fail after one 
to three years, reflects a limited and unstable market for banking in The Gambia during the 
early to mid-1980s. Furthermore, taking action to revoke a bank charter that had only been 
approved months earlier suggests the Central Bank could improve its processing of 
information needed to evaluate private bank charter applications. 
These limitations have manifested themselves in two areas. First, it is clear that 
Gambian authorities and donors misjudged the high social costs and minimal social benefits 
of establishing and promoting development banking institutions in the country. The failed 
experiments in development banking through the Agricultural Development Bank and the 
Gambia Commercial and Development Bank have created a costly legacy for the country 
to absorb. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is difficult not to conclude that these 
experiments in development banking contributed to a regressive distribution of income in 
the country. 
While the Central Bank is ostensibly responsible for the regulation and supervision 
of the banking industry, it would not be fair to hold Central Bank authorities responsible 
for the failure of the ADB or the GCDB. As is characteristic of most developing countries, 
central banks do not enjoy strong autonomy from the executive branch of the government. 
The deficiencies of development banking in The Gambia, a topic that will be explored in 
detail at the end of this chapter, were primarily derived from executive branch intervention 
to promote a cumulative supply of credit to a high risk, targeted clientele that eventually 
defaulted on their loans causing these banks to fail. Central Bank authorities along with the 
management of the development banks, for the most part, did not enjoy sufficient autonomy 
to challenge these directives. Until the Central Bank secures institutional independence 
from the executive branch, the loan portfolios of development banks will be largely shaped 
by government priorities and influence frequently at the expense of sound banking practices. 
Finally, it is apparent that it has been difficult to select winners from among the 
private commercial bank charters approved in the past ten years. One private bank failed, 
a second closed its operations, and a third is under litigation. To secure a stable and secure 
growth of formal financial markets in The Gambia, it is important that donors and 
government authorities strengthen and up-grade the supervisory and bank charter review 
functions of the Central Bank to better carry out these roles in the future. The recent 
revision of the Financial Institutions Act is a step in the right direction. It is encouraging 
to see Central Bank authorities undertaking the initiative to improve the supervisory and 
regulatory roles implicit in the revised Act. 
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III. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND MONETARY POLICY 
Prior to the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985, monetary control of the 
financial system was exercised largely by global credit ceilings and, to a lesser extent, by 
modest reserve requirements. Interest rate controls were also common along with many 
government and donor driven subsidized, targeted lines of credit provided through the 
GCDB. These lines were almost exclusively for agricultural lending and channeled through 
the GCDB to its downstream parastatal network. These classic forms of intervention in 
financial markets were the manifestations of the supply leading strategy of financial 
development In time, arrears grew to alarming proportions in the GCDB and the negative 
real rate of interest environment generated by interest rate ceilings and subsidized credit 
came under attack. However, it was not easy to remove these distortions in financial 
markets until macroeconomic balance was introduced into the economy. Several haltbearted 
attempts at economic stabilization were attempted in the early 1980s with IMF assistance. 
But it was not until 1985 that a credible consistent stabilization program was carried out by 
Gambian authorities. 
The crux of the ERP and the ensuing structural adjustment measures was the 
introduction of a flexible exchange rate regime and a partially liberalized interest rate policy 
(McPherson and Radelet, 1991). In September 1985, the Central Bank of The Gambia 
(CBG) doubled lending rates and rediscount rates from around 8 to 15 percent. Reserve 
requirements were raised from 8 to 15 percent on demand deposits and from 4 to 6 percent 
on time deposits. Global credit limits, however, remained in force as a monetary tool 
controlling liquidity. It was still not possible to free up interest rates and remove credit 
limits until a substitute monetary tool was in place to carry out these functions satisfactorily. 
That monetary tool turned out to be treasury bills. The T-bill market has been 
functioning since the early 1980s, however, it was a generally moribund market and an 
unimportant monetary instrument until the bi-weekly tender-auction bid system was set up 
in July 1986 (prior to this date, the Central Bank fixed interest rates on T-bills). From late 
1986 onwards, the T-bill market grew substantially, largely through sales to private banks. 
This market has grown from a meager 24.4 million dalasis in 1986 to 264 million dalasis in 
1991. Inflation was reduced from high rates of 43 and 30 percent in 1986 and 1987 to much 
lower rates between 9 to 12 percent in the early 1990s. Moreover, these auctions were 
reflecting a real demand for T-bills and, as a result, establishing a gradually rising floor on 
the structure of interest rates in loan markets. Thus, by 1990-91 credit limits could be 
removed, and the partially liberalized interest rate policy became fully liberalized by the 
early 1990s. Now monetary policy relied on the sale of T-bills and rising reserve 
requirements to control the money supply and inflation. Interest rates were free to find 
their own equilibrium subject to the interest rate floor established by the T-bill market. 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, this T-bill floor grew from 15 to 19 percent with loan 
rates ranging from five to ten points higher. In sum, by 1992 financial liberalization was 
complete, interest rates were flexible around a T-bill floor for loans and all vestiges of 
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targeting and subsidized credit and credit controls removed from Gambian formal financial 
markets. 
IV. TRENDS IN TOTAL CREDIT BALANCES 
The previous two sections of this chapter have underscored first that the Gambian 
banking industry in the past decade has operated in a small unstable oligopolistic market 
generating a fairly high turnover of institutions, given the small number of institutions (3 to 
5 banks) characterizing the market. Second, the growing financial liberalization from the 
mid-1980s onwards was bound to shake up financial markets as subsidies and distortionary 
controls were removed and market forces allowed to rationalize and restructure the banking 
industry in The Gambia. In this section, we document a number of the more important 
shifts produced by these structural and policy induced changes in Gambian financial 
markets. 
Measures of total outstanding credit balances are presented in Tables 1-3 and 1-4. 
This total is further disaggregated into total private and total public sector credit balances. 
Total public sector credit consists of net claims on the government along with credit to 
public sector entities. Table 1-3 presents the basic time series (drawn from Table 7 of the 
Central Bank bulletins) in current dalasis from 1981through1991 while Table 1-4 converts 
this time series into constant dalasis using the implicit GDP deflator. Table 1-5 sets forth 
real indices of growth or decline over this period derived from the data in Table 1-4. For 
the purposes of this trend analysis, we focus primarily on the real credit balances 
documented in Tables 1-4 and 1-5. 
Total domestic credit balances in real terms increased substantially over the period 
1981-83 (column 3, Table 1-5). Then from 1983 to 1985 the outstanding credit balances 
declined slightly in real terms. From 1985 to 1991, however, there was a precipitous fall in 
the real value of outstanding credit in Gambian financial markets. This fall coincides with 
the period subject to the discipline of the Economic Recovery Program and later structural 
adjustment program for the country (McPherson and Radelet, 1991). 
The subcomponents of total domestic credit balances, however, trace out different 
paths in the official statistics. Private sector real credit (channeled through the commercial 
banking system) increased sharply from 1982 to 1983, then declined even more dramatically 
from 1983 to 1987 when it stabilized up to the present at about 60 percent of its original 
real 1981 level (column 1, Table 1-5). Conversely, public sector credit balances, which 
generally accounted for about 60 percent of total domestic credit up to the mid-1980s, 
declined from 1985 at an increasing rate, actually registering negative values in 1990 and 
1991. The decade long decline in public sector credit and the recent appearance of negative 
balances is due to two factors: the decline in credit to public parastatal entities (which 
generates positive entries to public sector credit in the monetary survey data reported in the 
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Central Bank bulletins) and the confusing way in which the rise in the proceeds of the sales 
of government bonds and T-bills are documented in the monetary statistics. These sales 
proceeds are held on behalf of the government as deposits in the Central Bank (which 
generates a negative entry in the claims on government). 
The ERP and structural adjustment programs from 1986 to the present introduced 
a strong mandate to reduce credit to public parastatal entities. This led to the sharp 
contraction visible in the public sector credit series in Tables 1-4 and 1-5 from 1986 onwards. 
From 1987 to 1989, net claims on the government recorded in the Central Bank bulletins 
had already turned negative, however, credit to public sector entities was still sufficiently 
high (though declining) to create a net positive balance when one combines the two 
elements making up total public sector balances (i.e. government credit). That is why our 
series reported in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 for the public sector remain positive through 1989. In 
1990 and 1991, however, not only are the net claims on the government becoming even 
more negative, but the reduction of credit to parastatal entities become so severe that it did 
not compensate for the rising negative values of net claims on the government, thus negative 
values appear in our series for total public sector credit in 1990 and 1991. 
In summary, the data on trends in total credit and public sector credit indicate, at 
first glance, that credit extended to the public has contracted in real terms over this period. 
However, these data do not give a complete picture with respect to credit. This is because 
the government is actually borrowing (receiving credit) over this period through the 
increasing sales of its T-bills (as shown later in Table 1-14). 
What masks this fact is that proceeds from the sales of T-bills are held by the govern-
ment on deposit at the Central Bank. Hence, in examining government assets (i.e., deposits 
held at the Central Bank) and government liabilities (i.e., T-bills sold to banks and the pub-
lic), the picture created is one in which net claims on government (liabilities minus assets) 
is negative and suggests that government borrowing has declined when this is not the case. 
It should be noted that this policy (of depositing the proceeds of T-bill sales at the 
Central Bank) has beneficial effects for the economy. First, the policy has aided the 
government's efforts to sterilize foreign exchange inflows. Second, it has aided the 
government's efforts to control inflation. This has been accomplished by not allowing the 
funds to be disbursed into the economy, thereby leading to increases in the money supply 
and inflation. Oearly the rapid growth of the T-bill market after 1986 eventually created 
the declines in public sector or government credit as defined by official statistics. The 
government appears to have shifted from being a net debtor (ie. issuing credit to state 
parastatal entities) in the early to mid 1980's to eventually becoming a net creditor by the 
early 1990s (through the growth of sales in T-bill and bond markets held in the government's 
deposit account in the Central Bank), but as explained above, the government is still 
borrowing substantially through T-bill sales. 
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The issue of government participation in credit markets is of concern since conven-
tional wisdom suggests that private firms and individuals would be "crowded out" of the 
credit market with the expansion of government expenditures and debt. Public sector credit, 
until 1987, accounted for approximately 60 percent of total domestic credit. However, after 
1987 there is a substantial shift of credit towards the private sector. This is consistent with 
the structural adjustment program emphasizing less credit to government and more for the 
private sector. The share of private domestic credit in total GDP reaches a high of 31 
percent in 1983, but declines to 11 percent in 1987 (Table 1-6). Total credit as a percentage 
of GDP has declined markedly indicating that the budget deficit as a percent of GDP has 
declined as well. Again, one might expect that this would put less pressure on the domestic 
credit market. However, one must recall that real ·private sector credit has also declined 
during this period (Table 1-4) while its relative share has been increasing. 
Do these trends indicate that the contraction of real credit has harmed growth and 
efficiency in The Gambia? An initial answer is, no, since the index of real GDP growth has 
been increasing since 1984 (Table 1-7) despite the decline and then stabiHzing trends in real 
credit outstanding since this date. This suggests that "too much" credit was very likely 
extended in the early 1980's (with low marginal impact on growth) and that dec1ining credit 
is not a binding constraint to economic growth in the more recent period. 
Furthermore, these trends suggest that from the mid-1980s onward either the demand 
for or the supply of credit to the private sector has declined, or both. The demand for 
credit would be dampened by such factors as adverse changes in rates of return for 
economic activities and changes in expectations of inflation (i.e. a decreasing rate of 
inflation raises the real cost of borrowing). Moreover, lenders may have reduced (i.e. 
rationed), the supply of credit to the private sector because of the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems (ie. rising loan arrears) that led to the poor financial performance 
of the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) during the 1980's. It is clear 
that a substantial part of the decline in the supply of credit from mid-decade onwards 
reflects the decline in new loans issued through the GCDB for private sector activity as well 
as for the loan activity of The Gambia Cooperative Union. The Central Bank reduced its 
support for the GCDB and the bank's management was constrained to reduce the flow of 
new loans (compared to previous levels), especially loans to public sector entities. 
The contraction of credit documented in 1987, is also due to the transfer of "non-
performing" government guaranteed loans from the GCDB to the Managed Fund Account 
of the government placed in the Central Bank. These transfers are detailed in Table 1-8 and 
are quite substantial. They accounted for 18.9 percent of private sector credit and 26 
percent of public sector credit in 1987. In short, the credit balances reported in Table 1-3 
understate the outstanding credit balances in The Gambia in 1987 in that some of these 
balances were shifted into other accounts (or, put differently, non-performing balances 
inflated the credit balance data prior to 1987). These findings point to two features to keep 
in mind when using data on Gambian credit. First, the official statistics can inadvertently 
give a misleading picture when some portion of past credit balances are no longer reported 
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in standard Central Bank reports or bulletins after they are removed or transferred to other 
accounts. Second, the use of a "stock" measure, i.e. loans outstanding, hides current credit 
activity (a flow measure). This makes it difficult to document the correlation of current 
credit (new loans issued) with current economic activity. 
In conclusion, if we assume that an important part of the outstanding balances of the 
GCDB turned out to be implicit grants (i.e. loans that were not effectively recovered) and 
if, in turn, we keep in mind that the GCDB accounted for a substantial majority of the total 
credit balances in the financial system over this period, then the abrupt decline in 
outstanding real balances from 1985-6 onwards is an exaggeration of the true decline of 
"credit" activity over the past decade (i.e. loans issued and repaid). If one were to construct 
a time series of credit balances based only on loans issued and effectively repaid through 
time, the trend of this smaller credit balance series would likely be much more smooth and 
less abrupt than that associated with the current data series in Table 1-3. In any event, a 
time series based on a "flow" measure of new loans issued each year would offer a far more 
revealing insight into the evolving state of credit markets than the current reporting 
practices in the Central Bank Bulletin which report a "stock" measure of accumulated 
outstanding balances containing an important element of non-performing loans from the 
past. It would be helpful if the Central Bank Bulletin report both series. 
V. INVESTMENT, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND CROWDING OUT 
1. Goyernment Expenditure 
We explore the issue of credit and economic activity further, by examining the 
crowding out hypothesis through trends in investment and government expenditure. In parti-
cular, we set out to examine whether credit market conditions, on the one hand, and govern-
ment fiscal policy, on the other hand, have adversely impacted private investment within the 
Gambian economy (i.e. whether a crowding out effect has occurred for the private sector). 
We start by examining the data on government revenue and expenditures which is 
presented in Table 1-9 for the period June 1986 to June 1992. Revenue is decomposed into 
domestic tax sources and foreign grants. The data indicate that the central government has 
realized a budget deficit based solely on domestic sources of revenue in every year (Table 
1-9, line 4a). Hence, the government has not been able to finance its expenditures solely 
from domestic taxes. Foreign grants received by the government are used to finance govern-
ment expenditure, thereby reducing the burden of the fiscal deficit to such an extent to pro-
duce a surplus in 3 out of the past 4 years (Table 1-9, row 4b ). This has resulted in a budget 
surplus since 1990 of approximately 1.0 to 25 percent of GDP (Table 1-9, line 7b ). The 
government in effect has received foreign assistance beyond the levels needed to balance 
its budget. 
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Further, and more importantly, these inflows of grants must be sterilized or they will 
lead to increases in the money supply and eventually inflation. Given the absence of strong 
domestic taxes, sterilization occurs via the sale of T-Bills which draws purchasing power out 
of the economy. These T-bill sales add to future debt servicing charges and draws away 
deposit resources from the banking sector that could otherwise be used for loans. There-
fore, any reduction in foreign grants would lead presumably to more deposit funds being 
available for loans since the sterilization role of T-bills sales would presumably slacken off. 
2. Investment 
Tables 1-10, 1-11 and 1-12 contain data on the trends in private investment and 
government expenditure over the period 1987-1991. These data give some insight as to 
whether private investment has·been crowded out in the Gambia. Over the period 1987-
1991, the answer again appears to be, no, since real private investment has been increasing 
in Table 1-10, column 1, (though still remaining at a relatively low level), while government 
investment and government expenditures in real terms have been declining since 1988 
(Table 1-10, columns 2 and 3). Private investment has increased over 300 percent during 
this period (Table 1-11). However, this is still only approximately 7-8 percent of GDP 
(Table 1-12). This is in marked contrast to most developed and developing countries where 
investment is approximately 15-20 percent of GDP. There has also been a sharp decline in 
real government expenditure (Table 1-11, column 3). Further, since real GDP has been 
increasing over this period, it appears that much government expenditure in the early 1980's 
was used inefficiently. This is because real GDP has not been adversely effected by declines 
in real government expenditures. In contrast, it would appear that the more than three fold 
increase in private sector investment has been positively associated with the recent growth 
of real GDP. 
3. Crowdin& Out and Ti~t Credit 
These results do not, however, lead to the conclusion that no crowding out has 
occurred. Some financing of investment activity may not have occurred, as pointed out 
above, due to the presence of the T-Bill market. As we shall see later in the balance sheets 
of the commercial banks, there has been a substitution among assets from loans to T-Bills 
(i.e., from loans to the private sector to loans for the public sector). While the extent of 
unsatisfied investment demand cannot be calculated, insights into prevailing credit market 
conditions can be surmised. 
First, we explore the degree to which tight credit conditions prevailed for private 
investment. In a situation where credit is tight, one would expect that the excess reserves 
of banks (i.e. reserves above the legally required minimum) would be high. This may not 
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be true for all banks since banks can buy T-Bills or lend money to each other. However, 
such interbank movement in reserves must eventually show up as reserves elsewhere in the 
banking system. Insights into this for The Gambia are set forth in Table 1-13 highlighting 
the reserve and liquidity positions for the Gambian commercial banking system as a whole. 
These data reveal that cash reserves have declined from 53 percent of liquid assets 
in 1987 to 28 percent in 1990 (row 2/row 1 in Table 1-13). Excess cash reserves were 73 
percent of excess liquidity in 1987, but only 2.6 percent in 1990 (row 8/row 9). Banks held 
practically no excess cash reserves in 1989 and 1990. All excess liquidity was held in the 
form of T-Bills in these years. Hence, excess cash reserves have been used to buy T-Bills 
and not used for the purpose of making loans. 
This rapid decline in excess cash reserves is a direct result of the monetary policy of 
the Central Bank. The Central Bank (CBG) in attempting to sterilize foreign exchange 
inflows (i.e. such as foreign grants and aid loans) has offered T-bills at biweekly auctions. 
Commercial banks have responded and have purchased these instruments and, in so doing, 
drew down their excess reserves. Given the minimum denomination of 5,000 dalasis for T-
bills, banks are the principal participants and purchasers in these auctions. This has led to 
reduced loan demand (due to rising interest rates) and a reduced supply of loanable funds 
(through the reduction of excess reserves that could otherwise have been used for lending). 
In short, some potential borrowers vecy likely have been crowded out of the market for 
loanable funds. 
Further, these T-bill sales could have been reduced in volume in so far as the volume 
of donor aid used to support government expenditures has been greater than that necessacy 
to balance the budget (see Table 1-9). Bankers, on the other hand, are rational profit 
maximizers. They logically respond to incentives. Investing in high rate of return, risk free 
assets like T-Bills makes sense given the risks and costs related to loan evaluation and loan 
recovecy. It is also of interest to note that in the United States and most countries with 
developed financial markets, the interest rate differential between 3 month deposit rates and 
3 month T-bills is negligible, whereas in The Gambia there is a six point spread (6 percent) 
in favor of T-bills. This large spread in favor of T-bills could eventually induce some 
depositors to withdraw their deposits from the banking system to purchase these securities 
directly thereby earning more return than that associated with holding deposits. To date this 
bas not happened on a significant scale (in 1990 only 3 percent of T-bill sales were 
accounted for by the non-bank public at large, in Table 1-14), but in time this could grow 
if this spread remains or if the minimum T-bill denomination is reduced. 
An interesting counterfactual question is to estimate the volume of additional funds 
that could have been lent out to private borrowers in the absence of such a monetacy policy. 
First, we could look at this in an ex-post sense by asking what could be lent out from the 
existing excess cash reserves in the banking system. The value of the M2 money multiplier 
11 
in 1991was2.46.2 Data from Table 1-13 indicates that excess cash reserves (line 8) in 1991 
was 13.18 million dalasis. H we assume that all of this could have been lent out, an 
additional 33.74 million dalasis in loans would have been issued in 1991. This would have 
amounted to 12 percent of the outstanding loan balances in the banking system in 1991, a 
not inconsiderable amount Undertaking the same exercise for an earlier year like 1988 
when the excess cash reserves in Table 1-13 was 19.74 million dalasis and the money 
multiplier was 264, an additional 52.11 million dalasis could have been lent out representing 
20 percent of the loan balances of the banking system in that year. 
Next, if we were to look at the ex-ante rather than the ex-post excess liquidity, banks 
would have the additional option of not buying T-bills and instead issuing loans. This, of 
course, would generate a substantially larger amount that could have been lent out, 
especially from 1988 onwards, given the rapid growth of T-bill purchases by the banking 
system (line 5 of Table 1-13). However, given the attractiveness of the risk return option 
associated with T-bills compared to loans, banks opted for the former rather than the latter. 
However, the findings above also reveal that it is difficult to judge what would 
happen to the loan portfolio if T-Bills were to lose their attractiveness or their availability 
reduced. For example, in 1987 and 1988 banks were willing to hold excess cash reserves 
(Table 1-13). Even in the absence of attractive relative returns on T-Bills during this period, 
banks appeared unwilling to expand lending in the loan market After 1988, banks shifted 
almost all excess reserves into the T-Bill market and appear to have substituted T-Bills for 
potential new loans from this time onwards (Table 1-14). This strongly suggests that the rate 
of return to loan assets must have been low relative to T-bills. (This will be corroborated 
later in section X-3). Furthermore, interviews in the merchant community by the OSU team 
indicate that in 1990 and 1991 with the widening divergence between Gambian and foreign 
interest rate levels generated in large part by the substantial sale of T-bills, prime borrowers 
have chosen to borrow from a cheaper foreign market, rather than use the more expensive 
local market. This clearly reduced the local demand for loans. 
The policy implications of such findings are not entirely straight forward. On the one 
hand monetary policy has led to a reduction of excess reserves that could have been used 
for lending. However, a reversal of this policy (i.e. one of increasing excess reserves) may 
not lead to new loan activity since banks may be unwilling to lend in a loan market 
2 The formula for the money multiplier is as follows (see Mishkin, 2nd edition, p. 283). 
in which: C 
D 
Rd 
Rt 
T 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
currency held by the public (168.9 million D); 
demand deposits (165.4 million D); 
reserve requirement on demand deposits (.24); 
reserve requirement on time deposits (.08); 
time deposits (249.8 million D). 
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perceived to contain high risks and low returns. It is clear that banks are engaging in severe 
loan rationing practices in this high interest rate milieu. Further, given the high level of 
currency held in the hands of the public, as we will note later in this analysis, an increase 
in reserves will not necessarily lead to a large increase in the supply of loans. These 
implications indicate that there are other features of both the Gambian economy and the 
financial system that need to be improved to expand financial deepening and financial 
intermediation. These other features include expanding the scope and range of financial 
services through increased competition in the supply of financial services and financial 
intermediaries (more banks and more branches); increasing the use of demand deposit 
facilities, especially in rural areas; increasing the number of participants bidding in the T-bill 
auctions to lower T-bill rates, and overall interest rates; and improving the rate of economic 
return and reducing the risks for productive enterprises to increase the demand for loans 
(and reduce loan rationing). 
4. Problematical Sterilization Efforts 
Another area of policy concern is the failure of the T-Bill market to effectively steri-
lize foreign exchange inflows. This is documented in Table 1-15. The data in this table indi-
cate that while domestic credit has declined substantially since 1986, net foreign assets (i.e. 
foreign exchange reserves generated by donor grants and other foreign exchange inflows) 
has been increasing. Moreover, the increase in net foreign assets has been larger than the 
corresponding decrease in domestic credit since 1987. This has lead to increases in the 
money supply represented by M2 in Table 1-15. Complete sterilization would lead to a 
situation whereby a 1 percent increase in net foreign assets is matched by a 1 percent de-
crease in domestic credit. Furthermore, increases in the variable "other items" (column 3) 
has also led to increases in M2. The variable "other items" documents bow the CBG ba-
lances its monetary accounts. This reflects the revaluation of foreign assets and liabilities 
in dalasis derived from exchange rate movements during the year in question. Among other 
things, the growth of this domestic currency component of the money supply highlights the 
growth and revaluation of foreign donor inflows over this period. Column 5 indicates that 
the government has undertaken stabilization measures through the rapid increase in the vol-
ume of T-bills sold. However, this has not been sufficient to offset the rapid growth in the 
money supply. To contain this growth in the money supply, an effort should be made to 
reduce the need to build up foreign exchange reserves beyond the levels currently in force. 
5. Econometric Analysis of Monetai:y Policy Issues 
In this section we report the results of some simple econometric models that were 
estimated to examine the relationship between the components of M2 (private domestic 
credit, net credit to government, net foreign assets, and net other items) and other 
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macroeconomic variables. The purpose of these exercises is to explore the behavior of the 
monetary authorities (i.e. the Central Bank). We estimate models that are similar to those 
used by Maxwell Fry in his analysis of Turkish monetary policy (Fry 1988, Chapter 9). The 
first model estimated is private domestic credit. The equation estimated is: 
DDPC = a + b•DNY + c•DRES + d•DGC + UB + UBY + UBR + UBG (1) 
where DDPC is the first difference of domestic private credit; DNY is the first difference 
of nominal GDP; DRES is the first difference of official gross foreign exchange reserves; 
DOC is the first difference of net credit to government; LIB is a dummy variable which 
takes on the value of one over the liberalization period 1987-1991; LIBY, LIBR, LIBG are 
dummy variables that modify the slope coefficients b, c, and d respectively over the period 
1987-1991. We transform the variables into first differences, since many of the variables had 
negative signs. 
Equation 1 is estimated using ordinary least squares over the period 1967-1991. The 
results are presented below (with t-statistics in absolute value in parentheses): 
UB = 4.17 
(0.09) 
a = 14.75 
(2.lS) 
UBY = -0.006 
(2.S3) 
b = 0.002 
(2.47) 
c = -0.21 
(O.S8) 
d = -0.74 
(3.S9) 
UBR = 0.59 
(1.S2) 
UBG = -0.76 
(1.72) 
R2 = 0.76 
(2) 
DW = 1.12 
These findings indicate that increases in nominal GNP (coefficient b above) lead to 
expansion of private credit, while increases in net credit to the government (coefficient d) 
reduced private credit. This is seen in the strong statistical significance evident in the high 
t-statistics in the parentheses. Changes in foreign exchange reserves (coefficient c) had no 
significant impact on domestic private credit as seen in the low t-statistic. The dummy 
variables for the effects of nominal GDP and net credit to government during 1987-91 are 
also statistically significant. Hence, increases in nominal GDP dampened domestic credit 
over the period 1987-1991. This suggests that domestic private credit has not kept pace with 
the growth of GDP during this recent period. This was brought out in our earlier 
descriptive analysis and is confirmed here. The substitution between private and 
government credit is even stronger over the period 1987-1991. Increases in foreign exchange 
reserves have had a positive, but a statistically weak impact on domestic credit expansion 
in the hberalization period. 
The second model examines the sensitivity of the monetary authorities to inflation. 
One would expect that increases in the inflation rate would lead to reductions in net credit 
to government thereby dampening money supply increases which in tum would lead to lower 
inflation rates. The model is as follows: 
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DGC = a + b•DP + UB + UBP (3) 
Where DGC is the first difference of net credit to government and DP is the inflation rate 
measured by the change in the implicit GDP deflator and LIBP is a dummy variable that 
modifies the coefficient b and LIB modifies the constant a during the h"beralization period. 
The estimates are: 
a = 7.48 
(0.9S) 
b = -0.20 
(O.S3) 
UB = S9.62 UBP = -2.72 R2 = 0.73 
(1.Sl) (3.44) 
DW = 2.62 (4) 
The coefficient on DP (coefficient b) is negative, but not statistically significant. However, 
we do find such a relationship during the h"beralization period. Higher inflation rates lead 
to a reduction in government credit. In short, the monetary authorities have been sensitive 
to the danger of inflation and have reduced government credit in the face of higher inflation 
rates during this period. 
The next issue examined is sterilization and the relationship between net foreign 
assets and macroeconomic variables. The model estimated is: 
DNFA =a+b•DDC+c•DRES+d•DFNA(T-l)+e•DNY(T-l)+UB+UBD+UBR+UBY (5) 
where DNF A is the first difference of net foreign assets, DDC is the first difference of net 
domestic credit with the other variables as defined earlier. 
The estimates are: 
d = -0.20 e = -0.004 UB = -fJ0.67 UBD = 1.08 a=16.82 
(1.02) 
b= -1.57 
(3.0S) 
c=0.25 
(0.36) (1.26) (0.83) (O.Sl) (1.12) 
UBR = -0.04 UBY = 0.008 R2 = 0.85 
(0.0S) (1.62) 
QSTAT = 7.81 
(0.25) (6) 
Consistent with the monetary theory of the balance of payments, the estimates reveal that 
there exists an inverse relationship between domestic credit and net foreign assets 
(coefficient b) indicating that some sterilization has taken place. However, this sterilization 
has been dampened substantially in the liberalization period (i.e. the t-statistic is low and 
statistically insignificant under LIB). Moreover, increases in foreign exchange reserves have 
had no significant impact on net foreign assets. Further, there is a small positive impact on 
net foreign assets through changes in nominal income during the liberalization period as 
predicted by the monetary theory of the balance of payments. 
Our final model examines the determinants of the "other items" category. The model 
estimated is: 
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DNOI =a+ b•DNFA + c•DNOl(T-1) + UB + UBF (7) 
where DNOI is the first difference of net "other items," LIBF is a dummy variable that 
modifies the coefficient b with the other variables are as defined. 
The estimates are: 
a=-7.83 b=-0.19 c=0.003 UB=41.4S UBF=0.66 R2=0.83 QSTAT=3.S1 
(1.22) (8.73) (0.02) (1.79) (2.92) (0.73) 
(8) 
Decreases in net foreign assets contributed to increases in net "other items." However, this 
finding is lessened during the liberalization period The positive estimate of LIBF indicates 
that increasing net foreign assets leads to an increase in net "other items." This confirms 
the point made above that revaluation of the dalasi has lead to increases in net "other 
items." 
These simple econometric exercises lend support to the findings brought out in the 
descriptive analysis presented in the earlier tables above, namely: (1) credit has not kept 
pace with the increases in GDP; (2) the government has been responsive to the high rates 
of inflation from mid decade onwards; (3) the government has tried to sterilize the impact 
of foreign exchange inflows, but has not been completely successful in doing so during the 
period of hberalization; and, ( 4) the revaluation of foreign assets has led to increases in the 
money supply. 
The findings also imply that the monetary authorities have undertaken a more 
monetarist approach to macroeconomic policy since 1987. This is to be expected given the 
goals of the structural adjustment programs. However, the analysis also reveals that two 
major policy concerns remain. One is the failure to sterilize sufficiently foreign exchange 
inflows and, second, related to sterilization, is the impact of credit contraction on private 
investment. Both areas require attention by policy makers if The Gambia is to achieve long 
run economic growth. 
VI. TRENDS IN SECTORAL CREDIT 
Trends in real commercial bank credit extended to major economic sectors are set 
forth in Tables 1-16and1-17. Given the absence of data on new loans issued each year (a 
flow measure), we use loans outstanding (a stock measure) as of June of each year. All sec-
tors have experienced substantial contractions from the mid 1980s to the present. Real out-
standing loan balances have declined dramatically for agriculture and construction from the 
mid-1980s, while services have experienced the least decline. The transfer of loans to the 
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managed fund, as noted above, also contributed to this decline in 1987. The magnitude of 
such transfers were set out earlier in Table 1-8. In the case of agriculture, fishing, tourism, 
construction, and others in Table 1-8, these transfers are a substantial percentage of loans 
outstanding in 1987. However, it should be noted that many of these are nonperforming 
loans and hence, bias the credit balance data. Much of the credit given by the GCDB may 
not have been utilized in the stated projects or such projects themselves may have failed. 
The sectoral growth trends of GDP were presented earlier in Table 1-7. To review 
those findings, again the growth of industrial GDP, of which construction is a large part, had 
been low from 1981 to 1985 with a substantial recovery from 1985 to the present. The 
growth of services was modest from 1981to1985, but quite high from 1985 to the present. 
The growth of agricultural GDP was rapid from 1981 to 1983, then declined to 1986 after 
which time a new two year spurt of growth was recorded to 1988, followed by modest growth 
to 1990. However, in 1991 there was a sharp drop in agricultural output An interesting 
question is whether there is a correlation between the trends in sectoral credit and sectoral 
economic growth. 
A rough proxy answer to this question can be gained by examining the credit to GDP 
ratios in Table 1-18. Ideally, one would like to compare a flow measure of new loans issued 
each year (by sector) to the flow measure of value added (by sector) in the national 
accounts to gain some insights into the rough correlation between sectoral credit flows, on 
the one hand, and the generation of sectoral value added each year, on the other hand. 
Unfortunately, we are forced to use a less satisfactory stock measure (i.e. loans outstanding) 
by sector which includes previously accumulated past debt (including non-performing bad 
debt). With these limitations in mind, agriculture registered a credit to GDP ratio of 52 
percent in 1981, but only 8.6 percent in 1991. In contrast, the service sector recorded a ratio 
of 22 percent in 1981 and only 7 percent in 1991. Even in face of the measurement caveats 
mentioned above, credit clearly is not correlated with GDP growth. 
The extremely high credit to GDP ratio in the agricultural sector in the early 1980s 
must be reflecting an inefficient use of resources. It is difficult to imagine a relatively low 
productivity, undercapitalized agriculture (as in The Gambia) using credit equivalent to 50 
percent of its output during this period. Much of this credit was likely diverted to other uses 
and, of course, much was not repaid. No doubt much of this credit was issued to cover the 
operational costs and losses of The Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) rather than issued 
directly to farmers. Furthermore, the low ratios recorded in the mid to late 1980s for the 
agricultural sector occurred when high rates of agricultural growth were registered. This 
underscores the lack of any clear association between credit balances and growth in the 
agricultural sector. 
Having said that, however, one can still associate the trends in sectoral credit with 
important developments in the Gambian economy over this period. Additional insights can 
be derived from the subsectoral trends documented in Tables 1-21, 1-22, and 1-23. For 
purposes of our discussion, the indices of growth in real credit balances in Table I-22 will 
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be highlighted. Transport and tourism investment grew in the first half of the decade due 
to loans to the GPTC and GPA (in the transport sector) and the building of the Senegambia 
Hotel and other tourism facilities. At mid-decade, the GCDB loaned substantial amounts 
to major fishing enterprises and the GCDB also made substantial loans to contractors in 
1985 /86 to finance a two year spurt in public works. 
The post 1986 period reflects the period of growing hberalization of trade and a 
floating exchange rate regime. This brought on higher interest rates and dampened the 
demand for trade credit Agriculture, of course, experienced the largest decline in real 
credit as pointed out earlier. This reflected major declines in credit from the Central Bank 
to the GCDB and the successive write off of GCU and GPMB loans from the mid-1980s 
onwards. This finally reduced the agricultural share of outstanding credit balances from a 
preponderant 30 to 35 percent in the early 1980s to 8 percent in the early 1990s (Table 1-
23). Indeed, this sector's share shrank from the largest to one of the lowest sectoral shares 
over this ten year period. Yet, as mentioned above, this apparently had no visible impact 
on agricultural output (until 1991) due to the compensatory offset of favorable prices for 
groundnuts in the world market 
VII. SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF CREDIT BY BANK GROUP 
Information on bank loans to selected subsectors of the economy are set forth in 
Tables 1-24, 1-25, and 1-26. Table 1-24 documents bank loans in real terms (i.e. in constant 
1976/77 dalasis) from 1981to1991 for The Gambian Commercial and Development Bank 
(the GCDB), i.e. the public sector development bank, and the two private sector commercial 
banks taken as a group (i.e., the International Bank of Commerce and Industry (BICI) and 
the Standard Charter Bank of Gambia (SCBG)). Table 1-25 sets forth the indices of growth 
or decline of real credit by subsectors for these two groups of banks over the decade. 
Finally, Table 1-26 highlights the relative share of credit within each sector by each bank 
group over this period. Tables 1-25 and 1-26 will be principally drawn upon to underscore 
the key trends discussed below. 
First, Table 1-25 indicates the dramatic decline in real credit discussed earlier. 
Columns 17 and 18 of Table 1-25 show a two thirds decline in real credit for the GCDB and 
a one-third decline for the other commercial banks over this period. This growth profile 
indicates two distinct periods, for the two groups of banks. During the first half of the dec-
ade, (up to 1985), real credit balances in the GCDB generally fell much less than the 
declined recorded for the other banks in most subsectors. Overall (columns 17 vs. 18), the 
GCDB only registered a slight decline in its real credit balances up to 1985 while credit 
balances in the other banks declined to 60 percent of their 1981 levels. The GCDB actually 
registered increased credit balances in the relatively important subsectors of services, con-
struction, and trade activity, and maintained the real value of its credit balances in the trans-
port sector and for personal loans. Only in agriculture (the most important subsector in its 
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portfolio, accounting for 40 percent of its total portfolio in 1981 and 36 percent in 1985) did 
the GCDB register an important decline in its credit balances to 80 percent of its 1981 level, 
thereby generating the slight decline overall. The other commercial banks recorded signifi-
cant declines in their credit balances in the transport, trade and construction subsectors and 
increases in agriculture, tourism, and personal loans. The former outweighed the latter to 
register a substantial overall decline for these banks in the first half of the decade. 
The second half of the decade generated a sharp decline in the credit balances of the 
GCDB (1985-6 to 1991) for practically all subsectors in Table 1-25. Only the credit balances 
for tourism registered an increase during this period registering the outstanding credit bal-
ance for the GCDBs largest borrower, a hotel owner (who shortly became its largest default-
er). Dramatic declines were recorded for important subsectors such as agriculture, transport 
and construction. Less but still significant declines were recorded for trade, services and 
personal loans. In sharp contrast, the other private sector commercial banks recorded 
increased credit balances by the end of the decade in the three most important subsectors 
for their credit activity (services, trade and personal loans). At the same time, they 
increased credit twofold for agricultural activity, a sector that generally represented a minor 
share of their portfolios throughout the decade. Only tourist finance registered a decline 
in the second half of the decade. In the aggregate, the private banks generally maintained 
their overall real levels of credit balances throughout the second half of the decade while 
the GCDB was experiencing massive declines in the levels of its recorded balances. 
Table 1-26 highlights the changing relative shares of bank credit balances within each 
subsector for the two bank groups under analysis. It is to be expected that the relative 
shares would shift between these two bank groups in light of the differential growth profile 
outlined above. In 1981, the GCDB accounted for 80 percent of the outstanding credit 
balances in the Gambia (Table 1-26, column 17). However, during the course of the overall 
decade decline in real credit balances, the GCDB accounted for only 67 percent of the total 
in 1991. The relative share for the private commercial banks rose from 20 to 33 percent 
over this period. 
In 1981, the GCDB provided practically the entire credit balance for the agricultural 
and the transport sectors. In addition, it accounted for a substantial majority of the credit 
balances allocated to tourism and personal loan activity. The two bank groups held roughly 
equal shares of the credit balances for construction and service sector activities. Only in the 
trade sector did the private commercial banks account for a majority of the outstanding 
credit balance in 1981. 
By 1991 the overwhelmingly predominant position of the GCDB was reduced in the 
allocation of credit balances to the agricultural and transport subsectors as the private banks 
accounted for 20 and 44 percent of these credit balances respectively. At the same time, 
these banks increased their relative shares substantially in the credit balances allocated to 
construction activities and personal loans. Only in tourism did their share of credit balances 
decline relative to the GCDB. 
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In summary, the overall decline in outstanding real credit balances from 1981 to 1991 
saw the GCDB experience a sharp relative decline by 1991 to only one third of its level of 
outstanding balances recorded in 1981 while the private bank group declined to only two-
thirds of their 1981 levels. This differential decline in favor of the private bank group grew 
out of the structural adjustment mandate to reduce the excessive expansion of credit that 
has characterized the early 1980s, especially through the public sector (i.e. the GCDB). This 
decline in the institutional supply of credit through the GCDB to parastatal and private 
sector clients was reinforced by periodic write-offs of bad debt in the GCDB portfolio 
further reducing its share of outstanding balances. In the end, the private commercial banks 
increased their relative share of credit balances in all major subsectors except tourism before 
the GCDB terminated operations in 1992. 
VIII. FINANCIAL DEEPENING INDICATORS 
An important indicator of the growing complexity of an economy is the degree of 
financial sophistication and the spread of financial market instruments. This is commonly 
measured by examining the growth of money aggregates and the ratio of money to GDP, 
the velocity of money, and the relationship between currency and deposits. The relevant 
data are reported in Tables 1-27 to 1-30. 
The annual fluctuations of the conventional monetary aggregates, Ml (currency and 
demand deposits) and M2 (Ml + time deposits), in Table 1-28 reveal that these indicators 
experienced double digit growth for most years in the past decade. For example, the change 
for both measures has been in double digits for all but one year in the most recent seven 
years. As pointed out earlier in our discussions of Table 1-15, the continuing double digit 
growth in 1990 and 1991 suggests that the sterilization efforts of Central Bank authorities 
have had limited effectiveness in containing the level of Ml or M2 since 1989. In general, 
it may take a year or so before changes in the money supply finally generate comparable 
changes in the price level. Four years of high rates of growth of these money supply indica-
tors from 1985 to 1988 clearly led to the high rates of inflation recorded in 1986 and 1987. 
By the same token, the decline in their growth from 1987 to 1989 eventually led to a com-
parable decline in inflation from 1987 to the present. However, the resurgence of growth 
of these aggregates in 1990 and 1991, reversing the trend from 1987 to 1989, create the 
likelihood that the currently low rate of inflation recorded for 1991 may rise in 1992 and 
1993. Moreover, growing rates of growth of the money supply not only generate inflationary 
expectations, but also put pressure on authorities to depreciate the exchange rate and keep 
nominal deposit rates high to forestall capital flight. Gambian authorities have been parti-
cularly sensitive to maintain domestic interest rates sufficiently high to prevent capital flight. 
As we have seen from our documentation of the decline in credit balances, the 
nominal growth of these money aggregates (in Table 1-28) has not led to a comparable 
nominal increase in loans (see Table 1-3). Deposits have been growing, but not loans. This 
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suggests that increases in the excess reserves of banks is used to purchase other assets (as 
has been noted) and not expand loans. Nominal deposit growth has not led to increased 
financial intermediation. The classic measure of financial deepening, i.e. the ratio of M2 
to GDP has been fairly constant averaging 20 percent to 24 percent over the period 1981 -
1991, while (as we shall see shortly) loan deposit ratios have been decJining. This implies 
that velocity has also been constant over time. Hence, the relationship between money and 
nominal income is valid (i.e. changes in money influence changes in nominal income) as are 
other monetarist propositions. Another important ratio is that of currency to demand 
deposits. This ratio indicates the wimngness of individuals to hold money versus a near 
substitute for money (checking account deposits). This ratio is influenced by wealth, the 
degree of business development, and the relative cost of holding money. In The Gambia 
this ratio is close to or has exceeded 1.00 over the past 11 years. In contrast, this ratio has 
fluctuated between 0.40 and 0.45 for the United States and is well below one for most 
developing countries. The importance of this ratio is that increases in this ratio (i.e. 
increases in currency drawn from deposits) reduce the money supply since it reduces the 
value of the money multiplier and leads to a smaller expansion of deposits. This in turn can 
lead to contractions in nominal income. 
This finding also implies that many transactions are undertaken using cash rather 
than checks in The Gambia. There appear to be several reasons for this. First, and fore-
most, almost all of the groundnut buying activity is undertaken with cash. Second, demand 
deposits are not well developed throughout The Gambia due to the concentration of 
commercial banks in the Banjul area (i.e., a marked urban bias). Third, informal or parallel 
trading activities in The Gambia are largely carried out in cash so that their activities are 
not officially recorded. In sharp contrast, the ratio of currency to quasi-money (in column 
2 of Table 1-30) is less than 1.00 (0.66 in 1991). This ratio is sensitive to the interest rate 
on savings and time deposits and would decrease as interest rates on deposits rise. 
IX. INTEREST RATES IN THE GAMBIA 
Interest rates are one of the most important prices in the economy. Interest rates 
on deposits and savings instruments influence and shape the mobilization of savings in a 
society leading either to financial deepening or shallowing. Interest rates on loans influence 
the allocation of resources to different investment alternatives affecting the rate of growth 
of an economy. Also, interest rate margins between average deposit and loan rates reflect 
the degree of competitiveness in the financial sector and the profitability of banking. 
Finally, the differential between the level of domestic interest rates and international 
interest rates can influence capital inflows and outflows for an economy, thereby affecting 
the capital account in the balance of payments and the availability of funds for domestic 
investment opportunities. All these roles and functions of interest rates have been 
important in The Gambia and will be examined here. 
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1. Government Securities and Savings 
Data on interest rates are presented in Tables 1-31 through 1-35. Interest rates are 
documented for the following categories: government securities, the discount rate, lending 
rates for selected subsectors of commercial activity, and deposit rates. Table 1-31 sets forth 
the nominal rates for these instruments, government securities and loans. Table 1-32 adjusts 
these rates for inflation and presents a series on the real rates of interest ruling for the past 
10 years. The following analysis will focus on the real rates documented in Table 1-32 for 
savings and government securities.3 
Real rates of interest on 3 month T-bills and long term government bonds have been 
largely negative over the period 1981-1987. These rates have been positive in real terms 
since 1988. The discount rate has followed a similar trend. Examination of the rates paid 
to savers reveals that out of the past 11 years there have been 7 years of negative real rates 
for savings deposits and three month time deposits. The cyclical nature of the changes in 
real rates (between negative and positive) has introduced instability and uncertainty into 
choices made by savers. Savers have been penalized by such fluctuations, on the one hand, 
and by negative real rates, on the other hand. Investor-savers in government T-bills benefit 
substantially more than depositors, particularly lower income depositors saving in short term 
deposit instruments. Moreover, short term depositors have been penaliz.ed more than long 
term depositors, since real long term rates have been greater than short term rates. This 
implies that the yield curve for savings accounts is upward sloping. A rising yield curve may 
be due to the rising inflation expectations of savers and/or a premium offered by banks to 
attract longer term deposits. Finally, the discount rate in recent years has exceeded the 
savings rate which implies that it may be cheaper for banks to mobilize savings than to 
borrow from the Central Banlc. Indeed, only the GCDB (as will be shown shortly) has 
borrowed from the Central Bank (i.e. used the rediscount window). 
2. LendinB Rates 
The profile of real lending rates in Table 1-32 reveals that from 1984 through 1987 
almost all lending rates were negative in real terms favoring borrowers, regardless of 
subsector. In 1988, real lending rates become positive. From 1988, interest rates have 
3 For the real interest rate series reported in Table 1-32, inflation was measured with the consumer price 
index (CPI) of inflation. The formula used to derive the real rates of interest was as follows: 
[ 1 +i -1]x100 l+p 
where i = the nominal rate of interest and p = the annual change in the CPI index of inflation. 
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remained positive, increasing each year to a high level in 1991. The lending rates in 1991 
are relatively "high" relative to the 1980's. In summary, savers were subsidizing borrowers 
substantially from roughly 1984 through 1987 as the impact of inflation on the structure of 
nominal interest rates in The Gambia penalized (i.e. taxed) savers and favored (subsidized) 
borrowers. Very likely, this same pattern characterized the period 1981-83, however, we 
were unable to document detailed lending rates during the early 1980s in Table 1-31. Only 
from 1988 onwards can it be said that borrowers were beginning to pay a relatively high rate 
of interest reflecting the probable opportunity cost of capital. 
The current level of interest rates has become an important issue in The Gambia 
because it is perceived that lending rates are currently too high, depressing loan demand and 
presumably dampening economic growth. In part, this perception no doubt reflects the 
abrupt change from a previous low rate milieu to one of significant positive rates, 
particularly in 1991. In addition, any analysis of lending rates should include a consideration 
of risk and take into account the important relationship with 3 month T-bills, a risk free 
asset. Interest rates for lending are directly related to 3 month T-bills and only differ for 
three important reasons: risk, liquidity and the cost of loan administration. 
The difference between higher lending rates and lower, risk-free T-bill rates 
represents a premium that lenders receive for undertaking risky loans and/ or forgoing some 
degree of liquidity. However, the government's concern to sterilize the potential inflationary 
impact of growing foreign exchange inflows, during this period of structural adjustment, 
induced authorities to aggressively create a T-bill market from 1986 to the present. This led 
to some anomalous results as can be seen by comparing the T-bill rates in column 1 of 
Table 1-31 to the loan rates in columns 10 through 14. Contrary to expectations, some but 
not all loan rates were actually below T-bill rates in 1986 and 1989. They were only 
negligibly above them in 1988 and 1989 when the premium on risk and liquidity averaged 
only two percent. In short, there was no reasonable rate differential to cover risk and 
liquidity considerations in loan markets during this period. This was clearly a contributing 
factor in the decline of outstanding credit balances and the rise in T-bill holdings in 
commercial banks from mid-decade onwards as discussed earlier. Only in 1990 and 1991 
did a realistic risk premium finally emerge in loan markets increasing to 5.75 percent in 
1990 and 6.50 percent in 1991. However, this in tum created another issue in Gambian 
financial markets, namely the controversy surrounding the alleged high structure of loan 
rates in the country. We will explore this issue shortly. 
3. Gross Intermediation Mar~ns 
The gross intermediation margin between average deposit and loan rates offers a 
valuable insight into the competitiveness of Gambian financial markets. Tables 1-33 and 1-
34 set forth the components that allow us to generate the interest rate margins reported in 
Table 1-35. Table 1-33 presents the nominal and real deposit rates weighted by the relative 
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volume of demand, savings, and time deposits in Gambian financial markets. Two estimates 
of these weighted deposit rates are set forth: one, making allowance for the relevant reserve 
requirements on these deposits and the other ignoring these reserve requirements. 
The weighted real rates on deposits (columns 2 and 4) reported in Table 1-33 are 
generally negative throughout the past decade. High inflation rates rapidly erode the 
purchasing power of demand deposits and reduce the real return on savings and time 
deposits. It is clear from the earlier data on savings instruments in Table 1-32 and the 
weighted averages in Table 1-33 that savers have been penalized (i.e. implicitly taxed) by 
holding their savings in Gambian deposits (and currency) in the past decade. During some 
years this implicit tax has been severe (1984 through 1987). 
Table 1-34 sets forth the nominal and real lending rates (with and without the 3 
month T-bill rate) which are an average of commercial bank lending rates weighted by their 
sectoral shares of outstanding credit balances. These real weighted lending rates were 
frequently zero or negative in the mid-1980s. When this finding is combined with the 
finding above that real deposits were substantially negative during this same period, it is 
clear that savers were penalized (or taxed) to reward (i.e. subsidize) borrowers in the mid-
1980s. Borrowers were given the privilege to borrow and repay at rates well below the rate 
of inflation because depositors and savers were being forced to accept a return even more 
substantially below inflation, thereby experiencing a loss in the purchasing power of their 
deposit holdings. 
General knowledge about banking indicates that depositors and savers in deposit-
based banks are substantially more numerous than borrowers (usually on the order of 20 or 
30 to one). At the same time, these depositor-savers, on average, represent a lower socio-
economic status than borrowers (who after all have to be creditworthy). Therefore, we can 
infer that the interest rate structure in The Gambia in the mid-1980s was responsible for a 
regressive transfer of income from lower income to higher income members of the Gambian 
population. Real lending rates, on average, have been positive since 1988. 
The gross nominal interest rate margins averaged between 9 to 10 percent over the 
period 1984-89, but doubled to roughly 16 to 19 percent in 1990 and 1991 in Table 1-35. 
A quick inspection of data in the International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics confirms that in 1990 and 1991 these are among the widest interest rate margins 
in all of Africa. Banks in more developed countries register 4 to 6 percent spreads. Most 
developing countries record spreads between 7 and 13 percent, vecy few above 15 percent 
Thus in the more recent years, the Gambian financial markets have proved to be unusually 
profitable because of these unusually wide intermediation margins. This statement about 
profitability is true only if costs did not rise commensurately. There is no reason to assume 
they did. Certainly, the cost of funds did not rise much and there is no reason to imagine 
that administrative costs rose much in more recent years. The fact that several international 
private banks applied for licenses during the past several years underscores the 
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attractiveness of the Gambian market. The impact of these margins on profitability will be 
discussed shortly. 
4. The Determination of Interest Rates in The Gambia 
An important controversy in The Gambia today centers on whether the currently high 
loan rates documented above are too high, thereby choking off loan demand, investment and 
lowering the rate of growth. An important element in this debate is the T-bill market. It 
has been alleged that the T-bill rates are unusually high, thereby forcing up loan rates to 
maintain a realistic premiwn for risk and the loss of liquidity. This current level is allegedly 
an unacceptably high level discouraging loan demand and investment. This, in turn, raises 
the questions as to what determines the T-bill rate? Is this a competitive market? What 
factors are at play here? Do offshore financial markets influence the T-bill market in The 
Gambia? Only after testing some hypotheses concerning the determinants of the T-bill rate 
can one then consider if they are too high and, if so, what one should or could do about it 
A Interest Rate Parity 
The first hypothesis (i.e. interest rate parity) is based on the fact that The Gambia 
is an open economy. In an open economy with perfect capital mobility, the interest rate is 
determined by the following formula: 
where: ict = domestic interest rate in The Gambia 
iw = rest of world interest rate 
e = expected depreciation of the dalasis. 
(9) 
We tested various forms of this equation using U.K. (United Kingdom) and Gambian 
monthly interest rate data on 3 month T-bills and dalasi-pound exchange rates over the 
period from July 1986 to December 1991. We employed regr~ion models and 
cointegration econometric techniques. We could find no statistically significant relationships 
that lend support to this hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that interest rate parity does not 
hold between the U.K. and The Gambia. We also examined whether a causal relationship 
existed between interest rates in the U.K. and The Gambia using a bivariate vector 
autoregression. Again, we could find no support that U.K. interest rates influence interest 
rates in The Gambia. Our findings are different from Walsh, who also drew upon an 
interest rate parity approach (Walsh 1991). Walsh collected information for the right hand 
side of the above equation to generate the hypothetical 3 month T-bill series in The Gambia 
(i.e. the left hand side of the equation) under the assumption that interest rate parity would 
hold. He then compared this simulated interest rate time series with the actual Gambian 
3 month T-bill time series. He concluded that in some years they are similar, in other years 
25 
they aren't, but in general, he felt that the interest rate series in the U .K. were driving the 
Gambian series. It is important to note that he did not statistically test this hypothesis as 
we did. Moreover, we also drew upon a vector auto regression to test causality, which did 
not hold. In general, we conclude that the interest rate parity hypothesis does not hold for 
The Gambia. These results are consistent with those found for a number of other countries 
(Stein et. al. 1983; Thornton 1989; and Gregory 1987). 
B. Government Deficits and Interest Rates 
Another reason interest rates may be high may be due to large and persistent govern-
ment budget deficits. This is termed the crowding out effect. Research in other countries 
has produced mixed results as to the impact of this effect and whether it exists. Similar, 
mixed results were found for the Gambia in section m above. However, the T-bill market 
has no doubt absorbed funds that could be used for loans to the private sector. In order to 
compete for such funds, the government must offer a high enough rate to be able to sell its 
securities. 
C. Thinness of T-bill Market 
Given the thinness of the market, another hypothesis could be that the rates on T-
bills may not be determined under competitive market conditions. This was brought out 
earlier in Table 1-14. The commercial banks (primarily only three institutions for most of 
this period) account for 63 percent of the T-bill market, with private individuals and firms 
accounting for only 3 percent of T-bill purchases. Public enterprises comprise another 28 
percent. This evidence offers an insight as to why higher interest rates are observed. 
Namely, it is in the interest of and within the power of a limited number of dominant 
holders (i.e. the banks) to establish the observed high rates through coordinated bidding in 
the auction markets. 
D. The Fisherian Approach 
Interest rates may also be high due to expectations of higher inflation rates in the 
future. This is the Fisherian view and can be expressed as: 
(10) 
where ~ is the nominal interest rate, ~ is the real interest rate and Pc is the expected rate 
of inflation. One might expect that lenders have not forgotten the inflationary 1980's and 
may not yet be convinced of the government's commitment to policies to lower inflation. 
Given the growth of the money supply noted earlier, monetary policy is not as tight as 
commonly thought. In particular, one would expect a tight monetary policy to produce high 
interest rates, but given that monetary policy is not that tight, inflationary expectations may 
not be lowered. We formally tested Equation 10 using regression and cointegration 
techniques and could not find any statistical support for the Fisherian view in The Gambia. 
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E. Linkage Between Deposit Rates and T-bill Rates 
Finally, interest rates may also be high due to increases in deposit rates which in turn 
would put pressure on T-bill rates and hence lending rates. As banks attempt to attract 
more deposits by raising interest rates, the relative return on T-bills falls, making them less 
attractive to investors. T-bill interest rates must rise in order for the government to sell its 
securities. As these rates rise, banks attempt to attract more deposits so that banks can 
purchase more securities. However, it is widely acknowledged in The Gambia that commer-
cial banks are currently discouraging the mobilization of saving and time deposits which 
clearly weakens support for this hypothesis. Furthermore, the long history of penalizing 
savers to reward borrowers (evident in Tables 1-31 and 1-32) weakens this hypothesis. 
F. Summary 
Statistical testing of two major hypotheses of interest rate determination (i.e. interest 
rate parity and the Fisherian approach) have not been upheld for the Gambian economy. 
This strongly suggests that interest rates are determined by some means other than 
international interest rates and domestic inflationary expectations. Among the alternative 
hypotheses reviewed above, we suspect that T-bill rates are high due to market 
imperfections resulting from a small number of buyers dominating the volume of sales in 
the T-bill market The existence of this oligopolistic banking market also has contn"buted 
to the very high intermediation margins we observed in Table 1-35. 
Interest rates also influence the loan to deposit ratios which are presented in Tables 
1-36 and 1-37. This ratio declines over time for all banks and the two subsets of the 
commercial banking system, i.e. the GCDB and the other commercial banks. This ratio is 
considerably less than one for the other commercial bank group and has fallen to one third 
by 1991. In the case of the GCDB, the ratio exceeds one indicating that government and 
donor based borrowings have been an important additional source of funds for the GCDB. 
This is borne out in Table 1-37 when borrowings are included in the denominator of the 
loan to deposit ratio. This ratio is still high for the GCDB averaging 0.9 over the period 
1986-1991. These ratios confirm the point made earlier that more deposits do not 
necessarily create more loans, especially for the private commercial banks in The Gambia. 
While high interest rates stimulate deposit mobilization, at the same time they curtail loan 
demand and/or induce loan rationing by banks to reduce the risks of adverse selection (i.e. 
selecting default-prone clients who gamble on risky investment schemes). Hence, rising 
interest rates from 1986 onwards can be logically associated with the dec1ining loan deposit 
ratios in Tables 1-36and1-37. Furthermore, the recent high interest rate milieu leads one 
to suspect that banks may perceive an adverse selection danger in Gambian loan markets 
since bankers refuse to issue potentially profitable loans derived from high intermediation 
margins in place of lower return T-bill purchases. In brief, the recent spreads are not 
considered sufficient to cover the alleged risks of default, the costs of loan administration, 
and the loss of liquidity associated with loans. This remarkably low loan deposit ratio 
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scenario will now be documented in more revealing detail through analysis of bank balance 
sheets and income statements in the following section. 
X. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR 
1. Bank Balance Sheets 
The consolidated balance sheets for all banks and the two subsets of banks are set 
out in Tables 1-38 through 1-40. However, the most revealing set of tables are those 
documenting the relative shares (i.e. the composition) of total assets and liabilities (Tables 
1-41, 1-42, and 1-43). These data reveal many important features of the banking system in 
The Gambia First, loans have declined in relative importance in bank assets from 61 
percent in 1986 to 40percentin1991inTable1-41. This decline was more pronounced for 
the GCDB where loans made up 84 percent of assets in 1986, but were only 53 percent of 
its assets in 1991(Table1-42). However, lending activity was a markedly larger activity for 
the GCDB than for the private commercial banks where the share of loans to assets were 
only 26 percent in 1986 and 1991(Table1-43). These trends are in marked contrast to the 
United States where loans are the most important asset in private commercial bank balance 
sheets comprising 60 percent of all assets (Mishkin, p. 163). 
The other notable trend in asset composition has been the relative increase in go-
vernment securities. Three month T-bills comprised less than 10 percent of bank assets in 
1986, but accounted for 22 percent of the assets of the banking sector in 1991 (Table 1-41). 
A marked difference occurs when the subset of banks is analyzed separately. The GCDB's 
share of government securities in Table 1-42 was less than 2 percent of its assets in 1991 
compared to 43 percent for the private commercial banks (Table 1-43). 
On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, borrowings from the Central Bank as a 
share of liabilities has declined from 34 percent in 1986 to 7 percent in 1991 (Table 1-41). 
Borrowing was only undertaken by the GCDB. These borrowings became a less important 
source of funds to the GCDB (Table 1-42). They accounted for 56 percent of all liabilities 
in 1986, but only 15 percent in 1991. This decline in borrowings is consistent with the 
decline in donor sponsored financing of public sector entities from 1986 onwards. 
Conversely, demand, savings and time deposits have increased their share of liabilities for 
banks as a whole (Table 1-41). The share of demand deposits increased from 17 percent 
in 1986 to 23 percent in 1991, while the saving and time deposits share increased from 24.5 
percent to 34.5 percent. Hence, deposits account for 57 percent of all bank liabilities, a 
proportion only slightly smaller than that found for the United States (Mishkin, p. 163). 
Again, marked differences emerge between the subsets of banks. In 1986 deposits 
accounted only for 32 percent of the liabilities of the GCDB. By 1991, this had increased 
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to 38 percent (Table 1-42). On the other hand, deposits accounted for 57 percent of all 
liabilities for the other commercial banks in 1986 and rose to over 77 percent in 1991 (Table 
1-43). This again reinforces the point that more deposits do not lead to more loans. The 
above trends do not necessarily imply that the actual growth of these line items in assets and 
liabilities is increasing or decreasing (it is possible for a line item to increase, but the total 
increases more, so its share declines). Hence, we examine the calculated percentage 
changes in Table 1-44, which reveal that with respect to all commercial banks government 
securities are growing dramatically from 1987 to 1990, while loans have fluctuated on a year 
to year basis with relative decline recorded in 1987 and 1990. On the liability side, demand, 
saving and time deposits have been growing, while borrowings have been declining. 
2. Savings and Demand Deposits 
Of particular interest is the recent behavior of demand deposits and savings deposits, 
since commercial banks have undertaken a recent policy of discouraging time deposits by 
placing limits on the size of such deposits in 1991. Tables 1-44 through 1-46 document 
percentage changes in liabilities and assets. Demand deposits grew faster than savings 
deposits in 1991 for all commercial banks in Table 1-44 (31 percent vs. 14 percent). The 
other commercial banks as a group increased demand deposits by 42 percent for 1991, while 
savings deposits increased by only 29 percent (in Table 1-46). There appear to be two 
distinct forces influencing depositor behavior. First, there appears to have been deposit 
substitution from the GCDB to the other commercial banks, no doubt reflecting concern 
about the prospective closing of the GCDB. Second, depositors, by being discouraged to 
hold term deposits beyond a maximum ceiling, have increased their demand deposits. 
These findings have serious implications for the Gambian financial sector and the 
economy. Are such savings discouraged due to the lack of bank competition or are such 
savings discouraged due to the absence of profitable loan opportunities? Very likely both 
elements are present, however, the lack of bank competition is most evident. There appears 
to be savings activity through NGOs in The Gambia, which is being utilized for investment 
activity, albeit on a small scale (see Chapters II and V). Moreover, it has been documented 
that existing banks are more interested in investing in T-bills than in making loans. Hence, 
additional bank competition could induce more competitive rates being paid on savings and 
remove existing restrictions on maximum amounts held in interest bearing time deposits and 
reduce the unusually wide intermediation margins. This is not to rule out the issue that 
rates of return to many investment activities may be low. This is one area that needs to 
definitely be explored further, since there is no current systematically compiled information 
readily available on the returns to investment in the real economy. 
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3. Profit and Loss Positions of Commercial Banks 
The profit and loss statements and associated performance measures are reported 
in Tables 1-47 and 1-48. First, one must recognize the limitations of these data. Interest 
earnings are reported on an accrued basis, rather than interest actually received. Hence, 
the GCDB reports substantial "accrued" interest income but much of this was never 
received, given its high levels of default. Accrued interest for private banks, however, very 
likely is close to interest actually received (given their low arrears). The first measure 
presented in Table 1-48 is the gross margin as a percent of loans. The gross margin is the 
actual difference between interest received from loans minus the interest paid on deposits 
reported by banks in their income statements. These margins (in Table 1-48, row 1) are well 
below the interest rate margins presented earlier in Table 1-35 (6.7 percent versus 21 
percent in 1990). Three factors could potentially explain this anomaly. First, many loans 
may not be performing loans (i.e. not paying interest). Second, many loans could be long 
term in nature with a lower interest rate than those applying to current loans and, third, 
deposits could exceed loans by a large amount. Data previously presented on the low loan 
deposit ratios indicate that the third reason is clearly operating here. At the same time, 
nonperforming loans clearly influence the results for the GCDB. Increases in the gross 
margin on lending are also consistent with the recent rise in lending rates, less competition 
for deposits, and the overall lack of competition for loans in the banking industry. The gross 
margin as a percent of loans is substantially higher for the GCDB than for the other 
commercial banks for two out of the three years in Table 1-48. This supports the point that 
deposits are used more for purchasing government securities than for issuing loans by the 
other commercial banks. 
The return on assets and equity, as conventionally measured, is the ratio of total pro-
fits to total assets and net worth, respectively. The return on assets for the system as a 
whole increased from 4.8 percent to 8.6 percent over the period 1988-1990 (panel 1, line 3 
in Table 1-48) and the return on equity (line 4) increased from 60.7 percent to 77.2 percent. 
These are extremely high returns by international standards. Industry-wide rates of return 
on assets for U.S. banks fluctuate around one percent in recent years. Returns on equity 
range from 10 to 15 percent. These profit measures in The Gambia also indicate that in 
1990 the subset of other commercial banks bad a higher return on assets than the GCDB 
(13 percent vs. 4.8 percent in 1990) and these commercial banks together bad a higher 
return on equity than the GCDB (134 percent vs. 38.5 percent in 1990). However, we must 
keep in mind that these profit figures for the GCDB are grossly inflated since much of its 
reported interest income is fictitious (i.e., based on accrued interest). In reality, (as we shall 
see shortly in the next section) the GCDB was recording losses during this period. 
Surprisingly, the GCDB bad a lower operating expense as a percent of assets (2.9 percent 
in 1990) than did the other commercial banks (7.3 percent in 1990). This is clearly due to 
an inflated asset figure in the GCDB which would include a large portion of non-performing 
loans. 
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Further, it should be noted that "other income" (i.e., principally the returns on 
government securities and foreign exchange transactions) is very important to these banks. 
Without these earnings, the banks would have experienced considerably lower returns on 
their assets. H one were to assume that all operating expenses were associated with loan 
activity and none with "other income" generation, then profits as a percent of assets 
(excluding "other income") would be negative as can been seen in the last row in the panels 
in Table 1-48. In brief, the rate of return on the loan portfolio would be negative, raising 
questions about the nature of the loan market in The Gambia. However, making the 
assumption that all operational costs are associated with loan activity is extreme. A more 
balanced assumption would allocate both interest expenses on deposits and administrative 
expenses proportional to the relative weight of loan and non-loan assets in the total 
portfolio of assets of banks. With this assumption, the rates of return on loan and non-loan 
assets are set forth in Table 1-49. The return on non-loan assets far exceeds the return on 
loans throughout this period. If we ignore the misleading results for the GCDB (since all 
interest income is accrued even for a growing portfolio of non-performing loans) and 
concentrate on the results for the other private commercial banks, the rate of return on non-
loan assets is far more stable and considerably higher than that recorded for loans. Thus, 
the previous conclusion is still valid though less extreme. Foreign exchange transactions and 
interest earnings on T-bills are primarily responsible for the high returns to banking in The 
Gambia. Thus, it is not surprising to note that banks emphasize these activities in their 
asset portfolio and downplay the importance of loan activity. More competition is needed 
to reduce the currently high returns to these activities. Lowering the minimum T-bill 
denomination from 5000 to 1000 dalasis could broaden the T-bill market beyond its current 
structure. Similarly, allowing non-bank foreign exchange houses or agencies to compete in 
the foreign exchange market could introduce more competition for this activity. 
The other measures presented in Table 1-48 also point to improvements in 
profitability. The debt to equity ratio has been declining (total liabilities to net worth), most 
notably for the GCDB. Capital adequacy (net worth as a percent of total assets) increased 
from 6 percent to 12 percent for the GCDB while for other commercial banks this measure 
declined from 13.4 percent in 1989 to 9.6 percent in 1990. However, this measure of capital 
adequacy for the GCDB should be evaluated after taking into account nonperforming loans. 
Such loans need to be deducted from both net worth (capital) and assets. This would 
reduce the numerator more than the denominator and thereby lead to a reduction in this 
ratio. Thus, it is clear that the GCDB has a much lower capital adequacy ratio than that 
reported in Table 1-48. This inadequate capital adequacy for the GCDB reflects the high 
degree of moral hazard inherent to its portfolio. The GCDB as a public sector development 
bank was expected to take on risky projects as a part of its mandate despite the inadequate 
capital base to cover the potential losses that would be expected from these loans. 
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XI. THE GCDB AND ISSUES OF DEVELOPMENT BANKING 
The GCDB story has been told many times before (see for example, Nathan 
Associates, 1988; Sarr, 1989). In this case, however, we examine the bank within the context 
of the various measures undertaken by the government to restructure the financial sector 
(and the economy) and the effects of those measures on the bank. This treatment also 
draws upon findings from balance sheets and income statements to underscore performance 
over the period 1981-91. Moreover, these financial statements, in contrast to the CBG 
accounts for the GCDB used in the previous section, have been constructed from original 
GCDB data accounts in which interest income is not accrued but rather is counted only 
when actually received and, more importantly, accurate loan loss provisions are accounted 
for. 
1. The Early Years up to the Early 1980s 
Barely three years after its establishment in 1972, the GCDB had expanded its 
business in its existing offices (the Head office and Bakau) and had opened two new 
branches up-country (Farafenni and Basse). The short-comings in the Bank's bookkeeping 
and accounting systems that had persisted from the inception of the Bank were made much 
worse by this rapid expansion. Internal controls were weak, leading to serious problems of 
proper loan administration and oversight. The Bank was in violation of its own by-laws as 
it granted unsecured loans to a number of customers in excess of 25 percent of the 
aggregate amount of the Bank's unimpaired capital, and in excess of the unimpaired balance 
in its Reserve account. Most of these customers had started businesses in sectors that had 
been identified as top priority by the Government under its Five Year Plan, i.e., agriculture 
and small scale industry. During these early years, the bank was acting like the conventional 
supply lending finance institution. It issued loans in advance of an effectively established 
demand with reasonable prospects for repayment. All bank procedures and practices 
emphasized quick disbursement of funds to targeted priority areas with little attention to 
loan recovery. From its origins, the bank was a classic "borrower dominated" institution 
dispensing targeted subsidized credit in a manner that was compromising its future solvency. 
Even at this very early stage in its development, the Bank began experiencing diffi-
culties in getting customers to repay their loans. The most problematic borrower at the time 
(and the biggest debtor) was a customer who had borrowed money from the Bank against 
a Government guarantee - the outstanding balance in the account was eventually transferred 
to the Managed Fund Account in 1987. Unauthorized excesses were granted by the Bank 
where customers were permitted to draw over the agreed limit. Customers were granted 
excess overdrafts on lines of credit for foreign suppliers which led to serious exposure in 
foreign currencies. When local borrowers failed to pay their foreign suppliers, the bank was 
obligated to honor the foreign drafts. Development loans were extended prior to a detailed 
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appraisal of the project and the largest beneficiary eventually defaulted on his loan. The 
Bank has yet to collect from the three largest borrowers, in spite of several years of 
litigation. 
Several key lessons emerge from this early growth history of the institution. First, 
governmental guidelines influenced the allocation of the portfolio. Second, leadership in 
the bank did not ahere to established conventions of commercial banking. Therefore, 
political influence and direction from the government frequently shaped the lending policies 
into welfare oriented projects and/or risky projects. At the same time, bank management 
found it difficult to document its income and expenses properly or track its portfolio 
repayments accurately. Furthermore, there was no constituency within the bank to play the 
disciplinary role of a strong depositor base or private stockholders. Similarly, international 
donors were contributing to the targeting of unviable clients through continued injections 
of subsidized lines of credit channelled through the GCDB for an agricultural clientele and 
small scale industry much of which became a non-performing clientele. 
2. The Early 1980s 
By the end of the fiscal year 1981, the underestimated a<:cnmulated provisions for 
loan losses had risen to D13.3 million. The Bank was barely operating within the statutory 
limits related to the liquid assets and capital adequacy ratios as required under the Financial 
Institutions Act, 1974 (FIA) and its operations were supported largely by borrowings from 
the Central Bank (CBG). These borrowings totalled three-and-a-half times the Bank's 
deposit base. Additionally, the aggregate of development loans had almost doubled the 
amount in the Development Fund While at the beginning of 1980 authorities had 
introduced measures which were aimed at stimulating deposit mobilization and restraining 
credit expansion, the CBG continued to provide the GCDB with the liquidity to make more 
loans, notably for government supported activities in the 'productive' sectors of the economy. 
Loans for agricultural purposes (which were almost exclusively made by the GCDB) 
remained at concessionary rates even at the start of the first comprehensive program with 
the IMF in November 1981. At this time interest rates on deposits were raised, and 
commercial banks were requested to raise their lending rates to a minimum of 15 percent 
per year on advances for trading purposes. However, production credit remained at 6 
percent and marketing credit was only raised marginally from 6 percent to 8 percent. In 
December 1981, the authorities started to prescn"be global credit ceilings on the advances 
of each of the commercial banks. These credit ceilings were not tied to the deposit base 
of the individual banks, but were instead based on each bank's wi11ingness to lend, as 
reflected in the level of loans outstanding at the time, thereby proving to be an inadequate 
tool for control of liquidity. The ceilings were adjusted for seasonality. This was 
particularly true for the GCDB which made the bulk of the crop finance advances against 
re-finance facilities from the CGB. 
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Concomitant with the introduction of these measures to reduce the liquidity of banks 
was the pronouncement by the CBG in December 1981 that the local currency counterpart 
of funds awaiting the availability of foreign exchange to pay for imports could no longer be 
included in the Liquid Assets category of the banks. Ban1cs were asked to place all such 
funds in a special deposit account at the CBG to await foreign exchange availability. With 
all of its customers' deposits having been lent out, the GCDB had to resort to CBG 
borrowings to meet this new requirement This is yet another illustration of deficient 
liquidity management in the bank. 
By the end of 1983, the financial position of the GCDB had deteriorated seriously. 
In order to determine the extent of the Bank's malaise, a portfolio review was undertaken 
towards the end of fiscal year 1984. The portfolio review resulted in a provision of D15.73 
million for bad and doubtful debts for the year, an amount which exceeded the cumulative 
provisions for the preceding 10 years (see Table 1-50, column 2, line 8). Long outstanding 
balances in the Bank's reconciliation accounts were also written off. The Bank ended up 
with a loss of D18.30 million, after tax (column 2, line 14), and this eroded completely both 
the amount in the Bank's share capital account and in its Reserve account The 
shareholders' funds account was therefore in deficit by D15.16 million, and needed an 
additional capital infusion of D17.16 million (i.e., the deficit plus 5 percent of deposit 
liabilities) to operate within the minimum capital adequacy requirements under the FIA 
In the end, no additional capital was forthcoming. Instead, the Government retired the long 
outstanding debt owed by the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) to the GCDB under a 
separate arrangement between the two parties (and the World Bank). The amount ofD25 
million which was involved in this transaction related to amounts owed to the GCU by 
member-farmers who had been forgiven their debts by Presidential decree. 
The GCDB was also in violation of the liquid assets provisions in the FIA, although 
this was largely because of large credit balances which it held with overseas banks. The 
Bank was seriously exposed, particularly on balances held in currencies which had 
appreciated against the dalasi. Exchange losses of D5.0 million were recorded between the 
period 1981 to 1984. 
At the end of fiscal year 1985, the financial position of the Bank had deteriorated 
further; the liquid assets of the Bank stood at Dll.47 million (see Table 1-51, column 3, line 
1) against a minimum requirement of Dl 7.04 million. Customers continued to default on 
loan obligations, while loan recovery on bad debtor accounts was slow as a large number 
of cases were either in court or with the Bank's solicitors. Recovery was made even more 
difficult, as a large number of loans were grossly under-collateralized. The continued 
exposure in its foreign exchange transactions resulted in further losses of D4.60 million. 
Coupled with the additional provisions of 012.86 million for bad and doubtful debts, the 
Bank ended up with losses of 016.30 million for the year {Table 1-50 for year 1985, column 
3, line 12). 
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Accumulated losses to-date were 037.16 million (Table 1-50, column 3, last line), 
against reserves of 02.78 million and a capital of 05.00 million. A series of emergency 
financial measures were taken during the year, including an increase in the capital base 
(from 02.0 million to 05.0 million) and 035.0 million of the amounts owed to CBG was 
converted into a 15 year, interest free loan, subordinated to depositor's claims which 
assumed the characteristics of quasi equity. 
3. The Post ERP Years 
During the fiscal year 1986, the authorities introduced several measures which were 
aimed at restructuring the financial system under the ERP. In September, the CBG raised 
its lending rates on all advances (including existing loans) by 7 percent (from 8 percent to 
15 percent). Reserve requirements were raised from 4 to 6 percent for term deposits, and 
from 8 to 15 percent for demand deposits. Also, in January 1986, a flexible exchange rate 
system was introduced. 
The increase in interest rates introduced by the CBG measures nullified the potential 
savings in interest charges on the 035.0 million in development loans (discussed above), 
while the rise in interest payable on customers' deposits were barely matched by the interest 
earnings on the advances made by the GCDB, given the overall poor quality of its 
portfolio.4 Furthermore, losses in foreign exchange transactions amounted to 06.55 million 
(Dl.81 million on revaluation and 05.74 million written off from correspondent bank 
reconciliation). The net result was a loss of 011.38 million for the year, thus bringing the 
accumulated losses to 048.94 million (after tax) for 1986 (see Table 1-50). Measures taken 
during the year to "improve" the Bank's financial position included an increase in share 
capital (via conversion of the IDA loan of 06.03 million) and an increase of 010.43 million 
in the Bank's reserve account following a revaluation of the Bank's premises. None of these 
measures involved any infusion of cash and, even at that, the shareholders' fund remained 
in deficit by an amount of 023.65 million. 
With the introduction of the flexible interest rate mechanism, interest rates rose 
further in 1987. Although the Bank registered a small after tax profit of D0.28 million, its 
overall financial position remained precarious, despite the fact that The Gambia 
Government Managed Fund Account was created. Liquid assets were 015.78 million 
against a required minimum of 031.81 million, and although additional capital of 02.53 
million was raised, the balance in the shareholders' account remained in deficit by 020.83 
million. 
4 In 1986, development loans which were extended at concessionary rates totalled D45.(i() million gross 
(Table 1-51, column 4, line 22), against the Development Fund account balance of 010.21 million. 
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Under the Managed Fund arrangement, the government agreed to take over all 
guaranteed loans and related charges which the Bank, at the request of the government, had 
borrowed from the CBG for on-lending to various enterprises which were subsequently 
unable to service these loans. The government agreed to pay to the COB the borrowings 
still outstanding and owed to the CBG by the GCDB. Following the finaJfaation of these 
transfers, the GCDB was for the first time in a long while able to satisfy its liquid assets 
position and stabilize its net current assets position without much loss in earnings since 
treasury bills were available at attractive rates of interest. Instead, GCDB management lent 
out a substantial proportion of the D16.0 million cash surplus which had resulted from the 
transactions under the Managed Fund transfers. Instead of acting prudently (by placing this 
surplus in T-bills to meet its statutory liquid asset requirements), the GCDB management 
lost an opportunity to secure some semblance of institutional viability. Instead, it engaged 
in another round of lending that ended up largely in default. In short, they should not have 
made the loans in the first place. Secondly, once made they turned bad, thereby 
compromising the solvency of the institution. 
4. The Final Years and The Meridien Bank Solution 
By 1990, new lendings in the Development Fund had been suspended. CBG 
refinance facilities were no longer utilized for on-lending and new loans in the commercial 
portfolio were extended on a restrictive basis. During the year the government retired D48 
million of GCU's borrowings with the GCDB (leaving a balance of only 02.7 million 
unpaid). After repaying some of its borrowings from the CBG, the GCDB invested the 
surplus funds in treasury bills. All these transactions enabled the bank to raise its liquid 
assets ratio to within the minimum required under the FIA. 
Although the Bank's shareholders' fund was no longer in deficit, and the balance in 
the account was sufficient to meet the statutory capital ratio of D6.96 million, the change 
in the position of this account was brought about largely by a revaluation of the Bank's 
premises which yielded a surplus of D28.34 million. Shareholders subscnbed an additional 
amount of D9.60 to the share capital, but only D5.00 was made available to the GCDB in 
cash, the balance of D4.60 having been utilized to reduce the balance in the non-interest 
bearing loan of D35.00 million with the CBG. Further provisions of D27.26 million were 
made for bad and doubtful debts (Table 1-50, column 7, line 8). In preparation for the 
privatization of the Bank, its status was changed from that of an unHmited liability 
corporation to a limited liability company. 
By the end of the fiscal year, a firm decision had been taken to sell the Bank, with 
a provision that the majority shareholders must be a foreign bank. Originally, it was 
stipulated that the Bank would be sold without any sanitization of its balance sheet and it 
was on this basis that potential buyers had examined the books of the bank. Meanwhile, 
the loan and advances portfolio was reviewed yet again, and further provisions of D104 
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million were made for bad and doubtful debts (interest on non performing debts had been 
computed at current rates and the amounts were credited to the profit & loss account, see 
Table 1-50 for 1991 ). The bank ended up with losses of D85.18 million for the year and the 
shareholder's funds account was again in deficit by D76.28 million at the end of the fiscal 
year 1991. 
The Meridien International Bank, already granted approval to operate as a bank in 
The Gambia, was invited by the government to consider taking over the GCDB, instead of 
starting a new bank. By the end of December 1991, and after an evaluation of the bids for 
the Bank, Meridien's offer was determined the best. Negotiations on the side of the GCDB 
commenced thereafter. The Draft accounts for the seven months to January 1992 showed 
that the net asset position of the Bank was in deficit by D69.87 million and that the 
shareholders' funds account was also in deficit by D79.24 million. An agreement was 
reached to "clean up" the balance sheet of the Bank for the purposes of selling it to 
Meridien. 
Details of the sales have yet to be made public, but discussions with government 
officials and other informed sources reveal that initially the government had committed itself 
to providing a total amount of D51.0 million to "clean up" the balance sheet of the Bank in 
order to prepare it for privatization. We do not know the basis on which this figure was 
arrived at, but we find the amount to be inadequate for the stipulated purposes, unless all 
of the Bank's liabilities to the CBG are treated "below the line." 
Regarding the sale to Meridien, it is understood that at the top of the government's 
agenda was the need to protect depositors' funds. On the strength of that, and Meridien's 
desire to take over only the Buckle Street (Banjul), Bakau and Farafenni branches, Meridien 
agreed to take over all of the deposits at these three branches. On the asset side, the 
government agreed to transfer all of the GCDB's cash deposits as of 1/31/92 to Meridien, 
and Meridien agreed to take over up to D25 million of loans and overdrafts from the 
GCDB. The shortfall in total assets vis-a-vis total liabilities would be met by the 
government, through a gift of treasury bills and bonds. Meridien agreed to purchase the 
premises at Bakau and Farafenni and only to rent the Buckle Street building for an annual 
rental fee. Furthermore, Meridien undertook to sell up to 40 percent of its shares to private 
investors in The Gambia at a later date. 
The financial transactions outlined above are summarized below. While the figures 
are only indicative, they are likely very close to the actual figures involved in the sale. 
ASSETS (in millions of Oalasis) 
0 30.00 - Cash & Deposits 
25.00 - Loans & Advances 
1.10 - Fixed Assets 
0 56.10 
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Treasury Bills & Bonds required 
81.60 - to balance the Balance Sheet 
D 137.70 - Total 
LlABIIITIES (in millions of Dalasis) 
0 130.00 - Customers Deposits 
7.70 - Share Capital 
0 137.70 - Total 
Of the total deposits of 0132.005 million for the GCDB as of 1/31/92, only D130.00 
million had been assumed to be held in the three branches. Meridien agreed to subscribe 
to a minimum of D7.70 million in share capital, 01,10 million of which will be paid to the 
government for the Bakau and Farafenni branches, and 06.60 million will represent the 
minimum amount required under the FIA to support the level of customers' deposits. The 
cost to Meridien of the additional assets (such as computers) have not been included. These 
items will, however, not affect the amount to be transferred by the government to Meridien 
in the form of Treasury Bills. The Pro-form.a cash & deposits account includes 020.00 
million for the three branches (as of 1/31/92), plus 06.60 million of the total paid up 
capital. The remainder of the assets and liabilities of the GCDB as of 6/29/92 will be 
transferred to the Asset Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC). We estimate 
that a minimum amount of 080.00 million will be required to balance the Balance Sheet 
under the terms of the sale agreement. Any increase in the level of customers' deposits 
which are not matched by a rise in the Bank's Cash and Deposit account will render the 
amount of D80.00 million insufficient at the time of the final transfer (i.e. June 29th, 1992). 
Finally, it is of interest to note that the Meridien Bank has currently assumed 
responsibility for a maximum of 25 million dalasis of the GCDB commercial loan portfolio 
to include in its own assets. On-going negotiations could very likely reduce this amount. 
This represents 46 percent of the outstanding commercial loan portfolio of the GCDB in 
1992, even after one has subtracted out the rather ample and realistic provision for bad debt 
that had been culled out of the portfolio after three independent external auditing firms 
completed their evaluations (see Table 1-51, column 9, line 5). In short, Meridien was 
uninterested in roughly 54 percent of the net loans outstanding of the commercial portfolio. 
While there may have been some risky loans still left in the GCDB commercial portfolio, 
it is surprising that some additional portion of the 54 percent of the sanitized portfolio could 
not have been incorporated into Meridien's assets, thereby reducing the cost of using T-bills 
to balance the liabilities in Meridien's balance sheet. Currently, it would appear that loans 
only represent 18 percent of Meridien's assets and T-bills 59 percent. It is to be hoped that 
Meridien will shortly expand the share of loans in its asset portfolio competitively 
contributing to an expansion of the loan market in The Gambia, otherwise it will largely 
remain a repository of government securities. 
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5. The Develo.pment Bank Syndrome 
The GCDB experience illustrates many symptoms of the terminal illness that is 
frequently associated with development banks. First and foremost, among these symptoms 
is the ease with which a donor virus can spread through an institution's management and 
clientele when large transfers of government or donor funds are used for on-lending. The 
entitlement psychology generally runs rampant in a donor or government funded institution. 
Governmental guidelines in the allocation of loans is common with the usual default 
consequences. 
Related to this entitlement psychology is the absence of well defined property rights 
and an underdeveloped legal system. Oearly, an inefficient and unresponsive judiciary lies 
behind some of the GCDBs inability to secure quick and responsible legal action against 
defaulted borrowers. Moreover, the larger the loan, the longer the delay and the greater 
the likelihood of indefinite or no action at all. 
Third, the GCDB manifested little skill or talent in establishing an effective 
management information system. A striking weakness here has been the inability to track 
the repayment status of long term loans until it was too late. There has never been any risk 
management dimension to the GCDBs portfolio management, through loan tracking 
programs. Moreover, basic documentation of the terms and conditions of loan contracts and 
the registry of collateral have frequently been deficient. This has weakened the bank's legal 
cases against important defaulters. In short, the bank assumed the responsibility of a 
portfolio far larger in size and complexity than they had the talent to manage properly. In 
fairness to the banks management, they were frequently directed or influenced by the 
government to issue loans to a high risk clientele that they might not have chosen if they 
had enjoyed a more autonomous management status. However, it is precisely this lack of 
autonomy that compromises these institutions and weakens the discipline of accountability 
and rigorous loan tracking programs. 
Fourth, term lending institutions rarely issue long term loan contracts that are 
designed to adjust interest rates to inflation. This failure penalized the GCDB in its early 
years of operation, contributing to a rapid depreciation of its loan portfolio (and generating 
an implicit subsidy for borrowers). At the same time, term loans were frequently issued to 
first-time borrowers before they established a responsible repayment record through short 
term borrowing. In many cases, term loans were granted to customers without sufficiently 
secure collateral or up-front equity commitment. Weakly collateralized lending for large 
long term loans is reckless in the extreme and introduces moral hazard into the institution. 
In the end, a remarkably high default record resulted from this unfortunate 
experiment in development banking in The Gambia. Moreover, the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB), not discussed here, failed for similar reasons in the late 1980s. 
This has constituted a burdensome legacy for Gambian society and Gambian taxpayers. 
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First, the individual borrowers who defaulted on their large loans are comprised, in part, of 
a high income segment of Gambian society. Thus, the defaults in effect transferred an 
inordinate amount of both domestic and donor resources to a limited number of borrowers, 
thereby contributing to a regressive transfer of income. Secondly, the roughly 80 million 
dalasis in T-bills generated to transfer to the Meridien Bank (to clean up the GCDB 
balance sheet) will burden future taxpayers who have to service this increased debt. 
One can gain an insight into the degree of regressivity implicit in the GCDB 
defaulted loan portfolio by first distinguishing between the defaulted loans to the Gambian 
Cooperative Union (GCU) farmers and other "social" transfers and the rest of the portfolio 
in the Managed Fund Account. Next, one can look at the distnbutional profile of the 
private individual loan accounts in default in the GCDB portfolio currently placed in the 
Asset Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC) recently created by a Parliamentary 
bill in December 1992. 
As pointed out earlier, the Managed Fund Account was created in 1987 through 
which the government agreed to pay the Central Bank all of the unpaid amounts on 
defaulted guaranteed loans the GCDB had issued to a risk-prone clientele at the request 
of the government. Discussions with Gambian authorities indicated that as of February 
1992, there were 84 million dalasis outstanding in these defaulted accounts. Of this total, 
31 million represent unrepaid loans to farmers serviced through the GCU, 3 million is 
associated with loans to municipal bodies, 10 million to cover the marketing losses incurred 
by the GCU in its groundnut operations, and finally, 40 million is associated with defaulted 
loan account of private individuals. Therefore, loans issued to low income farmers (i.e., 31 
million) represent roughly 37 percent of the bad debt total in the Managed Account, loans 
covering the costs or losses of government or quasi-government operations (i.e., the 
municipal loans and those covering the GCU marketing operations) account for 
approximately 15 percent of the total, and the remaining defaulted loans to private 
individual borrowers roughly 48 percent of the total Managed Fund Account. In brief, only 
37 percent of the Managed Fund Account loaned to GCU borrowers can unambiguously be 
associated with a low income social priority. 
In short, approximately 48 percent of the Managed Fund Account (i.e., 40 million 
dalasis) is associated with individual commercial borrowers. Although these clients received 
government guaranteed loans at below market rates, most of these borrowers were 
commercial clients operating in such areas as tourism, hotels, manufacturing and other 
established businesses benefiting through government promotion of their activities. In no 
way could the default status of these clients be defended on equity or welfare criteria. 
Turning our attention to the current Asset Management and Recovery Corporation 
(AMRC), one gains additional insights into the degree of regressivity in the defaulted 
portfolio. This unit was set up to inherit and recover the outstanding loan accounts in the 
GCDB portfolio, following the merger of the GCDB operations by the Meridien Bank. 
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Discussion with Gambian authorities indicated the following distributional profile for the 
2,911 loan accounts placed in this unit: 
Number of Loans Loan Size Intervals (in Total Debt Average Loan 
Dalasis) Outstanding Size 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
211 Above D 100,000 D 181,853,932 D 861,867 
201 D 50,000 to D 100,000 13,461,594 66,973 
2,499 Below D 50,000 30,299,149 12,125 
Total 2,911 D 225,614,675 D 77, 504 
First, it should be noted that these loan accounts are associated with individual loans 
to private borrowers. Second, it is important to distinguish between "current" and "de-
faulted" loans in this recovery unit The most recent balance sheet for the GCDB for 1992 
( Table 1-51, column 9) indicates that 54 million dalasis were outstanding as "current" loans 
in the commercial loan portfolio immediately prior to the creation of the Asset Management 
and Recovery Corporation (AMRC). If we subtract this from the total loans outstanding 
in the recovery unit (column 3 above) we arrive at 171 million dalasis of loans in a defaulted 
loan status or 76 percent of the total loan balance in the AMRC. This total outstanding 
individual debt in "default" is quantitatively significant, representing the equivalent of 60 
percent of the total outstanding loan balances recorded for the banking industry in 1991 
(Table 1-38, column 6). Finally, the average loan sizes registered above are sizeable, 
particularly for the top-most category where 211 individual borrowers received loans above 
100,000 dalasis each and, in the aggregate, amounting to approximately 182 million dalasis. 
This creates an average loan size for this category of roughly 862,000 dalasis. This compares 
to an income per capita figure that ranges between 2100 and 2400 dalasis per person in 
1991. There is a two stage distributional process inherent to this GCDB loan profile 
outlined above. First, there is a relatively small number of individual borrowers that initially 
received unusually large sized loans. Second, these loan amounts ended up in default, 
further reinforcing the distributional consequences. It is hard not the come to the 
conclusion that both the intial loan rationing and the resultant defaulted loans in the GCDB 
portfolio contnbuted to a substantial regressive distribution of income in The Gambia. 
XII. SUMMARY 
To conclude this chapter on formal finance in The Gambia, it is instructive to review 
our finding in five major areas: (1) the predominant changes in the pattern of financial 
balances in the past decade; (2) the social costs of institutional failures growing out of an 
unstable market structure for banking in The Gambia; (3) the impact of the stabilization 
and privatization drives on financial deepening and financial intermediation; ( 4) the issue 
of savings mobilization in Gambian financial markets, and; (5) the collapse of rural finance 
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within the Gambian financial sector and the implications of this urban bias for future donor 
development policy. 
1. Deca.dal Patterns of Chan~ 
First, it is revealing to summarize the major patterns of change in formal financial 
markets during the decade. The overall financial market shrank dramatically over this 
period. This was largely due to the rapid decline of lending activity in the country's largest 
bank, the GCDB. The remaining private commercial banks experienced roughly a one-third 
decline in their outstanding balances in real terms over this period. 
Another feature of importance was the shift from public to private sector banking 
and from long to much shorter term lending. In the early 1980s, a supply leading financial 
development strategy predominated in policy circles and created a preponderance of public 
sector credit flows in the formal financial markets of that time. By the early 1990s, public 
sector credit activity through the GCDB and its downstream network had largely 
disappeared, and private commercial bank lending emerged as the only viable financial 
intermediaries functioning in the country. 
Another important change is evident through the collapse of agricultural lending from 
its predominant role of 30 to 35 percent of total lending in the early 1980s to 7 to 8 percent 
by the early 1990s. In contrast, loans for trading enterprises rose from around 20 to 30 
percent of total outstanding balances within the smaller scale financial market of the early 
1990s. The decline of agricultural lending was directly associated with the decline of the 
GCDB and the failure of the supply leading financial development strategy. 
Another element of change in the past decade was the rapid emergence of large 
interest rate margins in Gambian financial markets and the high rates of return on assets 
and equity by financial institutions in these markets from the late 1980s onwards. With the 
liberalization of financial markets freeing up interest rates, a wide margin emerged between 
average loan and deposit rates creating by 1991 one of the widest gross interest rate margins 
in Africa (19 points). Among other things, this increased the profitability of banking and 
played an obvious role in attracting a number of international banks to apply for bank 
charters to enter the Gambian market. At the same time, the growth of these wide margins 
created a high loan rate milieu that some allege discourage investment lending. 
A final feature that stands out in this decadal pattern of change is the periodization 
that characterizes the past decade. This, of course, has been reported on at length by many 
authors, however, rarely in reference to financial markets. The first half of the 1980s 
registered continuing high levels of outstanding balances of financial activity, a 
predominance of public sector credit activity, agricultural lending and negative real rates of 
interest for both loans and deposits. In effect, this failure to adjust interest rates for 
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inflation promoted a transfer of income from savers to borrowers during this period, 
worsening the distribution of income in the country. Indeed, the negative real rates for 
savers predominated throughout much of the decade. The final half of the decade saw a 
dramatic downscaling in the size and nature of Gambian financial markets (outlined above) 
as the financial excesses of the first half of the decade were removed through the discipline 
of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and ensuing structural adjustment programs. 
Borrowers were eventually charged increasingly higher positive real rates of interest from 
the late 1980s onwards, savers only achieved reasonable positive rates in 1989 and 1991. 
2. Market Structure and Institutional Failure 
The chronic instability of the market structure for banking stands out as the second 
major issue of Gambian financial markets. Institutional weaknesses were apparent in 
several private and both public sector banks. In The Gambia in the past ten years, four 
banks have closed operations and a fifth is under litigation. Only two banks have passed 
through the past 10 years free of financial problems. Oearly, the bank charter review 
process of the Central Bank and the supervisory functions should be strengthened to reduce 
this market instability. Central Bank authorities are currently strengthening these functions 
and playing a positive role in helping to design a revised Financial Institutions Act that 
creates a more appropriately designed institutional framework for bank regulation. 
The institutional failure of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) have proven costly to Gambian 
society in two ways. First, the large default burden and write-offs during this decade have 
been substantial. It is difficult not to conclude that this transfer contributed to a regressive 
transfer of income in the country. Second, to clean up the books of the GCDB, the 
Gambian government has been forced to issue roughly 80 million dalasis of treasury bills 
to induce an international bank to take over the deposit obligations of the GCDB in 1992. 
This action introduces a future burden for Gambian taxpayers through the servicing of this 
debt. 
When the income distribution implication of these transfers are added to the 
pervasive negative real rate of interest environment for savers in The Gambia until the early 
1990s, one has to conclude that the formal financial markets on balance have generated in 
the past decade a relatively more regressive distribution of income in the country. 
Ironically, both these processes of development bank finance and subsidized interest rates 
were designed to promote development and help the poor through these interventions in 
financial markets. The financial landscape has now been cleared of these experiments but 
with a legacy on the treasury and on the profile of income distribution in Gambian society. 
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3. The Impact of Structural Adjustment Measures 
The impact of the Economic Recovery Program (and ensuing structural reforms) on 
financial markets bas been dramatic and constitutes another important issue in financial 
market development. Interest rate reforms freed up interest rates to high levels contnbuting 
to the reduced demand for loans. Institutional reforms to reduce subsidies and the fiscal 
deficit reduced lending to perennially heavy borrowers like the GPMB and the GCU further 
scaling back the loan market Both these reforms were legitimate and long overdue and in 
the process reduced the loan market to a size more commensurate with a solvent clientele. 
The laudable stabilization measures to control the inflationary impact of donor 
inflows of foreign grants and loans, however, has created a crowding out effect in the asset 
portfolio of banks. The attractive interest rates negotiated to induce banks to purchase risk 
free T-bills has reduced their interest in pursuing a riskier loan market Loans account for 
only 25 percent while T-bills represent around 42 percent of total assets for the private 
commercial banks operating in The Gambia in the early 1990s. Thus, financial liberalization 
and economic stabilization has not promoted financial deepening and crowding out has 
reduced the scale of financial intermediation through the loan market 
These data might suggest that the structural adjustment measures were detrimental 
to financial development, but this is misleading. The size of the loan market was 
exaggerated in the early eighties. Much of the volume of outstanding balances at that time 
was a non-performing portfolio that later generated defaults in the largest bank in the 
market. In short, the financial market of the late 1980s and early 1990s more accurately 
reflects the true size of a solvent loan market for The Gambia. Still, the crowding out effect 
discussed above is a real concern. It represents a continuing process reducing the scale of 
the private sector loan market in The Gambia. This process could be ameliorated by 
drawing more on fiscal rather than monetary policy (i.e., the T-bill market) to contain 
inflation and introducing more competition in the T-bill market 
4. Savin&S Mobiliqtion 
Another issue of financial development during much of this period was the weak 
incentives for savings mobilization. To the extent that loan markets remain limited, there 
will be little incentive for banks to encourage savings mobilization. Savers have been 
penalized with zero or negative real rates of interest for a majority of the past 11 years. 
Savers in rural areas have been excluded from formal financial services altogether. In short, 
there is currently a greater potential for savings mobilization than for loans. The present 
underdeveloped state of formal financial markets in The Gambia will continue to penalize 
savings mobilization until markets expand for loan services. 
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5. Urban Bias and the Emer~<mce of NGOs 
The final issue associated with the evolution of Gambian financial markets has been 
the extreme urban bias that has emerged in these markets by the early 1990s. Several 
factors have reinforced this process. Agricultural lending has declined precipitously; the 
GCDB, the major rural bank has disappeared as an active lender; the agricultural linkages 
to the banking sector have been substantially reduced through the demise of the GCDB and 
the reorganization of the Gambian Cooperative Union. Finally, the natural heirs to the 
financial system, the private commercial banks, have no extensive branch network in rural 
areas to service rural depositor-savers, nor any direct agricultural loan portfolio. 
In the end, the rationali?.ation and reform of the Gambian economy from the mid-
1980s onwards was an essential step in the recovery of economic growth as Gambian author-
ities succeeded in stabi1izing inflation and liberalizing markets to secure a more stable path 
of development. The price policy reforms that grew out of these policy initiatives have 
proven successful in generating a more efficient and equitable pattern of growth. However, 
not surprisingly, institutional reforms have proven to be a far more difficult task. Restruc-
turing the banking system and liberalizing financial markets have produced a much smaller, 
leaner, and more resilient financial sector wholly dominated by private commercial banks. 
While this was in many ways a necessary and inevitable result for sound banking in The 
Gambia, this change does very little to service development in rural Gambia. Formal finan-
cial markets are still greatly underdeveloped, offering at best only limited financial services 
to an unusually small portion of the population from which rural areas are almost complete-
ly excluded. Private commercial banks located in Banjul cannot be expected to supply rural 
Gambians with financial services except as a wholesaler working through other agents such 
as commodity traders. 
The challenge facing Gambian authorities now is to expand and broaden financial 
intermediation beyond the mere transfer of the public's deposits into government securities. 
More attention must be given to promote the institutional innovations and strengthen the 
supervision and regulatory functions necessary to broaden the market for the supply of 
financial services. In this regard, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a possible 
option. NGOs have begun to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of formal 
financial linkages to rural Gambian markets. The degree to which NGOs can satisfactorily 
fill this vacuum and supply viable, self sustaining services is an open question. We explore 
these questions in greater detail in the following chapters. 
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Appendix 1-1 
The Demand for Money 
In this appendix, we investigate monetary issues further through estimation of 
demand for money equations in The Gambia. This was done to investigate the issue of 
what determines the demand for money and to examine the stability of the demand for 
money function. Our purpose in doing so was to determine if the quantity theory of money 
is valid in The Gambia (i.e. whether nominal income is determined by the stock of money). 
The theoretical approach in this analysis is based upon the neo-Fisherian-Friedman 
hypothesis, according to which the demand for money is a function of the level of economic 
activity and the opportunity cost of holding money (Balino 1980; Ahmed 1984; and 
Adekunde 1968). We postulate that the demand for real money balances is given by the 
function: 
M(t) =a + b•Y(t) + c•DP(t) + d•M(t-1) 
where M represents nominal money balances deflated by the implicit GDP deflator; Y is 
real GDP (our measure of economic activity); DP is the rate of inflation as measured by 
changes in the GDP deflator (our measure of the opportunity of the cost of holding money). 
The above equation is the standard demand for money equation found in the literature and 
has been estimated for numerous developed and less developed countries (Adekunde 1968; 
Balino 1980; Ahmed 1984 ). 
The above equation is estimated using ordinary least squares over the period 1967-
1991 with the variables M and Y transformed into natural logarithms. The money variable 
employed in all regressions is M2. The results are reported in Appendix Table 1-1. All of 
the estimated parameters are significantly different from zero at standard levels of 
significance. The Box-Pierce Q-statistic is utilized to test for autocorrelation. This was used 
since the equations contain a lagged dependent variable. The marginal significance levels 
of the Q statistics indicate that no autocorrelation of the residuals is present. The equation 
was run with and without DP (the GDP deflator) to assess the impact of this variable. 
The estimates of the individual parameters indicate the following: First, the 
estimated coefficient for real GDP is less than one (row 3, Appendix Table 1-1). However, 
at-test on this parameter failed to reject the hypothesis that it was significantly different 
from one, thus, implying that a 1 percent increase in real GDP would result in a 1 percent 
increase in real money balances. The coefficient of the rate of inflation (DP) has the 
expected negative sign. The elasticity of money balances with respect to inflation (row 9a) 
is found to be -0.041 indicating that real money balances are not very sensitive to changes 
in the opportunity cost of holding money. This is consistent with findings of most other 
studies on the demand for money cited earlier which report a similar result. 
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The coefficient on lagged money balances (row 2) is positive, less than one and highly 
significant. This indicates that individuals do not fully adjust their money holdings within 
a one year period, but such adjustment follows a smooth path. This further indicates that 
long run elasticities differ from short run elasticities. Long run elasticities are presented in 
row 7. The long run elasticities are found by dividing the short run elasticities by 1-d, where 
d is the estimated coefficient on lagged money balances. The income elasticity in the long 
run is approximately 2, a fairly high response. This highly elastic response of the demand 
for money to real income seems to confirm the hypothesis, put forward by Kaufman, 
according to which the income elasticity is inversely related to the state of money markets. 
The rationale for the Kaufman hypothesis is well established in economic theory. The 
development stage of financial markets may be judged by the availability and quality of 
money substitutes: the more advanced are money markets, the greater are the number, 
variety and liquidity of money substitutes. Thus, slower movements in money may be 
expected in response to a given percentage increase in income in countries with advanced 
money markets and the ready availability of a large variety of high-quality interest yielding 
money substitutes, like the United States. A quicker, more elastic response would be 
expected in less financially developed countries like The Gambia because there are no 
options other than money and one or two money substitutes. 
Statistical examination of the issue of stability of the demand for money was not 
possible due to the limited size of the sample. Some insights were obtained by estimation 
of this equation over the period 1967-1986. This was done to see if differences emerged 
with respect to the introduction of the structural adjustment and liberalization policies after 
1985. The results of the estimation, presented in columns 3 and 4 are not different from 
those over the period 1967-1991 and conform to the results reported over the period 1967-
1991. This suggests that the demand for money in The Gambia is stable. 
Given the openness of the Gambian economy, we also estimated the equation with 
the dalasi-British pound exchange rate and the 3 month UK T-bill rate as independent 
variables. Neither of these variables were significant, nor did their inclusion alter the 
findings already reported. Hence, the demand for real money balances is determined by 
real income and the opportunity cost of holding money. This supports the view that 
monetary policy (changes in the money supply) is important, and can affect economic growth 
in The Gambia. 
Appendix Table 1-1 
1. Constant 
2. ln M(t-1) 
3. ln Y(t) 
4. Inflation 
5.R2 
6. Q-stat 
7. Long run income 
elasticity 
8. T-stat for b=l 
9. Inflation 
elasticity: 
(a) short run 
(b) long run 
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Estimates of the Demand for Money in The Gambia. 
1967-1991 1967-1991 1967-1986 
(1) (2) (3) 
-2.98 -2Il -3.84 
(-2.88) (-2.15) (-3.02) 
0.51 0.(,6 0.45 
(3.78) (4.37) (3.00) 
0.85 0.64 1.05 
(3.22) (2.31) (3.32) 
-0.46 
(-1.86) 
0.97 0.97 097 
11.94 10.59 8.89 
(.45) (.56) (.54) 
1.73 1.88 1.91 
-0.53 -1.29 0.15 
-0.041 
-0.12 
1967-1986 
(4) 
-2.83 
(-2.00) 
0.63 
(3.48) 
0.76 
(2.18) 
-0.49 
(-1.62) 
0.97 
6.45 
(.TT) 
2.05 
-0.68 
-0.044 
-0.12 
Note: Number in parentheses is the t-statistic for estimated coefficients and the marginal significance level for 
the Q-statistics. 
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Appendix 1-2 
Notes on Alternative Forms of Term Finance in The Gambia 
1. Development Bank Finance Revisited 
The record for long term finance in The Gambia has not been promising. The 
collapse of the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank in the summer of 1992 does 
not bode well for the capacity of Gambian public sector institutions to manage the risks and 
the complexities of term finance contracts. These risks and operational complexities were 
outlined at the end of our earlier discussion of the GCDB at the end of Chapter One. 
Private banking institutions, on the other hand, largely avoid these risks and complexities 
as they focus on more secure shorter term loans and emphasize the purchase of T-bills and 
foreign exchange operations. The issue that surfaces at this point is whether there are 
viable long term investment opportunities in The Gambia that could be successfully financed 
by some term finance facility. 
One question that surfaces at this point is whether there are any viable long term 
investment opportunities in The Gambia. The short answer to this question is yes, and a 
good number are being financed by retained earnings, the most common form of finance 
used for long term investment in developing countries. One should not be misled into 
thinking that term investments are not occurring just because they don't stand out in bank 
portfolios. The next question that arises is whether term finance is possible from third 
parties rather than from the owner-investor. It is here that imperfect information emerges 
as a major bottleneck along with the risk already inherent to the investment project. The 
longer the term the greater the risk that strategic variables can change in unpredictable ways 
to affect profits and project viability. Moreover, an outside third party financier faces the 
additional risk of having less information than the investor (this is the asymmetric 
information problem), about the project's viability and the investors capability, motives, and 
character. Furthermore, if the outside source of finance is a bank, it has the additional 
fiduciary responsibility of protecting their depositor/ savers by not incurring undue risk in 
the allocation of their funds. Finally, a sound bank cannot engage in reckless term 
transformation (i.e. granting long term loans on the basis of short term deposit liabilities). 
This latter point deserves further comment. Private commercial banks in The 
Gambia face an average weighted deposit term (including both demand and time deposits) 
between two to four months. Hence, they cannot have a weighted term length of assets 
much beyond four to six months (assuming some degree of term transformation). This 
prudent balance or matching of asset and liability term structures protects the bank from 
a potential liquidity shortfall but it also reduces the potential for long term loans. Develop-
ment banks, of course, can remove this short term liability constraint by drawing on long 
term donor or government funds, thereby creating long term liabilities. This in tum can 
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lead to long term loans, however, at the cost of transmitting an incompatible incentive to 
borrowers that they can gamble on risky loan projects or that they do not have to be overly 
concerned about meeting their loan obligations. Thus, the creation of a public sector long 
term liability term structure can introduce moral hazard into the asset portfolio jeopardizing 
the solvency of the institution. 
2. Con~merate Ba.nkin& 
Another approach to the issue of the scarcity of term finance is to allow banks to 
create new-ventures or move into a commanding position in an existing business through 
term finance arrangements that in effect buys equity control of the business. This is some-
times referred to as the German banking model. This removes the information problem as 
the bank places key officials on the board of directors and, in some cases, in top manage-
ment itself. However, this requires that banks do more than banking. They must be expert 
professionals of non banking businesses and be prepared to risk the public's deposits for 
these business ventures. Germany (and later Japan) gradually moved into this form of 
"conglomerate" banking that included networks of business enterprises associated with key 
banks. British banking avoided this approach since there was not the same felt need for 
outside capital to finance industry during the industrial revolution. Americans distrusted this 
banking style from the very beginning, arguing against the concentration of economic power 
that this style would create compromising competition, and democracy. American analysts 
always point out that these historical examples of conglomerate banking emerged in non-
democratic states. 
Still this form of banking has emerged in some developing countries where the 
concentration of wealth naturally creates strong group interests and conglomerate banking 
to serve those interests. Chile, up to the 1982 financial crash, had several large group 
banking networks that, in the end, brought down the entire banking industry (McKinnon). 
The problem that emerged is the classic issue in group banking. To what extent can a bank, 
drawing upon deposits from the public at large, refuse a loan to a famng business within its 
own group? On the one hand, the bank has a fiduciary responsibility to its depositors, but, 
on the other hand, it has a responsibility to its shareholders who also have joint interlocking 
interests in a business in the bank group. This is a no win situation where the interests of 
two important constituencies in the bank group are in conflict. In the Chilean case, it led 
to a banking crisis that induced a conservative market oriented regime to nationalize the 
banking industry. This action was undertaken to protect depositors from wholesale losses 
as companies in one bank group after another began to fail in the midst of the recession of 
the early 1980s, prompting depositor runs on the banks. 
In the Gambian context, there is no feasible environment for group banking. The 
two strongest banks with the longest tradition of sound banking (the SCBG and BICI) are 
banks that come from a non-group heritage and would clearly be not inclined to undertake 
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an expansion into conglomerate banking. They are extremely risk averse in their lending 
behavior and would not be likely candidates to engage in conglomerate banking. The other 
two banks (Continental and Meridien) are relative newcomers, one of whom is still fighting 
litigation to remain open, while the other has just opened. More pertinent is the challenge 
to regulatory authorities in the Central Bank. They have a sufficient task to monitor and 
regulate the existing conventionally defined banking industry. It would be unwise to expect 
them to regulate conglomerate banking with its much more complex and risky group 
arrangements. In summary, it is appropriate for Gambian banking to remain in its present 
mode of conventional banking. 
3. The Stock Market 
The above discussion on conglomerate banking leads to the question of whether there 
are other alternative term financing vehicles available for The Gambia to substitute for the 
failed development bank option. Most do not appear promising, nevertheless, it is 
instructive to review the alternatives. One is a stock market. This of course avoids the 
pitfalls of debt finance discussed at length in our review of the GCDB history in Chapter 
One. However, this does not appear feasible given the limited market size in The Gambia. 
In 1991, only about three percent of the T-bill purchases were made by the non-bank, non-
public enterprise public. This barely represented 9 million dalasis, hardly a base for a stock 
market from this more affluent level of the Gambian public. Moreover, these people were 
looking for a secure, risk-free return in T-bills. It is not likely that many would shift to 
riskier investments in a local stock market. At the same time, the local banks and public 
enterprises who stand out in the T-bill market (particularly the former) would likewise be 
unusually cautious about switching investments from a secure T-bill market to a thin and 
unpredictable stock market. Finally, one has to ask who will offer stock issues in this 
market? Given the closely held nature of private businesses in The Gambia, it is unlikely 
any would issue stock at all, and if they would, they would always control the predominant 
majority of shares, thereby leading to potential "insider" problems that could compromise 
the rights of minority shareholders. A well developed Securities and Exchange Commission 
would be needed to prevent these classic abuses in an unregulated market through strong 
public disclosure requirements and related regulatory functions. Given the poor perform-
ance of public sector banking, and the growing demands on authorities to regulate the 
banking industry, it would not appear likely that Gambian authorities would be interested 
in nor prepared to successfully regulate a local stock market. 
4. Leasin~ Arran~ements 
An additional term finance vehicle is leasing (Karnath). Instead of engaging in loans, 
financial intermediaries or leasing companies can choose to work through leasing arrange-
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ments. This removes one troublesome feature of long term loans, namely, the foreclosure 
of collateral. Since the property in question belongs to the lender there is no legal question 
involved in repossessing the property. Furthermore, if the cash flow of a project declines, 
both the leasor and leasee can work out agreements to end the lease in contrast to a long 
term loan where the borrower is locked into a long time horizon of installment payments 
even in the face of a shortfall in project earnings or even outright failure. 
Leasing arrangements are usually associated with portable property (i.e. automobiles, 
trucks, buses, tractors, equipment, etc.). After an initial downpayment, the leasee agrees to 
pay the leasor a fixed fee for use of the equipment for a stipulated period of time at the end 
of which time the leasee may have an option to purchase or return the equipment in 
question. For leasing to work successfully, several important markets must be functioning 
efficiently, namely insurance markets, repair services, and a secondary market for the 
equipment or vehicle in question. Insurance markets are necessary to protect the leasor 
against possible damage to the equipment. At the same time, an efficient maintenance and 
repair service industry must be in place to monitor and inspect the state of the equipment 
at prescribed intervals on behalf of the leasor. Thirdly, there must be an active secondary 
market for the leased equipment to allow the leasor an option to conveniently repossess and 
sell the equipment to recoup his investment in the event of an unsatisfactory lease. The 
ever present possibility of this option also induces the leasee to meet his lease payments 
regularly. Finally, tax advantages favor leasing when both the leasor and leasee can write 
off depreciation charges (for the leasor) and interest or lease payments (for the leasee) 
respectively. 
It would appear that some market niches exist for leasing arrangements in The 
Gambia. One firm is reportedly leasing mini-vans successfully in the Banjul area. This is 
a classic market for lease arrangements as all of the above requirements are met: an insur-
ance industry to cover the vehicles, a service sector to inspect and repair the vehicles, and 
an active, assured secondary market for resale of the vehicles. When such conditions exist, 
natural market forces can emerge to fill the niches for leasing arrangements through entre-
preneurial initiative. 
Banks in developed economies frequently set up their own leasing companies. Such 
a move in The Gambia appears unlikely. Investment in specialized human capital would 
be needed and the markets for leasing in The Gambia generally do not have sufficient scale 
economies to justify such a move. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that local 
banks might help finance some of the working capital needs of firms well established in 
successful market niches like the one described above or poSSibly directly compete in the 
urban mini-van transport market now that one operator has established its profitability. 
English banks have a tradition of offering leasing services. Conceivably, Standard Chartered 
Bank could benefit from the leasing experiences of its larger branches in such countries as 
Kenya or Zimbabwe and transfer the lessons learned to the Gambian market. The key issue 
here is the size of the leasing market in a country as small as The Gambia, and whether risk 
averse banks would incur the start-up investment costs of such a venture. No information 
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is presently at hand to determine if banks in The Gambia are in fact considering such a 
move. However, it is the most likely term finance option for private banks to consider in 
the Gambian market. 
5. Guarantee Funds 
By far the most commonly used vehicle to promote term finance (outside of develop-
ment banks) is guarantee funds. These are designed to induce banks to make loans to a 
clientele they otherwise wouldn't service with loans. With a 100 percent guarantee, perverse 
incentives may exist inducing banks to make loans carelessly and not engage in much moni-
toring or determined loan recovery since they are guaranteed full compensation for all 
losses. Unlimited deposit insurance leads to this form of moral hazard as seen in the recent 
savings and loan industry crisis in the U.S. At the other extreme is limited coverage, say 50 
or 60 percent, in which a substantial part of the bank's own funds is at risk. The banks 
clearly want to negotiate an agreement as close to 100 percent as possible while donors and 
government try to reduce the guarantee. The danger of too low a guarantee is that the 
banks share of risk becomes too high and the fund is not resorted to as banks refuse to 
make loans under the program. Too high a guarantee increases moral hazard into the 
program as banks do not evaluate creditworthiness carefully or engage in determined loan 
recovery. 
Even 100 percent guarantee programs are not necessarily attractive. Banks frequent-
ly have to incur high transaction costs to prove they have made a determined effort to 
collect on outstanding defaulting loans including legal and court proceedings before they can 
access the guarantee fund. In light of these costs, many banks avoid guarantee programs 
altogether. The literature has generally been very skeptical about the extent to which 
guarantee programs contribute any additionality to loan programs (Levitsky and Prasad). 
The World Bank small and medium enterprise guarantee program has moved very little 
money in the late 1980s. The challenge is to choose a beneficiary group that is not too far 
beyond the normal risk horizon of the bank, and then negotiate to bring the client groups 
risk profile within the financial frontier of the bank. Too often the clientele group chosen 
is too far from the risk threshold of the bank so that no amount of tinkering with the terms 
and conditions (the risk exposure of the bank, the interest rate spread, the criteria for access 
to the fund, etc.) will ever bring the target group into the range of the banks risk frontier. 
NGOs can sometimes make a difference in lowering the risks and transaction costs 
for the bank by undertaking the responsibility of screening and sorting individual credit-
worthy clientele or forming solidarity groups who in fact practice responsible loan habits and 
generate a return on loan contracts. These success stories have been more noted in Latin 
America than Africa. Moreover, it is important to note that these successful programs 
emphasize working capital rather than investment loans (Berger and Buvinic; Magill and 
Swanson). Crucial here is the degree to which these valuable "brokering" services are 
effective and the reputation of the NGO. Clearly, the latter will have to have credibility 
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with the banks before they would enter into a guarantee program with them. The NGO 
community in The Gambia has not yet reached the level of experience and performance in 
financial markets (with the possible exception of the VISACA group) that one could 
envision them playing a comparable role with local banks in the near future. 
Finally, one must point out the issue of the credibility of the government or the 
Central Bank in honoring guarantee programs. The GCDB never received any compensa-
tion for the "guaranteed" losses they suffered in the IBAS loan guarantee program. It has 
been reported that one of the private banks was never compensated for losses associated 
with the failure of a hotel guarantee loan in the mid-1980s. Clearly, if the government 
chooses not to honor guarantee commitments, these programs will not be undertaken by the 
banks. Currently, the Gambian government has signed commitments with donors not to 
sponsor any guarantee programs. Thus, any discussion of designing and implementing 
guarantee programs in the financial markets of The Gambia has become redundant 
6. Contractual Savinp Pro&rams 
Another alternative term finance facility is contractual savings programs. In deve-
loped countries, this refers to the large funding base represented by institutional investors 
(i.e. insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) These operators play an important role in 
financing investment through long term capital markets of developed countries. In The 
Gambia, however, where such markets are absent, contractual savings programs logically 
invest their surplus in government securities. The Social Security and Housing Finance 
Corporation (SSHFC) is the principal contractual savings institution in the country. It 
consists of: (a) a Federated Pension Scheme made up of parastatal employees in which the 
employer pays in full 19 percent of employee salaries into the fund; (b) a National Provident 
(i.e. pension) Fund for private sector employees in which the employer contributes 10 
percent and the employee 5 percent of the relevant salary base, and; ( c) a housing finance 
fund that secures appropriations from the government, interfund transfers generated by the 
two pension funds and from external sources such as Shelter Afrique and other donors. As 
of June 1991, there were 29 member institutions (with a total number of 6,233 employees) 
in the Federated Pension Scheme (the parastatal pension fund). The National Provident 
Fund (NPF), on the other hand, includes 550 private businesses with a total of 16, 877 
employees. Civil servants within the government have their own pension scheme separate 
from these funds discussed here. 
The SSHFC is not important in formal loan markets. Only the pension fund 
associated with former parastatal employees makes loans (largely to its staff and to the 
housing fund), but this represents less than one percent of total outstanding loans in the 
banking system in 1991. However, the accumulated assets of the SSHFC are clearly more 
important. To place these assets in a relative context, they amount to 20 percent of the 
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assets held by the formal banking system in 1991, while SSHFC T-bill purchases in 1991 
represent 18 percent of the total T-bill market of that year. 
Given the relative importance of assets and government securities in the portfolio of 
the SSHFC, it is inspuctive to review the growth and composition of gross assets in the 
three funds of the SSHFC and then speculate on the implications for term finance. 
Appendix 1-2 Table 1 sets forth the relative size of each of these three funds in the asset 
structure of the SSHFC. The housing finance fund is clearly less developed than the two 
pension funds, however, it has grown more rapidly in 1991 through the launching of the 
Kaninfing low income sites and services housing project. Also, it is clear that the private 
sector pension fund (i.e., the National Provident Fund) has been growing more rapidly than 
the parastatal employee fund (i.e., the pension fund derived from the Federated Pension 
Scheme of the 1970s). The relative share of the former has been growing from 1984 to 1991 
(from 41to45 percent) while the share of the latter has declined from 50 to 42 percent of 
total SSHFC assets. The percentage change of total assets in Appendix 1-2 Table 2 is 
consistent with the changing relative shares in the first table, highlighting the greater relative 
growth of the private sector over the public sector pension fund. 
These results conform to the rapidly declining parastatal activity in the recent past 
in The Gambia. Fewer and fewer parastatal employees are now available to elicit the 
employer annual contributions of earlier years. The major activity increasing the assets of 
the pension fund is the rate of return on its asset portfolio. New annual contributions are 
rapidly declining with the decline in parastatal employment. In contrast, the private sector 
provident fund has been growing rapidly with the relative growth of private sector activity 
in the economy in recent years. Consequently, the growing annual contn"bution of both 
private sector employees and their employers add to the asset base of this fund along with 
the rate of return on its existing assets. Finally, the housing finance fund grows in part 
through appropriations from the surplus balances of both employee pension funds. With 
the relative decline of the public sector parastatal pension fund and the rapid growth of the 
private sector provident fund, it is clear that the profits or surplus from the latter are now 
playing a more important role in financing the housing fund through interfund loans. 
It is instructive now to review the form of governance for the SSHFC. In 1991, the 
Board of Directors was reconstituted following the signing of a World Bank initiated 
performance contract between the government and the SSHFC. The purpose of the 
Contract was to get the SSHFC management to 'improve on corporate efficiency and to 
fu.l6ll certain target objectives in exchange for the Government's grant of greater autonomy 
in the management of the Corporation's affairs.' The Board is now composed of 10 
members, five of whom are Executive Directors of the SSHFC. Two of the other five are 
Government employees (the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the Chief 
Executive of the National Investment Board) and the other three are nominated members. 
The three nominated members include one from the Private Sector one nominated by 
members of the Federated Pension Scheme (FPS) and one nominated by the members of 
the National Provident Fund (NPF). In light of the growing size of the private sector 
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pension fund in the SSHFC, there should be a greater representation of private sector 
business on the Board of Directors. The current Board is still weighted too heavily by 
public sector representation reflecting a legacy from the past 
Appendix 1-2 Table 3 sets forth the asset composition of the SSHFC. Investment 
assets play a far more dominant role in the provident than in the pension fund (92 vs. 56 
percent). Also, the pension fund is the only fund that records loans, while current assets in 
the form of bank balances and interfund fund transfers stand out for the housing fund. 
Investment assets are spread throughout a wider array of holdings in the pension fund re-
flecting the legacy from its past when it held small equity shares in parastatal operations and 
in mortgage properties. The provident fund, in contrast, largely holds its assets in T-bills 
and term deposits. The growing role of government securities (largely T-bills) stands out 
for the provident fund in Appendix 1-2 Table 4 where one can see that by 1991, the 
provident fund accounted for practically double the share registered for the pension fund. 
Among other things, this has secured a stable rate of return for the provident funds asset 
portfolio. 
Finally, it is revealing to analyze the income and expense statements for the three 
funds in the SSHFC. These income and expense statements are set forth in Appendix 1-2 
Table 5. The National Provident Fund (NPF) records a loss while the other two programs 
record surpluses for this period. This is in part misleading and should not be interpreted 
that the NPF is compromising the interests of its private sector pensioners. In fact, just the 
opposite is the case. The benefits payable under each Scheme is equivalent to the balance 
owed on the member's account. However, the FPS provides for the conversion of such 
benefits into annuities while the NPF pays out its benefits in lump sums. This is an 
important difference. While the FPS conversions are determined using the actuarial 
equivalents, the NPF lump sum payments are equal to the actual balances together with 
accrued interest on the member's account at the time that the payments are made. The 
NPF member's accounts are therefore credited annually with interest income (see line 2 of 
Appendix 1-2 Table 5). The rate is set in order that the Fund operates with only a 2 percent 
margin to cover administrative expenses. This low rate was set by the government in 1981. 
Although the SSHFC has realized that they have been 'losing' money on the Fund (to the 
benefit of the members) through this unrealistically low margin, the Corporation cannot 
change the rate unilaterally. The SSHFC has therefore requested that the Cabinet (and 
Parliament) increase its margin. 
Finally, it is appropriate to conclude this discussion by exploring the way in which 
these contractual savings programs may become a vehicle for term financing in The Gambia. 
In 1990/91 the Corporation applied for a license from the Central Bank to start a voluntary 
savings and loan scheme. Although the scheme has yet to get off the ground, it is instructive 
to review the initiative. 
The savings window would be open to the public at large. Loans would be granted 
to these depositors for housing only. In short, it would be a specialized lender, drawing 
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upon deposit liabilities and long term external loans from Shelter Afrique and other donors 
to meet the growing demand for housing loans. This would presumably represent a third 
tier to housing policy in The Gambia with the first tier representing completely built low 
cost public housing complexes (the Bakoteh Estate mortgage debtors), and the second tier 
made up of the sites and services project for the Kaninfing mortgage debtors. This third tier 
would be based on individual clients borrowing to build a home on properties they currently 
hold through renewable, 99 year lease hold leases. These properties would be held as 
collateral by the SSHFC for their housing loans. 
The apparent mismatch between short term deposit liabilities and long term housing 
loans would be corrected through a scheme of automatic salary deduction into the depositor-
borrower's savings account. In short, the savings account, once a housing loan is in place, 
no longer is a voluntary withdrawable account. On the contrary, it becomes a contractual 
savings account to service the loan obligation. Finally, the leasehold collateral is 
strengthened through the ease with which the SSHFC can automatically take over a 
collateralized leasehold in the event of a defaulting debtor. The SSHFC does not fall under 
the Financial Institutions Act (FIA). It operates under a separate act of parliament that 
expedites a quick right of repossession and the option to lease the property of a defaulted 
borrower to a third party or run it itself. A bank under the FIA must sell only to cover its 
outstanding debts. In the end, the legal transaction costs of repossession and rental are less 
cumbersome through the SSHFC than through banks. 
In summary, the SSHFC actually received permission to open its saving and loan 
facility, but did not exercise its option before its charter permission ran out at the end of 
the year. The prospective design appears sound. None of the pensioners accumulated 
savings are involved. The collateralized property holdings would appear secure and the mis-
match between assets and liabilities dealt with. On the whole, this experiment in specialized 
lending for housing appears to be a reasonably sound prospect for the expansion of financial 
services in the term lending market niche currently overlooked in the banking industry. 
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Appendix 1-2 Table 1 Share of Total Gross Assets of the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation 
Allocated Among the Three Major Funds of the Program. 
Percent 
1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pension Fund 49.9 47.9 42.1 
Provident Fund 41.0 43.8 45.2 
Housing Fund 41.0 8.2 12.6 
Total(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total ( dalasis) (98,867,021) (123,363,080) (163,936,231) 
Source: SSHFC Balance Sheets, 1989-91. 
Appendix 1-2 Table 2 Percentage Change in Total Assets for the Three Funds of the Social Security and 
Housing Finance Corporation (1989 through 1991). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Pension Fund 
Provident Fund 
Housing Fund 
Source: Balance Sheets of SSHFC, 1989-91. 
1989-90 
(1) 
7.1 
33.8 
143 
Percentage Change 
1990-91 
(2) 
103 
37.6 
102.0 
61 
Appendix 1-2 Table 3 Composition of Gross Assets of the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation 
(as of June 30, 1991). 
Percent(%) 
Pension Fund Provident Fund Housing Fund 
(1) (2) (3) 
I. Fixed Assets 17.9 0.1 
II. Investment Assets 56.2 92.1 76.0 
1. Government Securities (33.1) (56.9) (23.0) 
(Dev. Stock, Discount Notes, 
and Treasury Bills) 
2. GPMB Groundnut Bills (2.4) (113) (7.9) 
3. Bank Term Deposits (23.9) (2.4) 
4. Equity Holdings (7.1) 
5. Investment Properties (9.2) 
6. NTC Ltd. Debentures (43) 
7. Bakoteh Mortgage Debtors (233) 
8. Kaninfing Mortgage Debtors (0.1) (19.0) 
9. Other Investments 
m. Loans 14.7 
1. lnterfund loans (10.8) 
2. Staff loans (3.2) 
3. Other loans (0.7) 
IV. Current Assets 11.1 7.8 24.0 
(Interfund transfers; prepayments 
on loans, mortgages; bank 
balances) 
Total Assets(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total Assets (in Dalasis) (69,034,438) (74,22.5,383) (20,676,410) 
Source: Consolidated Balance Sheet of SSHFC, 1991. 
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Appendix 1-2 Table 4 Percentage Allocation of Government Securities (Development Stocks, Discount Notes 
and Treasury Bills) of the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation Among 
its Three Major Funds, 1989-91. 
Percent 
1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. Pension Fund 43 36 33 
2. Provident Fund 51 57 60 
3. Housing Fund 6 7 7 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Balance Sheet of SSHFC, 1989-91. 
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Appendix 1-2 Table 5 Income and Expense Statements for SSHFC Funds (For Year Ended 30 June 1991). 
Pension Fund Provident Fund Housing Fund 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. Income 
Investment Income 6,526,561 10,957,867 1,068,064 
Rents 607,301 
Interest on Loans 106,982 
Sundry Inc. 2,838 
Gross Income 7,243,682 10,957,867 1,068,064 
2. Less Charges on Gross Income 
Interest on NPF member accounts (9,792,721) 
Provision for Gross Income (125,144) 
Royalty 
3. Net Income 7,118,538 1,165,146 1,068,064 
4. Recurrent Expenditure 
(operating expenses, adlnin. 2,014,558 2,020,910 820,424 
expenses, etc.) 
5. Surplus (Deficit) 5,103,980 (855,764) 247,640 
Source: SSHFC Income and Expense Statements, 1991. 
Tables 1-1through1-51 
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Table 1-1 Market Structure of the Banking Industry in The Gambia, for Selected Years, 1980/81 to 
1991/92. 
Total Number of Banks 
Total Number of Branches 
Total in Greater Banjul 
Total Outside Greater Banjul 
Number of New Banks (opened in year) 
Number of Closed Banks (in year) 
Total Number of Banks 
Total Number of Branches 
Total in Greater Banjul 
Total outside Greater Banjul 
Number of New Banks (opened in year) 
Number of Closed Banks (in year) 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia files. 
1980/81 
(1) 
4 
12 
9 
3 
1 
0 
1988/89 
(5) 
3 
12 
9 
3 
0 
1 
1981/82 
(2) 
4 
13 
10 
3 
1 
1 
1990/91 
(6) 
4 
13 
10 
3 
1 
0 
1982/83 1985/86 
(3) (4) 
5 4 
14 13 
11 10 
3 3 
1 0 
0 1 
1991/92 
(7) 
4 
13 
10 
3 
1 
1 
Table 1-2 Bank Openings and Closings for Banks Operating in The Gambia, 1980/88 to 1992/93. 
Banks Year Opened Year Closed 
(1) (2) 
1. Gambia Commercial and Development 1972 1992 
Bank (GCDB) 
2. Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) operating 
3. International Bank of Commerce and 2 operating 
Industry (BCCI) 
4. General Merchant F"mancial Institution 1980/81 1981/82 
(GMFI) 
5. Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 1981/82 1988/89 
6. International Bank of West Africa (IBWA- 1982/83 1985/86 
BIAO) 
7. Continental Bank (CB) 1990/91 in litigation 
8. Meridien Bank (MB) 1992/93 beginning operation 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia files. 
Note 1: The Standard Chartered Bank dates back to the Colonial Period. 
2: The BICI was founded shortly after Gambian independence in the mid-1960s. 
Table 1·3 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
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Outstanding Balances of Private and Public Sector Credit in The Gambia, 1981-1991 (Millions 
of Current Dalasis). 
Total Private Total Public Sector credit (net claims Total Domestic 
Sector Credit on govt. plus credit to public entities) Credit 
(1) (2) (3) 
96.9 113.4 2103 
83.1 158.7 241.8 
165.8 165.4 331.2 
143.4 235.8 379.2 
146.6 255.1 401.9 
183.5 301.9 485.5 
174.2 153.1 3ZT3 
192.6 63.9 256.5 
224.5 173 241.8 
2503 -171.7 78.6 
289.8 -2773 12.5 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, data derived from monetary survey data in Table 7 of Central Bank 
bulletins (basic statistics for June of each year). 
Table 1-4 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Real Outstanding Balances of Private and Public Sector Credit in The Gambia 1981-1991 
(millions or 1976/77 dalasis). 
Total Private Total Public Sector Credit (net claims Total Domestic 
Sector Credit on govt. plus credit to public entities) Credit 
(1) (2) (3) 
89.94 99.80 189.75 
89.19 135.05 224.24 
138.77 38.53 277.40 
101.16 66.22 267.44 
94.87 165.12 259.99 
77.29 127.19 204.49 
54.44 47.86 10239 
56.45 18.73 75.19 
57.67 4.43 62.11 
55.59 -38.13 17.45 
58.27 -55.76 2.51 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, various bulletins. 
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Table 1-5 Indices of Real Private Sedor, Public Sector and Total Credit in 1he Gambia (1981=100). 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Source: Table 1-4. 
Total Private Sector 
Credit 
(1) 
100.00 
99.15 
154.28 
112.47 
105.47 
85.93 
6053 
62.76 
64.12 
61.80 
64.79 
Table 1-6 Ratios of Credit to Total GDP. 
Total Public Sector Total Domestic 
Credit Credit 
(2) (3) 
100.00 100.00 
13531 118.17 
138.80 146.19 
166.54 140.94 
165.44 137.01 
127.44 107.71 
47.95 53.91 
18.71 39.62 
4.44 32.73 
-38.20 9.19 
-55.87 132 
Year Private Sector Credit/GDP Total Domestic Credit/GDP 
(1) (2) 
1981 24.96 52.66 
1982 '12.72 57.13 
1983 3138 62.73 
1984 '13.97 6337 
1985 21.79 59.74 
1986 16.90 44.73 
1987 11.58 21.71 
1988 11.81 15.73 
1989 1159 12.49 
1990 10.58 332 
1991 10.86 0.46 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, various bulletins. 
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Table 1-7 Indices of Real and Sectoral GDP in 1be Gambia 1981-1991 (1981=100). 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total GDP Growth Rate 
GDP GDP GDP GDP (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1982 142.38 79.40 99.53 108.93 8.9 
1983 171.93 69.85 111.55 122.73 12.6 
1984 135.56 83.65 113.97 117.12 -4.5 
1985 145.00 81.10 116.65 120.78 3.1 
1986 129.20 112.10 149.84 126.87 5.8 
1987 138.18 129.04 148.26 130.40 2.8 
1988 136.79 120.57 155.07 132.63 1.7 
1989 133.20 125.49 165.51 138.01 4.1 
1990 144.84 135.05 172.25 145.73 5.6 
1991 124.62 138.70 186.25 148.80 2.1 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Table 1-8 
Private 
Public 
Total 
Agriculture 
Fishing 
Construction 
Transportation 
Trade 
Tourism 
Others 
Managed Fund Account (i.e. volume of credit outstanding transferred from the GCDB) in 
Absolute and Relative Terms by Private and Public Sector Allocation and Sector of Economic 
Activity in 1987. 
Sectoral Allocation 
(in millions of 1976/7 dalasis) 
(1) 
10.3 
12.5 
22.8 
Economic Activity Allocation 
(in millions of 1976 /7 dalasis) 
(1) 
7.4 
2.3 
2.6 
0.3 
0.7 
2.2 
4.1 
Percentage of 1987 Credit 
(%) 
(2) 
18.9 
26.0 
22.0 
Percentage of 1987 Credit 
(%) 
(2) 
54.5 
48.0 
35.5 
7.2 
4.3 
45.0 
49.0 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
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Table 1-9 Total Revenue and Expenditures for Central Government Operations in The Gambia 1985/6 
to 1991/2 (in millions or current dalasis). 
1985/ 1986/ 1987/ 1988/ 1989/ 1990/ 1991/92 
6 7 8 9 90 91 (estimated) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Tgtal R~v~n~ and Grants 271.8 484.7 490.1 565.2 659.6 6185 827.3 
a) Domestic Tax Revenue 212.7 328.2 3235 4505 508.4 533.3 652.6 
b) Foreign Grants 59.1 156.4 156.6 114.7 151.2 145.2 198.7 
2. Tmill EJmenditur~ and Net 286.0 546.9 6025 504.6 700.6 644.8 7745 
Lending 
a) Current Expenditure 183.3 327.0 433.7 354.8 434.4 452.4 509.7 
b) Development Expend. and 94.8 221.8 179.4 138.8 262.1 194.9 264.8 
Net Lending 
3. 11JJS11Jggt~ E!penditure 7.9 -1.9 -10.6 11.0 4.1 -2.6 
4. SYmlus Qr D~fim 
a) Excluding Foreign Grants -110.3 -232.8 -274.4 -79.6 -192.2 -1115 -122.0 
b) Including Foreign Grants -51.2 -76.3 -117.8 35.1 -41.0 33.7 76.8 
(as percent of GDP) 
5. Dgmestic Revenue 24.7 22.1 20.4 23.2 21.7 19.8 20.9 
6. Tmill EJmenditur~ 111!§ Net 335 36.8 36.6 26.0 29.9 24.0 24.8 
l..eDding 
7. SY!J!lus gr Deficit 
a) Excluding Foreign Grants -12.8 -15.7 -16.8 -4.1 -8.2 -4.1 -0.9 
b) Including Foreign Grants -6.0 -5.1 -7.2 1.8 -1.7 1.0 25 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
Table 1-10 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
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Real Gross Domestic Investment and Real Government Expenditure in The Gambia, 1987-1991 
(millions of 1976/77 dalasis). 
Real Private Real Government Real Government 
Investment Investment Expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) 
12.8 32.2 150.0 
55 32.0 184.0 
21.6 26.3 145.4 
43.8 26.6 132.2 
41.0 Z75 121.6 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
Table 1-11 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Indices of Real Private Investment, Real Government Investment and Real Government 
Expenditure in The Gambia, 1987-1991, (1987=100). 
Real Private Real Government Real Government 
Investment Investment Expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
42.9 99.4 122.7 
168.8 81.7 96.9 
342.2 82.6 88.1 
320.3 85.4 81.1 
Source: Table 1-10. 
Table 1-12 Pen:entage Shares of Investment and Government Expenditure in GDP. 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Source: Table 1-10. 
Real Private 
Investment 
(1) 
2.7 
1.2 
4.3 
8.3 
6.7 
Real Government Real Govt. Exp. 
Investment 
(2) (3) 
6.8 31.9 
6.7 385 
5.3 29.2 
5.1 25.2 
4.6 22.6 
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Table 1-13 Liquidity Position of Commercial Banks in The Gambia 1987-1990, (millions of current 
dalasis). 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Liquid Assets (2 + 5) 102.08 150.54 144.61 177.69 193.72 
2 Reserves (3 + 4) 54.63 00.91 41.80 50.75 72:lfJ 
3. Deposits at CBG 49.99 54.47 34.93 41.75 58.43 
4. Cash Holdings 4.64 6.44 6E1 9.00 13.83 
5. T-Bills 47.45 89.63 102.81 126.95 121.46 
6. Required Liquid Assets 73.88 tr7.69 96.23 103.99 124.15 
7. Required Cash Reserves 33.94 41.17 43.25 48.78 59.08 
8. Excess Cash Reserves (2 - 7) 20.69 19.74 -1.45 1.'T/ 13.18 
9. Excess Liquidity (1- 6) 28.20 6285 43.38 73.70 69.57 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Annual Report 1990/1991, Table VIIl. 
Table 1-14 Distribution of Outstanding Government Securities in The Gambia, (millions of current 
dalasis). 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
T-bills 
Central Bank 0 0 30.00 9.(>6 0.28 13.88 19.09 
Commercial Banks 24.40 2200 34.50 93.63 102.81 144.00 121.46 
Public Enterprises 0 0 6.00 24.11 45.99 6229 114.30 
Nonbank Public 0 0 1.45 2.61 327 6.44 8.78 
Total 24.40 2200 71.95 130.01 15235 21.6.61 263.63 
Govt. Development Stock 
Central Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.00 
Commercial Banks 5.40 10.90 10.90 10.50 13.(>6 10.50 10.50 
Public Enterprise 7.40 11.80 11.80 11.80 0 0 1.30 
Nonbank Public 0.59 0.82 0.82 0.81 9.88 1298 4.68 
Total 13.39 23.52 23.52 23.11 23.54 23.48 23.48 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Annual Rc;port 1990/1991, Table XVIII. 
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Table 1-15 Composition of M2 in The Gambia, 1981-1991 (in millions of current dalasis). 
Year Total Domestic Net Foreign Net Other Money T-bills 
Credit Assets Items Supply (M2) Outstanding 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1981 210.3 -485 -75.6 86.2 14.7 
1982 241.8 -101.7 -415 98.6 14.3 
1983 331.2 -160.9 -37.8 1325 265 
1984 379.2 -3'12.7 805 137.0 25.6 
1985 401.9 -336.7 117.3 1825 24.6 
1986 4855 -584.8 326.8 1Il.4 22.6 
1987 327.3 -313.2 313.1 3rl.3 71.9 
1988 2565 -175.9 313.7 394.3 130.0 
1989 241.8 -151.9 337.1 4rl.O 152.3 
1990 78.6 0.1 420.7 4995 226.6 
1991 125 143.9 4rl.1 584.1 263.6 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Notes: Column 4 = Column 1 + Column 2 + Column 3. 
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Table 1-16 Real Commercial Bank. Credit by Sector in The Gambia 1981-1991, (Loans Outstanding, 
millions of 1976/77 dalasis). 
Year Agriculture Construction Services Other Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1981 46.29 9.05 44.05 42.38 141.78 
1982 49.31 8.50 43.82 33.63 135.28 
1983 51.17 653 42.96 42.91 14359 
1984 39.15 8.63 56.15 22.19 126.14 
1985 37.89 1155 44.36 30.08 123.89 
1986 30.67 12.08 34.23 20.33 97.33 
1987 18.38 7.32 25.31 17.37 68.39 
1988 20.36 6.32 25.96 14.16 <>6.82 
1989 14.87 5.74 24.80 20.87 <>6.31 
1990 9.17 3.94 23.44 19.72 56.28 
1991 9.45 2.84 25.84 18.40 5655 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Various Bulletins, Table 1-11 (commercial banks loans and advances to 
major economic sectors), converted to constant dalasis series by GDP deflator. 
Table 1-17 Indices of Real Commercial Bank. Credit by Sector in The Gambia (1981=100). 
Year Agriculture Construction Services Other Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1982 10654 93.95 99.49 79.35 95.42 
1983 11055 72.18 9753 101.25 101.28 
1984 8457 95.42 127.47 52.36 88.96 
1985 81.86 127.58 100.69 70.98 87.38 
1986 <>621 133.50 77.70 47.98 68.65 
1987 39.71 80.88 57.46 40.99 48.33 
1988 44.05 69.89 58.93 33.42 47.13 
1989 32.14 63.48 56.31 4926 46.77 
1990 19.83 4353 53.21 4653 39.69 
1991 20.43 31.40 58.67 43.42 39.88 
Source: Table 1-16. 
Table 1-18 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
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Ratio of Sectoral Credit (outstanding balances) to Sectoral GDP in The Gambia, 1981-1991 
(percentages). 
Agr. cr./Agr. GDP Ind. cr./Ind. GDP Ser. Cr./Ser. GDP 
(1) (2) (3) 
52.60 19.22 22.71 
39.36 22.74 22.70 
33.82 19.86 19.86 
32.81 21.92 25.40 
29.69 30.24 19.61 
1.6.98 22.89 11.78 
15.11 12.04 8.80 
16.92 11.14 8.63 
12.69 9.72 7.73 
72JJ 6.19 7.01 
8.62 435 7.15 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Table 1-19 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Sectoral Shares of Total Gross Domestic Product in 1he Gambia, 1981-1991 (by major 
sectors). 
Agriculture Industry Services 
(1) (2) (3) 
24.42 13.07 53.81 
31.92 9.52 49.17 
34.21 7.44 48.91 
28.27 9.33 52.36 
29.31 8.77 51.97 
24.87 11.55 63.55 
25.88 12.93 61.18 
25.19 11.88 62.92 
'1.3.57 11.88 64.53 
24.27 12.11 63.61 
20.45 12.18 67.35 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Table 1-20 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
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Sectoral Shares of Total Commerdal Bank Credit in 'lbe Gambia (Pen:entages) 1981-1991 (by 
major sectors). 
Agriculture (%) Industry(%) Services (%) Other(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
32.65 6.38 31.07 29.89 
36.45 6.28 32.39 24.86 
35.64 4.55 29.92 29.88 
31.03 6.84 44.51 17.59 
30.58 9.32 35.80 24.28 
31.51 12.41 35.16 20.89 
26.87 10.70 37.01 25.40 
30.47 9.46 38.84 21.20 
22.43 8.67 37.41 31.48 
16.30 7.00 41.64 35.04 
16.72 5.02 45.70 32.54 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, various bulletins. 
Table 1-21 Measures of Real Sectoral Commerdal Bank Credit in The Gambia, 1981-1991 (Loans 
Outstanding, millions of 1976/77 dalasis). 
Year Agr. FJSh. Constr. Trade Tourism Transp. Other Personal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 44.15 2.13 9.05 '18.97 10.71 4.35 25.51 16.86 
1982 48.10 1.21 8.50 27.12 11.17 5.53 17.13 16.49 
1983 49.15 2.02 6.53 24.24 13.04 5.67 24.38 18.52 
1984 31.07 8.08 8.63 37.15 12.50 6.49 6.43 15.75 
1985 29.89 8.00 11.55 '18.36 11.81 4.18 12.92 17.15 
1986 21.54 9.12 12.08 23.25 7.35 3.62 9.58 10.75 
1987 13.59 4.79 7.32 16.30 4.84 4.16 8.26 9.11 
1988 14.27 6.09 6.32 15.39 6.47 4.09 4.94 9.22 
1989 9.03 5.84 5.74 13.61 8.67 2.51 11.23 9.64 
1990 4.48 4.69 3.94 13.66 9.02 0.75 10.71 9.01 
1991 4.89 4.56 2.84 16.86 8.39 0.59 9.01 9.38 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
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Table 1-22 Indices of Real Sectoral Commercial Bank Credit in The Gambia (1981=100). 
Year Agr. F"ish. Constr. Trade Tourism Transp. Other Personal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1982 108.94 56.76 93.95 93.00 104.22 127.06 67.15 97.82 
1983 111.30 95.06 72.18 83.66 121.69 130.35 95.57 109.86 
1984 70.36 378.59 95.42 128.21 116.65 149.14 25.23 93.42 
1985 67.68 375.09 127.58 97.87 110.22 96.06 50.64 101.75 
1986 48.80 4'Z7.74 133.50 80.23 68.66 83.13 37.54 63.78 
1987 30.77 224.50 80.88 56.25 45.20 95.68 32.37 54.02 
1988 32.33 285.44 69.89 53.11 00.40 94.06 19.37 54.68 
1989 20.46 273.77 63.48 46.97 80.96 57.82 44.01 57.19 
1990 10.14 220.14 43.53 47.14 84.23 17.24 41.97 53.44 
1991 11.08 213.71 31.40 58.17 78.30 13.66 35.34 55.65 
Source: Same as Table 1-21. 
Table 1-23 Sectoral Shares of Total Commercial Bank Credit in 1be Gambia (Percentages). 
Year Agr. Fish. Constr. Trade Tourism Transp. Other Personal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 31.14 1.50 6.38 20.43 7.55 3.07 17.99 11.89 
1982 35.55 0.89 6.28 20.00 4.25 4.09 12.66 12.19 
1983 34.22 1.41 4.55 16.88 9.08 3.95 16.98 12.90 
1984 24.63 6.40 6.84 29.45 9.91 5.14 5.10 12.49 
1985 24.12 6.46 9.32 22.89 9.53 3.37 10.43 13.85 
1986 22.13 9.37 12.41 23.88 7.56 3.72 9.84 11.05 
1987 19.87 7.00 10.70 23.83 7.08 6.09 12.07 13.32 
1988 21.36 9.11 9.46 23.03 9.68 6.13 7.40 13.80 
1989 13.62 8.81 8.66 20.52 13.08 3.79 16.93 14.54 
1990 7.96 8.34 7.00 24.27 16.03 1.33 19.02 16.01 
1991 8.65 8.06 5.02 29.81 14.83 1.05 15.94 16.59 
Source: Same as Table 1-21. 
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Table 1-24 Real Commercial Bank Credit by Sector and Bank Groups (GCDB and other commercial 
banks) in 1he Gambia, 1981-1991 (loans outstanding, millions or 1976/77 dalasis). 
Total Agriculture Construction Trade Tourism 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 45.72 0.56 4.75 4.30 12.33 16.64 6.16 4.55 
1982 49.06 0.24 5.84 2.66 14.13 12.99 6.72 4.44 
1983 49.98 1.19 5.02 1.51 11.66 12.58 7N> 5.17 
1984 38.12 1.02 1Zl. 1.41 28.41 8.74 7.14 5.35 
1985 36.90 0.99 10.44 1.10 21.60 6.76 5:n 6.53 
1986 '19.76 0.91 9.41 2.67 16.43 6.81 4.56 2.79 
1987 16.66 1.71 4.55 2.76 11.23 5.06 3.04 1.80 
1988 19.19 1.16 4.78 1.53 8.94 6.44 4.63 1.83 
1989 13.60 1.27 4.14 1.59 6.06 7.55 7.09 1.58 
1990 8.10 1.07 2.37 1.56 6.26 7.39 7.49 1.53 
1991 7.69 1.76 1.08 1.75 6.98 9.87 7.00 1.39 
Transport Services Penonal Loans OtberLoans Total Loans 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1981 4.02 033 22.Sl 21.53 13.6.S 3.21 38.68 3.70 111.67 30.10 
1982 4.77 0.15 25.63 18.19 13.94 2.55 29.rl 4.36 109.81 25A1 
1983 5.56 0.11 25.09 17.87 14.77 3.7S 37.83 5.01 117.94 25.6.S 
1984 5.28 1.21 40.83 15.31 11.22 4.52 16.52 5.66 102.72 23.41 
1985 4.~ 0.09 30.96 13.39 13.13 4.01 25.44 4.63 103.75 20.13 
1986 3.43 0.18 24.43 9.79 8.92 1.83 18.04 2.28 81.66 15.66 
1987 3.95 0.21 18.23 7.07 7.41 1.69 15.29 2.07 54.1S 13.64 
1988 3.90 0.18 17.48 8.47 1.SS 1.67 12.15 2.01 53.63 13.19 
1989 2.12 0.39 15.28 9.52 7.48 2.15 18.39 2.48 51.43 14.87 
1990 0.31 0.43 14.~ 9.3.5 6.31 2.69 16.84 2.88 41.40 14.88 
1991 033 0.26 14.31 11.53 6.09 3.29 14.70 3.70 37.79 18.75 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
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Table 1-25 Indices of Real Commercial Bank Credit by Sector and Bank Group in The Gambia, 1981-
1991 (1981=100). 
Total Agriculture Construction Trade Tourism 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1982 107.31 43.95 122.86 61.99 114.58 78.04 100.00 97.64 
1983 100.32 209.88 105.70 35.14 94.54 75.(IJ rn.70 113.56 
1984 83.38 180.02 151.97 32.91 230.34 52.53 115.98 117.56 
1985 80.70 174.73 219.67 25.79 175.12 40.62 85.70 143.37 
1986 65.08 161.42 198.00 62.11 133.24 40.94 74.16 61.22 
1987 36.44 302.64 95.88 64.30 91.12 30.40 49.38 3955 
1988 41.98 205.82 100.75. 35.78 72.52 38.72 15:lfJ 40.31 
1989 19.15 224.22 81Zl 37.17 49.14 45.36 115.21 34.67 
1990 17.71 189.92 50.00 36.37 50.82 44.41 121.66 33.63 
1991 16.82 310.47 22.83 40.86 56.62 59.33 113.64 3053 
Transport Services Personal Loans Other loans Total Loans 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1982 118.80 226.66 113.83 84.49 102.lS 79.40 75.67 117.M 98.33 84.61 
1983 138.40 33.75 111.44 82.98 l«ll.20 116.89 97Jr1. 137.13 105.61 85.20 
1984 131.39 362.19 181.38 71.11 82.26 140.80 42.73 152.98 91.98 77.77 
1985 101.63 29.16 137.53 62.18 96.26 125.07 65.78 125.23 92.91 66.86 
1986 85.41 SS.11 1~.54 45.46 6531 57JJ6 46.66 61.83 73.12 52.04 
1987 98.28 64.37 80.98 32.87 54.34 52.69 39.54 56.09 49.02 45.30 
1988 97.20 56.39 77.67 39.33 SS.32 51.99 31.42 5431 48.02 43Jr1. 
1989 52.81 117.22 67.88 44.21 54.86 67.~ 47.56 67.02 46.0S 49.41 
1990 7.9-0 129.45 62.54 43.45 46.27 83.9-0 43.54 77.80 37.07 49.43 
1991 8.27 78.36 63.58 53.53 44.63 102.43 38.01 99.96 33.84 62.28 
Somce: Same as Table 1-24. 
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Table 1-26 Relative Shares of Commercial Bank Credit within each Sector by Bank Group in The 
Gambia, 1981-1991 (percentages). 
Total Agriculture Construction Trade Tourism 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 98.n 1.22 52.50 47.49 42.56 57.43 57.47 42.52 
1982 99.49 0.50 68.65 31.34 42.10 52.16 39.83 
1983 97.ti6 2.33 76E7 23.12 48.09 51.90 60.31 39.68 
1984 97.38 2.61 83.61 16.38 76.46 23.53 57.14 42.85 
1985 97.38 2.62 90.39 9.60 76.15 23.84 44.69 55.30 
1986 97.01 2.98 n.90 22.09 70.68 29.31 62.08 37.91 
1987 90.64 9.35 62.23 37.76 68.92 31.04 62.79 37.1IJ 
1988 94.25 5.74 75.68 24.31 58.11 41.88 71.61 28.38 
1989 91.43 8.56 72.18 27.81 44.53 55.46 81.79 18.1IJ 
1990 88.24 1L75 60.30 39.69 45.89 54.11 83.01 16.98 
1991 81.34 18.65 38.18 61.81 41.42 58.57 83.41 16.58 
Transport Services Pel'SODlll Loans Other Loans Total Loans 
(GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other (GCDB) (Other 
Year Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) Banks) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (IS) (16) (17) (18) 
1981 92.31 7.68 51.11 48.88 80.94 19.0S 91.26 8.73 '18.76 21.23 
1982 86.30 13.69 58.47 41.52 84.53 15.46 87.1)2 12.97 81.16 18.83 
1983 98.00 1.99 58.40 41.59 79.72 20:J:l 88.16 11.83 82.13 17.86 
1984 81.32 18.67 72.72 21Il 11Il 28.72 74.47 2S.S2 81.43 18.56 
198.5 97.66 2.33 69.80 30.19 76.53 23.42 84.58 15.41 83.74 16.25 
1986 94.84 5.15 71.39 28.60 82.95 17.04 88.74 11.2.S 83.90 16.09 
1987 94.82 5.17 72.03 27.96 81.41 18.58 88.04 11.95 80.QS 19.94 
1988 95.38 4.61 61.36 32.63 81.87 18.12 85.78 14.21 80.2.S 19.74 
1989 84.41 15.58 61.61 38.38 77.64 22.3.5 88.11 11.88 77.56 22.43 
1990 42.28 57.71 60.fYT 39.92 70.08 29.91 85.39 14.60 13.SS 26.44 
1991 SS.88 44.11 SS.39 44.60 64.92 '35.07 19PIJ 20.10 66.84 33.15 
Source: Same as Table 1-24. 
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Table 1-27 Currency, Demand Deposits, and Ml in The Gambia, 1981-1991 (millions of current dalasis). 
Year Currency Demand Deposits Ml 
(1) (2) (3) 
1981 24.59 32.79 57.38 
1982 28.04 30.80 58.84 
1983 39.20 41.50 80.70 
1984 38.70 38.30 77.00 
1985 42.10 54.30 96.40 
1986 60.10 69.40 129.50 
1987 95.90 96.40 192.30 
1988 107.90 114.10 222.00 
1989 118.90 116.30 235.20 
1990 154.70 127.30 282.00 
1991 168.90 165.40 334.30 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Table 1-28 Selected Measmes of MOile)' in The Gambia 1981-1991 (millions of current dalasis). 
Year Monetary M12 Ml(%) Quasi Quasi MT M2(%) Inflation 
Base1 Money3 Money Rate GDP 
(%) deOator (%) 
-(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 65.94 57.38 29.60 86.98 7.30 
1982 60.95 58.80 2.40 40.00 35.1 98.84 13.63 3.37 
1983 100.90 80.70 37.24 52.40 31.1 133.00 34.85 1.60 
1984 50.30 77.00 -4.58 59.90 14.6 136.90 2.93 17.19 
1985 57.60 96.40 25.19 86.00 43.6 182.50 33.30 8.64 
1986 67.20 129.50 34.33 97.90 13.8 227.40 24.60 42.89 
1987 128.70 192.30 48.49 134.80 37.7 327.30 43.93 29.85 
1988 171.40 222.00 15.34 172.40 'rl.7 394.30 20.47 6.41 
1989 165.10 235.20 5.94 191.90 11.5 426.90 8Z7 13.18 
1990 192.20 282.00 19.90 217.40 13.3 499.40 16.98 14.55 
1991 224.90 334.30 18.54 249.80 14.9 584.10 16.96 9.90 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Note 1: The Monetary Base consists of currency plus reserves in the banking system. 
2: Ml consists of currency and demand deposits. 
3: Quasi Money consists of interest earning deposits. 
4: M2 consists of interest earning deposits and Ml. 
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Table 1-29 Measures of Financial Deepening and Velocity in The Gambia 1981-1991. 
Year Ml/GDP M2/GDP Ml Velocity M2 Velocity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1981 0.14 0.21 7.13 4.70 
1982 0.12 0.21 7.83 4.66 
1983 0.15 0.25 6.54 3.96 
1984 0.12 0.22 7.71 4.37 
1985 0.14 O.I1 6.97 3.68 
1986 0.11 0.20 8.38 4.71 
1987 0.12 0.21 7.81 4.59 
1988 0.13 0.24 7.34 4.13 
1989 0.12 0.22 8.23 4.53 
1990 0.11 0.21 8.38 4.73 
1991 0.12 0.21 7.97 4.56 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
Table 1-30 Ratios of Currency to Selected Measures of Deposits in The Gambia, 1981-1991. 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Source: Tables 1-27 and 1-28. 
Currency to Demand Deposits 
(1) 
0.74 
0.91 
0.94 
1.01 
0.71 
0.86 
0.99 
0.94 
1.02 
1.21 
1.02 
Currency to Quasi Money 
(2) 
1.10 
0.71 
0.79 
0.63 
0.63 
0.70 
0.51 
0.66 
0.00 
0.58 
0.66 
Table I-31 Selected Nominal Interest Rates and Inflation in The Gambia 1981-1991. 
A. Average Government Rates B. Average Savings Rates C. Average Lending Rates 
Inflation 
Year 3 Long Discount GDP CPI Short Savings 3 Month 12 Month Agricul- Manufac- Construe- Trade Other 
Month Term T- Rate Deftator Index Term Deposit Time Time turc turing tion 
T-Bill Bond Deposit Deposit Deposit 
-- --
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1981 6.00 NA 9.SO 7.30 7.87 NA 6.00 S.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1982 8.00 NA 9.SO 3.37 7.64 NA 8.00 8.SO NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1983 8.00 NA 9.SO 1.60 8.94 NA 8.00 8.SO NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1984 8.00 8.SO 9.00 17.19 14.43 7.7S 7.25 9.00 13.00 14.00 13.SO 13.SO lS.00 16.SO 
1985 8.00 lS.00 13.00 8.64 19.70 9.00 lS.00 lS.00 17.00 13.SO 21.00 18.00 22.SO 21.00 
1986 lS.00 lS.00 17.00 42.89 30.10 13.SO 18.00 18.00 19.SO 17.00 20.SO 18.00 24.00 26.00 
~ 1987 20.00 19.00 18.00 29.BS 37.79 12.SO lS.00 lS.00 16.SO IS.SO 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 
1988 17.00 19.00 lS.00 6.41 11.81 10.00 13.7S 13.7S 16.25 19.00 19.SO 19.SO 18.SO 19.00 
1989 19.00 19.00 16.00 13.18 7.41 10.00 12.SO 12.SO 14.SO 17.25 18.7S 17.7S 17.7S ts.so 
1990 18.SO 19.00 16.SO 14.SS 13.13 10.00 12.SO 12.SO 14.00 24.25 24.25 23.25 25.1S 29.00 
1991 18.SO 19.00 16.SO 9.90 S.19 11.00 12.SO 12.SO 14.SO 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 29.00 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins, Table I-13 (range of interest rates) where more than one rate is reported, the average of the 
minimum and maximum reported rates was used. The annual rate of change for the two price indices (columns 4 and 5) was derived by taking 
the first differences of the natural log of the respective price indices. 
Table I-32 Selected Real Interest Rates In The Gambia 1981-1991.1 
A. Average Real GOYemment Rates B. Average Real Savings Rates C. Average Real Lending Rates 
Year 3Month Long Discount Short Term Savings 3Month 12 Month Agriculture Manufac- Construe- Trade Other 
T-Bill TermT- Rate Deposit Deposit nme nme turing ti on 
Bond Deposit Deposit 
- ---
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1981 -1.73 NA 1.SO NA -1.73 -2.66 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1982 40.33 NA 1.72 NA 0.33 0.79 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1983 -0.86 NA O.Sl NA -0.86 -0.40 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1984 -5.62 -5.19 -4.15 -5.84 -6.28 -4.15 -1.25 -0.38 ..().82 ..().82 0.48 1.80 
1985 -9.77 -3.92 .-S.59 -8.93 -3.92 -3.92 -2.25 -5.17 1.08 -1.42 2.33 1.08 
1986 -11.59 -11.59 -10.0S -12.74 -9.28 -9.28 -8.13 -10.05 -7.36 -9.28 -4.67 -3.13 
1987 -12.91 -13.64 -14.36 -18.35 -16.54 -16.54 -ts.45 -16.18 -13.64 -13.64 -13.64 -13.64 
1988 4.63 6.42 2.84 -1.62 1.73 1.73 3.96 6.42 6.87 6.87 5.'TT 6.42 
00 
1989 10.78 10.78 7.99 2.40 4.73 4.73 6.59 9.15 10.55 9.62 9.62 7.52 Ul 
1990 4.74 5.18 2.'TT -2.76 -0.55 -0.55 0.76 9.82 9.82 8.94 11.ts 14.03 
1991 12.64 13.12 10.74 5.Sl 6.94 6.94 8.84 18.82 18.82 18.82 18.82 22.63 
Source: Same as Table 1-31. 
1 +i -1 
Note 1: The real rates of interest were derived from the following formula: 
l+p 
, where i = the annual change in the nominal interest rate in Table 
1-31 and p = the annual rate of inflation. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to measure inflation in this table rather than the implicit 
GDP deflator (see Table I-31, column 5). 
Table 1-33 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
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Weighted Deposit Interest Rates in The Gambia 1981-1991. 
Nominal Deposit Real Deposit Nominal Deposit 
Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate2 
(1) (2) (3) 
2.84 -4.66 2.96 
451 -2.91 4.70 
4.46 -4.11 4.65 
4.42 -8.75 4.60 
9.18 -8.78 9.57 
1053 -15.02 11.44 
8.73 -2L()C) 9.49 
8.26 -3.17 8.98 
7.78 0.33 8.46 
7.88 -4.64 8.56 
752 2.21 8.17 
Real Deposit 
Rate2 
(4) 
-455 
-2.73 
-3.93 
-859 
-8.46 
-14.32 
-2054 
-253 
0.97 
-4.04 
2.82 
Note: Deposit Rate 1 is a weighted average of demand, savings and time deposits, without allowance for the 
relevant reserve requirements. Nominal Deposit Rate 2 is column 1 (nominal rate), but takes into 
account the following reserve requirements: 6 percent for demand deposits and 4 percent for savings 
and time deposits 1981-85; 10 percent for demand deposits and 8 percent for savings and time deposits 
1986-87; 24 percent for demand deposits and 8 percent for savings and time deposits 1988-91. 
Source: Bulletins, Central Bank of The Gambia. 
Table 1-34 Selected Weighted Lending and Asset Interest Rates in The Gambia, 1984-1991. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Weighted Lending 
Rate 1 
(1) 
15.33 
19.23 
'12.15 
18.41 
18.95 
16.40 
27.47 
27.36 
Real Weighted 
Lending Rate 1 
(2) 
o.n 
-0.39 
-5.63 
-14.06 
6.38 
8.36 
12.67 
21.07 
Weighted Asset Real Weighted 
Rate2 Asset Rate 2 
(3) (4) 
14.20 -0.20 
17.49 -L84 
21.68 -6.45 
18.76 -13.81 
18.36 5.85 
17.16 9.(17 
24.(11 9.66 
24.68 1852 
Notes: Weighted Lending Rate 1 is a weighted average of commercial bank lending rates with the shares of 
sectoral lending as the weights. Weighted Asset Rate 2 is Weighted Lending Rate 1, including the 
return on 3 month T-Bills. 
Source: Bulletins, Central Bank of The Gambia. 
Table 1-35 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
87 
Gross Nominal Interest Rate Margins Between Average Lending and Deposit Rates in The 
Gambia, 1984-1991. 
Gross Margin 1 Gross Margin 2 
(1) (2) 
10.73 9.60 
9.(,6 7.92 
11.31 10.24 
8.92 9Zl 
9.97 9.38 
7.94 8.70 
18.91 15.51 
19.19 16.51 
Notes: Margin 1 = Weighted Nominal Lending Rate 1- Weighted Nominal Deposit Rate 2(column1 in Table 
1-34 and column 3 in Table 1-33 respectively). 
Margin 2 =Weighted Nominal Asset Rate 2 - Nominal Deposit Rate 2 (column 3inTables1-34 and 
1-33 respectively). 
Source: Tables 1-33 and 1-34. 
Table 1-36 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Ratios of Loans to Total Deposits of Commen:ial Banks in The Gambia 1986-1991. 
All Banks GCDB Other 
(1) (2) (3) 
1.43 2.50 0.45 
0.88 1.54 0.35 
0.81 1.51 0.25 
0.80 1.46 0.31 
0.71 
0.67 
1.32 
1.35 
0.31 
0.33 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
Table 1-37 Ratios of Loans to Total Deposits and Borrowings of Commen:ial Banks in The Gambia, 
1986-1991.1 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
All Banks 
(1) 
0.79 
0.64 
0.61 
0.64 
1990 0.61 
1991 0.60 
Source: Same as Table 1-36. 
GCDB 
(2) 
0.94 
0.84 
0.87 
0.92 
0.93 
0.97 
Other 
(3) 
0.45 
0.35 
0.25 
0.31 
0.31 
0.33 
Note 1: Borrowings refers to borrowings from the Central Bank through the rediscount window and other 
instruments. 
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Table 1-38 Consolidated Balance Sheet ror All Commen:ial Banks in The Gambia, 1986-1991 (in millions 
or current dalasis). 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASSETS 
Cash 7.99 8.86 9.86 7.45 8.44 20.M 
Govt. Sec. 39.00 58.35 100.12 11331 153.65 15933 
Loans & Advances 24S.19 207.76 23283 215.'11 252.17 1.8835 
Other Assets lOS.18 217.76 21137 193.84 201.74 25626 
Total Assets 397.36 492.73 SS4.18 589.67 616.00 727.(12 
LIABWTIES 
Borrowings 135.4S 86.65 92.40 92.89 57£/J SS.OS 
Demand Deposits 69.08 96.20 114.06 116.28 125.95 165.43 
Sav. and Time Dep. 97.36 134.11 17134 191.82 218.14 249.76 
Other Liabilities 74.77 13S.51 130.41 136.13 143.44 146.()C) 
Total Liabilities 376.66 452.46 508.21 537.12 544.56 616.38 
Capital 20.70 40.27 45.97 52.5S 71.44 100.64 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
Table 1-39 Balance Sheet ror the GCDB, 1986-1991 (in millions or current dalasis). 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASSETS 
Cash 3.18 2.48 2.34 1.75 2.78 3.92 
Govt. Sec. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.15 6.69 
Loans & Advances 204.40 161.64 192.17 222.16 188.42 193.53 
Other Assets 34.90 143.03 14130 116.95 138.53 1633S 
Total Assets 242.48 3'11.15 33S.81 340.86 348.88 3613S 
LIABWTIES 
Borrowings 135.4S 86.65 92.40 92.89 57.00 SS.OS 
Demand Deposits 23.25 33.53 34.54 28.74 30.88 30.45 
Sav. and Time Dep. S3.92 7030 91.74 98.52 lOCJ.79 110.45 
Other Liabilities 22.60 94.46 9S.83 98.22 113.28 lOLOCJ 
Total Liabilities 253.22 284.94 314.51 31837 310.95 297.04 
Capital 7.'}Jj 22.21 2130 22.50 37.92 70.43 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
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Table 1-40 Balance Sheet for Other Commercial Banks in 1be Gambia, 1986-91 (in millions of ClllTellt 
dalasis). 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASSETS 
Cash 4.81 6.38 152 5.70 5.66 16.16 
Govt. Sec. 39.00 5835 100.12 11331 134.50 15264 
Loans & Advances 40.79 46.12 40.66 5291 63.75 94.82 
Other Assets 70.28 74.73 70.07 76.89 63.21 9291 
Total Assets 154.88 185.58 21837 248.81 267.12 35653 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demand Deposits 45.83 6267 1952 87.54 95.07 134.98 
Sav. and Time Dep. 43.44 63.81 79.flJ 93.30 10835 13931 
Other Liabilities 5217 41.05 34.58 37.91 30.16 45.00 
Total Liabilities 141.44 16752 193.70 218.75 233.61 31934 
Capital 13.44 18.06 24.67 30.05 3352 37.21 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
Table 1-41 Relative Shares of Assets and Liabilities for All Commercial Banks in 1be Gambia. 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(percent) 
ASSETS 
Cash 201 1.80 1.78 1.26 137 277 
Govt. Sec. 9.81 11.84 18.07 19.22 24.94 22.01 
Loans & Advances 61.70 4217 4201 46.65 40.94 39.83 
Other Assets 26.47 44.19 38.14 32.87 3275 3539 
Total Assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowings 34.09 1759 16.67 15.75 9.25 7.00 
Demand Deposits 17.38 19.52 20.58 19.72 20.45 22.85 
Sav. And Time Dep. 24.50 'l7.22 30.92 32.53 35.41 34.50 
Other Liabilities 18.82 'l7.50 23.09 23.09 23.29 20.18 
Capital 5.21 8.17 8.91 8.91 11.flJ 14.87 
Total Liabilities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Table 1-38. 
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Table 1-42 Relative Shares of Assets and Liabilities for the GCDB. 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(percent) 
ASSETS 
Cash 131 0.81 0.70 0.51 0.80 L07 
Govt. Sec. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.49 1.82 
Loans & Advances 8430 52.63 57Z3 65.18 54.01 52.()6 
Other Assets 1439 46.57 42.08 3431 39.71 44.45 
Total Assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowings 55.86 28.21 Z'l.52 Z'l25 1634 14.98 
Demand Deposits 9.59 10.92 10.29 8.43 8.85 8.29 
Sav. and Time Dep. 22.24 22.89 Z'l32 28.90 31.47 30.06 
Other Liabilities 932 30.75 28.54 28.81 32.47 Z'l.51 
Capital 2.99 7Z3 6.32 6.60 10.87 19.17 
Total Liabilities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Table 1-39. 
Table 1-43 Relative Shares of Assets and Liabilities for Other Commercial Banks. 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(percent) 
ASSETS 
Cash 3.11 3.44 3.44 2.29 2.12 4.53 
Govt. Sec. 25.18 31.44 45.85 45.54 5035 42.81 
Loans & Advances 2634 24.85 18.62 21.27 23.87 26.60 
Other Assets 45.38 40.27 32.09 30.90 23.fJ6 26.06 
Total Assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
LIABILmES 
Borrowings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demand Deposits 29.59 33.77 36.42 35.18 35.59 37.86 
Sav. and Time Dep. 28.05 34.38 36.45 37.50 40.56 39.07 
Other Liabilities. 33.68 22.12 15.84 15.24 11.29 12.62 
Capital 8.68 9.73 1130 12.08 12.55 10.44 
Total Liabilities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Table 1-40. 
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Table 1-44 Percentage Changes in Assets and Liabilities of All Commercial Banks in The Gambia 
1987-1991. 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ASSETS 
Cash 10.89 11.29 -24.44 13.29 137.91 
Govt. Sec. 49.62 1159 13.17 35.60 3.70 
Loans & Advances -lSZT 12.07 18.14 -833 14.35 
Other Assets 107.04 -2.93 -8.29 4.08 rt.00 
Total Assets 24.00 12.47 6.40 4.47 17.54 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowi¥ -36.03 6.64 053 -38.64 -3.42 
Demand Deposits 39.26 1857 1.95 8.32 31.35 
Sav. and Time Dep. 37.75 27.76 11.95 13.72 14.50 
Other Liabilities 81.24 -3.76 4.38 5.37 1.85 
Capital 94.54 14.15 14.31 35.95 50.67 
Total Liabilities 24.00 12.47 6.40 4.47 17.54 
Source: Table 1-38. 
Table 1-45 Percentage Changes in Assets and Liabilities for the GCDB, 1987-1991. 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ASSETS 
Cash -22.01 -5.65 -25.21 58.86 41.01 
Govt. Sec. 0.00 0.00 0.00 infinity -65.01 
Loans & Advances -20.92 18.89 15.61 -15.19 2.71 
Other Assets 309.83 -1.21 -17.23 18.45 17.92 
Total Assets 'lf>.67 9.33 1.50 2.35 5.33 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowi¥ -36.03 6.64 053 -38.64 -3.42 
Demand Deposits 44.22 3.01 -16.79 1.45 -1.39 
Sav. and Time Dep. 30.38 30.50 7.39 11.44 0.60 
Other Liabilities 317.96 1.45 2.49 15.34 -10.76 
Capital 205.92 -4.10 5.63 6853 85.73 
Total Liabilities 'lf>.67 9.33 151 2.35 5.33 
Source: Table 1-39. 
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Table 1-46 Percentage Changes in Assets and Liabilities for All Other Commercial Banks. 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ASSETS 
Cash 32.64 17.87 -24.20 -0.70 18551 
Govt. Sec. 49.62 7159 13.17 18.70 13.49 
Loans & Advances 13.07 -11.84 30.13 20.49 48.74 
Other Assets 6.33 -6.24 9.73 -17.79 46.99 
Total Assets 19.82 17.67 13.94 736 33.47 
LIABILITIES 
Borrowings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demand Deposits 36.74 26.89 10.00 8.60 41.98 
Sav. and Time Dep. 46.89 24.75 17.21 16.13 2857 
Other Liabilities -21.31 -15.76 9.63 -20.45 49.21 
Capital 34.38 36.60 21.81 1155 11.01 
Total Liabilities 19.82 17.67 13.94 7.37 33.47 
Source: Table 1-40. 
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Table 1-47 Profit and Loss Statement for Commercial Banks in 1be Gambia (thousands or cummt 
dalasis). 
1. All Comm. Banks 1988 1989 1990 
(1) (2) (3) 
Interest Received 37,925 47,153 48,060 
Interest Expenses 29,786 29,971 30,722 
Gross Return 8,139 17,182 17,338 
For. Exch. Income 21,013 23,146 26,625 
Other Income 13,116 11,666 14,522 
Govt. Security Income 14,243 18,181 zi,m 
Total Income 56,511 70,175 81,263 
Operating Exp. 28,590 33,420 29,726 
Profit/Loss Z7,'n.1 36,755 51,537 
2. GCDB 1988 1989 1990 
(4) (5) (6) 
Interest Received Z'l,332 34,425 33,705 
Interest Expenses 19,897 20,038 19,628 
Gross Return 7,435 14,387 14,077 
For. Exch. Income 5,723 5,738 5,702 
Other Income 4,832 2,727 4,4Z7 
Govt. Security Income 0 0 2,CJ/9 
Total Income 17,990 22,852 26,285 
Operating Exp. 15,795 18,784 9,891 
Profit/Loss 2,195 4,068 16,394 
3. All other banks 1988 1989 1990 
(7) (8) (9) 
Interest Received 10,593 12,728 14,335 
Interest Expenses 9,889 9,933 11,094 
Gross Return 704 2,795 3,241 
For. Exch. Income 15,290 17,408 20,923 
Other Income 8,284 8,939 10,095 
Govt. Security Income 14,243 18,181 20,699 
Total Income 38,521 47,323 54,958 
Operating Exp. 12,795 14,636 19,835 
Profit/Loss 25,726 32,6ffl 35,123 
Source: Data provided by Gambian authorities. 
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Table 1-48 Performance Indicators of the Commercial Banking Sector in The Gambia. 
1. All Commercial Banks 1988 1989 1990 
(1) (2) (3) 
Gross Margin % of Loans 3.4 6.6 6.7 
Oper. Exp. % of Assets 4.8 5.8 4.8 
Profit% of Assets (rate of return on assets) 4.8 6.5 8.6 
Profit% of Net Worth (rate of return on equity) 00.7 59.9 77.2 
Net Worth% of Assets 7.8 10.6 10.9 
Total Liabilities/fotal Assets 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Total Liabilities/Net Worth 11.8 8.4 8.1 
Long Term Liab/Long Term Liab + Net Worth 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Other Income as a % of Profit1 173.2 144.0 124.0 
Profit as a % of Assets (excluding other income )1 -3.4 -2.8 -2.0 
2. GCDB 1988 1989 1990 
(4) (5) (6) 
Gross Margin % of Loans 3.8 7.0 7.5 
Oper. Exp. % of Assets 4.5 5.8 2.9 
Profit % of Assets (rate of return on assets) 0.6 1.3 4.8 
Profit% of Net Worth (rate of return on equity) 10.3 14.8 38.S 
Net Worth % of Assets 6.0 8.5 12.4 
Total Liabilities/fotal Assets 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Total Liabilities/Net Worth 15.6 10.7 7.1 
Long Term Liab/Long Term Liab +Net Worth 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Other Income as a % of Profit1 480.8 208.1 74.S 
Profit as a% of Assets (excluding other income)1 -2.4 -1.3 1.2 
3. All Other Banks 1988 1989 1990 
(7) (8) (9) 
Gross Margin % of Loans 1.7 4.8 8.8 
Oper. Exp. % of Assets 5.4 5.8 7.3 
Profit % of Assets (rate of return on assets) 11.2 13.3 13.3 
Profit% of Net Worth (rate of return on equity) 101.0 96.4 134.0 
Net Worth % of Assets 10.7 13.4 9.6 
Total Liabilities/f otal Assets 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Total Liabilities/Net Worth 8.3 6.5 9.3 
Long Term Liab/Long Term Liab + Net Worth 0.8 0.7 0.8 
Other Income as a % of Profit1 147.0 136.0 147.0 
Profit as a % of Assets (excluding other income )1 -5.1 -4.7 -6.1 
Source: Derived from data recorded in Table 1-38, 1-39, 1-40, and 1-47. 
Note 1: Other income is income earned from foreign exchange transactions, government securities and other 
non-loan assets. 
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Table 1-49 Rate of Return on Loan and Non-Loan Assets in the Banking System of The Gambia, 1988-
1990. 
A. All Commercial Banks 1988 1989 1990 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. Return on Loan Assets1 -1.39 4.34 6.15 
2. Return on Non-Loan Assets1 8.96 8.33 10.43 
3. Return on Total Assets 4.81 6.49 8.55 
B. GCDB 1988 1989 1990 
1. Return on Loan Assets -0.00 1.49 5.39 
2. Return OD Non-Loan Assets 2.16 0.90 4.10 
3. Return on Total Assets 0.00 lZI 4.81 
C. Other Commercial Banks 1988 1989 1990 
1. Return on Loan Assets -3.89 10.25 7.89 
2. Return on Non-Loan Assets 14.42 14.22 15.18 
3. Return on Total Assets 11.18 13.29 13.32 
Source: Same as Table 1-48. Asset information drawn from Tables 1-38, 1-39, and 1-40. Income and expense 
data from Table 1-47. 
Note 1: The rate of return on loan and non-loan assets is estimated as follows: Interest and operating expenses 
are allocated to loan and non-loan activity according to the relative share of loan and non-loan assets 
(excl. cash) in total assets. The profit/loss from loans equals interest received minus the appropriate 
relative weight of interest and operating expenses. The profit/loss for non-loan assets equals foreign 
exchange income plus government security income plus other income minus share of interest expense 
(based on share of government securities to loans) and operating expenses. The rate of return on loan 
assets equals the profit/loss on loans divided by value of loan assets. The rate of return on non-loan 
assets equals the profit/loss on non-loan assets divided by value of total assets minus loan assets and 
cash. The rate of return on total assets equals the profit/loss on both loan and non-loan activity divided 
by the value of total assets minus cash. 
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Table I-SO Income and Expense Statement of the GCDB, 1981 to 1991 (in 1000 of current dalasis). 
A Income (in D'OOO) 1981 1984 198S 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) 
Interest Income 10831 13323 14862 213S4 27181 34521 -37430 410ti0 
Foreign Exchange (186S) 713 (1817) 590 4300 5950 5922 
Transactions 9324 
Commission & Other 2715 2203 2570 1146 2221 2419 3144 
Total 11,681 16,239 15,615 23,090 33,702 42,890 46,496 S0,384 
B. Expenditure 
Interest Expenses 6814 14733 1486S 18311 21497 20038 20298 17756 
Administrative Costs 1173 20tiO 2038 2282 3194 4490 
Other Expenses 2495 1286 1393 1824 rm 2829 9888 11508 
Provisions - Bad Debts TIO 15732 lm75 278.S 278.S 9954 27030 104068 
- Other Losses 1986 8480 1109 l<iO 559 
Depreciation 289 401 762 787 1343 1351 538 2220 
-Total 11,541 34,212 31,919 34,469 32,3)5 38,822 58,313 135,552 
Profit (loss) before tax 140 (17,973) (16,304) (11,379) 1,497 4,068 (11,817) (85,168) 
Taxation 32.5 620 396 1214 7.034 1398 1512 
Profit (loss) after tax 140 (18,298) (16,924) (11,775) 283 2,034 (13,215) (85,184) 
Accumulated losses 91 1942 20240 37164 48939 47581 45541 S7S78 
brought forwaid 
Accumulated losses carried 49 (20,240) (37,164) (48,939) (48,6S6) (45,547) (58,762) (142,762) 
forward 
Source: GCDB files. 
Note: For 1981, "Accumulated Losses" refers to the amount transferred to the "Reserve Account." 
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Table 1-51 Balance Sheet and Related Accounts of the GCDB, 1981 to 1991 (in 1000 of current dalasis). 
A. ASSEl'S (D'OOO) 1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 
-(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cash & Deposits 7279 4050 11469 10166 lSTn 6967 36494 33883 
Balance with Foreign 1151 25148 8103 7509 17248 1695 4535 1543 24660 
Banks 
Investments 2SO 130 130 130 
Bills purchased & 5093 13005 1592 4645 5480 4857 
discounted for NUC 
Commercial Loans 97122 90726 104322 129313 103311 1S489S 112225 65169 54156 
Development Loans 22332 30340 3U13 36803 28.574 34309 22820 1951 4955 
Other Assets 5411 3245 8879 1021 2488 3264 4963 2114 5638 
Fixed Assets 1224 9305 8454 19355 18323 19006 47129 45036 44034 
B. LIABILITIES 
Customers' Deposits 22841 40002 59118 77173 106020 127647 139204 144074 132005 
Other Liabilities 9219 15779 14731 1SS29 20223 21793 23946 26748 27US 
Amount due Central 76927 93402 70581 74403 23920 36497 18920 18920 18920 
Bank 
Banks outside The 11940 23515 11167 15212 10231 5693 2374 1379 
Gambia 
Development Banks 12510 12510 12010 10210 9259 7259 133 133 133 
Quasi Equity 35000 35000 35000 35000 30400 30400 30400 
Other Bonowcd Funds 2290 5901 7679 5060 8380 8847 5305 4918 4104 
Shluc Capital 1000 2000 5000 11070 13600 13600 23200 23200 23200 
Reserves, gen. prov. & 3129 (17160) (34aw) (34715) (34432) (31323) (15316) (99476) (102444) 
Retained earnings 
C. MEMORANDUM 
ITEMS 
Bills purchased & 
discounted for NUC 
Gross 10862 7914 7910 7JJ!:1 2661 2661 2661 
Cumulative 3270 3269 2430 2430 2661 2661 2.661 
provisions 
Commercial loans 
Gro&S 122486 149744 126107 183952 1S983S 209754 21SS49 
Cumulative 18164 20431 22796 29051 47610 14398.5 161393 
provisions 
Development Loans 
Gross 39492 45591 38627 54722 517'1! 37418 38001 
Cumulative 8279 8794 10053 20413 28888 35617 33194 
provisions 
Soun:c: GCDBf"des. 
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CHAPTER1WO 
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL NE1WORKS IN THE GAMBIA: 
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active in The Gambia since its 
independence in community development efforts covering health, education, agricultural 
research and extension activities. In the eighties, however, with the decline of some sources 
of formal financial services in rural areas, several NGOs began operating as alternative 
financial networks for rural clientele. 
NGOs generally grow most rapidly in a liberalized economy and in a democratic 
policy environment (Diamond et al, 1988).1 The emergence of NGOs as an alternative 
financial network is in part the result of a liberal policy environment introduced by the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP gradually eliminated the supply of 
subsidized financial services through government channels. These measures encouraged 
NGOs and private entrepreneurs to enter these markets and offer financial services. 
NGOs have effectively demonstrated their capacity in the past to expand the supply 
of community services available in poor communities. Consequently, there was growing 
enthusiasm among international donors to develop NGOs to assume additional responsibility 
as channels to supply financial services for low income clientele. The NGOs' operational 
strategy emphasizing village level participation was seen to offer a comparative advantage 
for these organizations to increase access to cost efficient financial services through reduced 
risk and information costs.2 Furthermore, it was expected that the implementation of credit 
and savings programs in combination with other developmental activities would accelerate 
income generating activities in NGO service areas. 
• We acknowledge with sincere appreciation the valuable help extended by Pirkko Poutiainen, UNDP; Balla 
Silla, UNDP; Kofi Agyekumhere, CBG; Mariam.a Ashcroft, GWFA; Brooks Cricblow, CRS; Dodou Darbo, 
AFET; Burang Goree-N<liaye, TANGO; Helmi Govers, TANGO; Musa Jawneh, AFET; Maria tou Loum, 
WISDOM; Jean-Fran~ LeGrand, VISACA; N":unal Martinus, WVI; Aminatta N'Gum, GWFA; Solomon 
Owens, CRS; Samoo, GWFA; Jeffrey Saus&er, AATG; Aboubacry Tall, SCP/USA; and Gladwin Wdliams, 
TANGO in conducting this study. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 See Diamond, Linz and Lipset. 
2 The lending risks due to incomplete information about the capacity, aeditworthiness and character of 
borrowers can be reduced through close lender rapport with the clientele. Therefore, transaction costs are 
reduced due to better borrower screening, etc. 
1 
2 
Of the one hundred or so international and national NGOs in The Gambia, 14 were 
found to provide financial services (largely in rural areas) to farm and non-farm clientele 
along with formal and inform.al financial institutions in The Gambia (see Table 11-1). The 
entry of the NGOs into the financial markets has increased the number of alternative finan-
cial sources that service these markets, and the volume of loans supplied and savings mobil-
ized by them are significant. This can be seen in Table 11-2 where the share of NGOs in 
total agricultural loans disbursed in The Gambia in 1991-92 reached approximately 18 per-
cent. The increased importance of NGOs in the agricultural credit market in recent years 
was due in part to the collapse of the Gambia Commercial and Development Ban:k (GCDB) 
in the late 1980s, and the reluctance of commercial banks to make agricultural loans.3 
The savings and lending activities undertaken by the NGOs, however, represent only 
one of their several activities, and often account for only a small part of their total pro-
gram. 4 In general, the NGOs are embryonic financial institutions usually offering rudimen-
tary financial services to targeted populations in limited geographic areas. The segmented 
markets in which they operate lack broad national penetration. The diverse operational 
philosophies of the various NGOs have often resulted in heterogenous financial technologies 
that send mixed market signals and create market segmentation.5 Furthermore, inadequate 
regulatory guidelines in the country have led to a lack of coordination among the various 
NGOs. This tends to create a concentration of several NGOs within the same geographic 
areas leading to negative spill-over effects and an inefficient use of NGO resources.6 
Despite the continuing issues involved in using NGOs as an alternative financial 
network, international donors are increasingly encouraging NGOs to include a financial 
component in their community oriented activities. Therefore, there is an urgent need to 
3 Consult Chapter I in thiS report for further details on the role of formal financial institutions in the 
agricultural sector. 
4 For example, aedit activities represent only 5% of the total budgetary allocation of Action Aid in The 
Gambia (AATG). 
5 F'mancial technology refers to the operational practices and procedures followed by the financial 
intermediary in supplying financial services. For example, the loans offered, the terms and conditions of a aedit 
contract - interest rate, penalty costs for default, etc. - constitute the financial technology. The heterogeneity 
in financial technology arises due to variations in operational procedures and practices followed by different types 
of financial intermediaries. 
6 Spill-over effects arise when activities of one NGO affect the activities of another. The spill-over can either 
be positive or negative in nature. While positive spill-over effects augment activities of sewral NGOs, a negative 
spill-over effect hampers them. An example of a negative spill-over effect is as follows. Consider the loan activi-
ties of two NGOs in the same geographic area. Assume that NG0-1 offers 7.ero interest loans (because of subsi-
dies) while NG0-2 charges market rates. This leads to an excess loan demand for NG0-1 loans compared to 
NG0-2 loans, and market confusion regarding quality of loans. In time, NG0-2 loan activity disappears alto-
gether as cheap money drives out dear money. The subsidll:ed NGO has driven the market oriented NGO out 
of business. 
3 
assess the feasibility of NGOs becoming a viable alternative financial network in the 
country. The efficiency, viability and sustainability of financial programs implemented by 
NGOs need to be examined.7 Although there is still incomplete information about the 
operational practices of various NGOs involved in financial markets, this section attempts 
to document the philosophies behind their operation and identifies the financial technologies 
employed. A discussion of the functions of existing regulatory and coordinating institutions 
will follow. Documenting and discussing the current status of NGO financial programs and 
regulatory mechanisms will help in assessing the involvement of NGOs in financial markets. 
Finally, regulatory and operational guidelines will be suggested to facilitate the development 
of NGOs as viable alternative financial intermediaries without destroying their comparative 
advantage as grass root organizations. · 
II. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
There is no clear cut definition of an NG0.8 The NGOs, for this study, are defined 
as structurally and functionally unrelated private organizations that pursue activities to 
reduce poverty and promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment and 
undertake community development activities (Brown and Korten). 
The private nature of NGOs often limits the dissemination of information about their 
activities to restricted users. While the NGOs should have a fiduciary responsibility to 
disseminate information to the public, especially about their credit and savings activities, this 
information is considered sensitive and often confined to their parent donors. Therefore, 
complete documentation about the nature and type of financial services offered by NGOs 
in the Gambia is not available. Even a consultant hired recently by the Association of Non-
Governmental Organizations (TANGO) to document and evaluate the savings and loan 
activities of NGOs in The Gambia complained that information was limited in scope and 
coverage and difficult to secure. Moreover, whenever information was made available, he 
was constrained to maintain the confidentiality of it other than discussing broad generalities. 
This clearly compromises any serious effort to address important public policy issues in the 
area of NGO financial intermediation. One notable exception to this inadequate 
information base was the VISACAs, the unclassified non-governmental organization that 
shared its ample data base with the OSU research team (see Chapter V). With this one 
7 The limited information that is available has restricted the evaluation of the economic efficiency of several 
NGO programs. While economic efficiency should not be the only aiteria used in evaluating them, information 
on the role of NGOs in satisfyjng equity goals is equally limited. 
8 NGOs are often defined as residual non-profit organizations that emerge as a private response to market 
failure to offer public or private goods. They are viewed as alternative forms of organiz.ation that are remedies 
for market failure that occur due to nonparticipation in the market of a large segment of the population who 
lack basic purchasing power (See Brown and Korten). 
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important exception, the amount of information available was limited and not adequate to 
fully evaluate the performance of NGO credit and savings activities. The dearth of studies 
about NGO activities underscores the difficulty of gathering information through 
conventional data collection techniques. Therefore, this study followed an informal 
approach to data collection. Although the information obtained was limited, the analysis 
is useful in evaluating the role of NGOs in providing financial services in The Gambia. 
The current list of NGOs reported to be operating in The Gambia totals 108: 52 
international, 55 national and 1 unclassified.9 Of this 108, 14 national and international 
NGOs were reported to provide financial services, i.e., loans and savings (see Table Il-1). 
Since the objective of this study is to assess the feasibility of NGOs as alternative financial 
networks, especially for rural areas, the sample was confined to only those 14 NGOs that 
have a financial component While 14 NGOs provide financial services, the sample was re-
stricted for logistical reasons to ten NGOs, four international, five national and one unclassi-
fied NG0.10 In addition, four coordinating and regulatory agencies, and three beneficiary 
groups were also included in the sample. The list of the institutions that participated in the 
study are provided in Table Il-3. Representatives of the sample participants were 
interviewed using open ended and unstructured questionnaires. A rapid appraisal technique 
was used during the limited visits to three of the NGO project areas to assess their loans 
and savings programs. Consultant and annual reports (when available) were also consulted 
in addition to the interviews but generally they carried limited information. 
Assessing NGO performance is difficult without taking into consideration their 
multifaceted social objectives. However, incorporation of social objectives often leads to 
compromises of efficiency conditions. Furthermore, comparing the operational procedures 
and practices of heterogenous NGOs following diverse financial technologies is difficult. 
The difficulties are further aggravated by the absence of quality data. This study is no 
exception and data problems could not be avoided. The data limitations, however, did not 
seem to be any more difficult than those encountered in the study of NGOs in other 
developing countries. 
9 See Appendix 1 for a list of NGOs in the Gambia. 
10 The NGOs in this study are clascified either as international or national organi:rations according to the 
definition used by the recently established national coordination unit for NGOs in The Gambia, TANGO (The 
Association of Non-Governmental Organizations). The VISACAs as discussed in Chapter V are defined as 
unclassified because they are asM>Ciated with the government Jahally Pacharr Rice Project. The VISACAs are 
not members of TANGO and are not attached to the Gambia Village Development Trust Fund (GVDTF) that 
benefits national NGOs. However, the VISACAs are included in this study due to the NGO nature of its parent 
donors in France and Germany. 
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III. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE NGOs 
The operational philosophies and general characteristics of the sample NGOs are 
presented in Tables IV-1 and IV-2. While international NGOs have been involved in 
developmental activities for a long time, national NGOs became active only in the late 
1980s. Active participation by national NGOs was in part influenced by the growing 
economic liberalization in The Gambia that in tum generated a large flow of funds from 
international organi?.ations/donors such as the World Bank, UNDP, and US.AID and parent 
NGOs.11 Some donors prefer to link up with local NGOs rather than directly involve 
themselves in developmental activities. The funds are frequently directed by these 
international organizations through national NGOs in order to stimulate local participation 
in community developmental activities. The increased participation by national NGOs, who 
have a comparative advantage in interacting with local clientele groups, is expected to 
increase the efficiency of resource use in addition to creating community wide responsibility 
that is essential for the long-run sustainability of programs. 
The activities of the sampled NGOs have a strong orientation toward human capital 
development, the strengthening of village level infrastructure facilities and institution 
building. Since NGOs are multifunctional and represent at most only embryonic financial 
intermediaries, financial services are generally considered of secondary importance. Only 
the VISACAs specialize in financial intermediation. 
The majority of the sample, nearly 60 percent of the NGOs, target their community 
services to women, both individuals and tm. In general, village level indigenous groups 
like ~ and osusus are frequently used as conduits to supply community services to final 
beneficiaries.12 The use of kafos and osusus is expected to increase village level 
participation in community activities and avoid free rider problems inherent in the provision 
of public goods. 
' 
11 It has also been reported that several NGOs were organi:red by government employees furloughed as part 
of the Economic Recovery Program. Economic liberalization also reduced the aedit flows to rural Gambia 
through the Gambia Cooperative Union thereby leaving rural finance largely in the hands of NGO activity. 
12 Kafos are informal but strong and cohesive village groups that are multifunc::tional in nature. These groups 
are homogenous in terms of members' age, ethnicity, heritage, gender and occupation but have various member-
ship si7.es. In general, members of farmer kafos cultivate a common plot of groundnut, cereals or vegetables and 
contribute the sale proceeds to a common village fund. This village fund functions as an insurance substitute 
to primarily mitigate village level contingencies and member contingencies to a lesser extent. Some kafos also 
undertake savings and aedit activities on an organi:red basis. On the other hand, osusus resemble ROSCAS in 
their operational style, and are smaller in si7.e compared to kafos. The osusus are commonly observed in urban 
areas rather than in rural areas. 
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NGO developmental activities are usually concentrated in limited geographic areas 
like MID-S and LRD that are well developed compared to URD and NBD.13 Further-
more, of the 7 sample NGOs who target women entrepreneurs, 3 function around Banjul 
underscoring the concentration of NGO activities in this peri-urban area. In general, NGO 
developmental activities lack national penetration and are clustered around small growth 
poles. Although there is an overlap in service areas among various NGOs, there is no docu-
mented evidence on the extent of overlap in terms of beneficiaries. Random interviews con-
ducted for this study with villagers in Kwinella and Y am.inkunda, beneficiaries of AATG, 
confirmed the above statement. However, spill-over effects are observed from various deve-
lopmental programs initiated by the same or different NGOs who operate in the same 
area.14 
IV. FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE SAMPLE NGOs 
The inclusion of a financial component in NGO programs is a recent phenomenon 
(see Tables 11-5 and 11-6). The interest of international donors in the late 1980s to find non-
governmental solutions to mitigate government and market failures in financial markets led 
to the proliferation of NGOs as rudimentary financial intermediaries. The introduction of 
diverse NGO philosophies into rural financial markets increased the heterogeneity of 
operational practices and contract terms and conditions that has led to distortions in the 
functioning of rural financial markets. This section explores this issue by examining the 
savings and lending programs initiated by the sample NGOs in The Gambia. 
1. Issues in NGO Loan Pro&IJllllS 
A Funding 
The details about the loan programs implemented by the sampled NGOs is presented 
in Table 11-5. The majority of loan programs, especially by national NGOs, were started in 
the late 1980s. Among the 10 NGOs, 7 have established loan programs while 2 (WVI, 
GRUDA) intend to begin in 1993. In general, the loan programs of all NGOs, except the 
VISACAs, rely on external funds/ grants, and the initial funds are used to form a revolving 
fund for subsequent loan operations. Of late, however, an increased level of local 
13 MID-s: MaCarthy Island Division-South; LRD: Lower River Division; URD: Upper River Division; NBD: 
North Bank Division. 
14 For instance, the majority of beneficiaries from AATG's aedit programs were also beneficiaries of its 
education and health programs; the beneficiaries of the VISACA's aedit and savings programs often benefit 
from AATG's education and health programs. 
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participation is observed through savings mobilization and membership fees. Whereas the 
majority of the loan programs are launched individually, there is a limited degree of 
collaboration between NGOs to reduce costs and realize economies of specialfaation. 15 
The affiliation with local institutions such as the Central Bank of the Gambia and Standard 
Chartered Bank is, however, confined to a few selected national NGOs on a pilot basis. 
B. Loan Services 
In general, there is a strong bias toward short and medium term production loans.16 
Even though loans are fungible, the international NGOs supply loans in kind like fertilizer, 
seeds and agricultural implements (e.g. AATG) while national NGOs in contrast provide 
cash loans. The majority of NGOs provide group rather than individual loans.17 While 
borrowing groups are often formed out of existing informal groups like kafos and osusus, 
some NGOs also facilitate the formation of new groups to channel their financial services. 
Although not all loan programs are gender specific, three of the NGOs exclusively target 
women beneficiaries. 
little information exists on the volume, coverage, costs of operation and terms and 
conditions of loan contracts offered by the sample NGOs.18 However, the available 
information about loan operations suggests that the coverage is concentrated in just a few 
geographic locations. Moreover, the terms and conditions of loans are ambiguous reflecting 
the dominance of social over commercial objectives.19 In short, the terms and conditions 
observed among NGO loan programs are heterogenous, highlighting their diverse 
operational philosophies. 
C. Subsidized Lending and Repayment Issues 
The majority of NGOs still operate under the assumption that income generating 
activities of the rural poor require the provision of subsidized loans. Despite the widespread 
documentation of the failure of subsidized loan programs in developing countries, 20 NGOs 
15 For instance, CRS, an international NGO, collaborates with 2 national NGOs, AFET and GWFA, to 
provide financial services instead of jmtiating its own credit program. 
16 GRUDA, a national NGO, intends to provide short-term consumption loans beginn;ng in 1993. 
17 In the sample, 55% of the NGOs provide group loans, 11 % provide individual loans and 34% provide both 
individual and group loans. 
18 The exceptions are the VISACAs and AATG that maintain fairly good data on their loan portfolios and 
share it with interested outsiders. See Chapter V for a detailed analysis of the VISACAs. 
19 Indeed, their social objectives often introduce market distortions through subsidi7.ed lending rates. 
211 See Adams, Graham and Von Pischke for details. 
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believe they have a comparative advantage over formal financial institutions in efficiently 
supplying subsidized loans to achieve social objectives. NGOs assume their limited coverage 
and close links with the local community reduces information problems about their clients 
creditworthiness therefore leading to well monitored targeted loans. While the NGOs have 
discontinued giving funds as grants, the majority of their loans are often issued at below 
market rates. Interest rates, except in the VISACAs, range from 0 to 24 percent per annum 
based on the objectives of the parent NGO that provides the operational funds. Although 
the costs of lending are rarely documented, informants uniformly stated that they are high 
and often exceed the explicit interest rate charged. Since the rural poor often lack tangible 
collateral, the majority of programs use collateral substitutes like group liability, third party 
guarantors and social sanctions. Only three NGOs, WISDOM, SCF /USA and AFET, link 
savings with loans as a form of implicit collateral. While most NGOs have access to social 
and legal systems to enforce contracts, they seldom impose stiff penalties for 
nonrepayment.21 
Documentation about repayment performance in NGO loan programs is rare and 
often incomplete. While the repayment performance observed for international NGOs is 
disappointing, the relatively high repayment performance reported by national NGOs is due 
in large part to the small number of loans issued and their more cautious approach to lend-
ing and the linking of loans with savings. The high repayment performance documented in 
the VISACAs, despite high explicit interest rates, is an intriguing contrast to the other 
NGOs. This is due in part to a carefully planned design that includes the right incentives 
and strict penalties (see Chapter V). 
D. Segmented Markets 
Loan programs were generally confined to limited geographic areas. While the 
international NGOs covered a larger area and a larger number of beneficiaries, the national 
NGOs limited themselves to areas around Banjul or a few villages. The differences in 
coverage can be attributed to the high capital costs and manpower required to implement 
loan programs. In general, all NGO loan programs lack national coverage. This narrow 
geographic focus imposes an additional risk for them because of the covariance of risk 
inherent in portfolios dominated by borrowers subject to similar risks and income variations 
that is particularly characteristic of agriculture. This problem jeopardizes program 
sustainability.22 In the absence of contingent markets and portfolio diversification by 
lenders in terms of enterprises, geographic diversification mitigates lending risks. Hence, 
the lack of any substantial geographic network places Gambian NGOs at some risk in their 
correlated and undiversified loan activities. 
21 Save the Children (STC) reported using legal protection to recover a loan, while AATG rescheduled 
earlier loans and refused fresh loans in 1992 to villages that did not repay 95% of the rescheduled loans. 
22 For example, the covariance of risk arises when a natural calamity causes all borrowers to default at the 
same time. 
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E. Major Design Problems 
NGO loan programs are often designed with broad social objectives and have a 
strong orientation toward building non-financial community institutions. Furthermore, these 
programs utilize traditional village structures to reduce costs and increase local participation. 
Nevertheless, these loan programs have some design flaws and implementation problems. 
Since financial intermediation is only one of the several activities undertaken by NGOs and 
the inclusion of a financial component in their activities is relatively recent, they have less 
experience in financial intermediation. Indeed, some feel uncomfortable in trying to become 
viable financial intermediaries as they perceive it is a contradiction to their social objectives. 
It is, therefore, no surprise that NGO loan programs are experimental, less focused and 
rudimentary in nature. Table 11-7 presents the strengths and weaknesses of individual NGO 
financial programs, and underscores the major issues in design and implementation of these 
programs. 
Ent, there is dearth of documented information on NGO loan activities, especially 
with national NGOs. The available information is usually incomplete and mixed in with 
other developmental activities.23 While the multifunctional nature of NGOs may allow 
little flexibility or emphasis on sophisticated accounting procedures for loan programs, 
NGOs take on a fiduciary responsibility for proper bookkeeping and dissemination of this 
information when they begin to accept savings deposits from the public. At the very least, 
the NGOs that collect deposits from the public for on-lending on a more than marginal 
basis should be expected to produce standard reports on the status of their loan and deposit 
accounts. Inadequate accounting practices covering their loans and savings activities and 
the reluctance of NGOs to disseminate this information have limited the coordination and 
collaboration among NGOs that could reduce costs and possible conflicts. Consequently, 
there is often an overlap of diverse NGO loan activities in the same concentrated geogra-
phic areas resulting in confusion among the villages and the inefficient use of resources. 
The lack of coordination or uniformity in operational practices can lead to unhealthy 
non-market distortions (negative externalities) and possible system collapse in rural areas. 
For example, one NGO could presume to establish a loan program in a village with low or 
zero interest rates with its own monies, thereby destroying the institutional viability of 
another NGO loan program based on locally mobilized deposits paying positive real rates 
of interest and making loans at appropriately higher rates. The first NGO would make 
subsidized loans whose rates are not market determined and, in the process, destroy another 
NGO initiative carefully built up through locally mobilized resources and adhering to market 
determined rates to achieve financial viability. A subsidized intervention built on the 
philosophy of the mere transfer of cheap resources to the rural communities drives out a 
23 Often a single entry bookkeeping system is used by the NGOs. While their limited coverage allows them 
to use simple methods, the accounting systems need to be improved in the long-run when they reach a wider 
coverage. AATG is streamlining its aedit accounts through a double entry bookkeeping system by affiliating 
with an accounting firm in London. 
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market determined attempt to achieve institutional viability. This example illustrates a 
variant of Gresham's law where bad (cheap) money drives out good (dear) money. 
Second the majority of NGO loan programs are designed to capture donor funding. 
Furthermore, they are based on dubious assumptions regarding the role of loans in income 
generation activities. Loan programs are conceived as short-term solutions to development 
problems. The commercial nature of financial activities are presumed to conflict with social 
objectives that are oriented towards increasing access to resources for the rural poor. The 
rural poor are assumed to be unable to improve or diversify their income generating 
activities with high interest rates and strict collateral requirements. Therefore, loan 
programs are often subsidized by parent donors. The cost of lending operations are 
reported to be high and not covered by prevailing interest rates. However, the high 
operational costs of loan programs are not transparent due to hidden subsidies in terms of 
overhead costs that are often intertwined with their other developmental activities. While 
the subsidies benefit the rural poor who have access to NGO loans, they also discourage 
loan discipline among the rural poor. Often the subsidized loans are perceived by the 
beneficiaries as grants that need not be repaid. This has affected NGO loan operations in 
two ways: (i) in the event that NGOs intend to gradually pass on the responsibility of 
managing loan programs to rural communities, the use of subsidies erodes the viability and 
sustainability of these programs without the continuous infusion of donor resources, and (ii) 
with negative and fixed real interest rates due to growing inflation and poor loan recovery, 
the revolving funds formed with the initial grants revolve less frequently. In the extreme 
case they revolve only once and disappear altogether. In addition, the wide variation in 
subsidized interest rates charged by several NGOs introduces short-run negative externalities 
as one program erodes the base of other programs eventually leading to market failure.24 
Third less rigorous screening techniques to select borrowers and less stringent 
penalties for default and delinquency have resulted in low repayment rates for a number of 
NGOs. Those that have reported high repayment rates, however, had fewer loans and 
followed a very cautious lending approach. Furthermore, penalty conditions for lax loan 
repayment vary among the NGOs creating confusion and incentives for poor recovery. 
Fourth, while NGOs finance a wide variety of income generating activities ranging 
from microenterprises to farming, their strong bias towards the provision of production loans 
and discouragement of consumption loans ignores the fungible nature of credit, i.e., credit 
can be diverted to other uses. More importantly, the availability of consumption credit can 
create a form of insurance for low income families to smooth out their consumption 
34 An efficient market establishes prices that offer incentives for production, resource allocation and 
commodity distribution. It functions based on independent decisions of self-motivated individuals rather than 
on directions from external agencies, and provides information about relative resource scarcity. Market failure 
occurs when outcomes of existing markets are not efficient. For instance, interest rate subsidies from external 
donors aeate negative externalities in the financial markets through artificial disequilibrium in supply of and 
demand for financial services, and eventually lead to market failure. 
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expenses over a season, thereby releasing their own savings (that otherwise would have been 
used for this purpose) for productive investments. Thus, the supposedly unproductive 
consumption loans can lead indirectly to increased investment. 
Fifth. loan portfolios of individual NGOs are often concentrated in terms of 
geographic coverage and activities that are subject to high covariance risks. The financial 
terms and conditions used by NGOs are less developed to mitigate the high risk due to this 
covariance in income. This problem would jeopardize the long-run survival of the programs . 
.5mh, while the majority of NGOs direct loans to groups that are formed 
spontaneously in local communities, some NGOs prefer forming their own groups. In the 
absence of adequate information and experience in loan activities based on group dynamics, 
it is essential that NGOs do not impose new costs on groups or destroy the traditional 
structures through the formation of new uncohesive loan groups. 
Seventh. there is clearly a serious lack of coordination or exchange of relevant 
information among NGOs. A recent attempt has been made to address this problem 
through the creation of an umbrella NGO (TANGO) to act as a coordinating unit for the 
provision of financial services in The Gambia. This horizontal integration could help reduce 
the cost of operations and realize some economies of scale. However, conflicts of interest 
that impede the sustainability of the program may arise in the absence of self imposed or 
external regulations among the NGO community. 
2. Savin~: Deposit Mobilization 
Although information on deposit mobilization is scanty, sa~ programs, except in 
the VISACAs, play a less important role in NGOs' financial programs than do loans. The 
limited role for sa~ mobilization is due in part to NGO access to risk free external 
grants from parent donors (the only exception being the VISACAs). At the same time, 
NGOs are less enthusiastic to mobilize sa~ for on-lending due to the high risks and costs 
involved in full scale financial intermediation. The risks are compounded by the lack of 
insurance to protect savers. Therefore, NGO savings programs are less integrated with their 
loan activities. They more often function as moneykeepers rather than financial 
intermediaries. 2S 
The available information on individual NGO savings programs are summarized in 
Table 11-6. Currently, the savings instruments observed with NGOs are simple and 
~ F"manc:ial intermediaries facilitate the flow of funds from financiaJJy surplus UDits to deficit units. They 
match several borrowers and lenders by supplying loans from deposits mobili7.ed by them. Moneykeepers, on 
the other hand, function as mere safekeepers of their depositor's funds. Indeed, the safekeeping is a service 
offered to business customers, friends and relatives who lack adequate facilities to store surplus funds. 
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rudimentary. International NGOs mobilize deposits on a compulsory basis from loan 
beneficiary groups to augment their revolving funds from which loans are issued. The 
interest on compulsory deposits is paid indirectly through the subsidized loan received by 
beneficiaries. A national NGO, WISDOM, mobilizes savings from women osusus and 
invests in T-bills to pay market rates to its savers. On the other hand, the VISACAs 
mobilize deposits from all members and match deposits with loans to offer attractive interest 
rates to savers. In general, NGOs limit their savings services to a few well developed 
geographic locations. 
Many NGO savings programs have major design problems that impede their ability 
to efficiently mobilize savings. 
Eim., the ambiguous terms and conditions for savings instruments in the majority of 
savings programs creates little confidence in the NGOs ability to protect savers. Low or 
zero interest rates on savings mean that savers are not protected from the inflationary 
erosion of their savings balances. In addition, forcing savers from local village units to 
withdraw their savings from a centralized office or bank in Banjul creates delays for 
emergency withdrawals.26 Furthermore, in cases where savings are used to issue loans, it 
is not clear if prudential reserves are maintained to prevent a run on deposits.27 Indeed, 
the numerous obstacles for savings withdrawal in these programs acts as a substitute for 
prudential reserves. Unfortunately, this comes at the expense of savers and reflects little 
financial management skills in the organization. 
Second there are limited links between NGOs and formal financial institutions. A 
linkage with formal financial institutions enhances the NGO savings programs in three ways: 
(i) allows the opportunity for market rates paid by the bank to be passed on to the deposi-
tors thereby increasing the protection against inflationary risks, (ii) cultivates a banking 
discipline among the rural poor who usually shy away from formal financial institutions, and 
(iii) offers an NGO a place to hold their temporary surpluses thereby enhancing liquidity 
management during the year. Unfortunately, the problem of limited bank branches in rural 
Gambia greatly restricts the opportunities for NGOs to benefit from these services. 
Third, the compulsory savings programs benefit net borrowers through low interest 
loans but offers few incentives to net savers in the community.1.8 In the absence of 
2111 The savings are often collected and kept at the central office or deposited in a bank. In cases where the 
deposits are held in a bank, the NGO often maintains a signatory power over the withdrawal. 
'Z1 There is some evidence on reserves maintained by the VISACAs. 
28 No explicit interest is paid to savers. There is no net benefit for savers unless they can secure a loan at 
subsidi7.ed interest rates. Although the •effective• interest rate on loans increases as a result of the forced savings 
required to secure a loan, the total effective interest rate in most NGOs is still below the market rate for loans. 
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attractive savings mechanisms, the considerable potential for rural savings mobilization as 
demonstrated by the VISACAs is, therefore, left untapped. 
Fourth, little emphasis is placed on the 'savings first' approach in the financial 
programs. Fears are expressed that linking a loan to a proportion of savings may ration out 
poor borrowers who allegedly lack the potential to save. However, it is not clear if 
encouraging borrowers to demonstrate their ability to save before they receive a loan will 
dissuade the rural poor.29 Indeed, an insignificant savings component undermines local 
participation in financial programs, unnecessarily creates the image that the program deals 
only with outside money thereby creating a dole syndrome and, finally weakens the 
discipline to save. The lack of a strong savings constituency within a financial institution or 
program weakens careful loan evaluation and loan recovery efforts which quickly emerge 
when people realize their own savings are involved. Eventually, the soft approach towards 
savings mobilization may result in domination of net borrowers over net savers and affect 
the viability of the financial programs without donor support. This becomes all the more 
important in the event that NGOs decide to phase out grants and gradually turn over their 
financial programs to rural communities. 
Eif:th, the information available on deposit mobilization is scanty and incomplete. 
While some information is confidential, almost all NGOs, except the VISACAs, were unable 
to provide information on the volume, number of depositors, and terms and conditions of 
savings accounts. This is due in part to incomplete or nonexistent records, and in part the 
reluctance of program officers to share information with non-sponsors. In the absence of 
deposit insurance, any deposit mobilizer has a fiduciary responsibility to protect savers 
interests by accurate accounting on transactions and disseminating standard balance sheet 
and income statements to interested parties. 
V. REGULATING AND COORDINATING AGENCIES 
In the current favorable policy environment, some NGOs effectively fill in the 
vacuum created by the absence of formal financial institutions in rural areas, and offer 
rudimentary financial services to the poor in the Gambia While the entry of NGOs has 
increased access to financial markets by some of the poor, the number of villages served is 
quite small. It has also resulted in financial market segmentation. There is an overlap in 
the financial services offered by several NGOs with diverse terms and conditions in 
concentrated pockets of activity leading to negative externalities and market confusion. 
Indeed, while NGOs were perhaps considered an efficient solution to fix government failure 
29 In fact, two VISACAs that encourage their borrowers to save before they borrow have shown a good 
response. The amount saved is left to the borrower's discretion and is not used as collateral or proportionately 
linked to aedit. However, it is not clear if this is a one time deposit or requires multiple deposits for repeated 
borrowings, and if this type of sa~ earns any interest. 
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in financial markets, their entry has contributed to market distortions. The proliferation of 
NGOs, each spending resources on uncoordinated programs, importing and operating 
expensive vehicles, running independent offices, and hiring and training staff appears to 
provide a poor return to the governments or the private contributors that finance the NGOs. 
The market confusions are in part amplified by imperfect and incomplete information 
on the design, implementation, and performance of various NGO programs. Incomplete 
information about the diverse financial programs of NGOs is due in part to inadequate 
regulatory and coordinating institutions for NGO financial activities in The Gambia. The 
parent donors, who are often foreign based, monitor their financial programs to suit their 
own operational philosophies. However, with multiple NGOs operating under diverse and 
sometimes conflicting philosophies, it is difficult without an apex regulatory institution to 
mitigate the negative externalities of their financial activities. However, existing regulatory 
agencies do not currently monitor and regulate the activities of NGOs on a systematic basis. 
Some regulatory and coordinating institutions are essential to streamline the financial 
activities of the NGOs and to reduce the externalities that lead to market failure. 
Coordination rather than unhealthy competition and duplication of efforts is essential for 
the efficient use of resources. Therefore, there is an urgent need for identifying regulatory 
guidelines and areas for coordination that will benefit the NGOs. 
The set of domestic institutions that are supposedly regulating and coordinating the 
functions of NGOs is comprised of The Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG), The 
Association of NGOs (TANGO), The Gambia Village Development Trust Fund sponsored 
by United Nations Development Programs (GVDTF/UNDP), and The Women in 
Development Organization of the Women's World Bank (WID /WWB). This section briefly 
discusses each of these institutions and the ambiguous roles they are currently playing in the 
NGO financial markets of The Gambia. 
1. Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) 
The Central Bank of the Gambia was established in 1971 to define, monitor and 
regulate financial institutions in the Gambia according to the Financial Institutions Act 
(F1A). With the liberalization of the financial markets in the Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP) in 1985, the CBG encourages the entry of private and non-governmental agencies 
into financial markets to provide efficient financial services. Although the CBG has the 
legal authority to regulate the NGOs, no operational regulations have been formulated 
towards this end other than the conventional regulation designed to regulate banks.30 The 
laissez-faire approach to NGOs has been observed to result in negative externalities in 
financial markets and increases the potential long-run social costs of market distortions. In 
30 The CBG is currently contributing to the revision of the F'mancial Institution Act that gives it the legal 
authority to regulate all forms of financial intermediaries including village level institutions. 
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the past, the inconsequential role of the NGOs as financial intermediaries very likely led to 
a lack of interest by the CBG toward regulating these small and scattered organizations. 
Since the NGOs are becoming increasingly active in financial markets and since their share 
of lending in financial markets has become more significant, it is time to reconsider this 
position. 
The CBG does conduct regular dialogues with the NGOs to promulgate its policies 
on interest rates, linking loans to savings, and encouraging coordination among the various 
NGO financial intermediaries. The recently created Agricultural Credit Unit (ACU) at the 
CGB, however, has taken actions that go beyond the conventional role of a regulator. The 
ACU has been assisting the design and promotion of village level financial institutions. The 
ACU recently reviewed the possibility of assisting in the development of additional savings 
and credit kafos in the country. Central Bank authorities, however, have resisted any move 
to engage in these activities on a large scale. 31 
One can understand why the ACU might consider assisting fledgling financial 
intermediaries in rural areas. There is a natural desire to assume a tutelary role in these 
situations so that the local efforts avoid mistakes and get started on the right track. 
However, there is a danger that this role could expand beyond this tutelary stage and clearly 
become an inappropriate role for the Central Bank. The Central Bank should be primarily 
a regulatory institution, not a development agency. By engaging directly in the 
establishment of village based financial intermediaries, a conflict of interest would emerge 
as the CBG would be expected to regulate an institution it had been responsible in large 
part for having created in the first place. One could not expect the regulatory agency to 
operate with complete objectivity in these cases. The CBG should focus its attention on its 
regulatory role. 
2. The Association of NGQs (TANGO) 
This association of NGOs was formed in 1983 to provide an umbrella framework in 
which NGOs can consult, cooperate and collaborate with each other to enhance 
developmental activities.32 TANGO assists the intergovernmental body, the advisory 
31 The ACU is closely associated with the design and implementation of the village banking program of 
AFET in Bwiam and Karantaba (see "Report of the Establishment of Savings and Credit Kafos; ACU, 1992). 
The ACU plans to collaborate with WISDOM, another national NGO, to set up Village Banks designed after 
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and with the VISACAs on its proposed training complex on rural banking. 
Reference is made in the ACU memo cited above about future plans to assist in opening a large number of 
additional savings and credit kafos. However, as we noted in the text, the CBG has resisted any move on these 
plans. 
32 Of the 108 NGOs operating in the Gambia, 52 NGOs, 30 national and 22 international, are registered as 
members of TANGO (see Appendix 1 for a list of TANGO members). 
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committee for the coordination of NGOs (ACCNO), integrates NGO efforts and tries to 
prevent geographical and sectoral overlaps. To facilitate coordination among the NGOs, 
TANGO publishes a directory of NGOs in the Gambia, and a quarterly magazine, TANGO 
TALKS. It coordinates the flow of funds coming from international donors such as the 
UNDP, USA for Africa and national NGOs. Short-term training sessions are also organized 
by TANGO to provide technical assistance in rural financial activities. TANGO should be 
strengthened to carry out its service functions for NGOs in The Gambia. Unfortunately, its 
staff currently is not sufficient in numbers or training to implement a comprehensive second 
level federation role as an effective lobby for NGO interests, a forum for NGO dialogue, 
and a centralized training center to offer a range of services for local NGOs in The Gambia. 
Much more work is needed to accomplish these objectives. A strong investment in human 
capital is needed to achieve these ends along with a period of fairly intense external 
technical assistance and advice. 
3. GVPTF /UNDP 
This trust fund, worth $325,000, was established by the UNDP in 1991 to support 
village development groups and national NGOs who promote participatory income genera-
ting projects, especially for women and youth.33 While TANGO functions as a coordinator 
between the GVDTF, village groups and NGO beneficiaries, the monitoring and evaluation 
of projects is entrusted to NGOs and government extension workers. It was originally envi-
sioned that the trust fund would be used to support technical assistance and training efforts 
to launch local NGO sa~ and credit associations. In part, the trust fund could be 
channeled to support the training of local NGO staff in TANGO workshops or directly in 
the field as mentioned above. 
More recently, however, there has been talk that the trust fund be used to make 
loans directly to local NGO associations. As pointed out in the previous discussion on the 
role of the CBG, this is a dangerous precedent, resurrecting an obsolete and discredited 
strategy of financial development. In ignoring the more time consuming but necessary path 
of sustained growth through local savings mobilization (one of the main themes of this 
report), the channeling of outside trust funds to local NGOs would undermine that effort. 
More specifically, it could introduce a donor virus among the borrowing clientele weakening 
loan repayment behavior. In short order, this top-down external funding channel could lead 
to the collapse of the loan program once borrowers discover that external funds (that carry 
no meaningful sanction for default) are being used rather than their own mobilized sa~. 
It is hoped that the trust fund board repositions the fund into its original mandate. In the 
11 Recently dmemioated guidelines indicate that the GVDTF /UNDP has entered the agricu1tural loan 
market by using the trust funds as start up money for local associations (see Appendix Il-2). Loan were supplied 
to support various microentrepreneurial and farming activities in rural areas and loan repayment rates were 
reported to be satisfactory, however, no evidence is publicly available to confirm this performance. 
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event they do not, it should be recognized that they have transformed the trust fund into the 
equivalent of an operating NGO disbursing funds for on-lending. They therefore are 
undermining efforts to encourage local savings mobilization, placing current depositors 
savings at risk through injecting a donor virus weakening loan recovery, and potentially in-
troducing negative spillovers into other NGO efforts. In transforming its role into being an 
NGO, it should be regulated by the CBG and subject to the same guidelines as any other 
NGO engaged in the supply of financial services. 
4. WID/WWB 
The WID/WWB is not a domestic regulating or coordinating agency. However, it 
controls a revolving fund that is targeted toward national NGOs that provide financial 
services to income generating activities of women. It is currently affiliated with a national 
NGO, GWF A, to provide loan and savings services to women in 200 villages.34 While it 
cannot regulate all NGOs, its access to revolving funds can be tied to selective regulatory 
requirements. 
5. Summazy 
The GVDTF fUNDP and WID/WB are external funding agencies that have limited 
potential as coordinators of NGOs who are non-beneficiaries of these trust funds. The 
Central Bank of the Gambia should play its traditional role of regulating formal financial 
institutions but there exist very few prudential and fiduciary guidelines that currently 
regulate NGO financial activities. Whereas TANGO is an umbrella organi7,8tion that is 
designed to coordinate NGO activities, it is only built on the voluntary participation of 
NGOs to facilitate the exchange of information that promotes coordination among its 
members. Despite the presence of these regulating and coordinating institutions, NGO 
financial activities are largely unregulated and unfocused. At the same time, the CBG, 
especially the role of the ACU unit in training, designing and implementing financial 
programs along with education and information dissemination through seminars, resembles 
that of a coordinating development agency rather than a regulatory institution. Finally, 
TANGO is also involved in information dissemination and coordination of NGO activities. 
In short, the current roles played by CBG and TANGO overlap and duplicate one another 
with the roles of the trust funds ambiguous and potentially damaging to the creation of 
viable, self-sustaining local savings and credit associations in The Gambia. 
34 The funds became operational in 1991. About 125 women were trained under their skills development 
program before getting aedit. An interest rate of 13% per annum is charged. 
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It is essential to realize the need for regulatory requirements and coordination. 
Therefore, it is necessary to identify the roles of potential regulating and coordinating 
institutions that can bring order to the NGOs involved in financial markets. The CBG, as 
the central supervisory authority for financial institutions should be prepared to perform the 
role of an external, objective and non-partial regulator of NGOs. The CBG should be given 
the means and resources to perform rudimentary regulatory functions for the diverse NGOs 
involved in financial intermediation. On the other hand, TANGO as an association of 
NGOs should have a comparative advantage in functioning as a second level federation, as 
a lobby for NGOs, and as a forum to discuss problems and lessons learned through diverse 
NGOs financial programs. TANGO should not be a regulator. To ask TANGO to regulate 
NGOs (as distinct from training, technical assistance, information dissemination, etc.) is, in 
effect, allowing regulatees (those who are regulated) to be the regulator. The conflict of 
interest inherent in letting TANGO serve as a regulator is obvious. Therefore, while the 
CBG should perform the role of regulator, TANGO should assume the responsibilities of 
(i) acting as an NGO lobby to promote their interests in negotiations with donors and the 
government; (ii) providing an active forum for discussing NGO issues; (iii) coordinating 
NGO efforts through information dissemination; and (iv) improving NGO performance 
through training, education, technical assistance and auditing services. It is clear that 
TANGO is not currently equipped with a staff (in number or in training) to carry out these 
comprehensive responsibilities adequately. It is imperative that donor agencies commit 
themselves to a more serious effort to strengthen the staff of TANGO or a comparable 
institution to carry out these service functions. The next section suggests several regulatory 
and coordinating guidelines to streamline NGO activities in The Gambia. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY CRITERIA AND OPERATIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR NGOs 
1. Introduction 
With NGOs beginning to offer financial services under diverse financial technologies, 
it is now opportune to consider the adoption of regulatory and operational guidelines to 
improve the efficiency of the financial services and the soundness of these institutions. It 
is clear that the benign neglect of NGOs as suppliers of financial services is no longer 
appropriate. The laissez faire approach of allowing NGOs to enter financial markets in 
whatever helter-skelter fashion they wish, regardless of market distortions, needs to be 
reexamined. 
If NGOs presume to offer financial services, they should first realize that conceptually 
this service is markedly different from the grant activity with which they have been 
accustomed. Finance is not just another service provided by NGOs. It is conceptually 
different. Discipline is not required in handing out grant services, whereas it is the essential 
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core of financial management. Second, it is important in offering financial services to cover 
the costs of supplying these services in the prices (i.e. interest rates) charged for them. 
Third, NGOs have to recognize that some of their previous grant beneficiaries will not 
qualify for loans. While grants are necessarily inclusive, financial services must to some 
extent be exclusive. Fourth, the supply of financial services should not be considered a one-
shot exercise through a quickly eroding revolving fund, but rather a service that supplies a 
sustained flow of services over time built on responsible loan repayment. Moreover, it must 
be recognized that effective loan recovery can only come from an institution that creates 
both the capacity and the will to collect on due loans. This task can be more easily carried 
out when the loan funds are derived from locally mobilized savings than from external 
sources. Furthermore, savings instruments are an important service for rural Gambians. 
These should be supplied in addition to loan services. Finally, the long run goal should be 
to graduate either the customer-beneficiaries and/ or the institution itself into viable, self 
sustaining agents of financial intermediation. 
This section offers first the pertinent regulatory criteria for the attention of Gambian 
authorities, and second, internal operational guidelines for the NGOs to consider adopting 
to achieve the goals outlined above. 
2. ReiUlatmy and Superyismy Roles for the CBG and TANGO 
The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) should assume the principal respollSlbility 
of regulator while TANGO performs the role of coordinator and service organization. It 
. is inappropriate to allow TANGO to directly regulate NGO activity since this would 
constitute a potential conflict of interest with the regulatees simultaneously being the 
regulators. Just as banks are not permitted to regulate themselves through a bankers 
association, NGOs should not regulate themselves through TANGO. However, TANGO 
has a number of valuable roles to play as a service organization for NGOs. TANGO should 
focus heavily on strengthening NGO capacity to become viable financial agents through 
technical assistance and workshops reviewing NGO progress in this area. It should also be 
prepared to offer auditing services as a part of its technical assistance role. Finally, given 
its presumed comparative advantage of frequent close working contact with local NGOs in 
the field, it should be in a position to supply useful operational information for the CBG. 
At the same time, the CBG should transfer the current range of development agency tasks 
(promoting NGO financial intermediaries, training and workshop activities, etc.) to a 
strengthened TANGO staff and, in turn, properly concentrate on its regulatory role. 
Consistent with this, donors should invest much more in strengthening TANGO to carry out 
its responsibilities effectively. 
In the event that the CBG may be concerned about fine tuning its task of regulating 
NGOs, NGO donors and international organizations such as the WB, UNDP, USAID could 
assist in helping the CGB provide the appropriate infrastructure and adopt the relevant 
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criteria to supervise the evolution of non-bank, client-owned financial organi:lations. A 
special unit set up at the CBG or the ACU should have the responsibility of receiving 
financial reports and audits and undertaking spot field visits to randomly check operations 
and prevent fraudulent practices that might affect savers. However, as mentioned above, 
since regulating small scale, scattered and heterogenous NGOs involves high transaction 
costs, the CBG should minimfae its regulatory role to only the simplest of functions. For 
the most part the fledgling village based savings and credit are client-owned institutions and 
therefore should not be held to the same regulatory criteria used for banks. The regulatory 
unit at the CBG should work out appropriate reporting and supervisory criteria after 
consultations with NGOs and TANGO. In devising these guidelines CBG officials should 
be properly sensitive to the small scale and flexible nature of many of these rudimentary 
financial intermediaries and not come in with a heavy regulatory hand that stifles local 
innovative behavior. More specific regulatory criteria should include the following: 
A Registration 
All NGOs should be required to register with the appropriate authority or office 
within the Central Bank (CBG). The registration should include: 
a) the address of the NGO establishment; and 
b) the identity of the chief operating officer responsible for all the information required 
by the CBG in its mandate as principal regulator of financial institutions in the 
country. 
B. Statement of Operational Plans 
All NGOs presuming to establish financial operations in The Gambia should first be 
required to present an operational plan to the CBG. This plan should set forth the 
following: 
a) the names of the villages in which they expect to operate; 
b) the identity of any principal kafos or other relevant constituencies or clients whom 
they expect to serve; 
c) the procedures to be established in the supply of loan and savings services; 
d) the interest rate policies envisioned in the intermediary. The CGB should critically 
evaluate the extent to which the stated interest rate policies may be disruptive of 
healthy competition within a village or region thereby causing confusion to local 
constituencies as one program may deliberately subsidize its rates to the detriment 
of another program attempting to achieve financial viability with market rates; 
e) the criteria whereby the NGO ensures it is separating its financial services activity 
from its grant activity. This is important both for operations and for reporting (i.e. 
accounting) purposes. 
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C. Reporting Requirements 
All NGOs should be required to submit quarterly and annual reports to the CBG 
documenting their financial services activity in The Gambia in the previous period. The 
CBG should work closely with TANGO staff and relevant NGO donors to design an 
appropriate balance sheet and income and expense statement pertinent for NGO financial 
intermediaries to meet these reporting requirements. 
D. Portfolio Composition 
The COB should be sensitive to the dangers inherent in allowing a financial 
intermediary based on deposit sources to place all or most of its loans in the same type of 
enterprise or clientele. The covariance of risk here in which all borrowers could 
simultaneously succumb to the same downside risk of failure will destroy any intermediary 
with depositors losing their savings. While explicit operational criteria on proper portfolio 
diversification may be premature at this stage of NGO intermediary development, the COB 
authorities should keep this issue in mind during its supervisory review of the supply of 
financial services by local NGOs. Portfolio diversification also diversifies risk, thereby 
contnbuting to the fiduciary responsibility of protecting depositor savings. 
E. Minimum Prudential Reserves 
Local deposit-based NGO intermediaries should hold within their decentralized units 
a minimum prudential reserve (of 15 to 20 percent of their deposit liabilities). This will 
instill confidence among savers that they can have ready access to their savings for 
contingency purposes. Most NGOs have ambiguous savings programs that are generally 
inadequate to meet the emergency requirements of their savers. The CBG should include 
this liquidity reserve as a regulatory guideline for local NGO intermediaries to follow in 
their decentralized units. This is particularly important because of the allegations that exist 
about the loss of savings due to the failure of the Agricultural Development Banlc in the 
mid-1980s and the closing of the CTCS units within the GCU network during the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, there should be no misunderstanding about these prudential or liquid 
reserves. These are not reserve requirements held in the CBG. It would be heavy handed 
and inappropriate for the CBG to presume to hold reserve requirements from the deposit 
base of these embryonic NGO intermediaries. The prudential reserves referred would be 
held within the decentralized units in the field to be available for liquidity management and 
contingency purposes of the NGO itself. 
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3. Qperationa) Guidelines for NGOs 
In addition to the regulatory criteria set forth above, there are equally relevant 
operational guidelines that are in the interest of the NGO community to adopt to promote 
self sustaining field level intermediaries. 
A Source of Funding: External vs. Domestic 
There is a clear need to shift the source of funds for on-lending from external 
resources to locally mobilized savings. The majority of NGOs are still heavily dependent 
on external grants rather than locally mobilized deposits and savings to fund their loan 
programs. Revolving funds are generally established through donor grants to sustain loan 
operations. Not surprisingly, these funds rapidly shrink due to poor loan recovery and the 
impact of inflation that erodes the real value of the funds over time. Therefore, these 
programs cease to operate with the drying up of external funds. In extreme cases the 
revolving funds revolve only once (i.e., they collapse into unintended grant transfers through 
wholesale default). External funding has a valuable role to play in covering technical assis-
tance, training, infrastructure and equipment expenses for local NGO financial initiatives. 
However, outside funding should not be used as the principal source of funds for on-lending. 
This applies to the use of the GVD1F /UNDP trust funds as well as to donor funds per se. 
The infusion of locally mobilized savings into loan programs will have four effects: 
(i) increase the pool of resources, (ii) provide valuable and properly remunerated deposit 
services for net savers in the community, (iii) increase local participation and peer moni-
toring of the programs thereby improving loan repayment substantially, and (iv) reduce 
dependence on external sources thereby creating a base for long-run institutional viability. 
No loans should be issued to borrowers that have not previously proven their wimngness and 
capacity to save in the same institutions or associations granting them loans. Good savings 
behavior is an excellent collateral substitute that signals the likelihood that the borrower is 
creditworthy. 
To the extent that external donor funds are in fact used for on-lending purposes, they 
should come on-line only after the local association has proven (in two or three years) that 
it is viable with locally mobilized savings. Moreover, they should not constitute more than 
a fairly small, perhaps 15 to 20 percent, portion of the total base of funding for loans, and 
they should not lead to targeted or subsidized loans. On the contrary, outside funds should 
blend in with locally mobilized resources to make untargeted loans. Targeted (and 
subsidized) loan schemes are signals to local borrowers that this money does not come from 
locally mobilized savings and a donor virus will spread as they consider this an "entitlement" 
and refuse to repay loans.35 , 
35 Note the discussion about the careful use made of external funds in the VISACAs presented in Chapter 
V. 
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B. Member Education Programs 
A second need is to develop member education programs clarifying the philosophy 
behind NGO financial programs, the responsible use and administration of funds, repayment 
ethics, savings mobilization, etc. This will also reduce the confusion among beneficiaries 
about the legitimate obligation to repay loans and distinguish these from developmental 
grants for nutrition, education, health, etc. issued from the same NGO. TANGO staff could 
be drawn into directing these efforts as a service organization working with parent NGOs 
designing training modules and scheduling workshops to disseminate promotion materials 
that educate local NGO member/participants on the obligation to save regularly, borrow 
prudently and repay promptly. 
C. Portfolio Diversification and Program Risks 
A third need is to diversify NGO activities in terms of geographic coverage and 
portfolio composition to reduce the risks associated with the covariance in incomes. The 
majority of NGO programs are currently concentrated around narrow geographic pockets 
of activities and similar risk-prone income generating activities. This recommendation may 
require the NGOs to either individually expand beyond single villages and single enterprises 
or coordinate with other NGOs operating in more diversified environments and portfolios. 
While the issues associated with diversification compounds the problems in implementing 
financial activities in the short-run, it is essential to diversify and spread lending risks for the 
long-run survival as a lending institution. In this regard, NGOs should not force all or most 
oflocal savings deposits into allegedly "productive" loans (i.e. agricultural loans). These are 
the loans with the highest risks and lowest average returns in a rural portfolio; therefore a 
heavy bias in this direction will quickly create an insolvent institution, placing depositors 
savings at risk. Instead, the loan portfolio should be balanced among a diverse set of 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities as well as consumption loans. 
D. Scope Economies 
Multifunctional NGOs should design their financial programs to take advantage of 
their other community developmental activities. For example, borrowers should benefit 
from their education and skills development programs to improve loan repayment perfor-
mance. The decision whether to follow a minimalist approach (provide only loans and 
savings services) or a multipurpose package of services (in addition to loans and savings) in 
supplying financial services could be a function of the complementary services available 
among the various activities of an NG0.36 In making this decision, however, it should be 
noted that the multipurpose approach is far more demanding administratively for local 
managers. 
36 The decision on this matter is not easy without rigorous feaslbility studies. The available methodological 
tools for detailed feaslbility studies, however, are less developed. The AID stocktaking of microenterprise 
projects reported in Boomgard disc:uues these issues in detail. 
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E. Minimum Prudential Reserves 
As mentioned earlier in the previous section on regulatory guidelines, savings 
mobilization can be promoted only if the NGOs can instill confidence among the community 
regarding safety and accessibility to their deposits. While NGOs are often considered "the 
good guys on the block", the majority have ambiguous savings programs that are inadequate 
to meet emergency requirements of savers. It is advisable that prudential reserves from 15 
to 20 percent of outstanding savings deposits be maintained in decentralized units to meet 
these contingency needs. 
F. Minimum Prudential Rules on Penalties for Default/Delinquency 
Although the existing legal system may be used to enforce contacts, no insurance 
agency exists that protects NGO savers in case of delinquency/default problems as the 
Central Bank implicitly does for depositors in banks. While there are provisions for 
penalties for default and delinquency in NGO programs, many are not rigorous in 
implementation. Therefore, NGO loans are often perceived by the beneficiaries as grants 
that need not be repaid. This undermines the :financial programs of other :financial 
intermediaries and NGOs in the same areas who impose strict penalties for the non-
repayment of loans. At the very least seriously delinquent borrowers should not receive new 
loans. At the same time, interest rate penalties should be considered, and, enforcement 
action taken to secure tangible collateral pledged for the loan. In the event of group loans, 
no further funding should be forthcoming until the group repays the loan difference for any 
individual defaulter within the group. 
G. Positive Real Interest Rates for Loans and Deposits 
As a goal NGOs should strive to charge and offer positive real rates of interests on 
loans and deposits, respectively (i.e. charge and pay interest higher than the rate of infla-
tion). Any margin above this level should be left to each NGO to determine. Interest rates 
should reflect the real costs incurred by an NGO in offering a sustainable flow of :financial 
services. The costs of financial services are influenced by the financial procedures and prac-
tices adopted by the NGO which are in part determined by the source of funds, infrastruc-
ture facilities, and type of clients, enterprises and areas serviced. In the presence of multi-
ple NGOs with diverse financial practices and clientele, it is not necessary to arrive at a uni-
form cost of financial services. Ideally, interest rates should at least be positive in real terms 
(i.e., cover inflation) and cover operational costs.37 These bare minimum thresholds for 
interest rates on loans should reduce the negative externalities of non-market distortions 
caused by subsidized lending in addition to encouraging efficient use of NGO resources by 
the beneficiaries while positive deposit rates will promote savings mobilization. The interest 
17 Random interviews were conducted with NGO loan beneficiaries in 3 villages. The beneficiaries had 
revealed preference for adequate, continuous and timely loans with positive real interest rather than one shot 
grants. 
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rates established within NGO programs in The Gambia are generally similar across all types 
of borrowers, enterprises and geographic regions regardless of the differential costs due to 
differential client risks. Some loans are clearly less risky and therefore less costly than 
others. NGOs should employ a variable rate structure to reflect these differen~s. 
H. Minimum Uniform Bookkeeping Practices and Quarterly Reports 
It is essential that NGO financial activities be documented in a comparable fashion 
to permit evaluation of their financial performance. For example, the simple single entry 
bookkeeping followed by the VISACAs permits an easy evaluation of their performance. 
Furthermore, for the multifunctional NGOs, ~eparate accounting needs to be maintained 
between their financial and nonfinancial activities. While common costs may exist among 
various activities of a multifunctional NGO, it is essential to recognize the basic costs and 
benefits involved in administering the financial programs separate from other programs. 
Attempts should be made to create a rudimentary or simple balance sheet and income state-
ment to document the financial activity of NGOs. Parent NGOs, independently or in con-
junction with TANGO, should work with their local units to prepare and then train them 
to handle this simple documentation. This information should be prepared on a regular ba-
sis and used to prepare quarterly reports on the financial condition of the local NGO unit. 
I. I .inkages with Formal Institutions 
There is a continuing need for NGOs to develop linkages with formal financial 
institutions. The NGOs are multifunctional and are not specialized financial intermediaries. 
Therefore, their financial operations are less focused, more rudimentary and smaller scale 
than those of formal institutions. Their efficiency in financial intermediation can, however, 
be improved by increased ties with formal financial institutions that are specialized in 
financial intermediation. Currently, the links with formal banks are limited to depositing 
surplus or temporarily idle revolving funds in Banjul to earn market rates. These are 
valuable services and contribute to more effective liquidity management for NGO 
headquarter operations in Banjul. However, the almost complete absence of formal bank 
branches in rural areas restricts the development of these linkage services for the 
decentralized village banks in the interior. This deficiency underscores the constraints that 
an inadequate branch banking network creates for the development of NGO networks in 
the rural areas of The Gambia. Therefore, parent NGOs that transfer and place all the 
surplus savings of their decentralized associations into Banjul banks may compromise the 
ability of these local associations to meet the contingency needs of their rural clientele. On 
the other hand, leaving all these funds (beyond the prudential liquidity reserves) in local 
associations may forego an opportunity to earn a decent return on seasonally idle funds. 
J. The Graduation Syndrome 
In the future there may be an opportunity to transform some NGOs into formal 
financial institutions. It is obvious that despite the more h"beralized economic policy 
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environment in The Gambia today, existing formal financial institutions are not suited to 
service the poor or rural clientele.38 Therefore, it may be useful to graduate some NGOs 
who serve marginal groups into somewhat more formal institutions such as savings and loan 
cooperatives, credit unions or village/rural banks. In other words, instead of trying to 
graduate NGO clients into commercial bank portfolios, some NGO financial intermediaries 
themselves could be transformed into more formal financial institutions. The relevance of 
this recommendation, however, is contingent on the degree to which the NGOs are seriously 
committed to become responsible financial institutions offering sustained financial services 
through locally mobilized savings. This concept of graduation emerged as a 
recommendation in AID's recent microenterprise stocktaking exercise.39 Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that there are few examples to demonstrate how feasible it is in practice 
to convert a socially oriented NGO into an efficient banking operation. 
4. Summary 
The major theme of this chapter has been the strategic role of locally mobilized 
savings as the essential building block to create viable village banks/associations offering 
a sustained supply of financial services to their clientele. To properly remunerate local 
depositor /savers market rates of interest must be established for both savings and loan 
contracts. Externally injected revolving funds for on-lending undermine this effort to reward 
savers and weaken the resolve for effective loan recovery. These funds would be much 
better spent if they were directed towards creating the human capital base needed {both in 
local associations and in service organizations like TANGO) to launch and administer 
successful village savings and credit associations. Finally, the combined regulatory and 
coordination roles need to be quickly rationalized with the CBG restricting its role to be the 
principal regulator and TANGO the principal training and service organization for NGOs 
in The Gambia. 
38 See Chapter 1 for further details. 
39 See James Boomgard, AID Miqoenter;prise Stoc1ctakinr Synthesis Re.port. December 1989. 
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Table 11-1 Roster or NGOs Ofl'ering Financial Services in 1be Gambia. 
A. lnterytioual NGQs 
1. SCF /USA : Save the Children, USA. 
2. CRS : Catholic Relief Services. 
3. AATG : Action Aid, The Gambia. 
4. WVI : World View International. 
5. AN: Africa Now. 
6. FFHC/WRP: Freedom From Hunger Campaign, Women's Rice Project. 
B. National NGQs 
7. NWB: National Women's Bureau. 
8. GWFA : Gambian Women Ymancing Association. 
9. WISDOM: Women in Service, Development Organization and Management. 
10. GRUDA : Gambian Rural Development Agency. 
11. AFET : Association of Farmers, Educators and Traders. 
12. AGE : Association of Gambian Enterprises. 
13. GARDA: Gambia Rural Development Agency. 
C. Uncla§sified 
14. VISACA: Village Savings and Credit Associations (associated with CIDR and KWF). 
30 
Table 11·2 Volume of Dinct Agricultural Loans by Various Sources, 1991-92.1 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
Name of participating 
Institution 
Gambia Cooperative Union 
(GCU) 
Food and Agricultural 
Organi7.ation (FA0)2 
Commercial Banks 
4 Non- Governmental 
Organi7.ations (NGOs):3 
AATG 
SCF/USA 
VISA CA 
AFET 
Subtotal 
5 Total 
Volume of loans (in millions 
of Dalassis )2 
(1) 
3.75 
1.CJ7 
0.22 
(0.86) 
(0.21) 
(0.21) 
(0.04) 
1.32 
7:1/J 
Relative Share % 
(2) 
51.7 
27.10 
3.03 
(11.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.9) 
(0.6) 
18.2 
100.00 
Note 1: The volume of loans &om foreign sources, credit unions, private entrepreneurs and informal credit 
markets are not included in this table due to data limitations. 
2: This includes loans through private fertili7.er dealer auociations, mai7.e growers auociations and block 
demonstration villages. 
3: This includes only the NGOs who provided data on their loan portfolio, and therefore is incomplete. 
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Table 11-3 1he Sample of NGOs, Associated Orpni7.ations and Beneficiaries Partidpating in the Study. 
I. Non-Goyenunental Orpnizations <NGQsl 
A. International NGOs 
1. SCP /USA : Save the Children, USA 
2. CRS : Catholic Relief Services 
3. AATG : Action Aid, The Gambia 
4. WVI: World View International 
B. National NGOs 
5. GWFA : Gambian Women Fmancing Association 
6. WISDOM : Women in Service, Development Orgaojz.ation and Management. 
7. GRUDA : Gambian Rural Development Agency. 
8. AFET : Association of Farmers, Educators and Traders. 
9. AGE : Association of Gambian Enterprises 
C. Unclassified NGO 
10. VISACA. : Village Savings and Credit Associations 
IL Cnmjlinating/Regulatory Institutions 
1. CBG : Central Bank, The Gambia 
2. TANGO : The Association of Non-Governmental Organ;ntions 
3. GVDTF fUNDP : Gambia Village Development Trust Fund/United Nations Development 
Project 
4. WWB/WID: Women's World Bank/Women in Development 
m. Beneficiaries 
1. Women Kafo at Kwinella: AATG beneficiaries 
2. Y aminkunda Sesame Seed Processing Plant: AATG beneficiaries 
3. Farmers in the Sapu area: AATG and VISACA beneficiaries 
Table 11-4.1 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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Operational Philosophies of Sample NGOs Oll'ering Financial Sen:ices in The Gambia. 
NGO 
AATG 
CRS/USA 
SCP/USA 
WVI 
WISDOM 
AFET 
GWFA 
AGE 
GRUDA 
VISA CA 
Operational Philosophy 
I. Jntematjonal NGQs 
Uses AATG loans to form a Village Based Group Revolving Fund 
(VGRF) to finance future village activities. Traditional kafos are used as 
basic units of contact. 
Promotes institution building by auisting financial programs that involve 
communities; Collaborates with existing organizations in providing 
financial services. 
Establishes Community Based Credit and Technical Assistance (CTAP) 
program for forming Village Based Funds (VBF) to help in community 
development and income diversification of rural poor. 
Assists in self sustaining community development within its cukural 
framework through an integrated approach. Encourages collective savings 
to form Revolving Credit Funds (RCF), and implements a savings linked 
credit program. 
Il. National NGOs 
Organi7.es women osusus into functional groups and strengthens them to 
become viable and reliable credit institutions. 
Develops group loans through traditional kafos as Savings and Credit 
Associations (SCA) to improve access to financial services in non-banked 
areas. 
Establishes a viable credit institution to increase access to production 
credit by women through the Loan Revolving Fund (LRF) and the Loan 
Guarantee Scheme (LGS). 
Strengthens osusus as viable intermediaries and links up with formal 
financial institutions. 
Invokes village level participation in credit programs by assisting existing 
village structures like kafos. Increases access to consumption credit at 
reasonable rates. 
ID. Unclauifiecl NGO 
Village run institutions providing reliable and profitable savings 
alternatives and untargeted loans to individual clients in a market oriented 
unsubsidi7.ed fashion. 
Source: Brochures issued by individual NGOs. 
Table 11-4.2 General Characteristics of Sample NGOs by Selected Criteria of Activity, Sponsorship, Sble, Location, Membership and Financial 
Services. 
No. NGO Year Activity! No. Members Beneficiary/ Source of funds No. Service Fin. service 
Started target group villages A1eaa3 offered 
-(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
I. International NGOs 
1 CRS 1964 Institution building, 56,000 WomenKafos Private NA All Credit & Savings: 
health, nutrition, women in donations from through C.oonllnate with 
agriculture, credit nutrition and USA, USAID, Gambia GWFA and AFBI' 
and savings health IDRC, Font 
programs Foundation 
2 AATG 1979-80 Education, 177,300 Kafos Child sponsorcn 582 LRD, Credit & 
community health, in UK MID-S compulsory savings 
agriculture rcscarch, 
water, credit 
3 SCP/USA 1985 Health, education, NA Individuals and OXFAM NA NBD Credit and 
agriculture, credit groups;60% compulsory savings 
('f') and savings beneficiaries arc 
('f') women 
4 WVI 1992 Education, skills NA Agriculture and Norwegian NA NBD Credit and savings 
development, health, enterprises: NGO:WVI (Yet to begin) 
nutrition, Savings Kafo style Foundation 
and credit Groups formed 
byWVI 
Table 114.2 (cont.) 
No. NGO Year Activity1 No. Members Beneficiary/ target Source of funds No. Service Fin. service offered 
Started group villages Areas3 
--(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IL National NGOs 
s GWPA 1987 Research and data 300 Women Revolving fund 60 Mostly Credit. Planning 
collection on women entrepreneurs: raised through fund around on savings 
activities, credit, skills groups or raising activities, Banjul activities in 
development training individuals WBfWID,and collaboration with 
USAID. WWBfWID,CRS. 
6 AFBT 1988 Technical skills in 9300 (70% Vegetable gardens, DANIDA, US 14 zones WD,LRD Credit and savings 
agriculture and rural women) bee keepers, Bmbusy, CRS, (planning 
development, microentrepreneurs, Forestry on NBD 
Education, Credit and women and youth: dept.,Central Bank and 
savings Kafos. of the Gambia. URD) 
7 WISDOM 1989 Training, Education, 9031 Vegetable gardens, Partial funds from 300 Mostly Credit and savings 
Awareness creation microentrepreneurs: OXFAM around 
on gender issues, Women and osusus Banjul 
credit and savings 
8 GRUDA 1989 Training for skills NA2 Farmers, women UNDP,CRS, NA MID-N Credit (yet to 
development, Credit entrepreneurs: Village Aid/UK begin) ~ 
Kafos 
9 AOB NA Training in skills 2SO Microentrepreneurs NA NA Around Savings 
development, savings /osusus Banjul 
Ill. Uncl8181fted NGO 
10 VISA CA 1988 Savings, credit, 1384 (includes Rice farmers and French NGO 6 MID-S Savings and credit 
education S6 Kafos) retail traders: (CIDR) and 
Individuals and German funds from 
Kafos KFW 
Note 1: Listed by order of importance 
2: NA : Not available 
3: WD: Western Diviison; LRD: Lower River Division; NBD: North Bank Division; MID-N: MaCarthy Island Divlllon-North; MID-S: McCarthy Island Division-SOuth; URD: Upper 
River Division. 
Table 11-5 Financial Services Offered by NGOs: Loans. 
# NGO Year Source of Type of Target #borrowers Int.rate/yr Collateral Ave. loan Repayment Areas 
Started funds Loan1 group size rate covcml2 
- -(1) (2) (3) (4) (.S) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
L Jatematlonal NGO 
1 AATG 1983 UK sponsorers ST&MT Kafos 246 G.nut 0 to Kafos Group NA3 42% (as of MID-Sand 
agricultural groups and until 1991 liability Oct.91) LRD: 37.S 
credit: Inkind .53 rice and 12 villages 
loans, groups (as after that. 
production of PY 1991-
credit 92) 
2 SCP/ 1985 Revolving ST,MT,LT: Groups and .54 1.5 for all Group D.SOO to 7.5% NBD:7.S 
USA funds: Grants lnkind or cash individuals. outstanding benefi- guarantee, 28,.SOO. villages 
fromOXFAM, loans, Groups as loans ciaries ST legal 
membership production conduits for or LT protection, 
fees, int.rates credit individual social 
loans; 30% sanctions. 
must be 
lO women ('fl beneficiaries 
3 CRS a.1982-88: a.CRS funds a.Investment a.Sesame a..50000 Grant NA NA NA a.All 
Grants b.Matching grants: seed women through 
b.1988: grant from lnkind growers: Gambia 
Loans USAID grant Women where 
with b.STand MT: Kafos sesame is 
GWFA Cash loans, b.GWFA grown 
and production and b.AFET 
AFET credit AFET and 
GWFA 
areas 
4 WVI 1992-93 Membership ST: Cash Kafo style NA NA Group NA NA NBD 
fee, savings loans, groups: .S-1.5 guarantee 
put in rcw>I· production members 
ving fund and credit 
matched by 
WVI. 
Table 11...S (cont.) 
# NGO Year Source of Type of Target #borrowers Int.rate/yr Collateral Ave. loan Repayment Areas 
Started funds Loan1 group size rate covered2 
- -(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
II. National NGO 
s GWPA 1987 a.Revolving 6to 12 Kafos and a.13 loans a.12.S: a.Membership a.DSOOO NA Banjul area 
funds month individuals b.1 loan revolving contn'bution b.D20000 
b.Loan credit: Cash funds b.GWPA 
guarantee loans, b.23.S: guarantee 
scheme with production Std. 
standard credit chartered 
chartered 
6 WISDOM 1989 OXPAM sr and LT: Women 215 rural 11 Salaried D1000 to High Mostly 
Cash loans, osusus and and ud>an workcru D3000for around 
production limited groups guarantor, Sf loans. Banjul 
credit individuals half of savings D20,000 
and group for LT 
liability. loans. 
7 APm' 1990-91 Savings ST: Cash Kafo type 1343 (82% 24 3 guarantors, NA High 13 villages 
mobilized, loans, pro- groups women) 3/4 of savings in Bwiam ~ Central bank duction and 
°' of the Gambia credit Karantaba: 
LRD and 
WD. 
8 GRUDA 1992 UNDP S'fandMT Kafos and NA Planning NA NA NA MID-N 
loans: Cash individuals on market 
loans, Cons. rates 
and prod. 
loans 
III. Unelasslfted NGO 
9 VISA CA 1988 Savings sr: Cash Cients in 8271oans 4()..6() Animals, fann D20to 95 MID-S: 6 
mobilized, loans, pro- rice farm- issued up to (depends implements 3000; villages 
from fann duction ingand March 1991 OD and jewelry mean: 
income in loans retail VISACA) D200. 
Jahally-Pachar trade 
project 
Note 1: sr: short-term loans (leu than 9 months); MT: Medium-term loans (Uptil 3 years); LT: Long-term loans (Uptil S years) 
2: WD: Western Division; LRD: Lower River Division; NBD: North Bank Division; MID-N: MaCartby Island Division-North; MID-S: McCarthy Island Division-South; URD: Upper 
River Division. 
3: NA: Not Available 
Table 11-6 Financial Services Offered by NGOs: Savings Mobilization. 
No. NGO Year TYPe of savings Target Use of funds Annual Int. rate (%) Area covered2 
started 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) 
L lnterutlonal NGO 
1 AATG 1986 Compul&ory contribution:DlO Kafos Goes to build Village 0 MID.S and LRD 
/member/month by groups Group Revolving Funds 
assisted with credit 
2 CRS 1988 Collaborates with GWFA and Women kafos NAl NA NA 
APBT 
3 SCP/USA 1992 a.Compulsory savings by Groups and Goes to Bank in Earn bank rate NBD 
beneficiary groups Individuals individual savings 
b.Savings by group members accounts 
4 WVI 1992 Collective savings from kafo style Groups and Build group funds 0 NBD 
(Yet to groups, individual savings individuals 
begin) 
IL National NGO 
r--- 5 WISDOM 1989 Matches osusus savings by 1:3 Women: Buys T-Bills WISDOM Pays osusus Around Banjul: 3000 
~ OIUSUS 13%, and T-Bills pays women 
WISDOM 18.S% 
6 APBT 1990-91 a.Deposits with an agreed time of Kafos Gives out loans a.18 for deposits over 14 Zones: 12 savings 
withdrawal D2SO kafos with 6000 
b.Fllted deposits for more than 3 b.1S% members 
months 
7 GWFA 1993 Collaborates with WWB/WID Women: Gives out loans and link NA 200 villages projected 
(Yet to Savings and up with banks 
begin) credit Kafos 
8 AOB NA OsUIUll: Monthly J:Otation with Osusus Consumption or 10% earns bank rate Around Banjul 
10% compulsory contribution to productive USC by 
member's bank account members 
llL Unclualfted NGO 
9 VISA CA 1988 a.Tenn deposits for 3,6 & 9 Rice farmers a.Gives out loau a.20to30 6 villages in MID-
months. and Kafos South 
b.Current accounts b.O 
Note 1: NA : Not available 
2: WD: Western Divilson; LRD: Lower River Division; NBD: North Bank Division; MID-N: MaCarthy Island Division-North; MID-S: McCarthy Island Division.SOUth; URD: Upper 
River Division. 
Table 11-7 NGO Financial Activities: Strengths and Weaknesses. 
No. NGO 
(1) 
1 AATO 
2 CRS/USA 
3 SCP/USA 
4 WVI 
Strengths 
(2) 
I. International NGO 
a. Wide coverage of beneficiaries 
b. Oroup n:sponsibility system to build revolving funds and incentive based 
credit program reduce moral huard problems 
c. Unb village kaf0& to formal financial institutions through their deposits. 
d. Use or traditional kafOI increases village .level participation. 
a. Coordinates with national NGOs to minimize COits 
b. Benefits women. 
a. F.stablishment or village based funds (VBF) serves insurance purposes 
b. Matching locally mobilized funds by loans (1:3) from src to build 
VBP provides incentives for active community participation. 
c. Non-minimalist approach helps in overall community development. 
d. Group liability reduces moral huard problems: economies or 
information. 
a. Use or kafo style groups to form revolving credit funds (RCF) increases 
village participation and creates collective group n:sponsibility. 
b. A strong bias towards uvinp mobilimtion to build RCF. 
Weaknesses 
(3) 
a. Covers only upper 20% of the rural population. 
b. Undermines other credit programs that charge market rates. Need to shed 
the grant approach. 
c. Sustainability or the program in the presence of growing inflation rates and 
negative real int.rates is difficult. Will erode revolving funds easily. 
d. Compulloty uvinp program with no int.rate provide less incentives to save 
with revolving funds. 
e. Poor recoveiy performance 
a. No well planned credit/uvinp programs of their own 
b. Do not lnwlve in credit and savings activities of sesame seed growers 
associations assisted by CRS. Could have helped them to link up with 
formal financial institutions. 
a. No wluntaiy uvinp program to build VBF. 
b. Unks with formal financial institutions are veiy weak. 
a. Formation or groups by WVI instead of using existing kaf0& can undermine 
multifunctions traditionally provided by kaf0&. 
b. Need to plan linking RCF with formal banking systems to avoid funds lying 
idle. Need good plans for portfolio diversification. 
c. Proportionate linking or credit to uvings may benefit rich beneficiaries 
rather than poor. 
t>l 
00 
°' (f') 
Table 11-7 (cont.) 
No. NGO 
(1) 
5 WISDOM 
6 APBT 
7 GWFA 
8 AGE 
9 GRUDA 
10 VISACA 
Stn:ngths 
(2) 
II. National NGO 
a. Benefits women 
b. Encourages lllVings among women and links them with banks 
c. Pays positive inten:st on deposits 
a. Use of kafos incn:ases village level participation 
b. Strong lllVings program; lllVings linked cn:dlt program. 
c. Back up by Centnl Bank and CRS 
d. Market rates for cn:dit and lllVings programs 
e. Borrower scn:ening by village level committees reduces moral h111.11rd 
problems. 
a. Benefits women 
b. lncn:ases ac:cc&1 to bank loans through loan guarantee schemes. 
a. Functions as a faCilitator of osusus. 
b. Unks up osusus with banks. 
a. Use of kafOI pRVents destroying traditional groups and incn:ases village 
participation. 
b. Group participation reduces moral h111.11rd problems. 
c. Pl'OYides consumption loans 
III. UnclassUled NGO 
a. Strong local participation and basis on locally mobilized funds, and little 
donor intervention 
b. No targetting of loans 
c. Maintain prudential n:serves for contingency requin:menst 
d. Efficient use of collateral substitutes to enforce contracts 
d. Commited staff. 
Common weakness of all NGO actMtics 
1. Lack long-term cn:dit component 
2. Sustainability without external funds is questionable 
Weaknesses 
(3) 
a. Umited rural coverage 
b. Very cautious lending procedun:s; linking credit to savings may benefit 
richer women mon:. 
c. No portfolio divenification 
a. Need to consolidate savings programs and link them with formal financial 
institutions. 
b. All lllVings all loaned out: No protection to saven; need mon: portfolio 
divenification. 
c. No prudential n:serves maintained to meet contingency requin:ments. 
a. No rural penetration 
a. No rural penetration 
b. No din:ct financial intermediation. 
a. No savings program; sustainability of program is limited. 
b. Not well designed to handle consumption loans. 
a. Nuclear units that an: subject to risks due to covariance of income. 
b. Replicability limited to an:as with assured income generating activities. 
c. Matching of savings and credit term structun:s an: less flexible in n:cycling 
funds. 
3. Lack links with formal financiaal institutions for n:financing, liquidity management, and ruumcial intermediation 
4. Cover only small an:as and lack national coverage 
5. Overlap of actMties. 
6. React to donor signals. 
No. 
1.* 
2.* 
3. 
4.* 
5. 
6. 
7.* 
8. 
9.t 
10.* 
11.* 
12. 
13.t 
14.* 
15. 
16.§ 
17.t 
18. 
19. 
20.* 
21.* 
22. 
23.§ 
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APPENDIX 11-1 
UST OF NGOs IN TIIB GAMBIA1 
Abbreviation/Full Name 
AATG - Action Aid The Gambia 
ABWE - Assoc. of Baptists f. World Evangelism 
ADRA - Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
AFET - Assoc. of Farmers, Educators and Traders 
African Islamic Board for Medical & Social Aid 
Africa's Self Help Organisation 
AGE - Assoc. of Gambian Entrepreneurs 
Allah Leka Jombo Kuto 
AMA - Africa Muslim Agency 
AMDM -Anglican Mission Development Ministries 
AN - Africa Now 
Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha 
ANFAR - National Assoc. for Religious Families 
APSO - Agency for Personal Service Overseas 
ASHAD-African - American Society for Humanitarian 
Aid and Development 
Bahai Movement 
BCS - Brotherhood of the Cross and Star 
Blue Crescent 
British Gambian Friendship Society 
BMTG - Baptist Mission The Gambia 
Caritas 
CASE - Community Action for Socio-Economic 
Empowerment 
CODE - Canadian Organisation for Development 
through Education 
National/International 
I 
I 
I 
N 
I 
? 
N 
N 
N 
N 
I 
N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
N 
N 
I 
1 Source: TANGO Secretariat, March 1992. (Addr~ of the NGO's listed can be obtained &om the 
Secretariat). 
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No. Abbreviation/Full Name National/International 
24.* CCF - Christian Children's Fund I 
25. Celestian Church N 
26. Christian Council I 
27.t COP - Church of the Pentecost I 
28.* CP - Cooperationa and Progress N 
29.* CRS - Catholic Relief Services I 
30.* cu so I 
31.* CYSARDA - Child Youth Support and Rural N 
Development Agency 
32. Danish Gambian Friendship Society I 
33.* DASH - Development Action through Self-Help N 
34.t Exchange Crossroads Company N 
35. Fass Youth Association N 
36.* FFHC - Freedom From Hunder Campaign N 
WRP: Women's Rice Project, Mansakonko 
37.* FIOH - Future In Our Hands I 
38. Foederkreis: Afrika Hilfe E.V. I 
39.* FORUT The Gambia N 
40. FrG - Friends of The Gambia I 
41. GAICD - Gambia Assoc. for Islamic Culture and N 
Development 
42.* GAFNA - Gambia Food and Nutrition Association N 
43. Gambia-Swe Charitable Organisation I 
44. Gambia Youth Literacy Foundation N 
45.t GAMNCPADD - Gambia National Committee/Centre N 
for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drugs 
Dependency 
46.t GAMSAM I 
47.* GARDA - Gambia Rural Development Agency N 
48.* GBPW - Gambia Business and Professional Women N 
49.* GFP A - Gambia Family Planning Association N 
50.t GOGA - Gambia Girls Guides Association N 
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No. Abbreviation/Full Natne National/International 
51.* GGSM - Gatnbia Good Seed Mission N 
52.* GHEA - Gatnbia Home Economics Association N 
53.t G~ - Gatnbia Islamic Relief Services N 
54. GIU - Gambia Islamic Union N 
55. Gloria Baptist Fellowship Church I 
56.* GOVI - Gambia Organisation of the Visually Impaired N 
57.* GRCS - Gambia Red Cross Society N 
58.* GRUDA - Gatnbia Rural Development Agency N 
59.* GWFA- Gatnbia Women's Finance Association N 
60.* GYF - Gambia Youth Federation N 
61. HAAG - Help Age Association Gatnbia N 
62. HELPERS I 
63.* ICAM - Inner Oty and Africa Ministries I 
64.* ICO - Islamic Call Organisation I 
65. IIRO - Intern. Islamic Relief Organisation I 
66.t IOGT - Intern. Organisation of Good Templars I 
67. IRFF - Intern. Relief Friendship Found. Inc. I 
68. Islamic Assoc. for Relief, Development and the I 
Environment 
69. Islamic Cultural Centre N 
70.t ISHR - Intern. Society for Human Rights I 
71. JIDA - Jokadu Islamic Development Association N 
72.* KETA - Kombo East Tesito Association N 
73. Methodist Mission (Agric. Programme) I 
74.* MRC - Medical Research Council I 
75.* NGSFA - North Bank Sheep Fattening Association N 
76. OIC Chamen Centre I 
77.* PAIS - Pan African Islamic Society for Agrocultural I 
Development 
78.* PATH - Progress in Action Through Home-Resources N 
Development 
79.* PATW - Project Aid Third World N 
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No. Abbreviation/Full Name National/International 
80.t Peace Corps I 
81.* PPG - Partnership & Progress in The Gambia N 
82.* PIA - People in Action N 
83. PIA - Pipeline Islamic Association N 
84.§ Project Concern International I 
85. Rawdul Quran (Garden of the Quran) N 
86. Sahel Development Foundation I 
87.* SCF /UK - Save the Children/UK I 
88.* SCF /USA - Save the Children Federation/USA I 
89. Seventh Day Adventist Church I 
90.* SFP - Schools for Progress N 
91. Shabibatou Ansarudin N 
92. SHIA - Swedish Handicapped International AID I 
Foundation 
93.* SS - Sight Savers/Royal Commonwealth Society for the I 
Blind 
94.* SOS Children's Village I 
95. Swedish Gambian Society I 
96.t TBMPFS - Ti-Biray Multi-Purpose Farm Society N 
97.t TFI'F - The Forbes Trust Foundation I 
98. The New Apolistic Church Society N 
99. The Village Aid Project N 
100.* VSO - Volunteer Service Overseas I 
101.* W AM - West Africa Mission I 
102.* WECI - World Evangelisation for Christ International I 
103.t WIF - Foundation for Research on Women Health N 
Production and Environment 
104.* WISDOM - Women in Service Development and N 
Organis. Management 
105.* Worldview International Foundation I 
106.* YF ADAA - Youth Front Against Drugs and Alcohol N 
107.* YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association N 
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No. Abbreviation/Full Name 
108.f YWCA- Young Women's Christian Association 
109.* Tango observer outside The Gambia: OXFAM 
Notes: 
* TANGO Member 
t Applied for TANGO Membership 
§Inactive TANGO Member 
Total number of NGOs in The Gambia: 108 
of which national NGOs: 54 
of which international NGOs: 53 
Total TANGO membership: 52 
of which national NGOs: 30 
of which international NGOs: 22 
National/International 
N 
I 
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APPENDIX 11-2 
1HE GAMBIA VIUAGE DEVELOPMENT TRUST FUND 
(GVDTF) (1HE FUNP)2 
ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS 
ACTIVITIES 
The main activities of the Trust Fund are: 
1. To provide funding in the form of loans to village self-help groups and individuals 
whose nature and aims are generally consistent with national rural development 
policy. 
2. To establish a sustainable production finance for small self-help income-generating 
projects and community projects in villages where Village Development Committees, 
groups of individuals, or individuals have articulated their needs and identified their 
own priorities for action, thereby reaching the most vulnerable with the resources 
they need. 
3. To assist TANGO and National NGOs in helping their members (village groups) to 
obtain access to credit based on their own determination of priorities. 
4. To strengthen the capacity of the Department of Community Development to 
respond to the many requests for project finance that are made to CDAS in their 
cause of work in villages. 
5. To promote the formation of viable community groups which would be encouraged 
and supported to promote sustainable Saving and Credit Associations within their 
respective areas, to ensure that the provision of credit resources is linked to savings 
mobilization from the individuals and their groups. 
6. To provide refinancing facilities to rural Savings and Credit Associations so that they 
can on-lend to their members to allow them to undertake income-generating 
activities. 
7. To work closely with the line ministries and departments and all other relevant rural 
development agencies. 
2 Source: UNDP. 
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8. To establish linkages between UNDP assisted projects/programmes and village 
groups, and national NGOs that could benefit from advisory services in the areas 
such as: 
a. Women's horticultural production, processing and marketing; 
b. Livestock and small mminants development; 
c. Rural water supply {including training and maintenance). 
9. To support training programmes for effective functional literacy, numeracy, 
techniques of appraisals and of participatory self-monitoring and evaluation, 
campaign geared towards sensitation of the Trust Fund modalities, capacity and 
confidence building in the rural community on a continuing basis. 
10. The Fund will solicit additional funds from wide variety of local sources, international 
donors, development agencies both official and non-official agencies. 
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR LOANS 
i. Any groups of individuals, individuals, or Rural Savings and Credit Associations 
involved in rural income-generating activities may be eligible for loan facility 
provided that the economic, technical, managerial and marketing components of the 
project are established to the satisfaction of the Trust Fund. 
ii. Applicants for loan should not be borrowers or defaulters of any other credit agency. 
iii. Applicant should be resident in the village from where loan application was made 
for a minimum period of six ( 6) months. 
iv. Farmers should produce proof relating to ownership of land or right to cultivate the 
land from the Alkalo. 
v. Applicant should have had some experience and/ or ability in the activity for which 
loan is applied. 
vi. Projects must be in keeping with objectives/provisions of the Fund regarding eligible 
activities and must aim at raising the standard of living of the prospective borrowers, 
i.e. the scale of the project should be above subsistence level. 
vii. Applicant, whether individual, groups or associations, should have savings account 
with Savings and Credit Associations in their areas where such exists. 
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viii. Lending to groups will be confined to income-generating and/ or employment 
generating activities conducted by already existing groups working together or 
working together with groups mutual support (as in a savings and credit group). 
ix. Each group leader should be able to provide a mechanism whereby all members of 
the group would jointly and severally guarantee the loan when approved and also 
assist in the collection of repayment on due dates. 
x. Members of the Board of Trustees and staff of the Fund and their families, 
employees of Government or other institutions or. professionals are not under any 
circumstances eligi"ble for credit facilities from the Fund. 
LENDING PROCEDURES 
Applications for loan funds can be presented to the Fund in a number of ways: 
i. Direct applications from a village development committee or village group, through 
an extension worker from government or national NGO. The extension worker 
would help applicants to complete application forms to the Fund. The applications 
will give details of any feasibility study and whether the applicant has savings plans 
which should always precede an application for credit. 
n. Complete application forms will be forwarded to the Fund with the name of the 
extension worker who helped applicants. The extension worker will recommend the 
project and be expected to accept accountability for ensuring the beneficiary has 
access to technical on-going advice. 
TYPES OF LOANS 
The Fund will grant two types of loans and these would be based on the expected life 
of the project. 
Short-term loans - 1 to 12 months. 
Medium-term loans - 12 to 24 months. 
1. Short-term loans are typically granted to meet production, transportation, marketing 
costs, working capital, etc. 
ii. Medium-term loans are for purposes such as the purchase of farm equipment, 
livestock, and other allied enterprises, etc. 
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WAN SCHEMES 
The Fund has the following loan schemes 
1. AGRICULTURAL WANS SCBEME: 
This scheme is meant to provide credit facilities for agricultural and allied 
agricultural activities; 
(a) Short term loans: are granted for purchase of improved seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides horticulture and for meeting expenses like labor charges and 
transport costs, etc. 
(b) Medium term loans: are provided for purchase of agricultural implemen-
tations, farm machinery, plough animals, digging of wells, lift irrigation and 
sprinklers, for land development for production and processing of hybrid 
seeds, etc. 
( c) Development loans for Allied Agricultural activities are provided for activities 
such as dairy, fisheries, poultry, piggery, serculture, beekeeping, rabitary, etc. 
2. SMAIL BUSINESS FINANCE SCHEME 
Under this scheme, loans are granted for activities such as; retail trading in essential 
requirements of the rural community, working capital for small-scale business 
enterprises established by a group, an association or an individual for providing 
service (not professional service) manufacturing, processing, preservation, marketing. 
Blacksmiths, tailors, watch repairers, etc. are not in this category. 
3. SCHEME TO ASSIST COTIAQE INDUSTRIES 
Credit would be provided under this scheme for all artisans such as weavers, potters, 
etc. Soap making, tie and dye, etc. would be considered under this scheme. 
WAN LIMITS 
Borrowers do not have to contribute any cash margin for first loans, as the family 
labor itself is treated as margin. The scale of finance varies according to project and 
the amount of loan the borrower gets will depend upon the scale of finance of the 
particular project. However, for subsequent loans, borrowers are expected to provide 
cash margins, which will be determined by the Fund in accordance with the loan 
amount. 
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RATE OF INTEREST 
The Fund determines the annual rates of interest chargeable on its loans. These 
rates may change from time to time in line with the national economic and monetary 
policy prevailing at any particular time. However, the fund's prevailing rates of 
interest charged on loans ranges between 18 and 24 percent per annum. 
SECURI1Y FOR LOANS 
i. Security and/ or collateral must be offered for all loans made by the Fund. This may 
take the form of security on livestock, farming implements, ornaments such as gold 
jewelry (sufficient to cover the loan with the prescribed margin) hypothecation of 
crops, solvent sureties of two respected elders of the village who are compound 
owners, or repayment capacity of the borrower, depending on terms and conditions, 
nature and volume of facility granted. 
ii. Under the Fund's Group Credit Schemes, group loans are granted and payable at the 
end of each crop season or as determined by the Fund. The group leader and the 
executive committee members or the whole group would jointly and severally 
guarantee the loan when approved. The group leader and the executive members 
would also assist in the collection of loans when due for payment Thus, the group 
pressure is applied in the administration of these schemes. 
DISBURSEMENTS 
I. The Fund operates a supervised credit system. Under this system approved loans are 
disbursed in cash or in kind or a combination of both where necessary. Cash 
disbursements will be made in the form of cash or cheques placed directly in the 
hands of the ultimate borrower(s). Disbursements through intermediaries will only 
be made in exceptional cases with the permission of the Trustees. 
ii. Where cash disbursements are involved, disbursement of loan funds would be time-
phased with conformity with the different operational phases of the life circle of the 
project. Under this system, each case disbursement is preceded by a field visit with 
a view to assessing the extent to which the previous disbursement has been applied 
to the successful implementation of the project. A report on the field visit is 
accordingly prepared with a set of recommendations advising the need for additional 
fund release for the project. 
m. Where disbursements in kind are concerned procurement of capital items and 
production inputs will be made on behalf of the borrower(s) by the Fund only after 
the borrower(s) have identified the implements or inputs required for the project and 
instruct the Fund to purchase such items (as per invoice produce) on their behalf. 
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iv. Disbursements either in cash or in kind shall be made only after the loan agreement 
is completed, security created and guarantors have honored their commitment 
v. Requests for disbursements should be made on a standard form prepared and 
completed by the Fund. 
vi. All disbursements should be authorized by the Fund Coordinator. 
LOAN COLLECTION AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
i. Loan repayment period shall depend on the activity and scale of finance. However, 
the Fund shall specify repayment schedules for each loan. approved. 
ii. All loan repayment will be transmitted directly from the borrower(s) to the Fund in 
a manager to be determined by the Fund 
iii. As for group loan schemes, the group leader and the executive committee members 
would assist the Fund staff in collection of loans from group members when due for 
payment. 
iv. Borrower(s) shall be reminded, by way of a letter, one (1) month in advance of their 
upcoming repayment on a loan. 
v. Should borrower(s) not honor their obligations on the specified date nor submit a 
report of inability to repay a loan on time, then a second remind or "warning" letter 
shall be sent to the borrower(s) requesting payment within one (1) week of receipt 
of the letter. 
vi. The Fund shall, in exceptional cases, consider rescheduling the repayments if, for 
reasons considered tangible by the Fund, the borrower(s) cannot meet repayments. 
Evidence must, however, be provided to support and justify recommendations for 
rescheduling. 
vii. Should all attempts, including persuasion and consultation with borrower(s) to ensure 
that repayments are made, to recover a loan fails then legal action shall be 
recommended to recover outstanding loan funds. 
DEFAULTS ON REPAYMENTS 
i. Failure to pay a loan, or any installment, when due shall constitute default and in 
such cases the outstanding amount, including interest plus a penalty charge of 25%, 
shall immediately become due and payable. 
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ii. Occurrence of adverse circumstances which the Fund solely determines as prejudicing 
the repayment of the loan (e.g. using loan funds for other purposes) would be 
considered as default and the Fund's default rules shall apply. 
iii. The Fund or its assignee shall have full powers and authority upon default in any of 
the terms of this obligation of the rules of the Fund in relation to its installment plan 
account, or at any time the Fund shall deem itself insecured to declare without notice 
this obligation and payable forthwith. Thus, the Fund shall apply to the payment of 
the loan any and all securities and things of value which were offered as security for 
the loan. 
iv. In case it is necessary to take legal action for the collection of any loan, the borrower 
and/ or guarantors shall pay the full costs involved in this transaction. 
v. Defaulters shall not be granted any other loan facility from the Fund, nor could they 
serve as personal guarantors to borrowers from the Fund. 
SUPERVISION 
On approval and subsequent disbursement of loans and grants, regular follow-ups will be 
conducted by extension workers and staff of the Fund to assess progress, check on the inputs 
and identify pending problems. Where possible, officers may on the spot advise and/ or 
assist the beneficiary to find solutions to the problem. In all cases, an official report will be 
prepared indicating the status of the project and the area where assistance is required to 
improve its operational performance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GAMBIA COOPERATIVE UNION• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 1988, The Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) became a privatized 
farmer owned cooperative primarily involved in providing input and output marketing 
services to its members. Prior to privatization, the GCU was an affiliate of The Gambia 
Produce Marketing Board (GPMB), a government parastatal. The privatization of the GCU 
was due in part to the recommendations of the World Bank following the implementation 
of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) by the Government of The Gambia in 1985. 
The ERP recommended: (i) liberalization of the market for production inputs, especially 
fertilizer; (ii) liberalization of output markets; (iii) encouragement for private entrepreneurs 
to enter into both input and output markets, and; (iv) deregulation of financial markets. 
The ERP and the ensuing structural adjustment measures had profound implications 
for the GCU. Prior to the ERP, the GCU was the primary buyer of groundnuts and 
supplier of inputs on credit in The Gambia. It was affiliated with the GPMB that enjoyed 
a monopoly in the importation of inputs, processing and exports of groundnuts. The 
operations of the GCU in the input, credit and output markets were heavily subsidized by 
the government and the GPMB. While inputs were sold at very low subsidized prices, they 
were generally not available on a timely basis; output prices for groundnuts were set below 
world market prices; loans were rationed at below market rates and loan repayment rates 
were very low. In short, the GCU's operations were inefficient and inviable, unable to be 
sustained except through large subsidies. Several factors were identified as contributing to 
its poor performance including mismanagement of the GCU, inadequate macro-economic 
policies, inappropriate input and output price policies in The Gambia, political intervention 
and frequent droughts. Therefore, the World Bank recommended several changes to 
facilitate its reorganization. These changes eventually removed the monopoly status of the 
GPMB in output and input markets, withdrew government subsidies to the GCU, 
reorganized the GCU credit operations emphasizing strict credit discipline and a village 
branch lending program, and divested from the GCU certain multipurpose activities.1 
• We acknowledge with appreciation the valuable assistance provided by Baboucar Gai, GCU; E. Brewis, 
GPMB; Graham Yates, SCB; Binta Khan, GCU; Pa Sinyang, GCU; Karamo Trerra, GCU; Managers of sampled 
CPMSs and several farmers in conducting this study. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 The GCU operated as an apex cooperative body to promote, establish, support and monitor several 
multipurpose cooperatives including the 84 Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies (CPMS), 90 Cooperative 
Thrift and Savings Societies (CTCS), FJSheries Cooperatives (FC), Handicrafts Cooperatives (HC) and Consumer 
Cooperatives (CC). The ERP recommended that the GCU withdraw from supporting the CTCS, FC, HC, and 
CC and only work with the CPMSs. 
1 
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Based on these recommendations, the GCU reorganized its management sys-
tem and marketing operations in 1988/89. Since then, it has undergone significant changes, 
especially in its credit department responsible for supplying seasonal and medium term 
credit to its members. The recent performance of the GCU has been noteworthy. The 
GCU now functions as an importer and distributor of agricultural inputs, supplier of cash 
and in-kind loans, mobilizer of deposits, and buyer and ex.porter of groundnuts. It plays a 
major role in distributing agricultural inputs through seasonal and term loans to its members 
at market rates. Table 11-2 shows that the value of inputs supplied by the GCU on credit 
accounted for nearly 51 percent of total agricultural loans issued to the agricultural sector 
during the 1991-92 crop season. It was also the primary domestic buyer of groundnuts in 
1991-92.2 
The impressive share of the GCU in the input, credit and output markets in 
the presence of alternative suppliers and buyers in the current liberalized environment 
reflects its competitive edge. In addition, its large network with wide rural penetration, 
established infrastructure, long experience in the input,. credit, savings and output markets, 
and established links with formal banks gives it an important role in The Gambia. Its past 
poor performance, however, raises concerns about its capacity and to continue to effectively 
supply marketing services in a liberalized environment. 
Several studies have examined the output and input market operations of the 
GCU from 1955 to 1988 in great detail.3 The recommendations of these studies were used 
to reorganize the GCU. However, there has been little analysis of the performance of the 
reorganized GCU. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to only summarize elements 
of the earlier studies, but to examine in detail the performance of the GCU after its 1988 
reorganization in its savings and lending activities. Since a complete examination of the 
multifaceted and complex operations of the GCU would require a more detailed examina-
tion, this chapter is limited to documenting the performance of the current credit and 
savings unit and to exploring its potential to become a viable and self-sustaining supplier of 
financial services in a liberalized economy. Since GCU loans are often supplied in kind and 
the loan obligations are enforced through deductions from output sales, some discussion of 
both the input and output markets will also be presented when necessary to understand it's 
financial operations. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first we describe the methodology of the 
study; second, we analyze the performance of the GCU in output, input and financial 
markets before and after its reorganization; third, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of the GCU's current credit and savings program and its proposals for the future and, 
finally, we offer a set of policy recommendations in the last section. 
2 It purchased 8,000 tons of groundnuts compared to 2,000 tons by the GPMB. 
3 Examples include the FAQ funded "Agricultural Credit Policy and Structure in The Gambia" (1986), the 
ILO funded study by R. H. Clark (1987), and the USAID funded study by Dem.is&ee, et. al., (1989). 
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II. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Currently, the GCU is an apex cooperative organization with 54 affiliated 
CPMSs. The CPMSs are in turn responsible for several village branches attached to them. 
Therefore, this study was conducted at three levels, the GCU, the CPMSs and the village 
branches, to fully examine the GCU's operations and assess its capacity as an input supplier, 
output buyer and financial intermediary. 
The GCU: At the GCU level, the data compiled from the individual CPMSs were 
examined and relevant information was extracted for this study. Specifically, these data 
included the total number and the names of the CPMSs and the village branches registered 
with the GCU that qualified for the credit program, the volume of loans issued through the 
qualified CPMSs, both seasonal and medium term, and the repayment rates on current and 
overdue loans from the qualified CPMSs and for all CPMSs for the four years from 1988 
through 1991. In addition, information was also collected on the volume of inputs imported 
and distributed, the volume of groundnuts purchased and exported, input prices and output 
prices offered by the GCU from 1988 through 1992. Several annual reports, consultant 
reports and memorandums were also consulted to learn about the GCU's marketing 
operations and problems during the past several years. Furthermore, informal meetings 
were held with several officials at the GCU to obtain their interpretation of GCU's recent 
efforts and problems faced in reorganization. 
CPMSs: A total of 14 CPMSs were visited personally by the senior author during 
April 1992 to assess their current capacity in terms of physical infrastructure, area and size 
of operations, major constraints faced, managerial capabilities, and the nature of accounting 
procedures used. A list of CPMSs visited is provided in Appendix table ID-1. These 14 
CPMSs were purposely selected based on their geographic location, past loan repayment 
performance and output purchases. Efforts were made to contact at least one qualified and 
unqualified CPMS for the credit program from each of the seven geographic zones or cir-
cles. However, attrition was inevitable due to logistical constraints. Informal interviews 
were carried out with the managers of the CPMSs to gather information on the size of oper-
ations, membership structure, volume of loans issued and recovered, problems faced in 
terms of GCU's management, farmer clients and infrastructure facilities, and their opinions 
about the reorganized structure of the GCU and suggestions for further improvement. 
These interviews were facilitated by the fact that all managers were able to communicate 
in English. 
Village branches: Groups of farmers were interviewed from 14 village branches 
attached to the sampled CPMSs, one each for each of the sampled CPMS. Information was 
gathered about farmers' attitudes toward the GCU and alternative sources of input supplies, 
financial intermediaries and output buyers. The list of villages sampled for this study is 
provided in Appendix table ID-2. Two village committees appointed under the Village 
Responsibility System (VRS) were also interviewed to understand the borrower screening 
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and loan recovery procedures followed in conjunction with their parent CPMSs. Since the 
information gathered was sensitive, the interviews were conducted on an informal basis and 
in groups without any direct reference to an individual member of the cooperative. 
III. ANALYSIS 
1. Pre-Reorpni:ration Period (Pre 1988): An Outline 
A The Origin 
The Gambia Cooperative Central Banking and Marketing Union (GCCBMU), pre-
cursor to the current GCU, was formed in 1959 as a financial institution to provide savings 
and credit services to its affiliated cooperative societies. Beginning in 1971, the banking 
services were transferred to the GCDB and the GCCBMU was reorganized as the GCU to 
function as an apex cooperative body to promote, establish, support and monitor several 
multipurpose cooperatives such as Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies (CPMS), 
Cooperative Thrift and Savings Societies (CTCS), Fisheries Cooperatives (FC), Handicrafts 
Cooperatives (HC) and Consumer Cooperatives (CC). It was a quasi-independent organiza-
tion that was supposedly managed by a committee elected by its members.4 
B. Functions 
While the GCU was responsible for several cooperatives, the primary emphasis was 
on supplying inputs, financial (credit and savings) and output marketing services to its 
members through 86 CPMSs.5 The other cooperatives, such as the CTCSs, were adjunct 
operations. 
The input, credit and output market operations were usually subsidized by the 
government and several government parastatal entities such as The Gambia Produce 
Marketing Board (GPMB), The Gambia Commercial Development Bank (GCDB) and The 
4 The GCU was expected to be an independent organization managed by a committee elected by its 
members. However, the heavy involvement of the government and government parastataJs in GCU's operations 
limited its independence. Furthermore, because of the misappropriation of funds in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the minister of agriculture dissolved the old committee and appointed a new management committee in 
1974. The new management committee was appointed on a short-term basis but it lasted until November 1989. 
This Compulsory Management Regime (CMR) reduced control of the regional CPMSs on their operations and 
shifted the decision making process for their operations to the central office (see Demissiee, et. al., 1989 for 
further information). 
s See Appendix m-3 for the growth of the CPMSs over the period 1964-1992. 
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Gambia River Transport Ltd. (GRT) that collaborated with the GCU in the provision of 
marketing services. 
On the one hand, the GCU primarily purchased groundnuts through the CPMSs and 
sold these to the GPMB which operated as a monopolist in the processing and exporting of 
groundnuts. On the other hand, production inputs were sold to the GCU by the GPMB who 
was also a monopolist in importing inputs. The GCU was financed by the GPMB and 
GCDB to conduct its input and output marketing functions. The GCU in tum sold the 
inputs to farmers for cash and on credit, extended cash loans, mobilized savings and 
purchased groundnuts from its members through its affiliated CPMSs and their village 
branches. 
a.) Output markets 
The GCU was the major domestic purchaser of groundnuts in The Gambia during 
this period. Since the GPMB was the only processor and exporter, all the groundnuts 
purchased by the GCU were sold to the GPMB. The producer prices offered by the GCU 
were fixed by the GPMB in consultation with the Government of The Gambia. The GCU 
was given a buying allowance from the GPMB as a commission. Table ill-1, column 6 
shows that the share of the GCU in the GPMB's total purchases ranged from 42 to 81 
percent and GCU purchased nearly 60 to 70 percent of the total groundnuts produced in 
The Gambia until 1986/87.6 Output buying was conducted through the widespread network 
of the 86 CPMSs located throughout the country. Each CPMS in turn purchased nuts from 
its several village branches that serviced about 20,000 farmer members in total. The GCDB 
extended a credit line each year to the GCU to purchase groundnuts from the farmers.7 
b.) Input markets 
The GCU was also the primary distributor of agricultural inputs including fertilizer, 
seeds, pesticides, and agricultural machinery and implements in The Gambia during this 
period. Alternative sources of inputs were limited to scattered private traders who were 
involved in illegal cross border trade with Senegal.8 The GCU purchased inputs on zero 
interest credit from the GPMB. The GPMB deducted the input loans from the proceeds 
of the groundnuts delivered by the GCU at the end of the year. The GCU then sold the 
inputs on credit to the CPMSs who in turn sold them on cash and credit to their farmer 
members. 
6 In general, the farmers reserved 20 to 25 percent of their output for seeds and consumption purposes, 
and the rest was sold to output buyers. 
7 The GCDB in turn was refinanced by the Central Bank. 
8 See Chapter VII for details. 
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Although data on the quantity of inputs supplied were not available, Table ID-2 
presents the volume of input loans, seasonal and medium term, issued by the GCU to the 
CPMSs to be onlent to their members. Fertilizer, seeds and pesticides were supplied as in-
kind loans. The interest rates charged to the GCU, CPMSs and members from the several 
sources of suppliers involved in input marketing are presented in Table ID-3. The table 
shows that the GCU received subsidized loans until 1984 to distribute inputs on credit The 
inputs were also supplied to the CPMSs and farmers interest free until 1984 and were 
charged a below market rate until 1986. 
c.) Financial markets 
The GCU provided financial services through two types of cooperatives: the cress 
and CPMSs. While the cress were adjunct operations, the CPMSs were the major outlets 
for supplying financial services to farmer members. The loans made through the CPMSs 
were supplied in cash and in kind with the objective of increasing their member's 
marketable surplus thereby increasing the volume of output sold to the GCU. The savings 
mobilized through the CPMSs, however, were insignificant. This section first examines in 
detail the performance of the GCU as a financial intermediary through the CPMSs and then 
follows with a brief review of the cress. 
i) Loans through the CPMSs 
From 1959 until 1978, the GCU supplied small unsupervised cash loans to its 
members. Although detailed data were not available, the loan repayment rate was reported 
to be 97 percent (Clark, 1987). This credit program was supported through subsidized loans 
from the GCDB. 
In 1979, the Production Based Credit Program (PBCP) was introduced to supply 
loans in kind. The PBCP was funded by the Rural Development Project I (RDP I) of the 
World Bank to increase cash and food crop production in The Gambia. A total of $11.7 
million was contributed towards the RDP I fund by the Overseas Development Agency and 
the International Association of the Arab Bank for International Development. Loans worth 
D4.75 million were made in the form of fertilizer, seeds and farm implements to members 
of the CPMSs.9 While beneficiary coverage was impressive, poor planning and 
implementation, political interference, and the drought year of 1981/82 led to a poor loan 
recovery rate of less than 50 percent. Loans outstanding as of October 31, 1986 stood at 
D2.89 million on medium term loans and D0.87 million on seasonal loans.10 Therefore, 
the program under RDP I was terminated in 1982. 
9 Many loans were, however, issued to nonmembers with minimum record keeping. 
10 RDP I records of September 30, 1986, however, showed that outstanW. were D 4.44 million and D 1.0 
million under medium and seasonal loans, respectively. The differences in figures underscore. the poor record 
keeping procedures followed under the credit programs. 
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In 1982, the Agricultural Development Program I (ADP I) was implemented by the 
World Bank to consolidate the progress made under RDP I with the objective of increasing 
agricultural production of export and food crops through strengthening support institutions. 
Table ill-2 shows the volume of loans issued and the loan repayment rate under RDP I and 
ADP I. The ADP I supplied cash loans while RDP I supplied in kind loans. Surprisingly, 
the loan repayment rates improved from 55 percent under RDP I in 1980/81to89 and 60 
percent, respectively, under ADP I in 1982/83 and 1983 /84 (column 6). While it is tempting 
to attribute the improved loan repayment performance to the cash loan approach followed 
under ADP I, good weather conditions and favorable real groundnut prices during the 1982-
84 period compared to 1981 very likely should have contributed substantially to the 
repayment trends (see columns 2 and 9 in Table ill-1 for groundnut production and 
producer prices during the 1980-84). 
Based on the relatively positive experience of ADP I, a consolidated credit program 
was implemented as ADP II in 1984. The objectives of the ADP II included, among others, 
financing the GCU to distribute farm inputs.11 The ADP II was funded by interest free 
loans from the World Bank, IFAD, and gifts from the Government of Italy.12 A revolving 
fund worth of D8 million was established by the GCU to finance the procurement and 
distribution of inputs. 
Using the lessons learned from RDP I and ADP I, ADP II included a reorganization 
of the GCU's management establishing an agricultural credit unit responsible for loan 
processing, disbursement and collection. The GCU supplied loans in kind and cash to the 
CPMSs which then onlent to their members in cash and kind. The CPMSs tied the loans 
to the borrower's output sales and the loans due were deducted from the borrowers' sale 
proceeds. A minimum loan repayment rate of 85 percent was made mandatory for each 
CPMS in order for them to receive further loans from the GCU. 
Table ill-2 shows that loans were issued in cash and in kind under the ADP II. 
While the repayment rate was low in 1984/85 and 1986/87 which were years of droughts, 
it fluctuated until 1988.13 The implementation of ADP II also had difficulties. The 
majority of the CPMSs could not attain an 85 percent repayment level set by the ADP II 
11 The other objectives of ADP Il were to: (i) assist the government extension agency, Ministry of 
Agriculture, and Project Planning and Monitoring Unit (PPMU); (U.) improve infrastructure to conduct 
agricultural research; (iii) assist the government to remove fertili7.er subsidies; (iv) improve the seed 
multiplication unit at Sapu, and; (v) provide financing to improve groundnut storage facilities. 
12 The ADP Il was implemented at a cost of $30 million and was financed by loans from the WB/IDA ($8.9 
mill), IFAD($4.75 mill), and gifts from the Government of Italy ($95 mill). 
13 The better loan recovery rate from 1984 to 1988 compared to earlier years was probably due to the 
increased prices for groundnuts in the Gambia as reported in Table m-1. This was due to explicit policy 
initiatives in the post ERP policy environment dramatically increasing groundnut prices to keep up with 
Senegalese price trends (see McPherson and Radelet, 1991). 
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to qualify for further loans from the GCU. For example, in the drought year of 1984, some 
ePMSs repaid less than 1 percent of their current loans. Nonetheless, due to political 
intervention all CPMSs received new production loans in 1985 so the GCU's credit program 
became inefficient and inviable. 
The GeU's inability to implement its credit programs efficiently and independently 
induced the World Bank to critically evaluate its performance in 1986. Poor management 
of the GCU, inadequate macroeconomic policy, political intervention, lack of government 
commitment to remove price subsidies, and uncertain weather conditions were found to 
contribute to the GeU's poor performance in its credit programs (Clark, 1989). 
ii) Savings through CPMSs 
The GCU has also mobilized savings from its members through the CPMSs since 
1959 but the volume of savings mobilized was inconsequential compared to the loans 
issued.14 For example, the volume of savings mobilized by the 84 CPMSs at the end of 
1986 was D0.6 million compared to Dll.8 million in loans issued. 
iii) The cress 
A total of 90 cress were created from 1955 onwards by the GCU throughout the 
country to provide loans and savings to their members.15 These cress functioned as local 
units for the GCU to mobilize savings and supply loans.16 Nearly 85 percent of the cress 
were made up of women members involved in petty trading and microenterprises.17 The 
majority of the cress were urban based and were concentrated in peri-urban areas. 
14 The sa~ mobilized by the CPMSs are treated separately from those of the cress. There was 
presumably some overlap of members between the cress and CPMSs. 
15 The GCU was primarily involved in supplying agricultural input, output, credit and sa~ services 
through the 84 CPMSs established throughout the country. The cress were adjunct operations. Therefore, 
the credit and sa~ services to CPMSs are to be treated separately from those of the cress even though there 
might be overlaps of membership. 
16 Although the cress were the respoDSioility of the GCU, about half were registered with the Department 
of Cooperation (DOC). The DOC formaliz.ed the existence of the cress, established by-laws for the provision 
of financial services, and allegedly monitored the operations of the member cress through field inspectors and 
educated them on financial issues. 
17 The members involved in farming and market gardening accounted for less than 20% of the members of 
the cress. 
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Each cres was managed by an executive committee with technical support from the 
GCU.18 The savings mobilized in each crcs were transferred to the central office of the 
GCU. The GCU paid an annual interest of 8 percent to the cress and extended them 
overdraft facilities at 10 percent per annum. The funds deposited by each cress were 
partly used by the GCU to issue loans to each of them. However, loans were provided by 
the GCU to the cress regardless of the level of their deposits. For example, the savings 
mobilized by the 90 cress by the end of 1986 was about D 207,500 while the outstanding 
balance of loans from their members was D 371,500. Although Table ill-4 provides 
information on only 50 cress out of the 90, it shows that the ratio of loans to their capital 
base as of 1987 (shares and savings) was 116 percent.19 Whenever the loan demand 
exceeded the savings mobilized by a cres, the GCU covered the gap with its funds. In 
short, the GCU supported these cress and the majority of them were dependent on the 
GCU for their financial operations. Little importance was given to the mobilization of local 
savings to sustain the cres's operations. 
The cress paid an annual interest of 8 percent on deposits received from their 
members and charged 12 percent per annum for loans; both were vecy negative real rates 
of interest at this time. While the bylaws stated that the members were allowed to borrow 
twice the value of their savings, the cress were not particular on the proportion that 
linked members' savings with their loans. Indeed, the majority of the members joined the 
cress mainly to get access to loans. 
The loan recovecy performance of these cress was poor. Information on individual 
cress in column 5 of Table ID-5 shows that the majority were faced with severe problems 
of overdue loans. Table ill-4 indicates that the percentage of overdue loans to outstanding 
loans and capital base in the aggregate were 54 and 63 percent, respectively. These figures 
indicate that these cress were not viable, self-sustaining units but were functioning with 
external support from the GCU. The cress were, therefore, a burden on the GCU 
resources and were not contributing to its viability. This led to the World Bank 
recommendation that the GCU divest itself from the operations of the cress. 
iv. Summacy 
In short, the financial intermediation by the GCU was one sided and the credit 
programs were poorly implemented and inviable. Therefore, the World Bank once again 
suggested measures in 1988 designed to improve the efficiency and the financial viability of 
the GCU. The recommendations stated the following: 
18 Eight full-time managers were employed by the GCU to provide free managerial assistance to these 
executive committees. 
19 The information is limited to only 50 cress that maintained records on their transactions. 
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• The Government of The Gambia should not interfere with the GCU's operations but 
should improve the overall policy environment with respect to pricing, marketing and input 
distribution; 
• The Government should absorb the GCU's debt with the GCDB and the GPMB 
worth D 53 million. This would enable the GCU to write off debts owed to it by its 
member CPMS and become solvent to start a new credit program from 1988 onwards; 
• The GCU must withdraw its support to the cress and other cooperatives and should 
restrict itself to working with the CPMSs to conduct its input, output and credit market 
operations; 
• The capacity of the GCU should be upgraded so it can manage a viable and self-
sustaining credit program. This requires reorganization of the credit unit by employing 
competent staff to develop, document and implement credit programs at all levels. Techni-
cal assistance should be sought by collaborating with other extension and research agencies; 
• Each CPMS should be treated as an autonomous enterprise respoDSible for loan 
allocation and collection from its members. The CPMSs should be assisted by the village 
branches. A Village Responsibility System (VRS) should be introduced to incorporate 
decision making and disciplinary functions at the village level in order to improve borrower 
screening and loan contract enforcement by the CPMSs and the GCU; 
• Farmer attitudes towards credit use must be improved through member education 
and the imposition of strict credit discipline. 
The World Bank recommendations were implemented by the GCU in 1988/89. The 
Government of The Gambia paid off 053 million of GCU's debt to the GPMB and the 
GCDB, and withdrew further support to the GCU. Thus, it bailed out the GCU from the 
past debt obligations and reorganized it as a fully privatized cooperative, thereby ending its 
previous status as a government supported quasi independent cooperative. With its 
privatization in 1988, the GCU began to operate in a competitive market environment. 
Significant changes were made, especially in the credit unit, and several measures were 
taken to run a cost efficient program. These measures included: 
• The divestiture from the GCU of its responsibilities with the cress, FC, HC and 
other cooperatives in 1989;20 
31 The GCU closed its cres unit at its headquarters in June 1989 and withdrew its support to the cres 
network beginning in 1990. The cress were informed of the GCU's withdrawal and were given the option to 
continue their operations but without any external support from the GCU. Obviously, many cress were unable 
to function independently. Therefore, out of the 90 cress, 23 opted for voluntary liquidation. Of the remaining 
67 cress, 43 non-registered and 11 registered but dormant societies were closed by the GCU in September 1990 
and handed over to the Registrar of Cooperatives for liquidation. Four cress that primarily consisted of 
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• A reduction in the number of CPMSs from 86 to 54. Thirty-two (32) nonperforming 
CPMSs were either closed· or merged with neighboring CPMSs; 
• A reduction in operating costs through a reduction in staff size from 178 to 132, 
unnecessary vehicle usage and foreign travel; 
• Increasing revenue by exploring possibilities for improved markets for groundnuts, 
the sale of idle assets21 and hiring out idle transport facilities; 
• Producing audited financial reports for 1989 /90; 
• Fixing strict eligibility criteria for the CPMSs, village branches and their members to 
become eligible for loans from the GCU. The Village Responsibility System (VRS) was 
introduced on a pilot basis in five CPMSs. 
The next section evaluates GCU's performance in the input, output and financial 
markets following reorganization. 
women vegetable growers were passed on to the Horticultural Cooperatives (HCO). Only nine cress qualified 
to continue their operations on a self management basis. They were basically urban oriented and dominated by 
women members and dock workers (see Appendix m-s for the list of the nine cress). The GCU agreed to 
reconcile the deposits held by the nine cress that continued after 1990. The accounts were to be handed over 
to the management committees of those cress. 
An ILO study conducted in March 1990 concluded that the majority of the former cress were 
nonviable units and were unable to function without any external technical and financial support. The study 
recommended the cress to operate as aedit unions (CUs) to get access to external support. Fwe former 
cress agreed to function like CUs. With those five former cress, The National Association of Credit Unions 
in The Gambia (NACUG) was established in August 1991 with the help of the Irish League for Credit Unions 
International Development Foundation (Il.cUF) and the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU). The 
NACUG was established to ascimilate viable cress into the CU movement and to form new CUs to provide 
financial services (savinp and aedit) in The Gambia. The NACUG was initially formed with five former cress 
each paying a D 200 as an entrance fee to become a CU. Currently, it has expanded to 18 CUs of which seven 
were former registered as cress. Of the 18 CUs, ten are urban based while eight are rural based. The 18 CUs 
consists of 398 individual members. A total of D 15,000 was reported mobili7.ed &om these 18 CUs as of March 
1992. The individual members of the CUs were paid an 8 percent annual interest rate on their deposits and a 
7.ero rate on shares. None of the 18 CUs was issuing loans to its members at that time. 
21 The assets that were sold included share holdings with the GCDB and the National Trading Corporation 
(NTC), some premises in Banjul, redundant trucks, personnel carriers and stocks of their spare parts, and stocks 
of various commodities. 
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2. Post-ReorKani:zation Period (Post 1988) 
The GCU began to reorganize as a privatized farmer owned cooperative in 1988/89. 
It was expected to operate in a competitive environment without preferential status. The 
major institutional accomplishment of the recent economic reforms that delinked the 
GPMB, the GCU and the GCDB from subsidized credit contributed to the independence 
of the GCU. Currently, the GCU functions as an importer and distnbutor of inputs, a 
supplier of seasonal and medium term loans in cash and in kind, a mobilizer of deposits, 
and a buyer and exporter of groundnuts. These multifaceted and complex activities are con-
ducted through 54 CPMSs located throughout the country. Significant progress has been 
made but several problems remain that impede its viability and self-sustainability. The 
following section examines the recent performance of the GCU to assess the effects of reor-
ganization and identify the constraints faced in implementing several of the proposed 
changes. The focus of attention is the operations of the GCU in financial markets. 
A Output markets 
The GCU still remains the major domestic buyer of groundnuts in The Gambia. 22 
While Table ill-1 shows that it sold most of the groundnuts purchased to the GPMB, it 
began to export groundnuts beginning in 1992.21 The GCU purchased about 8,000 tons 
of groundnuts in the 1991/92 season (10 percent of total production) compared to 2,000 tons 
by the GPMB (2 percent of total production) despite intense price competition from Senega-
lese traders. While the groundnut prices offered in 1992 by the GCU to producers reflected 
world market prices, the Senegalese traders paid 55 percent more than the GCU.24 
The output purchases by the GCU were financed by the GCDB in 1989/90 and by 
the Standard Chartered Bank from 1990/91 onwards.25 For the 1990/91 and 1991/92 
seasons, the GCU received lines of credit from Standard Chartered for D12 million and D6 
million, respectively, at a 27 percent annual interest rate to purchase groundnuts. The 
pledging of its property holdings as collateral was required The GCU was prompt in 
repaying its crop loans to the Standard Chartered Bank. 26 
22 Currently, the domestic output buyers include the GPMB, private traders registered with the GPMB, the 
GCU, and unregistered private traders. 
23 The GCU entered into an export contract with Senegal to deliver up to 20,000 tons of groundnuts by May 
19'J2. It actually delivered 8,000 tons. 
24 The GCU paid 01550/ton compared to D2400/ton paid by Senegalese traders. 
25 A credit line worth of D4 million was extended by the GCDB at 24 percent annual interest rate in 1989-
90. The credit line was D28 million in 1988-89. 
26 Informal interviews with the officials at the Standard Chartered confirmed this information. 
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While the GCU's 1991/92 performance indicates its ability to compete with Senega-
lese traders and honor its export and credit contracts, there are serious concerns regarding 
its sustainability. Interviews with the managers of the sampled CPMSs and farmers revealed 
that the GCU will lose its share of the groundnuts market if the current large differentials 
in groundnuts prices offered by the GCU and Senegal continues in the future. Whereas 
some loyal cooperative members sold to the GCU this year, they said that they might shift 
to Senegalese traders if future price differences are more than 0400/ton. This has serious 
implications for the loan contract enforcement mechanism followed by the GCU since 
several members sell groundnuts to the GCU to repay their input loans. With alternative 
buyers offering higher prices, it will be difficult for the GCU to recover their loans through 
its role as a groundnut buyer. While the cooperative members should have cash to repay 
their GCU loans when they sell to outsiders for a higher price their actual repayment is 
subject to uncertainties. Furthermore, since several alternative sources supply inputs on 
credit, some farmers may discontinue buying future inputs from the GCU and stop repaying 
their loans through groundnut sales to the GCU at the current distorted price structure for 
groundnuts. Therefore, the ability of the GCU to continue to supply inputs and purchase 
groundnuts will depend greatly on the nature of future Senegalese pricing policies. 
B. Input markets 
The GCU is still one of the major supplier of inputs despite the emergence of several 
competing alternative supply channels in The Gambia. In 1991/92, it is estimated that the 
GCU distributed 30 percent of the fertilizer consumed and nearly 60 percent of agricultural 
implements used in The Gambia. 27 The inputs are distributed through the network of 
CPMSs. While inputs are supplied on credit to those CPMSs that qualified for loans based 
on their previous loan recovery performance, it sells inputs on cash to unqualified CPMSs. 
The GCU purchased fertilizer from the Government of The Gambia (GOG) that 
functioned as an importer from 1988 to 1991. The fertilizer was sold by the GOG as an 
interest free loan to the GCU. However, the revolving fund established under ADP II was 
used to finance the purchase of agricultural implements and seeds at a zero interest rate 
from the GPMB. In 1991/92 the GCU imported 500 tons of 8-24-24 compound fertilizer 
and implements from Senegal using the revolving fund. It intends to continue importing 
fertilizer and other inputs in the future. 28 
The recent performance of the GCU in input markets has been noteworthy. The 
prices at which the inputs were sold to the farmers have not been subsidized and have re-
flected market rates. The inputs, especially fertilizer, were distributed at a lower price than 
rr The total consumption of fertili7.er in the Gambia in 1991/92 was 2190 tons and GCU distributed 634 tons. 
See Chapter VII for details about the alternative channels that supply fertili7.er in the country. 
28 The GCU has already placed orders with a firm in Spain to import 15-15-15 NPK compound fertili7.er 
at $140/ton for distnbution in the 19'.rl./9'3 season. 
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its competitors such as the FAO.'J!J The sample farmers interviewed were appreciative of 
the timely supply of inputs by the GCU but were concerned about the increase in prices 
compared to previous years. However, the members of unqualified CPMSs complained that 
inputs were not available even for cash sales during 1991/92. The unqualified CPMSs obvi-
ously lacked equity capital to buy inputs from the GCU and sell them for cash to their 
members. 
The GCU bas a comparative advantage in input markets due to its long experience 
and established infrastructure. However, several factors can easily erode these advantages 
such as the termination of ADP Il funds, the shrinking demand for fertilizer due to the 
decreasing value cost ratio (i.e., groundnut price/fertilizer price ratio),30 the increase in 
competition from alternative channels, and the changing operational systems of its competi-. 
tors, such as the FAO and NGOs. All these factors could affect the GCU's share of future 
input markets. Left to adapt to market forces with no subsidization, two possibilities may 
arise: (i) it will be difficult for the GCU to realize economies of scale and profits so it will 
withdraw from the input market; or, (ii) the GCU will be. the only agent that survives due 
to its comparative advantage in established infrastructure and experience. The result will 
also have serious implications for the loans issued through the GCU. A shrinking share of 
the GCU in the input market will also mean a decreasing role in the credit market 
C. Financial markets 
Although the GCU is not a specialized financial intermediary regulated under the 
Financial Instruments Act (FYI) of the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG), it is a major 
supplier of agricultural loans in kind and a mobilizer of savings to a small extent In the 
pre-reorganization period the GCU bad been supplying loans in cash and kind primarily as 
grants or at subsidized rates and mobilizing deposits through the cress and CPMSs. The 
current credit program is, however, based on market rates and follows stricter operational 
procedures. The design of the current savings program implemented on a pilot basis is 
different from the operations of the earlier cress and CPMSs. A definitive evaluation of 
the GCU's current financial services assessing its viability with privatization is, however, 
premature and difficult due to the fact that (i) the new credit program is only four years old 
and is still undergoing changes; (ii) the savings program was implemented only on a pilot 
basis in 1991/92; and (iii) accounting procedures are still being streamlined to generate data 
required for a detailed study. Nonetheless, this section examines the new credit and savings 
program based on the limited information obtained from the GCU and the informal 
interviews conducted for this study. 
211 The prices were lower due to its lower operational costs. The cmt economies were reali7.ed in part due 
to its established infrastructure that reduced fixed and variable costs, and because of the :zero interest loans 
received &om the ADP II. This latter feature, of course, constitutes an implicit subsidy to GCU operations. 
30 See Chapter VII for details. 
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a.) Loans 
Under the new credit program, GCU loans are issued in kind and in a limited 
amount of cash to qualified CPMSs to be onlent to qualified members through qualified 
village branches. Since the members are expected to sell their output through the GCU, 
their sale proceeds are reduced by the amount of their loan repayments. The funds to 
finance the GCU's input and output operations are obtained from external sources. The 
flow of commodities and credit through the GCU in the post reorganization period is 
diagrammed in Figure ill-1. The following section explains the details of the objectives of 
the new credit program, its operational system and its performance over the past four years. 
• Objectives of the new credit program: The GCU's credit unit was formed in 1982 
and was made responsible for the processing of loan applications, loan disbursements and 
loan collection. However, it was not until 1988 that it was organized and equipped well 
enough to fully carry out these responsibilities. In 1988/89, based on the WB's 
recommendations, the credit unit was reorganized with competent staff; strict criteria were 
established for the credit program, the Village Responsibility System (VRS) was 
implemented, and cost effective efforts were introduced to provide a sustainable credit 
service by the GCU.31 
• Criteria for the new credit propm: Under the new credit program, loans in kind 
and in cash are extended only to those registered CPMSs that satisfy two conditions: (i) have 
repaid 95 percent of their loan arrears (principal and interest) since 1987 /88;32 and, (ii) 
purchase more than 500 tons of groundnuts/season. 33 The interest rates on the loans 
supplied by the GCU to the CPMSs and to the members have reflected market rates (see 
Table ill-3). The Village Responsibility System, also called the Village Based Group 
31 The credit unit is staffed by a manager, assistant manager, and 2 senior credit officers, and 8 credit 
officers in Banjul and 32 credit supervisors at the CPMSs level The loan application involves reviews at three 
levels: village branch, CPMS and GCU management. A village branch committee composed of five members 
acts as a loan committee to plan for future loan requirements, screen borrowers and approve loans. The village 
branch reports to its parent CPMS which then reports to the GCU. The CPMSs borrow from the GCU and 
on-lend to their respective village branches that in turn on-lend to their members. 
32 Any CPMS wishing to enter the credit program for the first time must have cleared a minimum of 95 
percent of principal and interest on all loans received from the GCU during and since the 19if'/ /88 season. Once 
qualified, it stays in the program irrespective of its subsequent repayment performance. Subsequently, the 95 
percent rule applies to its individual village branches. Overdues of the CPMSs with the GCU before the 19if'/ /88 
season will be negotiated separately. 
33 This criteria was not strictly followed, however, since the majority of the CPMSs that repaid 95 percent 
or more of their loan overdues could not purchase the targeted 500 tons of groundnuts due to droughts. 
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Lending System (VBGl.S), has been introduced.34 The new GCU policy calls for loans to 
be made only to those qualified CPMSs that adopt the VRS to supply loans to their 
individual members. A village branch qualifies for loans from the CPMS only if it repays 
95 percent of the principal and interest due on total current loans and loans in arrears since 
198735 (see Appendix ill-4 for details on the terms and conditions of the credit program 
implemented in 1991/92). 
• Source of funds: Tables ill-3 and ill-6 show that the current credit program is 
supported by zero interest loans from the ADP II funds that were established in 1984/85 
and by the GCU funds from the sale of assets. A total of about D15 million was drawn by 
the GCU from the ADP II funds in 1989 to supply inputs on credit Table ill-7 shows that 
loans were disbursed from the ADP II funds to the GCU to supply agricultural equipment 
and seeds but not fertilizer during 1989 /90 and 1990/91. Since the government supplied 
fertilizer on credit to the GCU in 1989 and 1990, loans were not disbursed from ADP II for 
this purpose. However, the funds from ADP II were drawn at a zero interest rate to support 
the credit program over the past two years (see Tables ill-3, ill-6 and ill-7). 
• Growth of CPMS and villa&e branches: Table ill-8 shows that the number of 
qualified CPMSs has increased from five to 43 (out of 54 in total) over the past four years 
and the number of village branches has increased from 65 to 518. This fact suggests that the 
new credit program has had a positive impact in improving credit discipline among the 
members in that several CPMSs and village branches that had a poor recovery performance 
in the pre-reorganization period have repaid their former arrears and have qualified for the 
new program. Otherwise the CPMSs would not have qualified for the credit program. 
Table ill-9 shows, however, that the growth of qualified CPMSs and village branches has 
a skewed geographic distribution. Although the number of CPMSs that qualified for the 
program has increased in all seven geographic circles, growth has been slow in several. 
Furthermore, while the number of qualified village branches has increased in several CPMSs 
across the country in the first two years, it has declined in three out of seven geographic 
34 The Village Responsibility System (VRS) or the Village Based Group Lending System (VBGl.S) was 
introduced in 1988/89. Under VRS, each qualified village branch is expected to form a committee of five 
members to screen individual member borrowers in the village, and to approve, disburse, supervise and recover 
loans from these borrowers. The purpose of the VRS is to incorporate the local decision making and aedit 
disciplinary functions that exist in each village community into the loan programs to strengthen the management 
of the GCU. The VRS was first introduced in five CPMS covering 66 villages that qualified in 1988/89 and was 
later extended to all qualified village branches. 
~ No village branch can qualify for the aedit program until it bas paid a minimum of 95 percent of principal 
and interest due on all previous loans. The member should have paid the amount due on all current loans plus 
any loan received since 19fr'T /88 in full to get further loans. 
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circles in the last two years.36 It is reported that these three geographic circles happen to 
be strongly biased toward the ruling party. 
In general, although several village branches remained in the program for more than 
one year by promptly repaying more than 95 percent of their loan obligations, the core was 
primarily composed of newly inducted village branches irito the program. An examination 
of the age of the village branches that continuously qualified for the program shows that the 
majority were one year old and that several village branches dropped out after their second 
year in the program (Table ID-10). For example, of the 518 village branches qualified in 
1991/92, 38 were out of the 65 newly qualified branches in 1988/89, 62 were out of 335 
newly qualified branches in 1989 /90, 74 were out of 118 newly qualified branches in 
1990/91, and 334 that were newly qualified in 1991/92. It is interesting, however, that while 
the majority of old village branches stayed in the program in 1990/91, they dropped out in 
1991/92. Whereas poor agricultural production due to severe drought in 1990/91 would 
have affected the repayment capacity of the members and hence caused a decline in the 
number of branches that qualified for the 1991/92 program, it is not clear, however, how 
the 334 new branches managed to repay their former arrears to get qualified in the same 
bad year. Therefore, while the increasing trend in the number of CPMSs and village 
branches that qualified for the program has been encouraging, the uneven and unsteady 
growth pattern after they enter the program needs to be considered as well. Several factors 
such as the drought, political support, and location specific mismanagement were reported 
to have contributed to the above trends. 
• Supply of loans: Table ID-2 shows that the total nominal volume of seasonal and 
term loans issued through the GCU declined in the post-reorganization period. With the 
growing inflation, total supply of loans declined also in real terms. Furthermore, the 
average volume of loans per CPMS and village branch has declined to extremely small 
amounts over the past four years. Table ID-11 shows that the average nominal volume of 
loans serviced by individual CPMSs and village branches were substantially less compared 
to earlier years of reorganization. The indices on the average volume of loans per CPMS 
and village branch in 1991/92 represent only 18 and 19 percent of the corresponding figures 
in 1988/89, respectively. The declining trend was due to the rapid increase in CPMSs and 
village branches that qualified for loans that could not be serviced through declining ADP 
II funds. In other words, the demand increased at a much rapid rate while the magnitude 
of ADP II funds available to service it shrunk due to low recovery rates and inflation. 
The design of the credit program made it mandatory for GCU to service all CPMSs 
that repaid at least 95 percent of their pre-1988 outstanding loans. The GCU was, 
therefore, locked into an institutional dilemma in which it had to include all CPMSs that 
qualified based on the 95 percent repayment rule even when it had limited funds to service 
them. As a result, the CPMSs and village branches that qualified for the program, especially 
36 See Appendix m-6 for further details on the CPMSs and village branches that qualified for the credit 
program from 1988 to 1992. 
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those that qualified in the earlier years of reorganization in 1988/89, were rationed and 
serviced with loans that have had a declining purchasing power. 
The GCU also engaged in loan size rationing among the qualified CPMSs. Table 
ID-12 shows that the ratio of the volume of loans approved to those applied or solicited 
(here after called RATION) ranged from 0.19 to 0.89 percent in 1991/92 (see column 3 for 
Bajakunda in the Basse circle and Burong in the Mansakonko circle). 
The rationing of loans indicates a supply constraint faced by the GCU. This 
constraint is due in part to the declining balance of ADP II funds because of poor loan 
recovery and the effect of inflation. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to 
examine in detail it can be speculated that some of the funds recovered from loans are likely 
being used to meet some of the operating costs of the GCU that are not covered by the 
donors. 
Several factors were reported to be determinants of loan size rationing: the recovery 
performance (RECOV) and quantity of groundnuts marketed (GNUT) in the previous year, 
previous loan recovery track record of the CPMS (proxied by AGE, number of years that 
a CPMS has been qualified for the credit program), and magnitude of competition from 
other input suppliers and output buyers (proxied by INDEX, an index reflecting isolation 
or difficulty in physically accessing a CPMS. An index of 1 represents easy access while 2 
represents difficult access). The model can be written as follows: 
(1) 
where t = time period. 
A simple correlation analysis among the variables in the above model indicated, however, 
that RECOV and GNUT were the only significant factors that directly determined allocation 
of the limited capital among several qualified CPMSs (see Table ill-13A).37 The variables 
AGE and INDEX nonetheless were significantly correlated with RECOV and therefore 
indirectly affected loan size rationing. A linear regression analysis was conducted to test if 
RECOV and GNUT explained rationing and the results are presented in Table ID-13B.38 
The variables AGE and INDEX were not included due to their collinearity with RECOV. 
Both the variables, RECOV and GNUT, had the expected signs indicating that ratio of 
loans supplied to loans demanded increased with an increase in loan recovery rates and 
quantity of groundnuts marketed in the previous year. Furthermore, the variable RECOV 
· significantly influenced loan size rationing. The significant influence of previous loan recov-
ery performance of a CPMS on the current amount of loans supplied shows the importance 
'S7 The newly qualified CPMSs in 1991/92 were not included in the analysis. 
38 The data on loans solicited and loans applied for were available for the 1991/92 and 1992/'13 seasons. 
The data on loan recovery rates and quantity of groundnuts marketed refer to the previous years, 1990/91 and 
1991/92, respectively. The newly qualified CPMSs in 1991/92 and 1992/'13 were not included in the analysis. 
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of better recovery rates by .all village branches that are attached with the CPMS so that the 
aggregate recovery rate for that CPMS is high. It is obvious that a few poorly performing 
village branches associated with a CPMS will pull down the loan recovery rate of the CPMS 
and increase the loan size rationing for those well performing village branches of the CPMS 
that qualified for new loans. While the Jinking of current loans made to a CPMS to its past 
aggregate loan recovery performance introduces some discipline into the system, it probably 
also leads some good performers to eventually default due to the lack of incentive 
mechanisms. In short, the supply constraint has led the GCU to ration it's loans, and the 
lack of appropriate incentive mechanisms to determine the amount to be rationed will lead 
to a drop out of good performers. Incentive mechanisms can be provided by rewarding 
good performers in the village branches attached to a qualified CPMS by not rationing their 
loans. Although the linking of the amount of loans granted to individual village branches 
implies higher administrative costs to the GCU, the responsibility can be delegated to the 
CPMSs. Indeed, the gains from the provision of proper incentives might outweigh the costs 
involved in implementing it The rationing of loan size can thus be used as a penalty 
mechanism for poor loan repayment as well as a means to allocate scarce resources. 
* Risk mana~ement: While the loan portfolio of the GCU has geographic 
diversification, it does not have enterprise diversification. Hence risk diversification is 
limited. The majority of loans are supplied to groundnut farmers, mostly men, and therefore 
are subject to risks through the covariance in incomes.39 
Another element of risk concerns first time borrowers. The loan portfolio is 
composed of both first time borrowers (CPMSs that qualified for the first time) and repeat 
borrowers (CPMSs that qualified in earlier years). Since first time borrowers are generally 
considered more risky, financial intermediaries should supply smaller loans compared to 
loans to repeat borrowers. Table ID-14 shows that the GCU in fact has been cautious in 
lending to new CPMSs and village branches. The average nominal volume of loans to new 
CPMSs (village branches) was lower compared to the average nominal volume of loans to 
old CPMSs (village branches). The data presented for individual CPMSs in Table ill-12, 
however, does not show a predictable pattern of the ratio of the volume of loans approved 
to loans applied for between old and new CPMSs. This indicates that ambiguities still exist 
concerning how loans are rationed between old and new CPMSs.40 
• R~ayment performance: There have been mixed results in the recent loan recovery 
performance of the GCU. Table ID-15 shows that while the loan repayment rate was very 
311 Since the reorganintion, the GCU imports fertili7.er that can be used for a variety of aops beside 
groundnuts. The fertili7.er loans are, however, largely supplied to groundnut farmers. 
40 While factors such as the quantity of groundnuts puchased by competitiors in the area and track record 
of the CPMSs in Pre-reorganization period would have been considered in addition to loan recovery and 
groundnuts marketed, they were not obvious to the study team. 
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low in 1988/89, it improved in later years.41 Although the recovery rate was high in the 
qualified CPMSs compared to the pre-reorganization period, the GCU still has problems 
in recovering overdue loans from all 86 CPMSs. The average loan recovery rate from the 
qualified CPMSs was 93percentin1989/90, but it fell to 73 percent in 1990/91. Table m-
16 presents the recovery rate for the 25 individual CPMSs that qualified for the 1989 /90 
loan season. The disaggregated data show that while the 20 CPMSs recorded a recovery 
rate of 95 percent or above to qualify for the 1990/91 program, they were unable to 
maintain the same 95 percent recovery rate in 1990/91. The low recovery rate was 
apparently due in part to the decline in real output prices and higher fertilizer prices. 
Official data that were available for the 1991/92 repayment rates showed that it was 
lower than 50 percent in the majority of the CPMSs (Tables W-15 and fil-16). Table W-17 
compiled from the sampled CPMSs shows that the recovery rate ranged from 8 to 88 
percent in 1991/92. This poor recovery rate can be attnouted to several factors such as 
drought in several locations, the anticipation of a loan write off during the election year,42 
and heavy subsidized competition from Sen,alese groundnut traders who purchased an 
estimated 30,000 tons or more of groundnuts. The Senegalese traders offered D2400/ton 
compared to D1550/ton by the GCU while the world price was nearly D1700.44 As a 
result, the majority of farmers, including GCU borrowers, sold the major part of their 
marketable surplus to these traders. Table m-17 shows that the volume of groundnuts 
purchased in 1991/92 by the sampled CPMSs ranged from four to 414 tons.45 Indeed, it 
was rational on the part of farmers to sell their crop to the highest bidder. It is discouraging 
to note, however, that a number of the borrowers presumably sold at higher prices to the 
Senegalese and failed to repay their GCU loans in cash, but chose instead to default 46 
41 The poor recovery rate in 1988/89 was explained by the decline in crop revenue from poor crop 
production due to drought, increases in interest rates and fertili7.er prices that increased the si7.e of loans, and 
a fall in groundnut prices compared to previous years. Also the merging and closing of several CPMSs created 
confusion among the borrowers. Some of the farmers sampled for this study reported that they assumed that 
loans from a merged or closed CPMS were written off by the GCU. 
42 The elections were held in May 1992 but no loans were written off by the government. 
43 Of the total groundnut production of 84,000 tons, 10,000 tons were purchased by the GCU and the 
GPMB, nearly 40,000 tons were estimated to have been stored as seeds and consumed as food. 
44 The world prices on oil type groundnuts were low on the one hand due to a bumper crop in the United 
States and, on the other hand due to diversion of damaged confectionery type groundnuts to oil crushing in 
Argentina. The Gambia primarily produces oil type groundnuts. 
~ The CPMS that purchased 414 tons in 1991/92 used to purchase more than 2,000 tons in previous seasons. 
46 The majority of the managers of the sampled CPMSs reported that while 10 percent of the borrowers fully 
repaid their loans in kind, nearly 50 percent paid part of their loans by selling fewer bags of groundnuts, ten 
percent paid part of their loans in cash and 30 percent defaulted. The sampled farmers confirmed the above 
figures. The sampled farmers stated that they sold at least a few bags to the GCU primarily to ensure their 
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It was possible, however, that the majority who sold to the Senegalese traders were small 
farmers with little marketable surplus due to droughts. Perhaps, the income generated from 
the limited sale proceeds had to be used to pay off senior claims and therefore could not 
also cover GCU loans. Nonetheless, the GCU's lack of an alternative contract enforcement 
technique is underscored by the 1991/92 experience. It was anticipated that the majority 
of the village branches and members will not qualify for the 1992/93 season if the 95 
percent rule is strictly followed. The GCU did not have clear criteria by May 1992 to follow 
in the 1992/93 season regarding those borrowers that repaid in cash either in full or in part. 
The current trend in repayment rates raises serious issues that must be addressed if 
the GCU is to become viable and self-sustaining. The GCU must maintain a loan recovery 
rate of over 95 percent for its credit program to become a viable operation. The operating 
costs of the credit program, excluding the cost of external funds, accounts for nearly 15 
percent of its total loan portfolio (Clark, 1989). In the event that the interest free ADP Il 
funds are not extended, it will be difficult to sustain a sizeable credit program with the 
current repayment rate. The repayment problems encountered by the GCU have under-
scored the impact of droughts that occur every three to four years on the borrower's capacity 
to repay combined with highly subsidized pricing policies in Senegal that weakens the 
GCU's "closed circuit" loan enforcement mechanism of tying loan repayment to output 
purchases. 
b.) Savings 
The poor past performance of the GCU in mobilizing savings through the CPMSs has 
impeded the reintroduction of a savings program. However, its initial positive credit 
experience through the VRS and the improvement in groundnut prices in The Gambia led 
it to reinitiate the savings program in 1991/92 in selected CPMSs. Savings at three levels 
were proposed: the village branch, the CPMSs and the GCU. While the savings transferred 
to the GCU will earn an 8 percent annual interest rate, the savings at the other levels will 
be held as non-interest earning current accounts at the respective level. Although the 
savings are not linked to loans, the program is integrated with the credit program for surplus 
generating activities. The GCU insists on collateral in terms of a bond from the managers 
of the CPMSs and it trains village level committees in monitoring deposits to ensure safety 
of deposits at the CPMS level. 
While the awareness regarding savings mobilization has been created among the 
members, only limited success has been reported in actually mobilizing savings. The 
sampled CPMSs managers reported that although they were trained in record keeping and 
were provided with safety boxes they could not mobilize deposits since their members lacked 
the capacity to save due to low incomes. The sampled farmers, on the other hand, were 
reluctant to save with the GCU since they were not confident of their accessibility to deposit 
loyalty and hence access to future loans, and secondarily to get immediate cash to spend on emergency purposes. 
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funds in times of emergency. Besides, the deposits held at local units earned no interest. 
Nonetheless, the sampled women members expressed their desire to save with the GCU 
provided that attractive rates were paid, and they were allowed access to easy withdrawals 
and contingency loans at reasonable rates. 47 
The savings mobilization program is intended to increase the pool of internal funds 
to support the GCU operations in the event that donor support is discontinued following 
the withdrawal of ADP Il support beginning in 1993. The GCU, however, has yet to make 
serious efforts to introduce innovative mechanisms such as positive interest rates and access 
to future loans that will win the confidence of its members and attract savings from them. 
Also the GCU could conceivably offer financial ·services in the CPMS and the village 
branch levels to semi-formal and informal intermediaries who mobilize deposits, especially 
from GCU members, but are presently unable to safely store them in their local units.48 
IV. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, PROBLEMS FACED AND PROPOSED CHANGES 
BYTHEGCU 
The GCU has undergone significant changes since its reorganization in 1988 and the 
results, especially in these first years, have been noteworthy. On the one hand, it has 
established the largest and most widespread network in the country. Furthermore, its 
specialization in output, input and financial markets has produced some comparative 
advantages for the GCU over its competitors including the GPMB, the FAO, the NGOs, 
and private entrepreneurs. On the other hand, while the GCU's performance over the past 
four years has demonstrated its ability to effectively survive in a liberalized environment, it 
is not clear that its credit program can be a viable and self-sustaining operation in the long-
run in the absence of subsidized external funds or some form of government support. This 
section examines the GCU's strengths, weaknesses and problems faced in effectively 
servicing the output, input and financial markets under a liberalized economy. 
47 It was not powble to determine how much the rumored losses of sa~ in the ill-fated Agricultural 
Development Bank and in the closed CTCSs might have influenced member attitudes towards sa~ in the 
GCU. 
48 See Chapter II for details. 
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1. Stren&ths 
A Output market 
Its long experience accumulated as an output buyer combined with an established 
infrastructure in transport and manpower are the strong points of the GCU. Furthermore, 
access to external funds from the formal banks aids its output marketing operations because 
it can implement good marketing strategies such as paying the farmers in cash with mini-
mum delays and fewer transaction costs. In addition, the tying of output purchases to input 
loans facilitates its role as a major output buyer in the country and enforces loan contracts. 
The large CPMS network with its wide geographic coverage also mitigates covariance risks 
caused by uniform crop failure experienced by all farmers in limited geographic areas. 
Indeed, these strengths helped the GCU to retain its position as a major domestic buyer of 
groundnuts in 1992, a rather unusual year for the Gambian output markets.49 Although 
the GCU could not beat the Senegalese traders due to huge output price differentials, it 
outperformed the GPMB and private groundnut buyers affiliated with the GPMB. 
B. Input market 
The GCU's ability to provide wide access to good quality inputs is facilitated by its 
large retail network, transport and other facilities such as storage depots, and access to 
interest free loans from the ADP II. In 1992, these factors helped reduce its fixed costs so 
it could supply inputs at a lower price than its competitors including the FAO. 
Furthermore, its recent entry into import markets helps its search for foreifl suppliers that 
offer competitive input prices so it can distribute inputs at market prices. 
C. Financial market 
The wide coverage of a large clientele accumulated since its inception, its established 
CPMSs infrastructure and valuable experience gained through the past implementation of 
several credit and savings programs are the strong basic building blocks that facilitate the 
GCU's financial market operations. The current credit and savings programs rely on these 
strengths. 
49 In 1992, the GCU was competing with the GPMB and its affi1iated private traders for the first time 
instead of buying for the GPMB. The competition was intensified by aggressive marketing strategies followed 
by Senegalese for the first time including groundnuts prices that were 50 percent more than the GCU, paying 
immediately for the produce in cash in CFA francs, a preferred currency in The Gambia, and buying from the 
doorsteps of the farmers to reduce farmers' transaction costs. 
311 A major qualification to these statements is that we were unable to analyze the GCU financial accounts 
to determine if it is covering its full costs. Our previous observation suggests that it is not. 
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There is no doubt that stricter credit discipline has been introduced under the new 
credit program. The number of CPMSs and village branches that qualified into the credit 
program by repaying more than 95 percent of their overdues has increased. The village 
committees formed under the VRS have been active in borrower screening, loan disburse-
ment and enforcing contracts. As a result, the loan recovery rates have been high during 
years of good weather and less Senegalese intervention in output markets.51 The charging 
of market interest rates to CPMSs and to farmer borrowers has demonstrated the GCU's 
commitment to a market economy. The increased awareness among the farmers regarding 
the GCU's deposit mobilization schemes facilitates the savings program that has been 
introduced on a pilot basis. 
2. Weaknesses 
A Output Market 
The lack of processing activities by the GCU reduces its opportunities for exporting 
value added outputs. The export of processed groundnuts could help realize higher prices 
that could be passed on to farmers compared to unprocessed groundnuts. In addition, the 
absence of crop diversification increases the covariance risks inherent in concentrating in 
the groundnut sector. 
B. Input Markets 
The input marketing operations, especially for fertilizer, are weakened by a complete 
dependence on foreign suppliers. While it may not be remunerative to build fertilizer 
production or mixing plants in The Gambia, it should be possible to develop seed 
multiplication units that can engage in research and multiplication of quality seeds. The 
unavailability of quality seeds was reported by the sampled farmers to be one of the reasons 
for poor groundnut production in the past few years. 
C. Financial Markets 
Even though the new credit program has stricter credit discipline compared to earlier 
programs, it is still fraught with several weaknesses. While the number of CPMSs and 
village branches that qualified for the credit program increased over the past four years, 
their geographic distribution has been skewed and this affects access to credit by their 
members. 
si While the loan recovery rates are not comparable to that of the VISACAs, they are better that the 
recovery rates recorded by the FAO and the NGOs (see Chapter IV and II, respectively). 
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There are problems in enforcing loan contracts due to several external factors 
including droughts and intense competition for groundnuts from Senegal, and internal 
factors such as limited emphasis on collateral and borrower education. However, the GCU 
has not developed mechanisms, such as crop and enterprise diversification and collateral 
substitutes other than output tied contracts, to mitigate the negative externalities in the 
markets. Therefore, while recovery rates are high during good years, they have been poor 
in bad years. 
Although the loans consist of in kind and cash components, they are supplied only 
for production, storage or processing purposes without considering the fungible nature of 
credit. The limited amount of cash supplied for paying labor expenses is often diverted to 
consumption purposes. Furthermore, the cash component is uniform across all borrowers 
regardless of their risk type or the area or crops cultivated. The criteria used to ration loans 
among new and old CPMSs have been ambiguous and it is not clear how loans are rationed 
at individual borrower levels. In other words, while the analytical results suggest that 
aggregate previous loan recovery performance of a CPMS influences the amount of credit 
granted to a given CPMS, it is not clear if the GCU has successfully adopted a "learning by 
doing" technique in supplying loans to old and new clients in such a way that good 
performances are rewarded. 
The current borrower education program has had limited success in creating 
awareness regarding the members' responsibility in electing the village committee and 
management committee at the GCU. For example, the elections held in 1989 returned the 
same management committee that was appointed by the government under the Compulsory 
Management Regime. 
The emphasis on groundnuts has rationed access to several women clients that are 
traditionally engaged in growing food crops. The limited representation of women members 
affects the performance of the GCU in two ways: (i) they are generally the most reliable 
borrowers; and (ii) they are generally the most promising savers. The inclusion of women 
also would help diversify GCU's portfolio into other crops and non-farm enterprises. The 
GCU is not expected to directly tie loans to their output because it is not involved in 
marketing several crops and non-farm products, but it should develop mechanisms to include 
more women clients into its core. 
The savings program is initiated to improve local participation in GCU's activities, 
and awareness is being created among the farmers regarding the mobilization of deposits; 
however, the GCU has yet to develop attractive operational procedures to actually mobilize 
deposits. The current program that offers only a eight percent annual interest rate for fixed 
deposits held at the GCU and zero percent for current accounts held at CPMSs and village 
branches can not attract the rural poor to save.52 Whereas it may not be possible for the 
52 By comparison, the VISACAs offer a 20 to 30 percent annual interest rate on their savings (see Chapter 
V). Currently, the GCU mobili7.es savings only at the CMPSs and village branch levels. 
26 
GCU to offer higher rates than this with its current risky portfolios and trends in their loan 
recovery rates, it can offer nonprice services including assured production and contingency 
loans for savers. 
3. Problems Faced 
The GCU has been honest in its efforts to become a viable and efficient operation 
in the post reorganization period but has been unlucky. The current problems of the GCU 
can no longer be fully attnbuted to internal factors such as incompetent management but 
to external and foreign factors including production risks, government macroeconomic 
policies, inappropriate incentives, donor intervention in financing its operations and 
Senegalese policies. This section identifies some of the problems faced by the GCU in its 
current role in Gambian markets. 
• Inadequate financial resources to cany out its present scale of activities. Output 
marketing is financed by the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) at market interest rates. If 
the current trend of intense competition from Senegalese groundnut traders continues, it is 
not clear that the SCB will continue financing the GCU since it will be more difficult for 
the GCU to operate in output markets and honor its loan contract with the SCB at the 
present interest rates. 
In the input and credit markets, there is a need to strengthen the ADP Il fund 
since the poor recovery rates and inflation in the past years have eroded the size of the 
fund. The GCU primarily relies on its own funds and ADP Il loans that supply interest free 
loans. The USAID has recently raised the issue of market rates for ADP Il loans. The 
Minister of Finance has assured the USAID that future loans from ADP Il loans will be 
based on market rates and the WB has confirmed this. Also, there has been no extension 
of the ADP Il loans that are scheduled to end by 1992. If the ADP Il fund is withdrawn 
and no strong savings program is implemented, the future sources of funds to support the 
GCU's input marketing operations will only be high interest external funds and government 
subsidies. 
• lmaie problem. In the post reorganization period, the GCU has demonstrated its 
ability to improve its performance as an autonomous cooperative despite the presence of 
several competing agents, and difficult times due to economic and agricultural production 
problems and aggressive subsidized competition from Senegal. Put differently, if there 
would have been no reorganization, the old GCU would likely have collapsed in the face 
of these adverse conditions. While problems still remain due to its limited number of 
adequately trained personnel and rudimentary accounting procedures, they are not the 
primary factors that influenced the GCU's post reorganization performance. Nonetheless, 
it has been difficult for the GCU to win member and donor confidence due to its old image 
as an incompetent, unreliable and quasi parastatal operation. 
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• Competition from otber output buyers and input SJ.U>pliers. With the hberalization 
of markets under the ERP, several heterogenous agents have emerged including the GPMB, 
the FAO, private entrepreneurs and the NGOs that supply output and input marketing 
services. These agents operate under diverse marketing procedures in buying output and 
selling inputs, especially on credit, that are sometimes detrimental to the GCU. For 
example, these input suppliers follow different pricing structures such as charging low and 
subsidized interest rates for input loans thereby undermining the efforts of the GCU to 
charge market rates. Output buyers such as the Senegalese traders use large groundnut 
price subsidies from their government to offer higher groundnut prices than the GCU. 
Despite its several comparative advantages, the GCU is unable to effectively compete with 
these new agents in the market in the absence of similar subsidization. 
• Uncertajn policy environment. The government still subsidiZes the GPMB to buy 
groundnuts and to distribute fertilizer on credit at subsidized rates through government pro-
grams. This constant government market intervention by subsidizing producer prices, input 
prices and credit raises uncertainty about the government's commitment to market hberali-
zation and market determined prices. The uncertainty regarding Senegalese prices for 
groundnuts adds another dimension to the problem. The Senegalese prices are in turn 
influenced by the level of subsidies obtained from their French counterparts. This uncertain 
policy environment undermines the GUCs efforts to effectively function in a market 
economy. 
• Uncertain &fOUDdnut production. The GCU was primarily formed to facilitate 
groundnut farmers in The Gambia and that objective is largely unchanged with its 
reorganization. However, shifts in cropping patterns from groundnuts to coarse grains, rice 
and cotton have occurred in the last three years. While these shifts might be temporary to 
mitigate declining value-cost ratios in groundnuts and droughts, it nevertheless raises 
concerns regarding the GCU's operational procedures that are currently designed only to 
deal with groundnuts. 
4. PJam; for the future 
The GCU is currently launching a proposal to extend loans to specific target groups 
consisting of farmers who traditionally had no access to cooperative loans. It is encouraging 
the CPMSs to identify and support cohesive farming groups that may qualify based on their 
management capacity and enterprise viability. They may be women's groups, produce 
specific interest groups like vegetable growers, etc. 
Links are established with the Women's Horticultural Cooperatives (WHC) and plans 
are underway to train the WHC on credit programs. 
Women members are encouraged to actively participate in village level committees. 
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Product diversification in terms of rice and coarse grains is contemplated. 
Processing activities will be considered although this has limited potential. 
Savings mobilization from individual members by the CPMS has been initiated to 
strengthen the financial base of the GCU. Although operational procedures need to be 
refined, plans are made for an integrated approach using the credit program to increase 
their income. 
The GCU intends to encourage members to view the VRS as an opportunity to 
become involved in managing savings and loan programs. This will eventually help decision 
malting at decentralized units. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Introduction 
With the liberalization of the output, input and financial markets in 1985, several 
agents have emerged to provide marketing services in The Gambia. Currently, the ground-
nut buyers include the GPMB, the private traders affiliated with the GPMB, the GCU and 
the Senegalese traders. The networks that supply inputs on credit include the GCU, the 
FAO, the NGOs and government programs, and the networks that supply savings services 
in rural areas are limited to the NGOs and the GCU.53 These heterogenous networks 
sometimes compete and sometimes collaborate with each other. They are scattered 
throughout the country and operate under diverse marketing technologies. It appears, 
therefore, that the current question in The Gambia is not the availability of alternative 
sources of groundnut buyers or input suppliers or external funds for lending to the poor, but 
rather the competitive access to these services and their sustainability in rural areas. 
Currently, the majority of these marketing networks are financed through external 
grants and government subsidies to conduct their marketing operations. The FAO is 
planning to withdraw from the input market, the GPMB is undergoing privatization, private 
S3 In the financial markets, formal bank branches are absent in rural Gambia, and the NGOs are usually 
unfocused and rudimentary intermediaries that provide subsidi7.ed loans from external funds and operate with 
diverse and often contradicting philosophies. The VISACAs mobili7.e local savings to provide loans for income 
generating activities but they are small and limited to only six villages. Informal networks such as ~ in 
urban areas and kafos in the rural areas mobili7.e savings and provide loans but are not capable of either 
servicing a larger clientele or protecting savers from inflationary losses. There exists an effective demand for 
loans and a promising potential for mobilizing savings in rural and urban Gambia. The well documented 
evidence on the continuing presence of several semi-formal and informal savings based on financial 
intermediaries offers evidence to the above argument (see Shipton, 1992). 
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entrepreneurs are showing some interest in entering the input and financial markets, the 
NGOs are trying to establish savings-linked credit programs, and the GCU is undergoing 
organizational changes but faces uncertainty about future funding from the ADP II. With 
these changes that involve dynamic institutional dilemmas, it is hard to predict the future 
role of the GCU. While the GCU is expected to continue as a major player due to its 
comparative advantage as a long time incumbent, uncertainties remain regarding its viability 
and sustainability as a reliable supplier of financial services. The status of its other activities 
are beyond the scope of this study. 
This section, therefore, outlines two extreme scenarios that explore the future role 
of the GCU as a supplier of efficient financial services in a self-sustaining fashion in a 
liberalized economy. Scenario one depicts a favorable market environment while scenario 
two depicts an unfavorable one for the GCU. The scenarios define the alternative roles and 
impacts of key agents in selected markets and help define the consequences for the GCU 
as an autonomous cooperative. Table ill-18 depicts the role of the various marketing agents 
in shaping the scenarios outlined in this section. A discussion on policy options under each 
scenario concludes this section. 
2. Scenario One: The Optimal Mix of Market Conditions. A&ent Behavior. and 
lnstitutiona] Security 
Output markets. It is assumed that: (i) the GPMB is successfully privatized and the 
new firm limits its operations to only processing groundnuts and does not directly buy or 
export groundnuts; (ii) Senegalese traders offer competitive (unsubsidized) groundnut prices 
consistent with the world markets; (iii) the formal banks such as Standard Charter continue 
to supply crop finance to the GCU; and (iv) there is no government intervention in terms 
of producer price subsidies. 
Input and financial markets. It is assumed that: (i) the FAQ withdraws from the 
input market; (ii) the ADP II funds are expanded to finance GCU's input and credit 
operations; (iii) the NGOs restrict themselves to non-agricultural portfolios; and (iv) there 
is no government intervention to subsidize input supplies. 
This scenario assumes the most ideal market environment for the survival of the 
GCU as a primary output buyer and input supplier on credit (see Table ill-14). This 
scenario might even lead the GCU to become a natural monopolist in the output and input 
markets through the efficient use of its established infrastructure and marketing experience. 
This scenario does not preclude, however, the entry of private entrepreneurs that are 
capable of competing with the GCU if it realizes excessive monopoly profits. This scenario 
also assumes a constant value cost ratio for agricultural crops, favorable weather conditions, 
a predictable demand for inputs and no major shifts in cropping patterns in the future. 
Although these assumptions are restrictive, they facilitate the analysis. There are six 
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recommendations about actions that should be taken under this scenario to help ensure the 
sustainability of the GCU. 
A Strengthening of the ADP Il Fund 
Although data on the current size of the ADP Il fund were not available, sources 
reported that it has declined over the years due to low loan recovery rates and inflationary 
losses. It would be necessary to augment the ADP II through the infusion of funds from the 
World Bank and other donors. Better loan recovery rates through improved borrower 
screening techniques and the use of collateral substitutes is also required if the GCU is to 
conduct its marketing operations at the current scale. 
B. Reserve Funds 
The GCU should establish a reserve fund to mitigate unfavorable weather conditions 
that occur two to three times in a decade. Since the recovery rates in bad years average 40 
to 60 percent, this reserve fund should be at least one third of the average volume of loans 
issued in a normal year. This reserve fund should be maintained in formal banks to earn 
market rates. The funds should be drawn upon during bad years and replenished during 
good years by diverting part of the interest earnings. 
C. Portfolio Diversification 
The GCU has a geographically diversified portfolio due to its wide penetration 
throughout the country. However, the portfolio is highly concentrated in groundnuts, a 
highly risky crop. The GCU should explore ways to diversify into other crops and 
vegetables. Crop diversification is important if the recent trends of declining groundnut 
productivity and shifts in cropping patterns from groundnuts to coarse grains and cotton 
continues in the future.54 Crop diversification will help mitigate covariance risks that arise 
due to the droughts and pest damage of the groundnut crop. 
In the event that the GCU continues as a private organization, it should explore ways 
to function as an exporter of groundnuts preferably after value added processing. It should 
also develop aggressive mechanisms to facilitate its role as an importer and distributor of 
inputs. Economies of scale, however, need to be realized in importation and distribution 
of inputs. 
S4 The decline in groundnut productivity is due in part to the unavailability of quality seeds, droughts and 
the reduction in use of chemical fertilizers. The increase in area under coarse grains may be attributed to their 
ability to withstand droughts and to satisfy consumption needs in bad years. 
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D. Savings Mobilization 
A strong orientation towards deposit mobilization should be developed to raise the 
GCU's internal funding position. While linking savings proportionately to loans received 
by members is not required, it should be mandatory for farmer members to save with the 
GCU. The GCU should, however, pay positive interest on the deposits held as fixed 
deposits irrespective of the level at which they are held. The current savings program offers 
a eight percent annual interest rate on deposits held at the GCU and zero percent on 
deposits held at the levels of CPMSs and village branches.55 The village branches and the 
CPMSs should be given authority to use the funds held at their levels, although the GCU 
should monitor and supervise them. The village branches and the CPMSs, especially those 
that are unqualified for the credit program, might use these funds to buy fertilizer from the 
GCU on cash to sell to their members. This would avoid pena1izing good borrowers in 
unqualified villages and CPMSs by denying them access to inputs. 
The GCU should also explore ways to attract non-members, including the NGOs and 
women, to expand its pool of savers and funds. In the absence of formal bank branches in 
the rural areas, the GCU could begin to operate more effectively as an alternative formal 
financial intermediary network. No one can argue for a strong savings mobilization for the 
GCU if it leads to _members losing their savings. The GCU needs to assure depositors 
concerning the liquidity and safety of their funds. This requires two actions. First, the 
individual CPMSs and village branches need to carefully plan their liquidity requirements 
so funds are available when depositors want to withdraw them. Second, accounting 
standards and GCU operations need to be improved so there is no use of mobilized funds 
to cover operating costs and poor loan recovery. Otherwise, savings will be drained away 
to cover GCU expenses. 
E. Member Education 
The GCU members should be educated regarding the use of funds, repayment ethics, 
the advantages of savings discipline, and the importance of peer monitoring to avoid misuse 
of funds by the village committees and CPMSs. The members should be made aware of the 
fact that the GCU is their organization. The member education programs must emphasize 
the collective responsibility of owning an organization. 
F. CPMS Network 
The managers of the CPMSs and village level committees should be trained in record 
keeping so that accounting procedures can be streamlined. It is important to maintain 
proper records, especially when they mobilize savings and have a fiduciary responsibility as 
a deposit mobilizer. 
ss By comparison, the VISACAs pay 20 to 30 percent annual interest on all deposits held as fixed deposits 
but pay no interest on current accounts (see Chapter V). 
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The managers of the CPMSs and village level committees should be trained in 
borrower screening mechanisms that incorporate "learning by doing" techniques. CPMSS 
and individual members should be given small loans first, then the size should be increased 
when their repayment performance justifies doing so. 
3. Scenario Two: The Unfavorable Mix of Market Conditions. f\aent Actions. 
and lnstitutiona) Instability 
Output markets. This scenario assumes that: (i) the GPMB functions as a processor, 
buyer and exporter of groundnuts either as a parastatal or a privatized firm; (ii) Senegalese 
traders occasionally offer higher groundnut prices and provide output marketing services at 
lower transaction costs than does the GCU; (iii) the formal banks do not supply crop 
finance to the GCU; and (iv) no government subsidies are provided to the GCU. 
Input and financial markets. It is assumed that: (i) the FAO continues to operate in 
the input markets as an importer and distributor; (ii) the NGOs are active in financing 
agriculture; (iii) no extension is provided for the ADP Il funds to finance GCU's input and 
credit operations; (iv) no subsidized external funds are provided to the GCU for groundnut 
marketing to compete with Senegalese buyers; and (iv) no government subsidies are 
provided to the GCU. 
While this scenario paints a gloomy market environment within which the 
GCU would operate, it partly resembles the 1991/92 market conditions. The GCU's 
competitors are, in general, subsidized through external donors and government. The GCU 
is, however, expected to compete based on its comparative advantages rather than through 
subsidies or external support. This scenario underscores the problems faced by an 
unsubsidized GCU, despite its comparative advantages, in operating in an environment 
characterized by asymmetric subsidization. This scenario also assumes a constant value cost 
ratio for agricultural crops, favorable weather conditions, a predictable demand for inputs 
and no major shifts in cropping patterns in the future. Eight actions need to be taken to 
help ensure the survival of the GCU in this scenario. 
A Guarantee fund 
In the event that ADP Il is discontinued, the current balance of the ADP Il funds 
should be converted into a guarantee fund that would be augmented through the infusion 
of donor funds and better recovery rates. This fund could be maintained in a local bank to 
be used as a guarantee for GCU loans. The improvements in GCU loan recovery rates 
discussed in scenario one would also need to occur. 
B. CPMS network 
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With several alternative sources of output buyers and input suppliers that sell on 
credit, and the lack of viability of several CPMSs, the GCU should consider scaling down 
its operations and limiting itself to a smaller number of well functioning CPMSs and village 
branches. This scaling down implies that all nonperforming CPMSs out of the present 54 
CPMSs would be closed down and liquidated. Otherwise, with declining funds the GCU will 
end up supplying smaller sized loans with lower purchasing power and declining productivity 
thereby reducing the value of loan services and very likely affecting negatively the incentives 
for good repayment from early qualifiers. The nondiscretionary expansion of the CPMS 
network based only on the 95 percent recovery rule has in recent years brought in weaker 
CPMSs from the pre 1988/89 period and bas penalized early qualifiers through a reduced 
volume of loan services. This has introduced moral hazard into the system. The criteria to 
select the CPMSs that remain with the GCU should, therefore, be based on: (i) the ability 
of the CPMS to recover at least 95 percent of its current loans made after reorganization 
for at least two years, (ii) the capability to purchase groundnuts from the GCU at least to 
some break-even level, and (iii) the capacity to mobilize deposits. 
C. Reserve fund at the GCU to offer competitive output prices 
Currently, groundnut prices in The Gambia are tied to world market prices. The 
prices should also be competitive with Senegal. A reserve fund should be established at the 
GCU to allow it to offer competitive prices with Senegal to a reduced number of CPMSs. 
These reserve funds should be built up during good years to be drawn upon in the event 
that high Senegalese prices are encountered again. The strongest arguments for this 
approach to the Senegalese problem are: (i) that this price instrument is the most efficient 
one available to the GCU to equitably distribute income to a large number of its members; 
and (ii) the GCU needs some assurance of access to groundnuts if it is to compete in a 
market environment and ensure loan recovery from its fertilizer loans. Otherwise, with 
porous borders and informal trading arrangements, it is not possible to prevent cross border 
trade between The Gambia and Senegal. The 1991/92 situation is evidence for that 
argument. The large groundnut cross border sales into Senegal could have been prevented 
if the GCU or the GPMB could have offered higher prices to compete with the Senegalese. 
This occurred in 1986/87 and 1987 /88 when the government fixed groundnut prices at 15 
to 20 percent levels less than the Senegalese prices to induce farmers to sell in domestic 
markets (see McPherson and Radelet, 1991). This experience shows that the GCU need 
not necessarily exactly meet the Senegalese prices to compete due to transport costs, 
uncertainties in the timeliness of Senegalese payment practices etc.56 But in 1991/92, the 
price differential almost reached 50 percent As a result, although the farmers were not 
affected, the GCU suffered because of low output purchases. Furthermore, loan recovery 
rates were estimated to be lower than previous years since the input-credit operations are 
linked to output marketing to ensure loan repayment. In short, the GCU lost its 
comparative advantage to enforce loan contracts by tying loans to output marketing. 
56 The sampled farmers reported that they would sell to the GCU if the price dift'erential between the GCU 
and Senegal is less than D300 to 0400/ton of groundnut. 
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Finally, items B, C, D, E, and F described in scenario one would also have to be 
implemented in this scenario. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the operations of the GCU both prior to and following 
its reorganization in 1988. The emphasis has been on its credit and savings operations, but 
other parts of its activities had to be considered as well because of their interrelationships. 
Qearly, the GCU has experienced a wide range of problems, but it has shown some positive 
signs of improvement since reorganization. Although an in-depth examination of its internal 
management efficiency was beyond the scope of this study, its sincere attempts made on 
reducing the expenditures are noteworthy. Of course, the GCU must continue to tighten 
up its internal operations and bear the consequences of its mistakes. But it is obvious that 
the GCU faces serious external challenges over which it has little control. There is not a 
level playing field among institutions operating in various markets in The Gambia. In 
particular, GCU cannot be expected to compete on an uneven playing field caused by 
policies in neighboring countries over which it has no control. Although the GCU has 
received some subsidies in the form of the ADP II fund and enjoys an infrastructure and a 
network of CMPSs that gives it some comparative advantages, it is faced by subsidized 
competition on all sides. The NGOs and the FAO are highly subsidized competitors in the 
input and credit markets. On the output side, it faces the competition of subsidized 
Senegalese prices. Not only does this affect the volume of GCU's marketing operations, but 
it also has a spillover effect in reducing the recovery rate of its input loans by weakening 
contract enforcement mechanism through its marketing role. 
It is not rational to close down GCU when it has made serious attempts to reorganize 
its management and operational procedures to attain sustainability and viability. The 
government and donors should at least observe its performance for another two to three 
years until the ADP II funds are exhausted. Furthermore, they should explore ways to 
develop a consensus between The Gambia and Senegal regarding the groundnut pricing 
structure. In other words, if the donors are reluctant to inject funds into the GCU they 
should at least urge Senegal to follow competitive and unsubsidized pricing policies. 
An obvious alternative is for the GCU to diversify into other areas. But groundnuts 
are likely to be the most important sector of GCU activities for the foreseeable future. 
With greater stability in the groundnut sector, the reforms undertaken by the GCU might 
be adequate to begin to assure its viability. 
Although it was beyond the scope of this study to thoroughly analyze the groundnut 
sector, it appears to be a strategic one in the country. This chapter has shown that the 
future of the GCU is largely tied to this sector, at least for the foreseeable future. Even 
more important, any private firm that acquires the GPMB groundnut facilities will need 
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some assurance of access to groundnut supplies if it is going to prosper. Given the 
impossibility of controlling the cross border trade, the GCU is going to have to develop 
some type of reserve fund for use in competing with future high prices in Senegal. 
Otherwise, the GCU and the country will lose control over the marketing of this strategic 
commodity, and Gambian farmers will be subject to the whims of future Senegalese policies, 
a situation untenable for any political regime. The privatization drive in The Gambia has 
not yet dealt with this crucial problem. Until it does, the GCU and all private agents linked 
to the groundnuts sector in The Gambia will be subject to great uncertainty. In addition, 
uncertainties regarding GCU's internal efficiency, ability to recover loans and access to 
groundnut markets impede it's future viability. At best, these problems will destroy any 
incentives for future investments in the sector. At worst, it may destroy the GCU. 
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Table 111-1 Groundnuts: Producdon, Quandty Delivered to GPMB by Source, and Producer Prices In The Gambia and Senegal, 1974 to 1992. 
Year Production Quantity Delivered to GPMB by: GCU as% % ofGPMB's Prices (D/ton) 
'000 tons Source ('000 tons) ofGPMB Purchase in 
GCU Private GPMB Total Purchases Total Production Gambia Senegal F.O.B. 
Traders Depots 
- - --(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1974/75 145.2 56.4 78.3 0 134.8 41.9 92.8 306 296 623 
1975/76 141.1 52.1 81.5 0 133.5 39.0 94.6 365 345 536 
1976/77 143.0 51.2 73.3 0 124.5 41.1 87.0 402 397 824 
1977/78 100.0 39.1 48.9 0 87.9 44.4 88.0 421 415 714 
1978/79 133.4 71.5 48.1 0 119.5 59.8 89.6 421 395 665 
1979/80 66.9 44.2 21.6 0 65.8 67.2 98.4 425 350 560 
1980/81 60.2 35.6 9.3 0 44.9 79.3 74.5 460 345 790 
1981/82 108.9 59.9 21.9 0 81.9 73.2 75.2 500 518 643 
1982/83 151.4 90.5 36.9 0 127.4 71.0 84.1 520 467 576 
1983/84 113.8 683 24.7 0 92.9 73.5 81.7 450 608 1291 w 
'° 1984/85 105.1 41.5 10.6 0 52.1 79.8 49.5 620 800 1350 
1985/86 75.8 41.9 10.2 0 52.1 80.5 68.7 1260 1170 1432 
1986/87 110.4 57.3 13.6 0 70.6 81.1 64.0 1800 2052 1642 
1987/88 120.0 513 12.2 0 63.5 80.8 52.9 1500 2106 1327 
1988/89 98.4 15.5 9.5 0 25.0 62.0 25.4 1100 1652 1474 
1989/90 129.9 25.8 11.4 12.2 49.4 52.0 37.2 1470-16503 1960 2402 
1990/91 74.5 18.4 5.5 5.1 28.9 64.0 38.8 1650 1960 2842 
1991/92 84.2 0.5 0.81 0.71 2.0 25.0 2.4 1500-17oo2 2400 2396 
Source: PPMU, GPMB, GCU. 
Note 1: Estimated figures. 
2: GPMB offered D 1500/ton for the first six weeks and raised it to D 1700/ton later. 
3: GCU buying price D 1470/ton; GPMB depot price was D 1650/ton. 
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Table 111·2 Volume of Loans Issued, Seasonal and Medium Term to CPMSs, 1981-1992. 
Seasonal Medium Tenn Repayment 
Kind Cash Equipment & %2 
Machinery1 Total 
Seeds & for Labor 
Years Fertilizer Pesticides Expenses 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(in '()()() dalasis) 
Pr" ReorsanizatiQn 
1981/82 (RDPI) 755 3,090 1,428 0 5,'1:73 55 
1982/&3} 0 0 3,440 0 3,440 89 
1983/84 (ADPI) 0 0 5,194 0 5,194 (j() 
1984/85 2,636 2,615 4,540 0 9,791 53 
1985/86 1,128 481 0 0 1,(i()9 87 
1986/87 3,400 7,692 280 431 11,803 Tl 
1987/88 5,962 0 0 m 6,934 81 
ADPII) Post Reorpnization 
1988/89 1,554 0 356 501 2,411 48 
1989/90 643 44 1,087 1,533 3;!H7 65 
1990/91 996 38 1,380 585 2,999 61 
1991/92 1,699 673 1,144 200 3,716 NA 
Source: GCU. 
Note 1: Includes donkey carts, horse carts, ox-carts, sine-hoes, occidental hoes and super seeders. 
2: Includes all 86 CPMSs. 
42 
Table 111-4 Operational Status, Membership Structure, Capital Base and Loans Issued for Selected 
cress, as of October 1987. 
Items 
(1) Operational Status (No. of cres)1 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
a. Active 
b. Dormant 
c. Total 
Membership Structure ( # of members)2 
a. Men 
b. Women 
c. Total 
Capital Base (in dalasis }3 
a. Shares 
b. Thrift Sa~ 
c. Total Capital 
Loans Issued (in dalasis}4 
a. Oustanding loans: 
(i) Amount 
(ii) Percent of capital base 
b. Overdue loans5 
(i) Amount 
(ii) Percent of capital base 
(iii) Percent of outstanding loans 
Source: ACCOSCA, 1990. 
Amount(%) 
31 (62) 
19 (38) 
so (100) 
353 (12) 
2,514 (88) 
2PJ7 (100) 
31,301 (6) 
518,81.8 (94) 
549,81.8 (100} 
601,489 
116 
326,048 
63 
54 
Note 1: Sample si7.e in SO cress. A cres that recorded a financial transaction after October 1987 was 
considered active. 
2: Sample si7.e in 40 cress. 
3: Sample si7.e in 48 cress. 
4: Sample si7.e in 35 cress. 
5: All unrecovered loans issed before October 1987. 
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Table 111-3 Interest Rates Charged to GCU, CPMS and Members by Various Sources, 1980-1992. 
Rates Charged to GCU by: Rates Charged Rates Charged 
Years GPMB GCDB ADP II 
to CPMS by to Members by 
GCU CPMS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(in percent) 
1980-84 0 9 0 0 
1984/85 21 17 0 11 13 
1985/86 18 21 0 11 13 
1986/87 18 21 0 22 24 
1987/88 19 24 0 22 24 
1988/89 19 18 0 18 24 
1989/90 0 13 15 
1990/91 0 13 15 
1991/92 0 16 21 
Source: GCU. 
GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; GCDB: Gambia Commercial and Development Bank; ADP II: 
Agricultural Development Program II funded by World Bank. 
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Table 111-5 Operational Status, Loans Outstanding and Capital Base of Individual CTCS.1 
Name of Society Proposed/ .Al!tive/ Loans %Loans Capital (as of Oct. 
Registered dormant2 Outstanding as of C>Yerdue3 1987, Savings & 
with Doc. Oct. 1987 Shares) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) 
Dockworkers R A 125,487.60 30 135,345.56 
Santa Yalla R A 65,010.00 0 87,695.00 
Banul Women Retailers R A 60,580.00 60 52,019.46 
Dimbalanteh R A 20,648.89 20 42,427.89 
Poultry Farmers R A 32,326.00 100 24,137.SO 
Soldiertown Dyers R A 38,680.00 64 20,010.58 
Serrkunda Women Dyers R A 23,210.00 100 17,542.45 
Denton Bridge R A 12,430.00 72 13,346.59 
Kaur Women R D 43,775.00 100 10,788.SO 
Basse Women R D 6,255.00 100 9,316.61 
Half Die Dyers R A 7,420.00 42 8,666.10 
Soldiertown Norrankats R A 10,6'70.00 60 8,371.53 
Barra Young Women R A 8,463.00 ? 7,880.00 
Carpenters New Society R D 11,840.00 100 11!A?P.8 
Bakau Women R A 7,159.97 100 7,042.25 
:Essau Women R A 5,293.00 29 6,069.55 
Georgetown Women R A 601!.42.SO 28 5,939.85 
Ker Gallob Women R A 6,352.00 14 5,421.SO 
Faraba Banta R A 2,377.00 100 5,345.00 
Banjul Seamstress R A 5,497.00 63 5,158.15 
Sukuta Women R A 255.00 100 5,ml9.00 
Barra Women R R 18,160.00 100 4,712.06 
Boka Helat R A 4,010.00 100 4,628.36 
Sibanor Women R D 1,840.00 100 4,345.15 
PinmgWomen R A 800.00 100 3,722.00 
(continued next page) 
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Table m-s (cont.) 
Name of Society Proposed/ Al:tive/ Loans %Loans Capital (as of Oct. 
RcgisteICd dormant2 Outstanding as of Overdue3 1987, Savings & 
with Doc. Oct.1987 Shares) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) 
Basori Women R D 0 0 3,625.00 
Karantaba Women p A 3,539.75 
Half Die Norrankats R R 2,780.00 100 3,141.34 
Bana Bana R D 2,193.00 100 3,064.84 
Kafuta p A 2,810.00 
Gambia Bee Keepers p A 2,725.75 
Kuntaya Women R A 264.00 100 2,576.72 
Sotolroi Mandina p A 1,215.00 0 2,314.25 
Atlantic FJShermen R D 0 0 2,244.00 
Lamin Women pp A 2,23S.OO 
Tambasansang Women R D 2,006.00 
Yakarr Women R A 2,805.00 100 1,998.83 
Bantanto Women R D 7,96.S.OO 100 1,930.00 
Gunjur Bajo Jarra R A 2,910.00 59 1,891.lS 
Senekunda Market Garden R D 2,814.00 100 1,886.01 
Gunjur Oil Palm & Bee Keeping R D 0 0 1,848.SO 
Brikama Women R A 2,972.00 100 1,719.SO 
Bijilo Women R D 3,330.00 100 1,575.99 
Brufut Women R D 1,323.00 100 1,318.1.6 
Janol Women p D 1,QIJ0.00 
Handicraft Producers R D ? ? 956.00 
Bansang Women R D 0 0 335.00 
Banujul Central Women p D 100.00 
Busumbala Women p D 0 
Yundum Women R D 0 0 0 
Source: Report on the Review of The Gambia CU Movement, ACCOSCA, March 1990. 
Note 1: Contains only those SO CTCS active after Sept. 1988. 
2: Active: if final transaction took place after October 1987. 
3: Overdues: All unrecovered loans which were issued before October 1987. 
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Table 111-6 Sources or Funds for the Credit Program at the GCU, 198h1992. 
Year GCDB GPMB GCU ADPil Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(in ·ooo dalasis) 
Pr~-R~rpnization 
1981/82 4,518 755 0 5,'Z73 
1982/83 3,440 0 0 3,440 
1983/84 5,194 0 0 5,194 
1984/85 4,540 5,251 0 9,791 
1985/86 481 0 0 1,128 1,(J()I) 
1986/87 4,020 2,884 280 4,619 11,803 
1987/88 NA NA 0 6,934 6,934 
PQ§! R~pnization 
1988/89 0 0 356 2,120 2,476 
1989/90 0 0 2,910 1,445 4,355 
1990/91 0 0 NA NA NA 
1991/92 0 0 NA NA NA 
Source: GCU. 
Table W-7 ADP II Funds: Loans Outstandings and Disbursements for Agricultural Input Loans made 
byGCU. 
Items Outstanding Disbursement Disbursement Outstanding 
(1989) (1989-90) (1990/91) (1991) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(in '()()() dalasis) 
Operational 4,672 2,296 1,624 8,592 
Capital 2,053 9 997 3,059 
Buil~ 3,790 3,790 
Fertili7.er 8,748 8,748 
Seeds 746 675 1,421 
Agricultural 
Equipment 5,438 969 1,522 7,929 
Chemical 841 841 
Total 22,498 7,064 4,818 34,380 
Source: ADP Il. 
Table UI-8 
Year 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
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Number of CPMS and Village Branches that Qualified to Receive Input Loans fl"om the GCU, 
1988-1992. 
CPMS 
(1) 
5 (9) 
25 (46) 
27 (50) 
43 (80) 
(#of Units%) 
Village Branches 
(2) 
65 
400 
396 
S18 
Total Number of CPMS: 54 
Source: GCU. 
Table DI-9 Number of Qualified CPMS and VIiiage Branches by Geographic Location, 1988-1992. 
No.of No. of Qualified CPMS No. of Village Branches 
Circle 
Registered 
88/ 89/ 90/ 91/ 88/ 89/ 90/ 91/ CPMS 
89 90 91 92 89 90 91 92 
-- -- --(1) . (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Brikama 8 1 6 6 7 11 102 92 74 
2. Mansakonko 5 0 3 3 4 0 30 27 25 
3. Barra 9 0 1 1 8 0 11 11 lOS 
4. Kerewan 11 3 6 8 10 47 102 117 117 
S. G.town-North 7 0 3 4 s 0 SS 74 111 
6. G.town-South 8 1 2 4 6 7 28 64 71 
7. Bassa s 0 4 1 2 0 72 11 15 
Total S3 s 25 27 43 65 400 396 S18 
Source: GCU. 
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Table 111-10 Number of Qualified Village Branches by Age of the Branches, 1989-1992. 
Years 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
One 
(1) 
65 
335 
118 
334 
Source: Compiled from GCU data. 
Two 
(2) 
65 
226 
74 
Age of the Branches 
Three Four 
(3) (4) 
( # of Village Branches) 
52 
62 38 
Total 
(5) 
65 
400 
396 
518 
Note: The figures need to be interpreted as follows: Of the 518 branches qualified in 1991/92, 38 were out 
of the 65 qualified in 1988/89, 62 out of the 335qualifiedin1989/90, 74 out of 118qualifiedin1990/91, 
and 334 that were newly qualified in 1991/92. 
Table 111-11 Total and Average Volume of Short Term and Medium Tenn Loans Disbursed, 1988-1992. 
Total Volume Average Loan Index for Average Loan Index for Village 
Years of Loans per CPMS1 CPMS per Village Branch 
Branch2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(in '000 dalasis) 
1988/89 2411 482.2 100.0 37.1 100.0 
(5) (65) 
1989/90 3307 132.3 rt.4 8.3 22.4 
(25) (400) 
1990/91 2999 111.1 21.1 7.6 205 
(rt) (396) 
1991/92 3716 865 17.9 7.2 19.4 
(43) (518) 
Number of CPMS given in parenthesis. 
2 Number of village branches given in parenthesis. 
Table 111-12 Volume of Loans Solicited and Approved by CPMS, Village Branches and Applicants during 1991-92 Cycle. 
Volume of Loans 
CPMS Solicited Approved Approved/ Previous Recovery Previous Groundnut #Year in Index 
Solicited (Ratio) Rate(%) Marketed Program 
(1990-91) (RECOV) (tons) (GNUI') 
91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 
Ttr (2) (3)9 (4) (4) --cs> (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (ii) (i2) 
(in '000 dalasis) 
Brikama Circle 
1. Sukuta 34.75 1.3 21.02 1.3 0.60 1.00 51 35 111 167 3 4 1 
2. Brikama 137.13 49.2 50.63 35.9 0.37 0.73 69 so 206 388 3 4 1 
3. Paraba 210.48 44.1 91.20 22.1 0.43 0.49 94 82 334 324 3 4 1 
4. Ndamban 102.99 5.9 64.44 5.9 0.63 1.00 87 71 539 412 4 5 1 
5. Sibanor 45.86 18.8 29.95 11.1 o.~ 0.59 81 69 476 436 3 4 1 
6. Bwiam 60.06 25.1 21.55 5.1 0.37 0.20 60 32 191 110 3 4 1 
7. Bondali• 88.20 74.8 30.43 34.S 0.35 0.46 95 99 280 232 1 2 1 
Barra Circle 
8. Buniadu• 72.13 201.7 36.90 99.3 O.Sl 0.49 95 100 210 452 1 2 1 
9. Medina S. Mass• 51.15 92.7 24.60 63.6 0.48 0.69 95 94 220 236 1 2 2 
10. Pakua-Penku• 207.48 14.8 88.78 8.6 0.43 0.58 9S 63 430 460 1 2 2 ~ 
11. Passy Mamudjaw 184.99 198.3 94.59 164.1 0.Sl 0.83 96 500 S04 1 2 1 00 
-
12. Ndungu Kebbah• 252.71 27.1 109.68 16.7 0.43 0.62 9S S4 671 201 1 2 1 
13. Kuntaya• 240.55 116.3 121.66 10.8 0.Sl 0.61 95 76 530 208 1 2 1 
14. Kerr Jarga• 281.13 85.S 129.61 53.6 0.46 0.63 95 77 551 183 1 2 1 
15. Darsilameh Joka 282.37 90.3 141.28 60.8 o.so 0.67 88 76 836 279 3 4 1 
Kerewan Circle 
16. Njawara 154.08 102.2 75.36 25.3 0.49 0.25 72 73 453 224 4 5 1 
17. Salikene 23.73 123.2 11.77 84.8 o.so 0.69 69 84 407 135 3 4 1 
18. Njaba Kunda 341.12 15.6 205.81 23.9 0.60 0.32 74 42 8S4 98 4 5 1 
19. No Kunda 96.30 o.o 52.68 0.0 0.55 0.00 67 28 374 35 4 5 1 
20. llliasa • 253.89 24.2 121.69 25.6 0.48 1.06 95 80 322 24 1 2 1 
21. Parrafenni 303.81 42.8 154.15 21.0 O.Sl 0.49 87 51 460 35 3 4 1 
22. Minteh Kunda .. 
-
40.3 
-
30.7 
-
0.76 
-
95 
-
27 0 1 1 
(Cont.) 
Volume of Loans 
CPMS Solicited Approved Approved/ Previous Recovery Previous Groundnut #Year in Index 
Solicited (Ratio) Rate(%) Marketed Program 
(1990-91) (RECOV) (tons) (GNUI) 
91/92 92/93 -91~-- 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 92/93 91/92 
Ci) (2) C3r (4) (4) ""(S) (6) -c;r- (8) (9) (10) (ii) (12) 
Mansakonko Circle 
23. Ngaycn Sanjal SS3.23 0.0 168.9S 0.0 0.31 0.00 93 13 4S9 2 2 3 1 
24. Sarakunda 278.34 0.0 156.42 0.0 0.56 0.00 92 22 S93 3 3 4 1 
2S. Kataba 140.25 0.0 BS.28 o.o 0.61 0.00 92 27 366 3 2 3 1 
26. Saaba• 213.77 177.9 61.78 97.7 0.29 o.ss 9S 88 22S 266 1 2 1 
27. Jiffarong• BS.99 27.S 40.30 9.4 0.47 0.34 9S 67 13S 98 1 2 1 
28. Burong 37.09 19.2 33.09 17.7 0.89 0.92 93 89 24S 293 3 4 2 
29. Burcng 81.39 0.0 32.S2 0.0 0.40 0.00 76 10 262 10 3 4 1 
30. Sankwia 14S.SS 0.0 76.14 0.0 O.S2 0.00 90 44 234 16 3 4 1 
G. Town North Circle 
31. Kaur 421.38 87.1 167.96 61.2 0.40 0.70 69 71 278 17 3 4 1 
32. Njau• 496.42 124.1 163.lS 67.7 0.33 o.ss 9S 96 181 18 1 2 1 
0\ 33. Wassu• 411.87 84.2 114.68 39.7 0.28 0.47 95 17 2S7 2 1 2 1 
-.::t" 
34. Yoona 13.98 0.0 7.23 0.0 O.S2 0.00 40 5 141 0 3 4 1 
3S. Chamen 229.SO 59.8 80.02 12.4 0.3S 0.21 64 67 87 7 2 3 1 
36. Ballanghar .. 
-
29.S 
-
lS.S 
-
O.S2 
-
68 
-
4 0 1 1 
37. Dingarai .. 
-
56 
-
23.3 
-
0.42 
-
9S 
-
4 0 1 1 
G. Town South Circle 
38. Mamdufona• 460.63 9.7 92.46 90.7 0.20 1.00 9S 36 224 2 1 2 1 
39. Sarasofie 203.78 0.0 117.3S 0.0 O.S8 0.00 96 56 468 83 2 3 2 
40. Gallic Manda• 293.61 59.1 120.79 22.1 0.41 0.37 9S 73 601 38 1 2 2 
41. Dankunku 248.89 7S.1 19S.21 BS.2 0.78 1.13 86 16 4S8 80 4 5 1 
42. Kundang 521.07 0.0 124.26 o.o 0.24 0.00 79 23 21S 7 2 3 1 
43. Bansang 324.54 7.1 24S.S9 7.1 0.76 1.00 100 38 718 71 3 4 1 
Basse Circle 
44. Bajakunda• 567.Sl 107.1 lOS.98 36.4 0.19 0.34 9S 92 43S 56 1 2 2 
4S. Sindowol 68.99 20.1 46.32 lS.8 0.67 0.79 74 4S 22S 99 3 4 1 
46. Banatenda .. 
-
7.7 
-
7.7 
-
1.00 
-
9S 
-
43 0 1 1 
47. Disandu•• 
-
5.1 
-
3.1 
-
0.53 
-
95 
-
51 0 1 2 
Source: GCU. 
• • Newly qualified for 1991-92 cycle. 
•• - Newly qualified for 1992-93 cycle. The recoyery rates for newly qualified CPMSs were assumed to be 9S percent. 
Table III-13A DeterminaDts of Loan Sl7.e Rationing: Results or the Conelation Coemdent AnalJsls. 
RATIO RECOV GNUT AGE INDEX 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RATI01 1.00000 0.35459 0.31300 -0.00232 0.04872 
(0.0) (0.0030)• (O.OO'J4) • {0.9850) (0.6932) 
RECOV2 0.35459 1.00000 0.59858 -0.38568 0.22998 
(0.0030)• (0.0) (0.0001)• (0.0012)• (0.0592)• 
GNUT1 0.31300 0.59858 LOOOOO -0.01591 -0.00880 
(O.OO'J4) • (0.0001)• (0.0) (0.8975) (0.9432) 
AGE' -0.00232 -0.38568 -0.01591 LOOOOO -0.25043 
(0.9850) (0.0012)• (0.8975) (0.0) (0.0394)• 
INDEX5 0.04872 0.22998 -0.00880 -0.25043 1.00000 
(0.6932) (0.0592)• (0.9432) (0.0394)• (0.0) 
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
RATIO refers to the ratio of loan amount supplied to loan amount solicited by the CPMSs. 
RECOV refers to the percentage of loans recovered. 
GNUT refers to the quantity of groundnuts purchased by the CPMSs. 
AGE refers to the number of years that a CPMS has been eligl"ble for the aedit program. 
INDEX refers to the difficulty in aa:escing a CPMS. An Index of 1 is assigned to CPMSs that are 
physically accesst"ble while 2 is assigned to CPMSs that are located deep in the bushes and are difficult 
to reach. 
• Represents significance at 10 percent level Figures within parenthesis refers to the significance level 
under which HO: p = 0 is rejected. 
Table 111-138 Determinants of Loan Sl7.e Rationing: Results or the Regression Analysis. 
Variables Co-efficient T-ratio 
{1) (2) 
Dependent Variable 
RATIO 
Independent Variable 
Intercept 0.265 2.886• 
(0.092) 
RECOV 0.291 1.83()•• 
(0.159) 
GNUT 0.217 L102 
(0.197) 
Sample Siz.e 68 
R-Square 0.15 
• Significant at 5 percent level 
•• Significant at 10 percent level 
Standard error given in parenthesis. 
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Table 111-14 Average and Total Volume of Short Term and Medium Term Loans Disbursed to New and 
Old CPMS and Village Branches, 1988-92. 
Average Volume of Loans (in '000 dalasis) Total Loans 
CPMS1 Village Branches2 (in '()()() dalasis) 
Years Old New Old New Old Units New Units 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1988-89 4n.656 36.743 0 2388.28 
(0) (5) (0) (65) 
1989-90 122.658 134.817 9.435 8.049 613.29 2696.34 
(5) (20) (65) (335) 
1990-91 118.632 79.164 9367 3354 2603.96 395.85 
(22) (5) (278) (118) 
1991-92 88.902 82.266 13.045 3.941 240036 1316.25 
(27) (16) (184) (334) 
Number of CPMS given in parenthesis. 
2 Number of village branches given in parenthesis. 
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Table 111-15 Repayment Performance on Current and Loans Overdue, 1981-1991. 
Years 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
88/89 (86 CPMS) 
89 /90 (25 CPMS)2 
(54 CPMS) 
(86 CPMS) 
90/91 (27 CPMS)3 
(54 CPMS) 
(86 CPMS) 
91/92 ( 44 CPMS) 
Source: GCU. 
Loans Due1 
(1) 
5,414 
3,712 
5,598 
10,50') 
1,762 
12,324 
NA 
4,295 
3,151 
4,403 
4,939 
3,712 
4,433 
4,911 
6,018 
Loans Recovered 
(2) 
('000 Dalasis) 
Pre-Reoril'nization (includes 86 CPMSs) 
2,982 
3,290 
3,376 
5,599 
1,181 
9,500 
NA 
Post Reorganization 
2,076 
2,944 
3,187 
3,205 
2,693 
3,005 
3,016 
3,176 
Note 1: Includes principal and interest on current loans and overdue loans. 
% Recovered 
(3) 
55 
89 
(J() 
53 
87 
77 
81 
48 
93 
72 
65 
73 
68 
61 
53 
2: Repayment performance is reported for those 25 CPMSs that qualified for the program, 54 CPMSs that 
remained after 1988 and 86 CPMSs that were originally affiliated with the GCU since 1959. The 86 
CPMSs includes the 54 and 25 CPMSs and the 54 CPMSs includes the 25 CPMSs. 
3: Repayment performance is reported for those 27 CPMSs that qualified for the program, 54 CPMSs that 
remained after reorganization in 1988 and 86 CPMSs that were originally affiliated with the GCU since 
1959. The 84 CPMSs includes the 54 and 25 CPMSs and the 54 CPMSs includes the 27 CPMSs. 
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Table 111-16 Repayment Performances OD Current Loans and All Loans Outstanding ror the CPMS that 
Qualified ror 1990-91 Loans from the GCU. 
Years 
Circle/CPMS 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Percent Repaid) 
I. Basse Circle 
1. Sudowol 93.1 95 74 45 
2. Bansang 95.1 100.0 100 38 
n. a. TQwn - SQYth ~ir£1~ 
3. Dankunku 76.9 100.0 86 16 
4. Kudang 66.4 96.6 79 23 
m. Q. Town· North ~ircle 
5. Cham.en 25.6 94.4 64 67 
6. Yoona 95.8 94.6 40 06 
7. Kaur 30.4 86 69 71 
IV. MQnsokonko ~irge 
8. Bureng 95.7 100.0 76 10 
9. Burong 100 98.9 93 89 
10. Sankwia 81.6 100 90 44 
11. Farafenni 90.0 91.9 ff1 58 
12. Sara kunda 79.8 100.0 92 23 
13. N'Sanjal 47.4 95.0 93 13 
14. Kataba 68.5 98.3 92 27 
v. Kerewan Circle 
15. Njawara 74.3 99 72 73 
16. Salikene 77.5 99.0 69 84 
17. Njaba kunda 94.7 98.6 74 42 
18. No kunda 100.0 100.0 67 28 
VI. Barra Circle 
19. Darsilame joka 93.7 95.9 88 76 
vn. Brnq•ma Circle 
20. Sukuta 97.4 91.9 51 35 
21. Brikama 41.4 98.3 69 50 
22. Faranba 28.1 97.4 94 82 
23. N'demban 90.6 94.7 ff1 71 
24. Sibanor ffl.3 91.5 81 69 
25. B'wiam 82.9 95.6 60 33 
Source: GCU. 
Table 111-17 Sampled CPMS: Qualification Status, Membership Size, Village Branches, Loans Issued and Repaid, and Groundnut Purchased in 1991· 
92. 
Qualified Members Village Branches Loans3 Groundnut 
CPMS Year1 Total Women Registered Qualified2 Issued4 Repaid' Purchase 
(#members) ( # branches) ('000 dalasis) (tons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Brikama 1990 1057 4 16 NA 132 (>6 (50) 388 
Sukuta 1989 2122 3 16 14 (88) 155 50 (33) 159 
N'demban 1988 850 3 11 6 (55) 147 101 (69) 414 
N'Jawara 1988 632 94 12 7 (58) 160 111 (70) 223 
Njabakunda 1988 700 70 32 22 (69) 3<>6 176 (48) 96 
Burong 1989 323 0 14 6 (43) 69 57 (83) 301 
Kwinella 1 250 10 7 0 (0) NA NA 45 
Njau 1990 954 100 51 10 (20) 170 150 (88) 18 
Dinganai 1991 NA NA 26 17 (65) 42 17 (41) 4 
°' 1 ~ Brikama-ba 1500 400 25 0 (0) 46 5 (12) 8 
Fatato 1 NA NA 14 0 (0) 21 2 (8) 55 
Baneang 1989 1386 550 21 21 (100) 2'1:1 103 (45) 70 
Source: OSU survey. 
Note 1: Not yet qualified. Loans issued for these CPMSs refers to loans outstanding from 1987 /88. 
2: Percentage of qualified to total villages registered is given in parenthesis. 
3: Both seasonal and term loans are included. 
4: Includes principal and interest dues. 
5: Percentage of loans repaid to issued is given in parenthesis. 
55 
Table 111-18 Alternative Roles of Key Agents on GCU Operations. 
Markets/ Agents 
Scenario I (favorable) 
a. Output 
b. Input 
c. Financial 
Scenario II (unfavorable) 
a. Output 
b. Input 
c. Financial 
Note 1: Inactive. 
2: Active. 
3: Not applicable. 
GPMB 
(1) 
IN' 
IN 
IN 
A 
A 
A 
FAQ 
(2) 
IN 
IN 
IN 
IN 
A 
A 
NGOs 
(3) 
IN 
IN 
IN 
IN 
A 
A 
Senegal 
(4) 
Competitive 
IN 
IN 
Subsidi7.ed 
na3 
A 
Banks/ ADPII 
(5) 
A2 
A 
IN 
IN 
IN 
IN 
Figure 111-1 
Commodity (Input and Output) and Credit Flows through the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) in the Post ERP period. 
:INPUT MARKET OUTPUT MARKET 
Notes: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
ADP J:J: 
funds 
(to puxch&•• input•) 
Pinance input maxketing • 
•• Finance output maxketing 
I ' ' ~I - P•Y• 1oan• ** I r------------------1_ ____ :~1~:.i.:~:.~~·----_:-_______ I I Pay• ocu ** 
CPMS (43) 
(Qua1:l.f:l.ed) 
• 
Ca•h ... 
:tn-kind 
l.oan• 
Ca•h A 
:tn•kind 
l.oan• 
:l.11age Branches 
(Qua1:l.fied) (518l 
Ca•h ... 
:tn•kind 
l.oan• 
• 
I I• lacu I sel.l.• output .. 
Sel.l.• output and al.•o 
xep&)l'a in.put l.oana ••• 
Pxovid•• cxedit al.ipa (redeemabl.e voucher•> or 
pay oaah ~or output ** 
Sel.l.a output and xepaya ~ox 
• __________ _, mb • ) input l.oan• in-kind ox ca•h I 
Me er ... armers I-· -------------------1-••• 
• 10,000 
Pxovid•• credit •l.iP• (xedeelllllbl.• 
vouchex•) ox pay ca•h ~ox output 
and col.l.eot• input l.oana ••• 
o = Primary Creditor; D = Retailers; 0 = Input Consumers & Output Producers. 
ADPII: Agricultural Development Program 11; GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; CPMS: Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies. 
Qualified CPMS and village branches represent those that qualified for 1991-92 loan cycle based on the 95% repayment rule. 
Figures within parenthesis gives number of participants in the operations in 1991-92. 
'""11• Loans supporting input and output marketing operations are repaid by the GCU to its primary creditors. 
• : represents input flows; •• : output flows; ••• : represents input-output linked transactions. 
lll 
0\ 
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Appendix Table 111-1 List of the CPMS Sampled by Their Status of Qualification in the Credit Program 
and Geographical Location. 
NameofCPMS 
Circle Qualified Not Qualified 
(1) (2) 
I. Brikama N'demban None 
Sukuta 
Brikama 
II. Kerewan Njawara None 
Njabakunda 
m. Barra Kerr-Gumbo Bakalar 
IV. Georgetown - North Njau None 
Dingarai 
v. Georgetown - South Bansang Brikama-ba 
VI. Basse None Fatato 
VII. Mansakonko Burong Kwinella 
Total 10 4 
Source: OSU Survey 
Appendix Table 111-2 Name and Location of Samples V'dlages in which Farmers/Kafos wre Interviewed. 
No. 
I 
II 
m 
IV 
v 
VI 
TOTAL 
Division 
(1) 
Brikama 
Mansakonku 
Barra & Kerewan 
Georgetown (South) 
Georgetown (North) 
Basse 
No. Villages Name of the Villages 
(2) (3) 
3 Sukuta, N'demban-Jo)a, Besse 
2 Burong, Kwinella1 
3 Panneh-ba, Foddakunda, Dipakunda, 
Kerr-Gumbo, Bakalar 
3 Boraba 
2 Dingarai, Njau 
1 Fatoto 
14 
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Appendix Table 111-3 Number of CPMS Affiliated with the GCU, 1964-1992. 
Years #CPMS Additional Total 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pr~-R~orW!niz.at!Qn 
1964 38 0 38 
1965 38 1 39 
1966 39 7 46 
1967 46 4 50 
1968-71 46 0 50 
1972 50 3 53 
1973 53 1 54 
1974 54 8 62 
1975-77 62 0 62 
1978 62 19 81 
1979-82 81 0 81 
1983 81 1 82 
1984-85 82 0 82 
1986 82 4 86 
1987 86 0 86 
PQ§l R~Qr~niz-atiQn 
19881 86 -32 54 
1989-922 54 0 54 
Source: GCU. 
Note 1: 32 CPMS were either closed or merged with existing CPMS. 
2: This includes all CPMS affiliated with GCU regardless of their qualification into the loans program. 
59 
Appendix ill-4 
Lendin~ Conditions and Eli&ibility Criteria 
for the 1991/92 A~cultural Season57 
The following are the major lending conditions and qualifying criteria that will apply to all 
loans made by GCU to CPMS and members for agricultural purposes in the coming season. 
Any variation of these will be communicated to the CPMS and others associated with this 
loan programme in advance of the lending period. 
1. Lendini Arran~ements 
GCU will provide resources on credit to affiliated CPMS which will in turn be onlent 
by the CPMS to individual members (or groups). These resources will be for 
agricultural production purposes only. This will give rise to a two level contractual 
arrangement with loan contracts between GCU and borrowing CPMS and other 
contracts between CPMS and their individual borrowing members (or groups). 
2. Period of Loaps 
Loans will be either seasonal (a maximum of one year) or medium term loans (a 
maximum of five years). For medium term loans the principal amount will be repaid 
in 5 equal, annual installments starting in the first year and no grace period will be 
permitted. 
3. Nature of Loans 
Seasonal loans will be primarily for fertilizer but may also include seed, crop 
chemicals and cash to meet farm labor costs. Medium term loans will be primarily 
for various items of animal drawn equipment such as farm carts, seeders and sine 
hoes. Other types of loans may be provided by GCU depending upon the availability 
of funds. 
4. Interest Rates 
Interest will be charged to the end users of loans at the following rates: 
Seasonal Loans 21% per annum 
New Medium Term Loans 18% " " 
S1 Source: GCU. 
Previous Medium Term Loans 
Arrears brought forward since 
1987 /88 season 
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15% 
24% 
" 
It 
" " 
CPMS will be paid by GCU at the end of the recovery period an amount equal to 
5% of the value of the current loan installment recovered (this includes arrears 
brought forward since 1987 /88) in order to meet their own internal loan management 
costs. 
5. Repayment of Loans 
All loans will be repaid by members to the CPMS where the loan was drawn and will 
normally be made by cash deductions from the proceeds of produce sales. This, 
however, does not preclude any member from making loan repayments in cash. 
CPMS will repays loan to GCU in cash and amounts will be deducted by GCU from 
crop purchase finance sent to each repaying CPMS. The final date for the 
repayment of both seasonal loans and medium term loan installments is the 31st 
March 1992. Any loans disbursed during the dry season will have a different 
repayment date depending on the date of disbursement and periodicy of the loan. 
6. Borrowini Member's Contributions 
Members are not required to make any financial contribution in respect of seasonal 
loans and may draw 100% of their requirements. In respect of medium term loans 
a down payment in cash to the approximate value of 10% of the retail price is 
required for all items. This must be paid in full to the CPMS at the time of delivery 
and these amounts will in turn be remitted by the CPMS to the GCU. 
7. Security for Loans 
Loan made by GCU will be secured by the assets of the CPMS which may include 
any payment owed by GCU in respect of farm produce purchased. Members 
borrowing from the CPMS will not normally be expected to provide any security 
beyond a pledge to market the produce, for which the loans are taken, to the same 
CPMS. 
8. Eli~bility Criteria 
8.1 In respect of epMS 
a. No CPMS will qualify for agricultural loans from GCU unless it shows 
itself capable of conducting its produce marketing and other 
commercial activities on a sustainable financial viable basis. 
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b. In addition, all CPMS must ratify with GCU the "GCU Bilateral Loan 
Management Agreement" which regulates the manner in which 
agricultural loans are managed on the basis of the Village Branch 
Group Loan system. 
c. Any CPMS wishing to enter the Village Branch Loan system for the 
first time must have discharged a minimum of 95% of what is due for 
payment in terms of principal and interest on all loans received from 
GCU during and since the 1987 /88 season. Amounts to be repaid on 
loans still owing from before the 1987 /88 season will be negotiated 
separately. 
8.2 In respect of Villa&e Branches 
a. Each Village Branch must agree to establish a 5 man loans committee 
with the primary function of screening loan applicants and supervising 
loans. The election of this committee must be in accordance with the 
wishes of the CPMS Executive Committee and Village Branch 
members. 
b. No Village Branch will qualify for further loans until it has repaid a 
minimum of 95% of principal and interest due on all previous loans 
drawn under the Village Branch Group Loan system. 
8.3 In respect of individual members 
Other than the standard requirement that each borrower is a registered 
member of the CPMS, Village Branch Loan Committees should determine the 
eligibility criteria for the individual members. However, the following is 
proposed as a guide. 
a. Each individual is free of any previously incurred debt to the CPMS. 
b. Each individual has marketed produce to his CPMS during the 3 
previous seasons. 
c. Each individual has the productive capacity to repay the loan both in 
terms of the size of his land holding and his managerial ability. In this 
respect, it is proposed that the quantum of loans to individuals do not 
exceed one third of the total value of their marketable produce. 
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9. Group Loans 
Within the framework of its lending policy GCU is developing a system of lending 
to groups of farmers such as Kafo Farms and Womens' Groups, etc. For such a 
group to qualify for a loan it must be thoroughly screened by the Village Branch 
Loans Committee who must consider the group cohesive and with the productive 
capacity to repay the amount of any loan advanced. The group must also have the 
approval of the CPMS Executive Committee. In order to meet the requirements of 
cooperative legislation and as the group loan will be approved and disbursed in the 
name of the group leader, it is only the group leader who need be a registered 
member of the CPMS from where the loan is drawn. Each member of the group will 
be jointly and severally responsible for the repayment of amounts owed by other 
group members. 
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Appendix Table 111·5 List of CTCSs that Qualified in 1989 to Form CUs. 
1. Diambalollateh Women CTCS 
2. Dock Workers of Kaur port CTCS (men) 
3. George town Women's CTCS 
4. Kuntaya Women's CTCS 
5. Poultry Farmers CTCS 
6. Santa Y aila CTCS 
7. Tambasangsang Women's CTCS 
8. Sotokoi Mandina Women's CTCS 
9. Gambia Beekeepers CTCS 
Source: ACCOSCA, 1990. 
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Appendix Table 111-6 Growth of Village Branches that Qualified for Loans from GCU, 1988 to 1992. 
Years 
Circle/CPMS 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(No. of Village Branches) 
I. Basse Circl~ 
1. Suduwol 15 11 6 
2. Basse 23 0 0 
3. Jahkunda 18 0 0 
4. Bana Tenda 16 0 0 
5. Baja Kunda 9 
II. Geors;etown-South 
1. Bansang 19 21 21 
2. Dankunku 7 9 9 5 
3. Kundang 16 13 
4. Sare Sofie 18 19 
5. Galleh Mada 9 
6. MamudFana 4 
7. Brikama-ba 
8. Fulla Bantang 
m. Q~rs;etown-North 
1. Kaur fBaJanghar 19 18 34 
2. Yoona 16 16 1 
3. Koli-kunda 20 22 0 
4. Cham.en 18 5 
5. Njau 40 
6. Wassu 31 
7. Karawtabe 
IV. Man§i!kQnko 
1. Burong 13 12 8 
2. Bureng 6 5 3 
3. Sankwia 11 10 6 
4. Jiffarong 8 
5. Kwinella 
v. Kerewan 
1. Njawara 12 12 4 7 
2. Njaba Kunda 24 32 32 23 
3. Salikene 13 13 1 
4. Farafenni 20 18 18 
5. Sare Kunda 8 9 8 
6. No Kunda 11 17 17 6 
7. Kataba 8 10 
8. Ngayen Sanjal 16 20 
9. Saaba 14 
10.Illiassa 10 
11. Dtl>ba Kunda 
65 
Appendix Table 1114 (cont.) 
Years1 
Circle/CPMS 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(No. of Village Branches) 
VI. Bmn 
1. Darsilameh Joka 11 11 8 
2. Kerr Jarga 10 
3. Ndungu Kebbah 14 
4. Buniadu 12 
5. Medina S. Mass 8 
6. Pakau-Penku 11 
7. Passy Mamudjaw 25 
8. Kuntaya 17 
9. Banacar 
vn. Brikama 
1. Sukuta 13 9 7 
2. Brikama 16 19 11 
3. Faraba-Banta 15 15 15 
4. N'Demban 11 11 7 7 
5. Sibanor 26 22 6 
6. Bwiam 21 20 7 
7. Bondali 21 
8. Gunjar 
Total 65 400 396 518 
Source: GCU. 
Note 1: "-"indicates that the CPMS is not qualified for loans in that year. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FAO INPUT SUPPLY SYSTEM• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a United Nations organization that 
has been involved in supplying agricultural inputs on credit to farmers and farmers' organi-
zations in The Gambia.1 Beginning in the late 1970s, the FAO has been coordinating with 
Government of The Gambia and agricultural extension services to develop farmer's aware-
ness about modem agricultural practices and fertilizer use. While the FAO launched a 
project ''Fertilizer Use, Promotion, Distribution and Credit Assistance (GCPF/GAM/014/ 
DEN)" in 1981 with external funds from the Government of Denmark, its direct involvement 
in the input and credit markets was prompted by the liberalization of the agricultural inputs 
market with the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985.2 
The FAO actively advocated deregulation of the agricultural inputs market and 
encouraged participation of private entrepreneurs (PEs) in its distribution networks. With 
the lethargic response from PEs to independently enter into the inputs market due in part 
to capital constraints, 3 and the reluctance of domestic banks to finance private 
entrepreneurs to enter the market or farmers to purchase agricultural inputs in rural areas,4 
the FAO assumed the role of a supplier of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer, seeds, plant 
protection chemicals, etc., on credit beginning in 1988. The FAO intended to initially 
stimulate the participation of the PEs in the market by the provision of financial and 
physical infrastructure, and to gradually transfer the responsibility over to them. 
We acknowledge with appreciation the valuable assistance provided by Mr. Sven Christenssen and Mr. 
Amadou Sowe, and the 12 Sample Private Dealers in conducting this study. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 The FAO is the primary international organization involved in assisting to provide inputs on credit in The 
Gambia. The services are channeled through the FAO office located within the Agricultural Input Office (AIO) 
which is attached to the Department of Agriculture (DA), The Gambia. To avoid confusing FAO's activities 
in the AIO office with DA, this report refers to FAO as the alternative supplier of inputs on credit. 
2 See Appendix 1 for the specific long-term objectives of this project. 
3 The response by private entrepreneurs to become involved in the agricultural input market, especially 
fertilizer, has been limited due to capital constraints, uncertainty in government fertilizer policy, low profit 
margins compared to other commercial activities, high carry-over and market risk, and lack of experience in input 
marketing (see Chapters VII and VIII for details). 
4 See Chapter I for the reasons for the lack of access in rural areas to the formal financial institutions in 
The Gambia. 
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Whereas the FAQ is not a specialized financial intermediary and its financial services 
are limited to the provision of agricultural inputs on credit to private entrepreneurs, the 
value of this credit in the total agricultural credit market has been substantial.5 
Furthermore, its role in encouraging the participation of the private sector in the rural 
financial market has been significant. To help incorporate private entrepreneurs into 
fertilizer marketing, especially at the retailer level, the FAQ established a Private Dealer 
Network (PDN) in 1988. The private dealers (PDs) function as retailers to extend in-kind 
loans such as fertilizers, farm machinery, and seeds to farmers. 
There has been a growing interest among policy makers in finding private sector 
solutions to improve agricultural marketing efficiency in developing countries. The FAQ's 
experiment with PDs helps to identify several issues encountered in incorporating them into 
the input market in The Gambia. Furthermore, with a large loan demand from farmers to 
purchase agricultural inputs and with the almost complete absence of formal banks in rural 
areas, it is important to analyze how this type of program functions to supply loans to the 
agricultural sector.6 While several studies exist on the FAQ in The Gambia,7 there is a 
dearth of documented information on FAQ's input marketing system, especially through its 
innovative PDN and the associated credit provided by it. Therefore, this study analyzed the 
FAQ's PDN method of supplying production inputs on credit, especially considering the 
possible withdrawal of external supfOrt from the FAQ and the implications for full 
privatization of the fertilizer sector. The study was undertaken not to evaluate the 
fertilizer program, but rather to assess its financial arrangements because in-kind loans for 
inputs represent an important alternative credit source for farmers. However, to understand 
this credit source, it was necessary to analyze aspects of the entire program. 
After outlining the methodology of the study in the next section, the participants in 
channelling inputs and credit through the FAQ channel are described. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the FAQ Program and changes proposed or underway are discussed in section 
four. This study then ends with a section on conclusions and recommendations. 
5 See Table Il-2 in Chapter Il. 
6 The majority of farmers buy fertili7.er on credit from sources such as the Gambia Cooperative Union 
(GCU), PEs attached to PAO, government programs, etc. For example, in 1990-91, 85% of FAQ's fertili7.er 
sales were on credit through PDs, while 80% of the fertili7.er supplied through the GCU was on credit (see PAO, 
1992). 
7 Several studies exist that trace the evolution of FAO's involvement in Gambian agriculture, document the 
reasons that guide the operational procedures followed by the PAO, and provide recommendations on technical 
aspects of fertilizer marketing through PAO (see Appendix 2 for a list of these studies). 
1 Consult references listed in Appendix 2 for details of the PAO operations that are not discussed in this 
section. 
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II. METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY 
Although there is a relatively large amount of general information about FAQ's 
program in the inputs and credit markets, there is limited detailed information about these 
activities, especially data on the volume of business and loan repayment performance of the 
individual PD's with FAO and the loan repayment performance of farmers with the PDs. 
Although the details of all transactions between FAO and the individual PDs are currently 
being compiled in a uniform fashion, the data were not available for this study. Therefore, 
a rigorous examination about the feasibility of the PDN as a viable alternative supplier of 
inputs on credit is difficult. Nonetheless, enough data were obtained to develop some fairly 
clear impressions about the poSSI"bility of using the PDN to regularly supply inputs on credit 
in rural areas. This study is based on the aggregate data provided by the FAO, interviews 
conducted with the local FAO officials, selected PDs affiliated with the FAO and a few of 
the farmer beneficiaries, and consultant reports. 
The selection of the PDs that were interviewed for this study was based on several 
factors including their (i) geographic location of operations, (ii) gender, (iii) proximity to 
other financial networks, and (iv) unofficial information on their past loan repayment 
performance with the FAO. The list of sample PDs included in the study is provided in 
Table IV-1. They were interviewed by the senior author during April 1992 to gather 
information on infrastructure facilities, marketing activities, type of clients, terms and 
conditions of credit contracts, and the constraints they faced. Since the majority of them 
either did not maintain accurate records or were reluctant to share them with an outsider, 
quantitative information on their volume of business, loan transactions, and loan repayment 
performance could not be collected. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Currently, the FAO functions as one of the major channels supplying agricultural 
production inputs in The Gambia along with the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU), the 
Government of The Gambia (GOG) and several registered and unregistered private 
entrepreneurs.9 The marketing of inputs through the PDN is facilitated by credit from the 
FAO. The operational procedures of the FAO for the importation and distn"bution of 
agricultural inputs through the PDN and the terms and conditions of the credit provided are 
discussed in this section. Specifically, all the participants in the FAO input supply channel 
are first described to illustrate the role of the PDN. This is then followed by a detailed 
examination of the input and credit flows through the PDN as revealed by the aggregate 
FAO data and by observations obtained from the survey of the 12 PDs. 
9 Consult Chapter VII in this report for a detailed report on the fertili7.er marketing channels in The 
Gambia. 
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1. The Network 
A The Participants 
The FAO began its involvement in the distribution of agricultural inputs, especially 
fertilizer, on behalf of the Department of Agriculture in 1985 (FAO, 1991). The FAO 
intended to identify efficient agents at all marketing levels to establish a network for selling 
inputs on credit. The GCU with its widespread Cooperative Produce Marketing Society 
(CPMS) network was considered as an option to distribute fertilizer imported by the FAO. 
A total of five CPMS were chosen in 1988-89 to distribute inputs to farmers. The inputs 
were given on credit to the GCU.10 However, with the restructuring of the GCU in 1988, 
the FAO decided to establish its own network by incorporating private entrepreneurs at the 
retailer level. Consequently, a total of 36 PDs were selected from all over The Gambia in 
1988-89 and they became operational as the PDN in 1989-90. Currently, the PDN is 
composed of several heterogenous agents at various levels in the marketing channel for 
importation and distribution. The importation of inputs is primarily carried out by the FAO 
and established private food importers, the wholesaling is done by the FAO, and the 
retailing is primarily conducted by the PDN. 
The PDs in the PDN formed a legally backed Private Dealers Association (PDA) in 
1989. Although the PDA was formed as a coordinating body for the PDs, the FAO has 
maintained responsibility of coordinator, monitor, financier of the PDN, and importer and 
wholesaler of agricultural inputs. The coordinating functions of the FAO included: (i) 
demonstrating improved fertilizer use technologies to PDs and their clientele; (ii) conducting 
training activities for the PDs; (iii) gathering and disseminating market information to the 
PDs, especially regarding the for inputs; (iv) distribution of inputs to PDs; and (v) provision 
of technical advice to PDs. 
a.) Importation of Inputs 
While the F AO imports fertilizer directly from foreign suppliers, part of the 
importation has been carried out through selected private food importers, such as S. Madi 
and Mukthara enterprises, working as agents for the FAO. Table IV-2 shows the quantity 
of fertilizers imported into The Gambia through the FAO channel. A total of 3207 tons of 
fertilizer was reported to have been imported into The Gambia in 1991-92. Of this, the 
FAO accounted for 30 percent. Table IV-2 shows that all of the FAO imports were 
conducted through private entrepreneurs in 1991-92 in contrast to previous years. 
10 The funds to finance the imports and provide in-kind credit to GCU were drawn from the revolving fund 
established by the PAO in 1988. 
-
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b.) Retailers of Inputs 
The FAO functions as the wholesaler for the inputs. The set of primary retailers for 
the F AO is composed of 36 PDs of the PDN, 76 PDs serving nearly 5000 members of the 
Maize Growers Association (MGA),11 4 Block Demonstration Villages (BD), the two 
NGOs of Action Aid (AATG) and Women in Development (WID), and government pro-
grams such as the Jahally-Pacharr rice development project (JP). These primary retailers 
supply inputs to farmers through their established secondary and tertiary retailer networks. 
While fertilizer is the major input supplied through the FAO channel, limited quantities of 
seeds, pesticides, and farm implements were also distributed, Table IV-3 gives the value of 
inputs distributed through various agents involved in the FAO channel. It is obvious that 
PDs were the major retailers for the FAO program. 
The FAO functions only as a wholesaler for the AATG, WID and JP which are 
physically and financially supported by external agencies including foreign donors and the 
Government of The Gambia. While the BD program is part of FAQ's fertilizer trial 
programs, the inputs were supplied on cash or credit through the PDs.12 The PDs, on the 
other hand, were selected and supported through a revolving fund created by the FAO. 
Therefore, the discussion in this chapter about the retailing of inputs through the FAO 
channel is limited to the PDs. 
i) The PDs 
In order to develop a well knit retail network of private entrepreneurs as retailers, 
the F AO established the PDN in 1988. A total of 36 PDs, including 10 women, were selec-
ted throughout the country to serve as primary retailers. The selection of PDs was supposed 
to be based on the entrepreneur's infrastructure facilities available to store and distribute 
fertilizer, ability to deal with formal financial institutions and their reputation in the 
community. These 36 PDs along with 76 PDs of the MGA and four BD villages formed a 
Private Dealers Association (PDA) in 1989. The PDA is supposed to be responsible for (i) 
disseminating market information among its members, (ii) conducting training programs for 
the PDs, and (iii) employing support staff such as the Technical Sales Assistants (TSA).13 
Table IV-3 gives the value of agricultural inputs distributed through the PDN 
beginning in the 1989-90 season. The FAO, based on the demand for inputs estimated by 
the Department of Agriculture, supplies the inputs on a consignment basis to the PDs. The 
FAO maintains ownership of the inputs supplied to the PDs until they are sold. An interest 
11 MGA covers about 107 villages in the Upper River Division and MaCarthy Island Division. This 
association was formed in 1988 to improve the production of maiu in The Gambia. 
12 The BD program is outlined in Appendix 3. 
13 See Appendix 4 for the functions of the TSAs. 
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rate of 1.5 percent per month (18 percent per annum) was charged only on the actual quan-
tities of inputs sold by the PDs. The unsold stocks are returned to the FAO at no cost to 
the PDs.14 The PDs are not required to make any partial down payment on the consign-
ment. They were required to repay into the FAO revolving funds the principal and interest 
due on the actual quantity of inputs sold by the end of the season. This marketing mechan-
ism based on a consignment system transfers the marketing risks from the PDs to the FAO 
(see Appendix IV-5 for the terms and conditions of input sales from the FAO to the PDs). 
The storage facilities and transportation required by the PDs to carry out their retail 
operations is currently provided by the FAO in coordination with government parastatals 
such as the Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) and the Gambia River Transport 
Ltd., (GRT). While the PDs are required to pay for the transport and storage services 
provided through the F AO, these costs are often subsidized by the FAO. Therefore, the 
operational costs of the PDs appear to be low and underestimate the true costs that would 
exist without FAQ's involvement. 
ii) Analysis of the Sample PDs 
To assess the performance of the PDs and to identify their constraints, a total of 12 
PDs, seven men and five women, were interviewed for this study. The results can be 
summarized as follows: 
• While 50 percent of the sample was previously engaged in small-scale food retailing 
(rice, sugar, cooking oil, etc.)15 and 40 percent in farming and non-farming activities, only 
9 percent were previously involved in fertilizer trading (see Appendix IV-6 for details).16 
• Some PDs reported owning small storage rooms at the back of their houses and 
donkey carts to transport products within a limited geographic areas. However, they lacked 
large storage and transportation facilities for use in marketing agricultural inputs. 
• It was difficult to gather quantitative information on the volume of business from the 
sample PDs. The available information showed that an average of 200 to 300 bags of 
14 This system is in contrast to a system of sales on aedit in which the ownership of the inputs would be 
transferred from the PAO to the PDs once the inputs are delivered by the PAO. While the PDs need not pay 
for the inputs immediately, they would be respoDSl'ble to pay the PAO (principal and interest) on the entire 
supply irrespective of their volume of sales and unsold stocks. Obviously, the risks would be greater for the PDs 
under this system compared to the current system. 
15 This food trading was primarily financed through equity funds. A limited amount of short-term suppliers 
aedit was also available. For a more complete <liscus&on of the food trade, see Chapter vm. 
16 The PD involved in fertilizer retailing bought fertilizer from the GPMB for 010/bag and sold it for cash 
at 013/bag or for 020/bag on a four months loan to about 30 to 40 farmers who had familial and tn'bal links 
with him. This PD was a large farmer and used equity funds to finance his operations. 
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compound fertilizer and urea were sold through each PD per season. However, the women 
PDs sold a smaller quantity than the male PDs. 
• Among the 12 sample PDs, ten had some form of formal education, while two were 
illiterate. Of the ten educated PDs, five (two women, three men) were able to communicate 
in English. The low education level of the PDs has serious implications for their ability to 
assimilate the training given by the F AO and to maintain proper records of their 
transactions and business. 
The interviews revealed that in general the PDs increased farmer access to fertilizer 
but the majority of them were limited by their lack of business experience and limited trans-
port and storage facilities. The low profit margins and slow fertilizer tum-over, especially 
in the last two years, were reported to provide insufficient incentives and did not cover the 
cost of operations of the PDs. 
B. Credit Flows through the Network 
The flow of credit through the various agents involved in the marketing channel in 
the FAQ network is diagramed in Figure N-1. 
a.) The Revolving Fund 
The FAQ established a revolving fund in 1988 through grants from the Danish 
Government in order to finance the importation and distribution of inputs. The Danish 
grants provided the seed money for the FAO to purchase fertilizer auctioned by the GOG 
in 1988. The FAO bought 2,000 tons of fertilizers from the auction at a low price of D5 /50 
Kg. and sold it through the PDN at D 70/50 kg to establish the revolving fund worth D 15 
million. The revolving fund has been used since then to finance the importation, 
wholesaling and retailing operations of the FAO channel. Thus, the revolving fund functions 
as a source of working capital for the F AO to cover all importation and distribution costs, 
since it does not have any equity capital for these purposes. The revolving fund is 
maintained as a current account in the local Standard Chartered bank. 
b.) Importation of Fertilizers 
In the 1990 and 1991 trade seasons, the FAO used the two RPEs of S. Madi and 
Mukthara Ltd., as agents to import fertilizer. The RPEs financed their imports and delivery 
to provincial depots through lines of credit obtained from commercial banks in London. 
The FAQ revolving fund was used as a 100 percent guarantee to obtain the line of credit 
from these offshore banks. The revolving funds were later released by the Standard 
Chartered to the FAQ to pay the RPEs for the fertilizer imports and its transportation to 
provincial depots. 
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c.) Retailing of Inputs 
At the primary retail level, the PDs and MGA receive fertilizer on credit from FAO 
at a 18 percent annual interest rate charged on the quantities actually sold on cash or credit 
to the farmers. The PDs are required to pay into the revolving fund the principal and 
interest charges rates due on the inputs actually sold by them. The revolving funds are also 
used to finance the transportation of inputs to the individual PDs and for the storage of 
inputs at these provincial depots. 
At the retail level, it is left to the discretion of the PDs as to whether or not they will 
sell the inputs on cash or on credit to their final consumers. The explicit interest rate, 
according to FAO stipulations, at which PDs can sell on credit to farmers cannot exceed 18 
percent per annum. This is the same rate that FAO charges the PDs for interest. The PDs 
are, however, allowed to fix the retail price of the inputs. Therefore, the PDs mark up the 
input prices according to the method of sale: on cash or credit. In general, the price of 
inputs sold on credit were marked up by an additional 2 percent over the price of inputs 
sold on cash. On the average, a 5 to 10 percent profit margin was reported to be realized 
by the PDs from cash sales, while the profits from credit sales varied based on the loan 
repayment performance. 
d.) Input Credit through the Sample PDs 
Table Vl-4 indicates that there were notable differences among the men and women 
PDs regarding their choice of clients in terms of gender, crops grown, and method of input 
sale. The observations can be summarized as follows: 
• Men PDs were observed to sell fertilizer, either on cash or credit, mainly to men far-
mers, while women PDs primarily sold fertilizer to women farmers. The crops financed by 
the PDs reflect their gender preferences. Women farmers were traditionally engaged in rice 
and vegetable growing, while men farmers mainly grew groundnuts and other cash crops. 
• All men PDs extended fertilizer credit, especially to men farmers, while all women 
PDs sold fertilizer on credit to women farmers. One women PD extended credit to men 
farmers who were guaranteed by women's kafos. The loans were generally made for a 
period of 4 months. 
• The explicit interest rate was 18 percent per annum. The PDs marked up the prices 
of inputs to realize profits. In general, the price of fertilizer sold on credit was marked up 
by about 2 percent over the cash price. 
• No explicit collateral was required by the PDs for the loans made to farmers and 
kafos. However, collateral substitutes such as third party guarantees, group loans and 
familiarity were used. Women PDs usually supplied fertilizer loans to women's kafos and 
individual women and men farmers guaranteed by women's kafos. The men PDs were 
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observed to extend fertilizer loans to both kafos and individuals. The individual loans were 
made to their long-term customers. Two men PDs offered moneykeeping services to some 
of their clients and therefore were able to monitor the cash flow of some of their borrowers. 
One male PD tied fertilizer loans to the sale of groundnuts from the farmers. 
• The loan repayment performance of the borrowers to the PDs, although not 
quantifiable, was reported to be better for the women than for the men PDs. The women 
PDs were more cautious in their borrower screening techniques. The loans were extended 
to only those kafos and farmers who had established their reputation through earlier 
transactions. The men PDs were better than women PDs in contract enforcement through 
legal proceedings and social sanctions. Despite all the care taken in extending loans to 
farmers, only two PDs, both women, were able to collect all the loans on time in 1991-92. 
• All PDs reported that they have insufficient equity capital to offer a partial down 
payment or pay cash for the inputs provided by the FAQ. Therefore, they were totally 
dependent on the FAQ consignment system to support their operations. They expressed 
their concerns, however, about their dependence on the FAQ and possible consequences for 
its withdrawal from the market. Although all the PDs have bank accounts, none were able 
to obtain formal loans. 
• The majority of the PDs did not maintain proper records of their transactions, and 
lacked experience in selling inputs on credit. Their borrower screening and contract 
enforcement techniques were not well developed. Consequently, they suffered large 
repayment problems. It was reported that only four out of the 12 sample PDs would qualify 
to receive inputs on consignment from the FAQ for the 1992-93 season because of their 
overdue accounts. 
IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE FAO PROGRAM AND PROPOSED 
CHANGES 
1. Stren~ 
First the FAQ's efforts to incorporate established private food retailers into a net-
work to carry out input distribution at the retailer level has been important. Although the 
PDs are highly subsidized by the FAO, its ability to utilize them, especially women PDs, and 
retain them in its marketing operations for the past four years has been noteworthy. Of 
late, this has increased the confidence of the private entrepreneurs and therefore there has 
been a growing voluntary response from them to independently enter into the agricultural 
input markets. For example, the recent interest shown by three Lebanese traders involved 
in food commodity imports to enter into the inputs market at all marketing levels has 
demonstrated that (i) private entrepreneurs with a temporary external risk reducing guaran-
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tee can create the marketing confidence needed to identify and exploit trade opportunities 
in agricultural inputs market, and (ii) there may be scope for product complimentarity so 
that inputs can be efficiently accommodated with food commodities in a trader's 
activities.17 
Second the PDN through its wide national coverage has increased the timely 
availability of agricultural inputs and has promoted some competition in rural areas among 
the various sources that supply these inputs, especially through credit arrangements. The 
input prices offered by the PDs have been competitive and free of subsidization, although 
high from the farmer's perspective. 
Third the successful use of private dealers as agents to import fertilizer may facilitate 
the gradual transfer of FAQ's responsibility over to the private sector. 
Fourth. the horizontal linkages established with other fertilizer distnbutors, such as 
NGOs, governmental programs and the maize growers association, have helped achieve 
some economies of scale at the importation level.18 
Eifth, it has been cost efficient to use the idle infrastructure owned by government 
parastatals such as the GRT, the GCU and the GPMB rather than invest in the 
development of new infrastructure by the PDs. 
SOOb, the banking discipline made mandatory among the PDs is supposed to allow 
them to establish a good reputation with formal banks. 
Seventh. the use of revolving funds as a guarantee to obtain access to off-shore 
financing for the private food importers was successful. This has indicated the importance 
of setting up of a guarantee fund to achieve self-sustainability once the F AO pulls out of the 
market. 
17 The interest demonstrated by private entrepreneurs has been induced by the non-interference of the 
Government in the inputs market for the past four years, especially during the eled:ion year of 1992. 
18 A non-linear surcharge is assessed by the foreign suppliers on the quantity of fertilizer imported (i.e., the 
charges decline with an increase in the quantity imported). Also, the majority of fertilizer suppliers are reluctant 
to supply less than 500 tons of fertili7.er per shipment since it is not economical for them to produce or mix the 
special type of fertilizer (8-24-24 compound) demanded in The Gambia. With total fertilizer consumption less 
than 3000 tons and with more than four different suppliers, it is more economical to have one organization with 
the comparative advantage to assume the responstbility for all imports (consult Chapter VIl for details). 
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2. Weaknesses 
First in the current program the F AO is the principal actor in fertilizer marketing 
and in the provision of credit associated with it. The FAO was established in The Gambia 
to primarily demonstrate and train farmers in modem agricultural practices to increase 
agricultural productivity for attaining food self-sufficiency. Therefore, while the F AO assists 
with creating awareness among the farmers about fertilizer use through conducting fertilizer 
trials, it is not expected to directly involve itself in the functioning of domestic fertilizer 
market as a seller nor act as a bank substitute for credit sales. 
Second. although the FAO project helped establish a private retailer network, the 
PDN is an "artificial" creation, and the current involvement of the PDs is an "induced" 
phenomenon. The PDN has some weaknesses because it didn't emerge spontaneously 
through market forces. A voluntary response from PDs requires incentives created by 
profitable opportunities generated in the marketplace. 
The PDs are supported by the FAO through the implicit subsidization of their oper-
ating costs. Despite the subsidization, however, the majority of the PDs have not been able 
to break-even and suffered losses because of low tum-over and high loan delinquency by the 
farmers, especially in the last two years. The low tum-over in 1991-92 was due in part to 
higher prices charged b{g the PDs compared to other input suppliers such as the GCU and 
government programs. 9 l..oan delinquency has been due in part to poor borrower 
screening procedures followed by the PDs. While the repayment performance of PD loans 
to FAO was above 90 percent in 1988 and 1989, some informants suggest that it declined 
to below 50 percent in the past two years (see Appendix IV-7 for details). l..oan repayment 
by the PDs is affected by: (i) loan repayment (supposedly) by farmer/kafo borrowers; (ii) 
the lack of equity by the PDs means that they may not have enough cash flow to pay FAO 
when they do not recover the loans made to their customers; (iii) confusion about the 
amounts owed and the loans calculated by the FAO; and (iv) the possibility of willful 
default. 
Because of the recovery problem, the FAO implemented a "repayment rule" in 1991-
92 to bring greater repayment discipline to the poorly performing PDs. It requires a 100 
percent repayment of FAO loans (principal and interest) by the PDs to qualify for further 
loans. As a result, the number of PDs qualified to carry out retamng operations for the 
FAO declined in 1991-92. Of the 36 PDs originally included in the PDN, only 10 PDs, six 
women and 4 men, were qualified in 1991-92 to receive inputs on consignment.20 
19 While the GCU was able to keep its operational costs low due to economies of scale and low fixed costs, 
and, therefore, offered lower fertilizer prices, it has also received explicit and implicit subsidies (see Chapter III). 
20 In 1991-92, the unqualified PDs were, however, allowed to sell for cash their inventory of unsold inputs 
carried over from previous seasons. 
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Therefore, the poor loan repayment performance has reduced the number of participants 
in the inputs markets and hence farmer access to fuputs. Furthermore, the poor loan 
repayment performance has led to the erosion of the revolving fund used to finance the 
program. Unofficial sources suggest that 50 percent of the revolving fund (which was 
originally about D 1.5 million) has been eroded and that the 1991-92 marketing operations 
were supported by the newly injected external funds of about D six million from the 
Women's World Bank. These issues have raised serious concerns regarding the 
competitiveness and sustainability of the entire system. 
A Problems with the PDN 
Several factors related to design flaws are respoDSiole for the poor performance of 
the PDN and they can be sUIIlDUlrized as follows: 
a.) The Choice of PDs 
The PDs included in the PDN were not selected based on a rigorous criteria required 
to reflect capacity to effectively market inputs. While care was exercised to not include indi-
viduals who lacked previous experience in trading activities, it was implicitly assumed that 
input trading could be integrated with other food trading activities and that experience 
gained from trading in food commodities could be transferred to trading inputs. In other 
words, the design assumed product complimentarity and homogenous marketing technology 
for different commodities. The majority of the PDs were previously engaged in petty trading 
of food commodities that are characterized by inelastic and continuous demand, quick turn-
over and small investments in infrastructure facilities. Agricultural inputs, on the other 
hand, involve elastic demand, slow tum-over and have a high correlation with production 
risks compared to food commodities. These differences were not adequately considered in 
the design. 21 
Furthermore, even if the experience gained by the PDs from food trade could be 
applied to the input trade, they lack adequate infrastructure facilities required for large scale 
input trading. The majority of the PDs do not possess adequate trucks or storage capacity 
to handle the inventory of inputs that are seasonal in nature. The result was that the 
majority of the PDs maintain diverse professional interests that are not complimentary with 
their input marketing activities. Therefore, the majority of PDs tend to operate on a part-
time basis leading to few economies of scope due to product complimentarity. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the FAO was not enthusiastic regarding the 
inclusion of established groundnut traders in its PDN. There were 42 registered groundnut 
PEs (GPEs) engaged in groundnut buying operations for the GPMB in 1988. These GPEs 
were experienced in large-scale commodity trading and possessed adequate physical facilities 
21 See Chapters vn and vm for a detailed discus&on of the characteristics of the fertili7.er trade that 
distinguish it from food commodities. 
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for their trading activities. Furthermore, they were linked to formal banks to finance their 
trading activities. However, the FAO feared that these established GPEs would tie their 
input operations to their output operations which would lead them to ration (i) small 
farmers who lack a large groundnut marketable surplus, and (ii) non-groundnut farmers, 
especially women. Therefore, the FAO selected new PDs to include in the PON. Perhaps, 
a balance between established GPEs and food PDs would have improved the viability of the 
FAO program. The established GPEs might have used their reputations established with 
the formal banks through previous groundnut trading to acquire credit to finance their input 
trading and would not have depended exclusively on the FAO for financing the inputs 
received through the consignment system. Also, since groundnut trading is subject to 
production and price risks, these GPEs are equipped to deal with problems inherent to 
agricultural trading. Furthermore, the GPEs can link input sales to farmers with output 
marketing (as is frequent in Asia), thereby improving their loan repayment performance and 
the long-run sustainability of the F AO program. 
b.) Limited Liability for the PDs 
The PDs operate on 100 percent financing from FAO and are not required to offer 
any collateral or down payment for the inputs received on consignment. Therefore, the PDs 
have less of a stake in the marketing operations and they consider themselves as mere con-
duits to distribute inputs for FAO. The lack of PD equity capital in their marketing opera-
tions and the lack of limited penalties in the early stages of operations for non-performing 
PDs has led to inadequate borrower screening procedures by the PDs as they offer inputs 
on credit to their customers resulting in a risky loan portfolio and poor loan recovery. 
c.) Rudimentary Financial Technology 
The majority of the PDs were previously involved in food retailing operations that 
requires working with only small and short-term loans {often less than one month). 
Therefore, they did not have the appropriate financial technology required for making input 
supply loans that are large, are six to nine months in term, and involve substantial lending 
risks.22 The lending risks can be mitigated in part through innovative and carefully 
designed contract terms and conditions. Whereas the PDs maintain market level interest 
rates, the other contract terms and conditions are weak and provide incentives for default 
by farmers. While some PDs are creative in using third party guarantees offered by kafos 
as collateral substitutes, the majority of the inputs are sold on credit to farmers free of 
collateral and with soft penalties for default. In the absence of land as a tangible collateral, 
the use of innovative collateral substitutes such as interlinked contracts (eg., input-credit-
product linkages, input-credit-labor linkages) could enhance efficiency in input marketing 
through improved loan recovery performance by farmers. However, there is no evidence 
that the PDs use such interlinked contracts. Perhaps their lack of equity capital and the 
22 Consult Chapter VII for further details. 
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limited external funds provided by the FAQ to finance their operations prevent the PD's 
from offering output linked input loans. Therefore, the PDs may need to obtain other 
external sources of finance for their output marketing if they are to offer interlinked 
contracts, but these sources may be expensive or inaccessible to all PDs. 
d.) Poor Record-Keeping Procedures 
Since most PDs were previously engaged in small-scale food retailing that involved 
quick tum-over and used mostly equity capital, they are not rigorous in maintaining accurate 
records about their business transactions. The relatively more complex marketing of inputs 
procedures involves working with a larger clientele, loans, inventories and external financing 
sources and requires more sophisticated accounting. The PDs were, however, not trained 
in accurate record-keeping procedures. Therefore, they were unable to understand complex 
operational procedures and hence were unable to account for all their transactions. For 
instance, while the in-kind loans from the FAQ resemble the terms and conditions of sales 
on consignment, the PDs often mistook them for sales on credit. Therefore, there is 
confusion among the PDs about the interest rates charged by the FAQ on (i) the total 
quantity of inputs supplied to them, (ii) the actual quantity of inputs sold to farmers, and 
(iii) unsold quantities held at their stores. Therefore, they have been unable to account for 
their liabilities to the FAQ and are unaware of their eligibility for the program in the next 
season. This uncertainty reduces the incentives for the PDs to continue in the FAQ 
program. The system needs simpler operating procedures. 
Third. the availability of the. revolving fund to finance fertilizer importation and 
distribution has led the private entrepreneurs to continually depend on external funds. With 
the drying up of the revolving fund due to inflationary losses and low loan repayment, 
alternative mechanisms are needed for program sustainability. Currently, the alternative 
financial sources of domestic banks and informal markets to finance fertilizer marketing are 
either absent or expensive. Furthermore, the PDs are not enthusiastic about exploring 
alternative financial sources which might involve offshore loans or trader finance. 
Fourth. the current program does not provide adequate incentives to PDs who are 
interested in establishing their own retail network to distnbute inputs. The PDs interested 
in wholesaling are required to use the PDN established by the FAQ. If PDs are to set up 
independent operations, they need to establish their own network of agents. To do so, they 
can either select efficient PDs from the current PDN and/ or select entirely new agents to 
serve as retailers. They also need to develop alternative sources of finance and devise 
innovative financial contracts to facilitate input marketing activities. 
fifth, the program provides few incentives for the PDs to establish horizontal linkages 
among themselves. Weak linkages have been stimulated by the FAQ to exchange 
information among the PDs about lessons learned in marketing inputs. But the PDA is 
inactive and does not serve the interests of the PDs well. 
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Smh., while the 14 Technical Sales Advisors (TSA) appointed by the PDA and paid 
through the FAO revolving fund provide technical advice about fertilizer use to PDs and 
their clientele, they have weak links with other government agricultural extension programs. 
Therefore, farmers may have some doubts about the validity of their technical 
recommendations. 
3. Chan&es Bein& Proposed for the FAO Program 
The FAO is in the process of withdrawing as an inputs marketing channel. We 
understand this withdrawal will be completed by 1995. Before withdrawing from the market, 
however, it has been involved in restructuring the current program based on the lessons 
learned in previous years. Some of the proposed changes are outlined here. 
A Strengthening the PDA 
The PDA is intended to be strengthened to (i) provide training to PDs, and (ii) to 
disseminate market information. The strengthened PDA is expected to take the 
responsibility of coordinator of the PDs. Plans are being made to implement the proposal. 
B. Expansion of the PDN 
The lessons learned from the poor performance of some retailers has led to 
restructuring of the PDN. Plans are made to (i) eliminate non-performing PDs, (ii) include 
new PDs to replace the eJiminated PDs, and (iii) expand the PDN. The existing PDs are 
required to clear all their arrears by the end of 1992; if they fail to do so they will be 
eliminated from the PDN. Strict criteria have been established to select PDs to include in 
the new and expanded PDN (see Appendix IV-8 for the list of criteria for private dealers). 
The expanded PDN is proposed to include 46 PDs of which at least 40 percent will be 
women. The basic principle behind the expansion is that no farmer should travel more than 
15 kilometers to purchase agricultural inputs. 
C. Uniform Accounting Procedures 
The accounting procedures are proposed to be streamlined and the PDs will be 
required to maintain proper records. 
D. Establish a Guarantee Fund 
The revolving fund is proposed to be converted into a guarantee fund (see Appendix 
IV-9 for guidelines on the guarantee fund). The guarantee fund is proposed to be 
established as a savings deposit at a local bank to provide overdraft facilities to PDs at the 
retail level. The FAO/AIO will be one of the parties included in the Guarantee Fund 
Board responsible for selecting and monitoring the beneficiaries. 
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E. Encourage the NGOs to provide input credit 
The NGOs are being requested to help in the formation of village banks that can 
provide short-term loans to farmers to purchase agricultural inputs. 
4. Inte~tion of the FAQ Prowun with Other Institutions 
While the proposed changes in the current FAQ program attempt to strengthen and 
streamline the PDN activities for a self-sustaining program, several issues about its 
integration with other institutions are left unanswered. This issue is important because 
of FAQ's proposed withdrawal from the market and the responsibility of supplier of inputs 
will be turned over to local agents. 
A Integration into the Department of Agriculture (DA) 
The proposed changes in the current FAQ program obviously do not address the 
fundamental issue of naming the future coordinating agent in the event of its withdrawal 
from the market. While the proposed changes implicitly indicate that the Agricultural 
Inputs Office (AIQ) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) will function as principal 
coordinator and monitor of future supplies of inputs through the PDN, it is not clear if it 
is committed to or even has the capability to carry out the revised FAQ program. The fact 
that the PDs in the field recognize the program as being FAQ's and not the AIQ /DA and 
the fact that the program hired its own TSAs rather than using the agricultural extension 
staff of the DA indicates that the current program is heavily dependent on the FAQ for its 
implementation and involves little commitment from the DA This suggests weak 
integration of the FAQ program into the DA, and the DA's commitment to continue the 
project is uncertain. The proposed changes in the FAQ program do not address this issue. 
B. Integration with WID 
The involvement of WID with the FAQ program through its request to train and 
place women PDs in the field and its contribution to the revolving fund for that purpose 
raises questions about the possible integration of the new WID retailers (with future 
coordinating agent for the FAQ). It is not clear if the women PDs trained for the WID will 
be part of the PDN and will be accountable to the future coordinating agent or will function 
independently from the PDN. The proposed changes do not address this issue either. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This analysis has documented the extensive role that the FAO has played in 
developing the fertilizer sector. Several strengths and weaknesses of the current system have 
been identified and some of the proposed changes have been reviewed. Apparently, the 
FAO project that has supported this work will end in 1995 as part of the privatization 
process for the fertilizer sector. H that happens, it is important to consider the policy 
options that may exist for the government. This section summarizes our analysis of two 
scenarios. Scenario one represents a rapid shift to a completely privatized sector (this might 
be referred to as the "cold turkey" scenario). The second scenario represents more of a 
gradual reduction in the intensive role that the FAO/AJ.O has played, but assumes that the 
AJ.O will continue some level of support to the private sector agents involved in the sector. 
The selection of which of these or other scenarios to pursue depends on governmental 
decisions about: 1) how much of the fertilizer trade it expects will be entirely left up to the 
private sector, 2) what capability the GCU has and/or will develop in supplying inputs to 
farmers, and 3) the investment it will make in supporting public sector involvement in some 
aspect of the fertilizer sector. The nature and extent of future donor involvement, especially 
FAO, will undoubtedly shape these decisions. 
1. Scenario One 
The objective of scenario one is to get the FAO / AJ.O out of fertilizer importation 
and distribution as soon as possible, and attempt to accelerate full privatization of the 
sector. No assumptions are made about the nature of the primary agents that will evolve 
in the sector. They could be cooperative; they could be private. It only assumes that the 
governmental agencies do not have a comparative advantage in the fertilizer trade. There 
are three primary components to this scenario. 
A Guarantee Fund 
The current balance of the revolving fund would be converted into a Guarantee Fund 
(as proposed in Appendix IV-9 but with a different operating approach). The Fund will be 
located in and managed by any local commercial bank. Strong efforts will be made to 
collect the balances due by the PDs. However, this may not be very successful if the PDs 
learn that there is no assurance that they will get new fertilizer stocks if under this scenario 
they pay their current obligations. Therefore, the government and/or the donors should 
review the possibility of augmenting the size of the Fund if, as reported, the revolving fund 
balance is small. The donors might want to support a project to absorb a specific portion 
of the potential losses of the guarantee fund. 
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The Fund would be used by the domestic bank to guarantee loans made to any agent 
(GCU, PDs, private groundnut traders, NGOs) that operates in the fertilizer sector: 
importer, wholesaler, retailer. Any commercial bank in The Gambia that agrees to the 
terms and conditions of the Fund could receive guarantees for the loans made. The 
objective of the Fund would be to accelerate the learning process of the domestic banks by 
reducing their risk of lending to these borrowers. The expectation is that because of the 
guarantees banks will use their existing resources (discussed in Chapter I) to make some 
fertilizer loans that otherwise they would not make because of their risk perceptions. The 
guarantee should also encourage banks to charge a lower risk premium in their loan rates 
for the fertilizer loans made. 
Specific terms and conditions would need to be established for use of the Fund, 
including the percentage of guarantee cover, procedures to access the guarantee fund, the 
standards that guaranteed loans must meet, and a fee structure designed to make the Fund 
self-sufficient. An Advisory Committee for the Fund could be created including representa-
tives of the banks, traders, AIO, and donors, that provided funds and shared the risk. 
Farm loans could be guaranteed but, because of the limited bank branch network in 
the country, it is not expected that many farmers would incur the transaction costs of trying 
to get a loan. Rather it is expected that by lending for the working capital requirements of 
agents in the marketing channel this liquidity will pass down the channel so that retailers 
will be encouraged to sell fertilizer to farmers on credit. The retailers are located close 
enough to the farmers so they have a better chance than banks to successfully screen 
farmers and determine creditworthiness. Obviously, retailers will have to learn to do a 
better job of lending than has been done by many of the PDs to date. 
B. PD Network 
This scenario does not contemplate an ongoing role by AIO in developing and main-
taining the PDs and the PDA, because there is no certainty that any of the agents (private 
dealers or cooperatives) that will expand into the fertilizer trade will choose to use any of 
the PDs to form part of their retail network. The fertilizer importers and wholesalers will 
each need to develop their own markets. They may decide to do business with some of the 
better PDs or start from scratch with their own agents. They may decide to accept the risk 
of continuing the consignment approach, or reduce their risks by choosing to sell fertilizer 
on credit only to those dealers they determine are most creditworthy. 
Since this scenario assumes that the AIO will not actually handle input stocks in the 
future, the current fertilizer inventory should be auctioned off along with any equipment that 
might have been acquired for this program. The bookkeeping accounts will need to be 
evaluated for each PD, an attempt will need to be made to collect delinquent payments, and 
a determination made to write-off uncollectible debts. Any substantial inventories with PDs 
should either be paid for or returned to AIO depots for sale. 
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C. Future Fertilizer Development Programs 
There are several activities that the Department of Agriculture should continue to 
implement and some of them could be logically supported by the FAO and/ or other donors. 
First, strong programs are needed to acquire and test seed varieties, measure fertilizer yield 
response, and evaluate optimum rates and types of fertilizer application. This information 
should be disseminated to farmers to help them with their fertilizer use. It should also be 
disseminated to the dealers so that they can augment the extension function by transmitting 
information to their farmer customers. Second, it may be useful to implement business 
development programs for private dealers in the fertilizer sectors. These programs could 
disseminate information about the FAO / AI.O experience in importing and distributing 
fertilizer. They could also teach the basic rudiments of business management (accounting, 
finance, etc.) to small scale firms. 
There are several implications with this scenario. There may be temporary 
disruptions in fertilizer supplies as the current distribution system is replaced by the new 
privatized one. Fertilizer prices and interest rates for fertilizer loans will rise as the 
remaining subsidies are eliminated. Some of the current PDs will no longer be involved in 
fertilizer retailing. The losses that have occurred in operating the current program, which 
are currently difficult to observe, will become transparent when the size of the remaining 
revolving fund is known. 
2. Scenario Two 
The objective of this scenario is to privatize parts of the fertilizer sector but leave a 
more active role for the AJ.O. 
A Guarantee Fund 
The guarantee fund is created in the same way as proposed in scenario one but there 
may be a possibility for some remnants of the PON to receive guaranteed loans in addition 
to the other agents already identified. 
B. PD Network 
This part of this scenario is most problematic. The fundamental issue is whether or 
not the Department of Agricultural Services will decide to more fully integrate the AJ.O into 
its operations and provide it with adequate staff and resources once the FAO project ends. 
As described above, the AIO currently seems to be largely a donor-funded appendage that 
is not fully integrated into the Department. The Department must also decide if it wants 
to support the PON as currently designed, in which fertilizer is supplied on consignment, or 
if it wants to convert the PDs into truly private dealers who will buy and sell inputs 
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according to their market opportunities. The former implies that the AIO would continue 
to bear the risk of acquiring and distributing inputs. The latter alternative would transfer 
much of this risk to the private sector. If it chooses the latter alternative, the AIO will have 
to maintain a capacity to store and transport inputs and distnoute them to a strengthened 
PON. The PDs, however, would be developed to operate as viable, independent retailers 
that could acquire inputs from any source. Presumably, the AIO would acquire inputs 
through traditional lender operations. Resources would need to be acquired to pay for the 
fertilizer stocks and the operational costs of the office, either through budget allocations or 
donor funds. The AIO would need to develop a capacity to undertake all the tasks now 
done by the FAO personnel. 
C. Future Fertilizer Development Programs 
These would be conducted as discussed in scenario one. Regardless of which 
scenario is chosen, the importation and distribution system for fertilizer will have to undergo 
substantial changes. Privatization implies that the private sector will have to play a more 
significant role, and will have to be renumerated for the resources used and the risks faced. 
This implies higher fertilizer prices in the future. As will be argued in Chapters VII and 
VIlI, there are some reasons for optimism about the future role of the private sector. There 
are, however, serious problems that must be addressed before a completely self-sufficient 
privatized system will emerge. Furthermore, it is possible in the long-run that the GCU will 
have the comparative advantage to supply agricultural inputs to farmers for the reasons 
outlined in Chapter m. 
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Figure IV-1 
Financial Services by the FAQ to Various Agents Involved in Fertilizer Marketing in The Gambia 
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{36) 
Repay PDA 
Repay kafo 
Notes: 
1. Figures in parenthesis represent the number of participants through the respective program/association. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
RPEs: Registered Private Entrepreneurs; JP: Jahally-Pacharr Rice Development Project; MGA: Maize Growers Association; PDA: Private Dealers 
Association; PD: Private Dealers 
1:.. = Importer; o = Retailers; D = Consumers; "11\n- = Represents instances where fertilizers are distributed through kafos to individual 
farmers (intermediated by kafos). 
* : Importation through RPEs; ** : FAQ-RPE links in importation; *** : Distribution through FAQ network. 
Table IV-1 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4a. 
4b. 
5 
Total 
24 
Sample of Private Dealers (Affiliated with F AO) Interviewed for the Study. 
Division Male Participants: Female Participants: 
Name of Village Name of Village 
(1) (2) (3) 
Western Division Brikama Sukuta, 
Faraba-Banta 
Lower River Division Burong None 
North Bank Division Munyagen Farrafenni, Bakindik 
MaCarthy Island Division Bansang, Madina-Umfally 
(South) Brikama-Ba 
MaCarthy Island Division None None 
(North) 
Upper River Division Basse, None 
Fatoto 
7 5 
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Table IV-2 Quantity of Fertilizer Imported through the FAO Channel, 1989-
1991. 
Importers 
Items PAO Private Entrepreneurs 
Urea 
NPK (8-26-26) 
Total 
Urea 
NPK 
a. 8-24-24 
b. 10-20-20 
Total 
Urea 
NPK (8-24-24) 
Total 
Source: PAO. 
(1) 
610 
1550 
2160 
(100) 
500 
1000 
165 
1665 
(77) 
0 
0 
0 
(0) 
1989-902 
1990-913 
1991-92" 
1 Percentage of total is given in parenthesis. 
2 Imported from Italy through Italian grants. 
(2) 
(In Tons) 
0 
0 
0 
(0) 
500 
0 
0 
500 
(33) 
0 
1000 
1000 
(100) 
Total1 
(3) 
610 
1550 
2160 
(100) 
1000 
1165 
2165 
(100) 
0 
1000 
1000 
(100) 
3 Imported from Poland except for 10-20-20 NPK that was imported as grants 
from France. The PE used was S. Madi Enterprise. 
4 Imported from Senegal. The PE used was Mukthara Enterprise. 
Table IV-3 
Items 
PD's 
MGA 
BD 
PD's 
MGA 
BD 
PD's 
MGA 
BD 
Source: PAO. 
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Value of Inputs Distributed through the PDA Under the FAQ Channel by Type of 
Agent, 1989-1991. 
Fertilizer 
(All types) 
(1) 
1118.6 
10165 
122.3 
1734.2 
939.2 
493.6 
870.4 
280.0 
181.9 
Seeds Pesticides 
(Food & vegetable) 
(In '000 Dalasis) 
(2) 
1989-90 
53.3 
0 
73.9 
1990-91 
272.9 
0 
170.6 
1991-92 
151.1 
42.0 
25.1 
(3) 
31.6 
0 
42.8 
167.2 
37.8 
34.1 
56.0 
0 
30.9 
Others 
(Implements) 
(4) 
20.4 
0 
37.9 
189.7 
3.1 
46.9 
196.4 
0 
135.5 
Total 
(5) 
1223.8 
1016.5 
276.9 
2363.9 
979.9 
745.1 
1273.9 
322.0 
373.4 
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Table IV-4 Sample Private Dealers: Crops Financed, Modes of Sale and Client Type by Gender. 
Item 
(1) Crops financed 
(2) Modes of Fertilizer Sale 
a. Cash 
b. Cash & credit 
c. Credit 
d. No sale 
(3) Client type 
a. Kafos 
b. Individuals 
c. Kafo & individuals 
Source: OSU survey. 
Men PDs WomenPDs 
Men Women Men Women 
Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groundnut, Groundnut, Groundnut Vegetables, 
Cotton, Rice Rice Rice 
(No. of PDs under each category) 
0 
1 
6 
0 
2 
5 
0 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
0 
3 
2 
0 
4 
0 
1 
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Appendix N-1 
Objectives of the Fertilizer Use, Promotion, Distribution and Credit Assistance 
Project(GCPF /GAM/014/DEN)1 
Short-term Objectives 
To increase production of crops like rice, sorghum, millets, maize, vegetables, 
groundnut and cotton by: 
1. conducting fertilizer demonstration trials in farmers' fields to show correct use of 
fertilizer and to affirm recommended doses of fertilizers, 
2. developing systematic training of agricultural extension workers, and 
3. providing support for fertilizer marketing through technical and financial assistance. 
Long-term Objectives 
1. to assist the GOG in increasing agricultural productivity, especially of small farmers, 
to attain self-sufficiency in food and increase revenue through increase in production 
of cash crops; 
2. to facilitate wider use of improved farm technology through an adequately equipped 
and trained extension service, and; 
3. to develop effective extension techniques, train staff, formulate long-term policies for 
the use of farm inputs, with special reference to fertilizers. 
1 Source: FAO. 
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Appendix IV-2 
List of Studies on the F AO in The Gambia2 
1. Zeller, Manfred, Ken John, and Ebrahim Kamara," Rural Financial Markets and 
Their Food Security Linkages in The Gambia: Current State and Policy Implications," 
Washington, D.C., IFPRI, 1991. 
2. Zeller, M., J. Von Braun, K. John, and D. Puetz, "Sources and Terms of Credit 
Faced by the Rural Poor in The Gambia: Policy Implications," Washington, D.C., 
IFPRI, 1991. 
3. FAO, "Report of the Consultancy on Fertilizer Procurement, Distribution Strategies 
and Pricing Policies in The Gambia," Rome: FAO, 1992. 
4. FAO, "Private Dealers Network," Cape Mary: Agricultural Inputs Office, 1991. 
5. Von Braun, J., Kenneth John, S. Kinteh, and D. Puetz, "Structural Adjustment, 
Agriculture and Nutrition: Policy Options in The Gambia," Washington, D.C., IFPRI 
Working Paper No. 4, 1990. 
6. FAO, "Promoting Competition in Fertilizer Marketing in Africa," Rome: FAO, 1987. 
2 Source: FAO. 
33 
Appendix IV-3 
Block Demonstration Concept3 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on the operational modalities of the block demonstration scheme 
for crop production in selected areas of The Gambia. It is based essentially on the experi-
ence gained so far from the block demonstrations, carried out through FAO Fertilizer 
Project with the cooperation of the Department of Agriculture from 1987-1990. 
The effect of an intensive trial, demonstration and training (T & V) programme on 
farmers' fields during the first and second phase of the FAO Fertilizer Programme in The 
Gambia, has created an increased demand both for fertilizer and other related inputs. For 
this reason, and in line with the Government's policy to intensify and expand crop produc-
tion, the project has implemented a Block Demonstration Programme with a view to bring 
farmers to a sustained application of technical and economic recommendations for all crops 
under varying local soils and agro-climatic conditions. 
Major emphasis will be given here to the operational arrangements and services 
related to the execution of the block demonstrations which are considered as the centre 
points of the formation of farmers' groups and serve also as pilot undertakings for a sound 
education for the entry of their members into a credit system. 
A number of ideas have developed since the start in 1987 and a number of adjust-
ments have been necessary over the years and might still be necessary for the years to come, 
in order to make the programme suitable and sustainable. 
The block demonstrations can be divided in two types: 
The Dry season block demonstration focuses almost entirely on womens' vegetable 
production, where the group of women running a block demonstration might range as high 
as the number of members. In practice a whole vegetable garden in participating with the 
size of the gardens ranging Vi - 5 Ha. 
The wet season block demonstration focuses on upland crops and the participants 
have so far mainly been male farmers with groups of 5-20 members cultivating 5-30 ha per 
block. 
3 Source? 
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Objective and Concept 
The objective is to demonstrate on a larger commercial scale, the beneficial effects 
of efficient and economic use of fertilizer and related inputs, in combination with other 
improved cultural practices. 
This is done without creating any new institutions but rather by strengthening the 
input distribution and marketing services set up by the Fertilizer Project, which in return has 
the block demonstration as a sales promotion tool. 
Site Identification and Selection of Farmers Groups 
Prior to the lay-out of a block demonstration farm a rough survey of a suitable 
location is done and meetings held with the field extension workers and the key farmer 
before selecting a uniform five to thirty hectares block demonstration farm. 
Within each block demonstration farmers are organized into a cohesive group of 5 
to 20 members according to the size of farm holding prevailing in the area. 
Willingness of well-motivated farmers in joint groups is basis criteria used for the 
selection. The group could be a dabada or compound comprising 5 - 20 members with a 
farm size of 5 - 30 hectares. The individual fields of each participant on which all recom-
mended practices are applied and all inputs used accordingly to recommendations, should 
be adjacent thus forming a block. 
Extension Approach 
The block demonstration programme is part of the T & V system and thus managed 
by the extension staff in collaboration with the technical sales advisers attached to the 
private dealers network. 
The success of the demonstration scheme depends largely upon the degree of follow-
up by the field extension agents under the District Extension Centres. Through the Divi-
sional Agricultural Coordinators and the extension centres farmer training, intensive 
supervision and extension programmes is carried out to ensure timely and right use of inputs 
and technologies. 
Input Supply 
Once the selection and forming of block farms is made, timely and adequate 
provision of fertilizer and other recommended inputs is planned. The required inputs are 
worked out by the YEW and the technical sales advisers according to the projects recom-
mendations and submitted to the Agricultural Input Office for approval/recommendation. 
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After approval the nearest retail outlet is approached for supply of the required inputs and 
a contract is signed between the president of the farmers group and the supplier. 
Credit Agreement 
The above inputs, all given out in kind, are not on an individual basis, but are 
considered as a group credit to the members involving group responsibility for repayment. 
Upon delivery of inputs and as a kind of guarantee for repayment, agreement 
contract is submitted to each farmer's group. Such credit agreement includes basically: 
Farmers' Group Leader's name and address 
Location and number of participants 
No. of hectares including specification of crops 
Type of inputs received and principal value of the credit. 
Total value of credit, including interest 
Date of credit disbursement 
Date of repayment. 
Each contract is to be signed by two members of the group, normally the group 
leader contact farmer and the secretary or/and treasurer. Usually the group leader takes 
responsibility for storing and distributing the inputs to the individual members, based upon 
their landholding within the block farm. 
After harvest and sale of produce, the group leader and treasurer collect from each 
member the individual credit value plus interest and repay the supplier. 
This simple procedure has the advantage of reducing considerably all administration, 
overhead and supervision costs. 
Suppliers 
Farm inputs for the block demonstration programme can be obtained from any retail 
outlet on terms specified by the particular outlet delivering the inputs. Presently the private 
individual dealers and the block villages are providing the inputs for the programme, as they 
are financed by the project's Revolving Fund. As credit is provided on the dealers own 
discretion, implementation is subject to a final agreement between the group of farmers and 
the supplier. 
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The concept is in line with the government policy of privatizing the farm input sector 
and making it sustainable. 
Data Collection 
Data collection is an integral part of block demonstration activities. Data are 
collected on yields and inputs supplies to the blocks. Yields are recorded, because it is from 
the yield that the loan can be paid. 
Yield data are collected by way of random sampling from a few representative blocks, 
in accordance to National Agricultural Sample Survey (NASS) procedures. Staff involved 
are provided with a written guide on procedures. 
Data on inputs given out on credit to blocks from private dealers are deducted from 
contract forms signed by both parties. Values and interest on such inputs are clearly 
inscribed on these form. 
After each season, AIO will organize a workshop, in order to analyze the results from 
the block demonstration programme. Result and recommendations emanating from such 
workshops are deployed in adjusting and improving the programme. 
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Appendix IV-4 
Technical Sales Adviser 
Terms of reference4 
Under the general guidance and supervision of the Agricultural Input Office under 
the Department of Agricultural Services, and under direct supervision of the committee of 
the Private Dealers Association, the Technical Sales Adviser will carry out the following 
duties: 
i) Assist, advise and train the private dealers participating in the private dealers 
network in distribution of agricultural inputs in all aspects of marketing of 
farm inputs, and more particularly, assessment of input requirements, product 
knowledge, timely ordering, storage, sales promotion and record keeping. 
ii) Liaise with the Extension Service in the area in all aspects related to use of 
agricultural inputs. 
iii) Assist and liaise with the Extension Service in organizing and evaluating the 
Block-demonstration Programme or other credit programmes. 
iv) Carry out all other duties related to the activities of AIO and the private 
dealer network as may be required. 
4 Source: F AO. 
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Appendix IV-5 
Terms of Trade 
Agricultural Input Office 
(DAS/FAQ FP)5 
1. As from 1 April 1990 the interest rate is 1.5% per month but month of delivery is 
free of interest charges. 
2. Interest is debited last day of every month on basis of outstanding las day of the 
previous month. 
3. Stocktaking on Wet Seasons (1/4 - 30/9) is carried out from 30/9 after closing hours 
to 7 /10 by the TSA's. Deadline for payment of the Wet Season supply is 28/2 the 
following year. 
4. Stocktaking on Dry Seasons (1/10- 31/3) is carried out from 31/3 after closing hours 
to 7 /4 by the TSA's. Deadline for payment of the Dry Season supply is 31/5 the 
same year. 
5. Payment due (28/2 and 31/5) is calculated as follows: Opening stock + supplies -
closing stock = payment due. 
6. Any stock at any time is the property of AIO and AIO might transfer any stock at 
any time from one dealer to another. 
7. The dealer will receive a statement of account minimum twice a year, one for the 
Wet Season transactions and one for the Dry Season transactions. 
8. Last day of each month the dealer must transfer the wholesale value of any cash 
sales during the month from her or his personal account to the AIO Revolving Fund. 
9. Any credit to farmers is at the dealer's own discretion, risk and responsibility. 
10. Any guidelines on retail prices from AIO are only guidelines and dealers are not 
obliged to follow them. 
11. Legal action will be take against any retailer failing to settle his outstanding with 
AIO at above given time. 
5 Source: Agricultural Input Office (AIO), 1990. 
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Appendix Table W-6 Previous Experience of Sample Private Dealers by Gender and Type of Activi-
ties. 
Private Dealers 
Item Men Women Totalc 
(1) (2) (3) 
(No. of PDs in each category) 
1. Food retailers1 
2. Farming and non-farming 
activities2 
3. Farming 
4. Fertilizer retailer 
5. Total sample 
Source: OSU survey. 
3 
2 
1 
1 
7 
1 Engaged in rice, sugar, cooking oil retailing. 
3 6 
(50) 
1 3 
(25) 
1 2 
(16) 
0 1 
(9) 
5 12 
(100) 
2 Non-farm activities included jeep driving, sale of petrol and groundnuts buying activities. 
3 Figures in parenthesis gives percentages to the total. 
Appendix Table W-7 Number of Retailers in the PDN and Their Repayment Performance, 1989-90. 
Number of Retailers % Repayment Performance 
Agents1 1989-90 1990-91 1989-90 1990-91 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. PDs 36 34 97 64 
2.MGA 77 33 74 36 
3.BD 2 3 95 39 
Total 115 70 87 53 
Source: FAO, 1991. 
1 PDs: Private dealers; MGA: Maize Growers Associations; BD: Block Development Villages. 
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Appendix VI-8 
Private Dealer Criteria for Retailers6 
All private, individual retailers financed by the Revolving Fund of Agricultural Input 
Office (AIO) shall be selected and approved by AIO, in accordance with a set of criteria: 
1. GEOGRAPHICAL WCATION: 
In cooperation with Private Dealers Association and the Extension system of 
Department of Agricultural Services (DAS), AIO selects areas with expected 
sufficient demand for agricultural inputs, enabling a private retailer to make a 
reasonable living of the business. 
2. STORE FACILITIES: 
A private retailer must have adequate store and shop facilities. The shop should be 
located where it is easily attracted by potential customers. Safe guarding, theft, 
maintenance and any expenses or losses are entirely at the private retailers own cost 
and responsibility. 
3. BUSINESS EXPERIENCE: 
A private retailer must have some basic knowledge and experience on business 
matters, such as: risk involved when providing credit to farmers, costs involved when 
calculated margins, interest, demand if prices increase/decrease, sales and margin 
necessary enabling the private retailer to make a reasonable living of the business. 
At any times the private retailer must be aware, when selling a commodity, which 
money belongs to him/her (margin), and which money is due payment to the 
Revolving Fund of AIO. 
4. PERSONAL BANK ACCOUNT: 
A private retailer must have (or open) a personal Bank Account with a commercial 
Bank. No cash or cheque payment to any TSA or staff of AIO will be accepted. 
The private retailer must pay for inputs provided, by depositing receipts into their 
own accounts, which are then transferred by Banker's order into the Revolving Fund 
of AIO. 
6 Source: FAQ. 
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5. FINANCIAL CAPACITY: 
A private retailer must have some financial means to meet expenses such as costs of 
transport of fertilizer from the nearest GPMB-Depot to his/her shop, major repairs 
of his/her shop or store, deposit to open a personal account and any other expenses 
vital for maintaining his/her business. 
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Appendix IV-9 
Concept of Guidelines for Guarantee Funds: The F AO Design.7 
The credit line to Private Dealers (in kind) is presently financed by the AIO 
Revolving Fund. 
In order to bring the financing of the Private Dealers (PD) into normal commercial 
channels, the AIO has developed an alternative to the Revolving Fund. The model is 
named the Guarantee Fund. 
The concept of the Guarantee Fund: 
1. The money from the Revolving Fund will no longer be revolved but will be deposited 
in a commercial bank account. 
2. These funds are then the guarantee against overdraft facilities for the PD's. 
3. The limit for overdraft for each individual PD is based on turnover and performance 
from previous years. 
4. If new dealers are appointed, they will only be given very limited overdraft facilities 
for the first year to test their performance. 
5. The total overdraft from all the dealers must not exceed the total value of the 
Guarantee Fund. 
6. A Board is formed, in charge of the Guarantee Fund. The major task of this Board 
is maintain the effective value of the Fund. The Board will approve the limit for 
overdraft for each individual PD twice a year (Wet Season and Dry Season supply 
to the PD's). 
7. The Board is: Agricultural Input Office (AIO), Private Dealers Association (PDA) 
and a representative from the commercial bank where the Guarantee Fund is 
established. A lawyer will be attached as advisor to the Board on all legal matters. 
8. The AIO and the Technical Sales Advisers (TSA's) attached to the PDA will assist 
the PD's in estimating the demand for agricultural inputs within the PD's area of 
operation. This demand forecast will take place twice a year (Wet Season and Dry 
7 Source: FAO. 
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Season). Based on the forecast a request is forwarded to the Guarantee Fund Board. 
The Board will estimate the value of the inputs requested and will set the limit for 
overdraft accordingly. 
9. The AIO will ask potential wholesalers for quotations on the requested inputs by 
PDA The quotation must be within the total approved limits for the PDA The 
Board will evaluate the quotations and approve the wholesaler who brings the best 
offer (prices, quality, timeliness, etc.) 
10. All quotations must be based on delivery provincial depots enabling the PD's to link 
up with the wholesaler. The PD's will transport the goods from the depots to their 
stores at their own cost. The wholesaler will receive a distribution list from AIO on 
the quantities to be delivered at the various depots (which is based on the PD's 
locations, request for inputs and approved overdraft). 
11. The wholesaler must finance the import and the in-country distribution to the various 
depots. 
12. When the goods have been received in all the depots in accordance with the agreed 
terms, the bank will pay the wholesaler. In each depot a TSA will be in charge, 
receiving the goods and releasing it to PD's according to the approved quantity. The 
bank will be informed by AIO on the total value of goods supplied to each dealer 
and the ban will debit each individual account. 
EXAMPLE: 
Wholesaler 1-- .... I __ B_ank ___ I - Debits-
Value of goods 
supplied to 
deposit: 200,000. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I Guarantee Fund I 
Personal 
accounts 
40,000 
40,000 
40,000 
40,000 
40,000 
200,000 
Individual 
dealers 
approved 
overdraft. 
Above example shows that the dealers do not get money in hand but their private 
individual accounts are debited according to the value of goods they have received. 
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13. Every dealer must have a personal individual account with the bank where the 
Guarantee Fund is established. 
14. The PD's pay back to their individual accounts and must settle the overdraft at a 
given deadline, set by the Board of the Guarantee Fund. 
15. The PD's pay their overdrafts with interest. (At present, the lowest interest rate 
against 100 percent guarantee is 23.5 percent per annum). 
16. If a dealer fails to settle his/her account at the given deadline, the Guarantee Fund 
pays the remaining outstanding. The lawyer attached to the Board will take legal 
action against defaulters. 
17. If a PD does not sell all his stock by the end of the season, he might not be able to 
settle his account at the given time. The TSA's will carry out stocktaking twice a 
year and two weeks before the given deadline for repayments. The Board will 
calculate the value of the PD's stock and this is included in the next seasons 
overdraft. 
At present, the Revolving Fund is a normal current account established in Standard 
Chartered Bank Ltd. 
A Guarantee Fund would be established as a savings account, enabling the Fund to 
earn interest on its deposits. 
Standard Chartered Bank has offered to pay 13.5 percent per annum but has also 
accepted that treasure bills can be deposited as guarantee against the overdrafts, which 
would earn 18 percent per annum. 
In other words, 18 percent interest is the amount available .per annum to maintain 
the value of the Guarantee Fund, which means that its value can only be maintained if 
inflation + non recovered defaults are below 18 percent. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL NETWORKS: 
THE VILLAGE SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (VISACAs) 
IN THE GAMBIA 
by 
Korotoumou Ouattara 
Douglas H. Graham 
and 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
Table of Contents 
I. A BRIEF IIlSTORY OF THE VISACAs IN THE GAMBIA............. 1 
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
2. Internal Regulations of the VISACAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
3. VISACAs and Credit Unions: Operational Philosophies Compared . . . 3 
II. MEMBERSllIP GRO'WIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
ID. VISACA SA VIN GS AND CREDIT FLOWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
1. Savings Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
A Membership Participation and Savings Accumulation Through 
Tim.e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
B. Growth of Deposit Outstanding Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
2. Loan Disbursement in the VISACAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
A Credit Flows Through Tim.e and Term Matching Practices . . . . . 8 
B. The External F'llilding Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 9 
C. Loan Practices and Characteristics of the Loan Portfolio . . . . . 10 
IV. LOAN RECOVERY PERFORMANCE . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
REFEREN CBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
List of Tables 
Table V-1 Individual and Group (Kafo) Membership on a Cumulative End of 
Year Basis by Visaca and Gender from 1988 to March 1992. . . . . . . . 19 
Table V-2 Annual Profile of End of Year Total Membership for all VISACAs 
from December 1988 to March 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Table V-3 Share of VISACA's Membership in Overall Village Population as of 
December 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
i 
Table V-4 Female Participation in the VISACAs' Cumulative Membership as of 
March 1992 and Growth Multiples for Male and Female Members 
from December 1989 to March 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Table V-5 Number of Deposit Accounts and Percent of Membership as 
Depositors for the Four Principal Deposit Accounts by VISACA, 
December 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Table V-6 Volume of Deposits (in Dalasis) Accumulated Through Time from the 
Inception of Each VISACA to December 1991 in the Four Principal 
Deposit Accounts by VISACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Table V-7 Relative Importance of the Volume of Deposits in the Four Principal 
Deposit Accounts Accumulated Through Time from the Inception of 
Each VISACA to December 1991 by VISACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Table V-8 Outstanding Balances for all VISACAs Combined by the Four 
Principal Deposit Accounts, from 1988 to 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Table V-9 Volume of Outstanding Deposit Balances for All Four Deposit 
Accounts by VISACA from 1988 to December 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Table V-10 Total Value of Loans Issued, Average Loan Size in Dalasis, and Term 
Maturity (in Days) by VISACA from 1989 to 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Table V-11 Selected Indicators of Women's Access to VISACA Loans from 1989 
through 1991 by VISACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Table V-12 Documentation of Loan Recovery by Number of Loans and by Volume 
of Loans by VISACA for all Loans Issued from 1989 Onwards and 
Due for Repayment through December 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
Table V-13 Basic Documentation of Time Profile of Loan Repayments in Terms 
of Number of Loans and Rates of Repayment for Total Number of 
Loans Issued and Due for Repayment from January 1st 1989 Through 
December 31st 1991 by VISACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
Table V-14 Annual Rate of Return for the VISACA Portfolio by VISACA for the 
Calendar Year 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
List of Figures 
Figure V-1 Individual and Group (Kafo) Membership Evolution by Gender from 
1988 to March 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Figure V-2 Relative Size of Membership by Gender in All VISACAs as of March 
1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Figure V-3 Share of Cumulative Outstanding Deposit Balances from 1988 through 
December 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
ii 
ADB 
CIDR 
CUs 
IFAD 
KFW 
MID-South 
NGO 
TANGO 
VISACAs 
ACRONYMS USED IN CHAPTER FIVE 
Agricultural Development Bank 
Centre International de Developpement et de Recherche 
Credit Unions 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 
McCarthy Island South Division 
Non governmental organization 
The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Village Savings and Credit Associations 
iii 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL NE1WORKS: 
VILLAGE SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (VISACAs) IN THE GAMBIA• 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VISACAs IN THE GAMBIA 
1. Introduction 
Village Savings and Credit Associations (VISACAs) were launched four years ago 
in 1988 as a pilot project in The Gambia. The primary objective of these village banks is 
to collect local savings and make loans to individual villagers or groups. A total of six 
VISACAs function currently in villages in the Sapu area, located in the McCarthy Island 
South Division (MID-South), about 350 kms East of Banjul, the capital city of The Gambia. 
The first VISACAs were created in 1988 as a pilot project with the Gambian Ministry of 
Agriculture and managed by Centre International de Developpement et de Recherche 
(CIDR) a French NGO (Non governmental organization), in cooperation with Kreditanstalt 
fur Wiederaufbau (KFW) of Germany and the Jahally-Pacharr Rice Project. 
The Jahally-Pacharr small holders rice project of the Sapu area was originally 
launched in 1984 through support from IF AD, the ADB and the governments of Holland 
and West Germany. The project was designed to improve rice yields in the region. With 
irrigation, up to two rice harvests are possible in a year. Income from the sale of rice was 
expected to provide farmers with surplus liquidity and a continuous· flow of income from 
which the VISACAs would be able to mobilize their savings. According to one of the 
Jahally-Pacharr project managers, the Sapu area produces 30 percent of all the rice 
consumed in The Gambia and accounts for 80 percent of all domestic rice production in the 
country. The population of the Sapu area is a good representative sample of the major 
ethnic groups present in The Gambia with 32.5 percent Fula, 32.5 percent Mandinka, 18 
percent Sarahole and 17 percent Wolof. 
• We would like to thank the people who have made this VISACA report possible by giving us full support 
during our mis&on in The Gambia and the Sapu area. They are: Jean-Fran~ LeGrand, CIDR Manager of 
the VISACAs in The Gambia was an invaluable colleague helping us throughout our work &om the beginning 
Fatou and Aissatou Camara, Gambian assistants to the CIDR and the I .amine Manneh and Amadou Cham were 
Gambia translators aAAisting the Ohio State University team. We also thank the director and staff of the 
International Trypanotolerance Center (ITC) in Bansang for providing us with accommodations and adequate 
working conditions. Kebbah Njie, the driver who accepted to spend all of the Ramadan fasting month with us 
in the very hot Sapu weather and did not complain once deserves special thanks. F'mally, our thanks go to all 
the villagers with whom we bad to deal with in the Sapu area and who were always accommodating in so many 
thoughtful ways. 
1 
2 
The distance from Jahally to Pacharr is 15 kms. This area comprises 73 villages. 
Most villages are members of the rice irrigation project and enjoy ample access to pump-
irrigated fields. Within the Jahally-Pacharr area, six villages were chosen to participate in 
the VISACA program. They are: Ahallulie (Wolof village), Sare Ngai (Fula village), 
Tabanani and Wellingara (Mandinka villages), Jahally and Madina (Sarahole villages). Four 
of the VISACA villages are members of the rice project. One village (Ahallulie ). recently 
pulled out of the Jahally-Pacharr program because of the difficulties of maintaining their 
rice fields from such a long distance. An additional VISACA village (Tabanani) is currently 
waiting to be included in the rice project (after wells are dug to irrigate their fields). 
Besides rice cultivation, farmers in Jahally-Pacharr also grow groundnuts, millet, sorghum 
and raise livestock. Rice cultivation was traditionally a women's activity in The Gambia. 
But with the advent of the Jahally-Pacharr project, men have become actively involved in 
rice growing because of its potentially promising source of substantial revenues. A few 
NGOs that are present in the Sapu area are also helping women to set up vegetable gardens 
as a means to diversify their crops and income generating sources. 
2. Internal ReiUlations of the VISACAs 
Internal regulations of VISACAs are discussed and established at a general assembly 
of all villagers. The villagers decide upon membership conditions, interest rates for deposits 
and loans, and management procedures and practices. Membership consists of both 
individuals as well as kafo groups. Furthermore, members of kafo groups can and frequently 
do have individual accounts as well. Each VISACA has a management committee whose 
responsibilities consist of: (1) keeping members informed of VISACA activities; (2) 
expanding membership; (3) encouraging members to open savings accounts; and (4) 
evaluating and granting loans. Each management committee is composed of six to ten 
people, with a.ii equal number of men and women chosen by all villagers during the 
preliminary meetings. Two to three cashiers are also selected to carry out bookkeeping 
responsibilities. Cashiers receive a small financial compensation for their services from the 
interest income generated by their VISACA. Committee members, on the other hand, are 
volunteers and do not receive any salary. All committee members and cashiers receive 
some initial numeracy training offered by the CIDR. The accounting practices used in the 
VISACAs have been kept simple during this initial phase. However, they will progressively 
incorporate some conventional double bookkeeping entries in the future. 
Membership fees have been sufficiently low (10 and 20 daJasis) to allow everyone the 
opportunity to become a member. Membership is required to make deposits and/or receive 
loans. Some VISACAs require their members to make a one-time deposit of any amount 
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in order to become eligible for future loans.1 In general, VISACAs do not try to match the 
deposits of a particular person with his/her loan request Instead they try to match the term 
structures of assets and liabilities of the VISACA as a whole. Loans are made out of the 
three types of savings instruments, i.e. three, six, and nine months "term deposit" accounts. 
Twelve-months deposit accounts exist but have not received too much attention from 
VISACA members. Non interest bearing current account deposits (i.e. demand deposits) 
are also available but are not used for loan purposes, i.e. the VISACAs hold 100 percent 
reserves on demand deposits. 
Annual interest rates are set through discussions at open meetings including all 
villagers. It is interesting to note that these villagers after discussion voted to set relatively 
high positive real rates of interest. Four VISACAs set annual deposit rates at 20 percent 
and loan rates at 40 percent. Two VISACAs established 40 percent annual deposit rates 
and 60 percent annual loan rates. Thus, the gross intermediation margin reaches 20 percent 
between deposit and loan rates in all VISACAs. This just happens to be the same margin 
recorded by commercial banks in The Gambia (though banks achieve this with lower deposit 
and loan rates as discussed in Chapter I). These high positive real rates of interest allow 
the VISACAs to effectively compensate for inflation (currently 10 percent) and to generate 
interest earnings to cover incidental expenses and, most importantly, create a growing 
surplus to service new loans. Initial Capital is made up of membership fees which are quite 
low and would not offer at present adequate collateral to external partners such as 
commercial banks. These rates are set on an annual basis so that a 6 month loan would pay 
20 percent interest at a 40 percent annual rate and a six month deposit would earn 10 
percent interest at a 20 percent annual rate. 
3. VISACAs and Credit Unions: Operational Philoscwhies Compared 
In many respects VISACAs are similar to the generalized model of Credit Unions 
(CUs). Nevertheless there are some operational differences that need to be pointed out. 
Credit Unions are organized under rules and regulations that are fairly uniform wherever 
they exist. The member's share contribution in a CU is crucial in determining eligibility and 
size of loan. Credit union members have a right to a loan equivalent to a multiple of their 
share (frequently two to one). At times deposit accounts in some CUs are used (in addition 
to shares) as the basis to establish the loan multiple. In this case the deposit account is 
blocked during the life of the loan. These loan to share multiples for individual loans are 
not part of the VISACA's loan practices. The VISACAs do not have any explicit loan size 
criterion for individual borrowers based on shares or deposits. However, it is clear that they 
try to balance the term maturity of their volume of deposits to the same maturity (or less) 
1 It is interesting to note that CIDR did not ask the villagers to tie savings behavior to credit However, on 
their own initiative the village VISACAs ( 4 out of 6) implemented the requirements of some prior savings before 
receiving a loan. The CIDR wisely did not interfere. 
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for a comparable volume of loans. Thus, a volume of three months loans (or less) is 
matched (i.e. supported) by a comparable volume of three months deposits, six months loans 
with six months deposits, etc. Hence the VISACAs engage in an institution-wide term 
matching of assets and liabilities instead of an individual client criterion between loan and 
savings. Also non-members can own a deposit account in a CU in contrast to a VISACA 
where only members can hold deposits. Finally, current accounts (i.e. demand deposits) 
do not exist in CUs as they do in VISACAs. 
The sharpest difference between VISACAs and CUs pertains to interest rate policy. 
As pointed out earlier, VISACAs currently charge annualized short term loan rates of 40 
or 60 percent Credit unions, on the other hand,· generally charge a 12 percent annual 
interest rate on loans and usually require installment payments of principal plus one percent 
interest each month. VISACAs only expect payment at the end of the loan term.· However 
it should be pointed out that the effective interest rate on CU loans turns out to be much 
higher than the stated 12 percent annual rate since the deposited share is in practice rarely 
withdrawable, hence it represents an additional cost (above and beyond the 12 percent 
annual interest rate) to secure a loan. This adjustment notwithstanding, VISACA loan and 
deposit rates are much higher than those normally found with credit unions. 
Another pertinent difference lies in the much broader role for non-member villagers 
to influence interest rates and other loan and deposit terms and conditions in the VISACAs 
in open village assemblies. Credit Unions, in contrast, restrict these decisions to their mem-
bership. The more open village approach creates local legitimacy and acts as a member 
recruitment vehicle. This is no doubt feasible in the relatively small sized villages in which 
the VISACAs currently operate. It would likely be less feasible in larger villages or towns. 
There is also usually a formal limit on the size of a single loan in a credit union 
whereas this is not explicit in a VISACA, although it would appear that an implicit threshold 
is recognized. Double entry bookkeeping is the standard in all CUs (though sometimes 
imperfectly administered) whereas more rudimentary single entry procedures are currently 
practiced in the VISACAs. Any realized net earnings in CUs are given to shareholders as 
dividends or paid out as patronage refunds to borrowers. In VISACAs net interest earnings 
are used for further loan activity. In VISACAs, net interest earnings are used for further 
loan activity and mainly for strengthening of VISACA reserve/ capital. Finally, kafo groups 
as well as individuals can be members in VISACAs while individual membership alone 
characterizes credit union membership. 
II. MEMBERSHIP GROWfH 
The first VISACAs opened in October 1988 were Jahally and Sare Ngai. Three more 
VISACAs, Ahallulie, Wellingara and Madina were launched one year later in 1989. 
Tabanani was the final VISACA founded in February 1991. Some VISACAs accept 
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members residing in neighboring villages. As of December 1991, a total of 1305 villagers 
and kafo groups were members of the six VISACAs of the Sapu area, with 676 women, 574 
men and 55 kafo groups (Table V-1) according to the VISACAs membership files. 
Kafos are groups of individuals that have common interests and organize for diverse 
reasons. Originally, kafos were an intrinsic part of every Gambian village and were the 
symbol of social cohesion as well as solidarity as every villager automatically belonged to 
a men's or women's kafo. They have been gender specific and involved mainly in 
community activities (digging public wells, helping neighbors in the fields, building or 
repairing houses, cleaning up village streets, etc.). A number of kafos originally also 
engaged in credit activities. Today, kafos vary widely in size and nature (e.g. soccer club 
kafos, political party kafos, gardening kafos, NGO kafos, etc.). Some kafo groups have even 
crossed the gender line and have male as well as female members (e.g. VISACA committee 
kafos, health center kafos, etc.). 
By March 1992, the total membership of the six VISACAs had reached 1384 villagers 
and groups with 52 percent women, 44 percent men and 4 percent kafos. Of the 56 kafos 
in the six VISACAs, the majority (21 kafos) were found in just one village while the other 
five VISACAs had an average of seven kafos. The VISACAs as a group recorded a growth 
in membership in 1989 roughly 2.6 times their 1988 membership. In large part this was due 
to more villages joining the first two VISACAs bringing in 223 new· members (Table V-2.). 
The original two villages increased their own membership by 87 members. Growth was 
lower in 1990 (57.6 percent), the year no new VISACA was launched. However, in 1991, 
with the addition of Tabanani, the most recently created VISACA, total membership 
increased 65 percent from 1990. Another 6 percent increase was recorded within the first 
three months of operation in 1992. 
Table V-1 and Figure V-1 show the growth trend of the membership in VISACAs 
from their creation in 1988 up to March 1992. The growth multiple ratio in column 6 of 
Table V-2 obtained by dividing the cumulative total membership as of March 1992 by the 
total membership recorded back in December 1989 gives a better insight into the pattern 
of growth that might be anticipated in the future for all VISACAs. For the five VISACAs 
then in operation, a total growth multiple of 2.8 suggests that for the two year and three 
months to come, VISACAs will at best triple their original membership if they are to emu-
late their past growth. It is evident that any particular VISACA realizes much of its mem-
bership growth in the very first year of its creation, capturing up to 30 percent or more of 
the total economically active adult population in their village. The total membership record-
ed by the VISACAs as of December 1991, shows that up to 52 percent of the villagers are 
members in some VISACAs and, on average, one-third of the villagers in all the six villages 
are VISACA members (Table V-3). If we bear in mind that 30 to 40 percent of the total 
population consists of minors, then (taking a 35 percent average for the non-active popula-
tion) VISACA membership accounts for 45 percent of the adult economically active age 
group. 
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Women have shown a strong participation in the VISACAs. By March 1992, women 
represented 51 percent of the total membership of all six VISACAs. They recorded a 
membership growth of 72 percent from 1990 to 1991 compared to a male membership 
increase of 59 percent over the same period for all six VISACAs (Table V-4). Women form 
the majority in the two Sarahole villages (60 percent and 59 percent respectively). However, 
they represented only 19 percent of the Fula village's membership. We do not have any 
unique evidence to explain the reasons behind the relative predominance of women in the 
two Sarahole villages where curiously most men are involved in trading and therefore, one 
would expect these men to use the VISACA loan services to meet their cash flow. In the 
Fula village, the unusually low participation from women (19 percent) reflects the overall 
low village population, i.e., only a small percentage of the village (16 percent) are VISACA 
members. Table V-4 and Figure V-2 also highlight the relative growth by gender from 
December 1989 to March 1992. Overall the growth multiples indicate that both men and 
women members increased almost three fold (2.8 and 2.9 respectively) over this period of 
two years and three months. However female membership grew much more rapidly in only 
two VISACAs. Male membership grow more rapidly than female membership in two other 
VISACAs. The data in Table V-2 also shows that Ahallulie and Madina are the rapid 
growth VISACAs overall while the remaining three are the slow growth associations. 
III. VISACA SAVINGS AND CREDIT FLOWS 
1. Savings Flows 
A Membership Participation and Savings Accumulation Through Time 
The VISACAs started collecting deposits in 1988 and by December 1991, members 
with three, six and nine month savings accounts represented 47.4 percent of the total. 
membership (Table V-5). The most popular savings instrument among the membership is 
the six months term deposit. Twenty three percent of the membership held these accounts. 
On the other hand, current accounts (demand deposits) recorded a relatively low 6 percent 
membership participation (Table V-5). This low percentage of current accounts held by 
members is no doubt a reflection of the low demand for an account that pays no interest 
and is only accessible once a week (i.e. VISACAs are only open for one day a week, hence 
current account deposits can only be withdrawn once a week). 
By December 1991, a total of 399,693 dalasis had been mobilized cumulatively from 
their inception by all six VISACAs in 698 demand deposits and savings accounts (see Table 
V-6). At an average exchange rate of 1.00 dollar = 8 dalasis (the dollar exchange rate went 
from 6.50 dalasis in 1988 to 9.00 dalasis in 1992), this amounts to a savings inflow of 
$49,961.6 dollars. Deposits in all accounts range from 10 dalasis to a maximum of 7,000 
dalasis. The relative importance of the four principal deposit accounts varies by VISACA 
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and, as can be seen in Table V-7, three month term deposits were the most popular deposit 
instrument in Village 1 (Wolof) and Village 2 (Mandinka) (63.6 and 43.2 percent respective-
ly). Members preferred six month term deposit accounts in Village 4 (Mandinka) and 
Village 6 (Sarabole) (43.8 and 45.7 percent). Nine month term deposits were favored in 
Village 3 (Fula) and Village 5 (Sarabole) and accounted for 58.1 percent and 45.2 percent, 
respectively, of all accumulated deposit funds over this period. Overall all VISACA mem-
bers from all six villages have a relative preference for the six months term deposit account 
which captured 33.8 percent of the accumulated deposit flow from 1988 until December 
1991. 
Another interesting pattern can be seen in Table V-7 in the intertemporal bias for 
shorter or longer term deposit instruments. Village 1 and Village 2 are predominately short 
term VISACAs (i.e. the relative weight of current accounts and 3 month deposits is 
overwhelming in total deposits). On the other hand, the other four VISACAs are 
predominantly associations with a bias for longer term deposit instruments ( 6 or 9 month 
deposits). This particularly stands out for Village 3 and Village 5. One factor seems to lie 
behind this contrasting intertemporal preference for different deposit instruments. The first 
two VISACA villages mentioned above are not part of the Jabally-Pacharr Rice Project and 
therefore do not grow rice. The other four are. Savers cannot afford to lock themselves 
into relatively illiquid savings if they don't have alternative streams of income to service 
their liquidity needs throughout the year. In effect, the rice project creates this liquidity for 
the four longer term VISACAs. They can rely upon two irrigated rice harvests per year 
while the other two non-rice villages cannot. Being subject to much less certain income 
flows, they must protect their liquidity with shorter term deposit instruments. 
B. Growth of Deposit Outstanding Balances 
Another revealing perspective is the trend in deposit growth over time that can be 
seen through the change in the end of year outstanding balances for the four principal depo-
sit instruments for all VISACAs combined since 1988 in Table V-8. As of December 1991, 
a total of 188,006 dalasis was outstanding in 485 accounts resulting in an average balance 
of 388 dalasis per account. The growth was a little over three-fold for total outstanding 
deposits of all VISACAs in Table V-8 for the two years from January 1st, 1989 through 
December 31st, 1991. Current account balances grow most rapidly (about 8 fold) followed 
by 6 month deposit balances ( 4 fold) with the longest term 9 month deposit instrument 
growing the slowest (2.4 times). As pointed out earlier in the cumulative data, the 6 month 
deposit account was uniformly the most popular savings instrument from 1989 to 1991, 
accounting for 43 percent of total deposits in 1989, representing 58 percent in 1990 and 49 
percent in 1991. 
Of all VISACAs, Village 4 ranked first with the largest share of outstanding balances 
through time, capturing 38.4 percent of total outstanding balances for the four years com-
bined (see Table V-9 and Figure V-3). Village 6 and Village 5 were second and third with 
28.1 percent and 23.9 percent respectively. Village 1 had only 4 percent of all outstanding 
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deposit balances summed up for four years, closely followed by Village 2 with 3.5 percent. 
Village 3 was last with only 2.1 percent (Table V-9 & Figure V-3). Again, the two non-rice 
project village VISACAs (Village 1 and Village 2) stand out as relatively less secure and less 
wealthy villages mobiHzing a much smaller volume of savings deposits. At the same time, 
Village 3 is the only rice-village that also appears insecure in its deposit behavior perhaps 
because rice constitutes a rather minor part of the villages activity. It records the slowest 
growth in deposits of all villages, has the smallest participation by women and the highest 
number of kafos. It is also the village most involved in cattle raising activity (a classic male 
occupation). Among other things, this suggests that an agricultural base to village life leads 
to more regular income flows and savings than one based on livestock herding. 
It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions about the seasonality of deposits 
in the VISACAs because no definite pattern is evident in the data. However, the economic 
environment in the Sapu area and the VISACA villages is a useful barometer to make a few 
predictions. In all villages, deposits should be expected between February and May when 
groundnuts are sold. In the months after the groundnut season, commonly called the trade 
season (June to January), little money would be collected in VISACA villages where irriga-
ted rice is not grown. The only remaining source of income for villagers would, therefore, 
come from secondary off-farm activities like trade and handicrafts. On the other hand, 
villages actively engaged in the Jahally-Pacharr irrigated rice project (Village 3, and 
especially Village 4, Village 5 and Village 6) and enjoying two harvests of rice a year would 
be able to maintain a less seasonal pattern of deposits throughout the year. In general, for 
these villages, deposits would increase again by August and September as the dry season rice 
harvest is sold. 
2. Wan Disbursement in the VISACAs 
A Credit Flows Through Time and Term Matching Practices 
Most VISACA members list loans as the primary reason for joining the association. 
Lending is an important part of the VISACAs' operation and access to loans is valued 
highly. Despite what some may think of as high interest rates (40 and 60 percent), the 
VISACA loan rates compare favorably to village money lender rates that can reach 140 
percent. The confidentiality involved in individual loan disbursement is another feature 
members like about the VISACA. 
Since the VISACAs began granting loans in 1989, a total of 366, 709 dalasis ( 45,838.6 
dollars) have· been issued cumulatively to 1266 members as of December 1991 resulting in 
an average loan size of 290 dalasis or about 36 U.S. dollars equivalent (see Table V-10, 
columns 8 and 12). The average loan term for all loans issued during this period has been 
156 days (five months) which, not surprisingly, is approximately one month less than the 
preferred deposit term length. As a general policy, all VISACAs try to match the term 
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structure of a given volume of loans with that of a comparable volume of deposits so as to 
be able to service withdrawals. Moreover, to instigate the savings habits of their member-
ship, some VISACAs now require a one-time deposit for members to be eligible for future 
loans. The proportion of people who receive a loan is still very much dependent on 
membership involvement through savings accounts activities that comprises the loan pool. 
Consequently, 48.3 percent of the members were issued 630 loans in 1991, very much in line 
with a total participation of 47.4 percent of the members holding the 619 existing savings 
accounts at the same time. 
The term matching feature so characteristic of VISACAs deserves more comment 
Any financial institution must be prepared to engage in responsible liquidity or cash flow 
management. Loan repayments must be scheduled in such a way as to facilitate deposit 
withdrawals. Moreover, this must be programmed so that possible delays in repayments do 
not lead to a liquidity crunch (i.e. an inability to service regularly scheduled deposit 
withdrawals or renewals). The VISACAs protect themselves from this risk through two 
mechanisms: the high interest rate margins pointed out earlier and the staggered scheduling 
of loan terms for a period shorter than the deposit instrument supporting this lending. The 
twenty point margin between deposit and loan rates generates substantial net interest 
earnings to contribute to the funds needed to cover deposit withdrawals in the face of late 
loan repayments. At the same time, a given volume of three month deposits are drawn 
upon to support a comparable volume of loans but staggered or shortened to two months 
or less in term, six month deposits support loans at five month terms or less, etc. In this 
way, VISACAs are able to meet obligated term deposit withdrawals when they mature 
except in the case of extreme loan delinquency, a rare event in most VISACAs. 
B. The External Funding Issue 
The VISACAs were able to mobilize 304,098 dalasis from their savings accounts (ex-
cluding current accounts which are not used for loans) while, as pointed out above, 366, 709 
dalasis were issued cumulatively to members as loans. The shortfall in funding was obtained 
through external funds in June 1991. External donors lent to the VISACAs' management 
at 11 percent annual interest rate for nine months. The management in turn lent to two 
VISACA villages at the same 11 percent interest rate for the same nine months maturity 
(without revealing the source of the fund). Each village then lent to its respective members 
at 40 and 60 percent annual interest rates for eight months. Borrowers thus paid an effective 
27 and 40 percent interest on their eight months loans. For the first experiment with donor 
funds, the margin for VISACAs was 18.4 percent [(40% x 8/12)-(11% x 9/12)] and 31.75 
percent [(60% x 8/12)-(11% x 9/12)] respectively. In fact, Village 5 has seen a dramatic 
increase in the number of loans granted from 101 loans in 1990 to 234 loans in 1991, after 
receiving this injection of outside money. Village 4 also received some of this money. This 
volume of outside money was placed in nine month deposits with loans going out for eight 
months terms, thereby lengthening the term maturity (term transformation) beyond the more 
common five month term supported by locally mobilized deposits. Among other things, this 
increases the probability that more loans could be issued for agricultural operations that 
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have longer gestation periods than the short-term trading activities typically supported by 
VISACA deposits. In practice, however, many of these long term loans were paid off early 
following the harvests of groundnuts and rice in December and January. It would appear 
they were used to smooth consumption expenditures over the period June-December and 
then paid off with harvest proceeds. 
This external funding of loan activity raises some important questions. Outside funds 
can make a contn'bution to VISACAs through allowing them an opportunity to expand their 
loan activity beyond the level of their deposit resources. At the same time, it allows lending 
for longer term loans, thereby opening up the possibility of incorporating more agricultural 
loans in the portfolio that heretofore had been dominated more by trading loans. Because 
these loans were granted at a time when people were in need of seeds and fertilizer for 
their upland fields (end of May 1991), it is not unlikely that these loans directly supported 
agricultural undertakings. They also probably played the equally valuable role of smoothing 
the cash flows for consumption over this period. In any event, the fungible nature of 
financial inflows and outflows make it difficult to identify the probable use of funds. No 
doubt they were used for a variety of purposes. More important for our discussion is that 
this external funding can also introduce a donor virus into a healthy local savings and loan 
effort. The careful loan evaluation and loan recovery practices can quickly collapse into a 
"take the money and run" psychology since it is not the villagers own money (or the savings 
of their neighbors). In short, borrowers would not encounter any severe sanction in not 
repaying externally financed loans. 
The VISACAs, fortunately, have carefully and laboriously established their indigenous 
village-based and village-run identity based on village savings. Hence loan recovery (as we 
shall see shortly) has been reasonable. The gradual introduction of some outside funding 
could poSSI'bly allow these associations to expand their loan activities and engage in some 
term transformation as long as the relative share of outside money remains a distinctly 
minor share of total funding and is not associated with any earmarked or targeted loan 
scheme. Targeting merely signals borrowers that the money comes from outside resources 
and, not surprisingly, it is precisely this part of the association's loan portfolio that would 
then not be repaid. Currently outside money has reached almost 10 percent (9.86 percent) 
of total funding. Fortunately, all these loans were repaid by March 1992, indicating that the 
experiment worked successfully this one time. Nevertheless, it would be risky to increase 
this outside funding much beyond the 20 percent range without placing at risk the VISACAs' 
incentive structure for repayment and saturating the market for secure lending opportunities 
in these villages. 
C. Loan Practices and Characteristics of the Loan Portfolio 
Loans are granted on a first-come, first-served basis according to available funds. 
The VISACA loan committee makes the final decision on loan approval and the amount 
approved. Collateral, often in the form of livestock or farm implements and gold jewelry 
for women, is required to secure a loan. Moreover, field interviews suggest that this 
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collateral is linked to a sufficiently credible local enforcement milieu within the village to 
ensure good loan repayment Most loan applicants indicate trading as the purpose of their 
request although loans are issued for a wide variety of other purposes. The VISACAs do 
not engage in loan targeting. They quickly realized that money is fungible and consumption 
credit is just as productive as any other loan. Indeed, the availability of consumption loans 
can smooth out consumption flows throughout the year, thereby releasing personal savings 
to be used for investment purposes rather than consumption. In brief, the availability of 
consumption loans can be a form of insurance that guarantees consumption levels, thereby 
leading indirectly to an increase in investment through the borrowers savings. 
In the year 1991 alone, 630 loans were granted to 48.3 percent of the total 
membership of the six VISACAs. Loan sizes in the VISACAs range from a low ten dalasis 
to a maximum of 3,000 dalasis and loan duration never exceeds a year. According to a 
CIDR report in 1990, most loans went out for trade purposes as 56 to 97 percent of 
VISACA loans were given out to shopkeepers, for petty trade, sale of coarse grain, and 
cattle trading (CIDR, 1990). The high share of loans for trading activity and fewer loans 
for farming was explained by the presence of other NGOs in the area (Action Aid) and the 
Jahally-Pacharr Project that specialized in granting fertilizer and farm equipment loans at 
vecy low interest rates. Given the relatively short term loans in the VISACAs (more 
commonly three to six months), most loans would not be expected to support agricultural 
production that has a longer seasonal gestation. Many loans are used to finance village 
trading activity in which the inventocy turnover of goods is consistent with the shorter term 
structure and where trade margins can support the higher interest rate than those commonly 
associated with agriculture. 
Women account for 52 percent of total VISACA membership and are equally well 
represented in the loan portfolio. VISACA female members received 659 loans as of 
December 1991 which accounted for 52 percent of the 1266 total loans cumulatively granted 
to all members from the inception of the VISACAs (Table V-11). Loans requested by 
women are mainly for petty trade and handicrafts, according to the same 1990 CIDR report, 
and based on some information from one of the VISACAs' files. For three consecutive 
years from 1989 onwards, more than 50 percent of all loans were issued to women while, 
on average, 40 percent of the total female membership of the VISACAs has been able to 
secure a VISACA loan. 2 
2 It is important to point out that kafos have become less important in VISACA loan activity. Kafos very 
rarely apply for loans, but they participated in an important way in the savinp effort, particuJarly at the beginning 
of the VISACA.s. Individual kafo members are now more commonly applying for individual loans to satisfy their 
needs. 
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IV. WAN RECOVERY PERFORMANCE 
Table V-12 documents loan disbursement and loan recove:ry for the VISACAs for all 
954 loans issued and due for repayment from January 1st 1989 through December 31st 1991. 
All due dates for repayment fell within this three year period. Five VISACAs had complete 
information on loan disbursements and loan recove:ry. Since Village 2 began operations 
only in 1991, none of its 29 loans issued in 1991 fell due during this year. One VISACA, 
Village 3, issued 50 loans during this two year period, however, the research team was 
unable to secure any information on the loan repayment status of these loans. 
Therefore, based on the information on the four VISACAs that had a documented 
histo:ry of loan disbursements and loan recove:ry from January 1989 through December 31st 
1991, the overall repayment rate was an outstanding 94.4 percent by number of loans and 
94.7 percent by the volume of loans (Table V-12, column 8). The best performing VISACAs 
were Village 6 and Village 1 with a remarkable 97 percent loan recove:ry rate over this three 
year period. The lowest repayment was recorded by Village 5 at 90 and 92 percent a still 
ve:ry fine performance. For the VISACAs as a whole, some delay in loan repayment is a 
ve:ry common phenomenon, as Senegalese purchasers have taken 4 to 6 months to pay 
Gambian farmers for their groundnuts. This suggests that VISACAs may well be playing 
an interesting insurance role by allowing these groundnut producers and traders, along with 
other borrowers, more flexible loan terms to repay their loans somewhat later than 
scheduled 
Table V-13 highlights this issue in detail through documentation of the time profile 
of loan repayments for all 906 loans in the four VISACAs discussed above. Overall roughly 
37 percent of all loans due were repaid promptly or in advance whereas 36 percent of the 
loans were repaid one month late, approximately 16 percent between one and three months 
late, and 4.3 percent more than three months late (panel B, column 7). It is interesting to 
note that a significant part of all loans (30 percent) were repaid early. As mentioned 
earlier, no repayment information was available on the Village 3 VISACA which has had 
a sluggish operation for some time now, recording the lowest share of village membership 
and the slowest growth of all VISACAs, while more investigation of this VISACA is called 
for, oral evidence in field interviews suggest that most all loans have been repaid. 
In summa:ry, the VISACAs, record outstanding repayment records over this three year 
period. No other formal or NGO financial intermedia:ry in The Gambia can match this 
performance with the possible exception of the BICI and SCBG, but no data on loan 
recove:ry or arrears are publicly available for these private banks, hence comparisons are not 
possible. Furthermore, judged on the risks inherent in the VISACAs portfolio with an 
overwhelming low income rural constituency, the above performance stands out as a 
remarkable achievement. 
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To place this in a relevant context, the credit union movements in Togo and the 
Cameroon are frequently pointed to as the outstanding success stories for non-bank financial 
intermediaries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the Togo movement in 1986 after 20 years of 
history and donor support still registered 18 percent of its loan balances as more than one 
year overdue. (Cuevas, 1989). 
Another pertinent performance indicator is the rate of return of the VISACA loan 
portfolio. This was estimated for the VISACAs for the calendar year 1991 (see Table V-14). 
Overall the five VISACAs register a 26 percent weighted average annual rate of return, a 
promising result reflecting the solvency of the movement during this period. Village 3 
registers the highest annual rate of return ( 40 percent). This grows out of its higher average 
annual interest rate (60 percent) vis-a-vis the other VISACAs in the table and the fact that 
a larger majority of its loan portfolio was issued for a longer term (8 months or more) 
leading to a higher average annualized interest rate compared to other VISACAs (where 
5 to 6 month term loans were more common). 
A final indicator of the remarkable performance of the VISACAs is its loan deposit 
ratio of 100 percent, ie. the term matching practice of the VISACAs for loan and deposits, 
excluding demand deposits, means they operate with a one-to-one loan deposit ratio. This 
ratio is much higher than that characteristic of credit unions worldwide (50 to 60 percent) 
who hold much of their savings in deposit accounts in branches of banks rather than using 
them for loans. Similarly, this ratio is much higher than that of the private banks in The 
Gambia (33 percent) who allocate most of their deposit resources into T-bills or other non-
loan assets. This high ratio for the VISACAs implies a "no reserve" policy for time deposits, 
a seemingly risky practice. However, since 100 percent reserves are held on demand 
deposits this compensates for no reserves held on time deposits. 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The single most important feature behind the VISACAs success is the local savings 
mobilization dimension that has nurtured and expanded the funding base from its inception 
in 1988 to the present. This feature quickly established the legitimacy of these young 
associations. It meant that villagers controlled their own association, guaranteed their 
autonomy in decision making and introduced a moral authority for responsible loan 
administration and loan recovery of their own funds. This locally mobilized resource base 
clearly created the environment for local village assemblies to meet and discuss such 
questions as the composition and responsibilities of the management committees and the 
establishment of interest rate policies and composition of savings instruments. 
Six important operational features have come out of these discussions and have 
shaped the positive performance of the VISACAs since their inception. Eir.s1, the depositors 
were paid positive real rates of interest on their savings and borrowers have paid positive 
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rates on their loans. Moreover, the effective interest rate earned on deposits and paid for 
loans are higher than those earned and paid in the formal financial markets of The Gambia 
in Banjul. This is an important lesson underscoring the fact that rural borrowers in fact can 
and do pay 20 to 30 percent interest rates on 6 month loans (based on 40 to 60 percent 
annualized rates). On the savings side, depositors in the VISACAs earn substantially more 
on their savings than do depositors in formal banks. Six month deposits (the most 
commonly held deposit instrument) earn either 10 or 15 percent interest (based on 
annualized deposit rates of 40 to 60 percent). Banks at best pay 12 to 14 percent annualized 
interest on time deposits. 
Second. loans are not targeted in the VISACAs. Since outside money played no 
initial role in the funding base for on-lending, villages had the autonomy to decide whether 
loans should be targeted in any way or remain untargeted with management committees 
servicing loan requests on a first come, first serve basis. They decided on the latter course 
of action with positive results in the end as a diversified loan portfolio contributed to good 
loan recovery. 
Third. short term loans of six months or less have predominated in the VISACAs. 
Only a few loans beyond 9 months have been made. Among other things, this implies that 
trading activity, artisan activities and handicrafts, and other non-agricultural activities will 
necessarily have to play an important role in any village banking initiative. These activities 
generate value added in their own right, are more suited to shorter term finance and can 
cover the interest rate charges with their earnings. Nevertheless, some farming loans are 
made, especially to the rice irrigated farmers who benefit from a two harvest season. More 
importantly, farm families are involved in many of the off-farm and non-farm activities 
mentioned above and clearly benefit from VISACA loans. Forcing targeted loans into what 
are misleadingly called "productive" activities is a misplaced and counterproductive effort 
often undertaken by donors. It is refreshing to see the VISACAs have been unencumbered 
by this typical form of donor intervention. 
Fourth. the VISACAs have managed their assets and liabilities intelligently by 
carefully matching the term structure of loans and deposits in a consistent fashion to meet 
liquidity demand. This is an extremely important lesson that should be followed by all 
village based savings and loan initiatives. These organizations must calibrate the cash flow 
derived from their loan repayment schedules to meet the term schedule of deposit 
withdrawals. Among other things, this implies that several deposit instruments should be 
made available so that several loan term maturities can be offered to meet loan demand 
consistent with these deposit term instruments. The VISACAs have shown that a safety 
cushion should also be programmed into this term matching exercise to cover for the fact 
that some loans may be repaid with delays. Hence, loan maturities are typically issued for 
slightly shorter terms (usually one month) than the deposit term obligation supporting them. 
The fifth operational feature that comes out of the VISACA experience is the impor-
tant role of collateral. Farm equipment and livestock were the typical forms of collateral 
15 
pledged by borrowers. Management committees take these pledges responsibly and will 
take possession of the collateral of seriously delinquent borrowers. The important lesson 
here is that the credibility of local enforcement of collateral obligations will only work when 
it is based on local savings (that are not being repaid) and when local officials support these 
actions as ethical and proper. It would appear that the threat of taking collateral is 
sufficiently credible in the VISACA villages to encourage responsible loan repayment 
behavior. 
Last but not least of all the features is the self-management approach to the 
VISACAs. The successful experience here has proven once again that villagers can be and 
should be given more, if not full responsibilities to manage their own finances. Along with 
these six operational features are two important lessons from the donor program design for 
the VISACAs that merit discussion. First, the VISACA donors were only interested in 
setting up VISACAs where there was substantial non-agricultural activity (or conversely, an 
amply fund~d region-specific agricultural development project that generates substantial 
non-agricultural income streams). This grows out of a concern that a local village savings 
and loan effort could not hope to pay savers an attractive return on savings through interest 
earnings from loans primarily based on agricultural activity alone. The loans are too risky, 
the returns too problematical, and the term maturity too long to service 3 to 6 month 
deposit instruments that would be required to attract local savings. People in rural areas 
cannot afford to lock up their savings for 12 month periods, and certainly not for interest 
rates as low as the average rate of return to farming in these settings (adjusted for risk and 
default). This is an extremely important lesson for any NGO effort designed to issue loans 
through locally mobilized savings in rural Gambia 
The second important lesson of program design in the VISACA experience is to 
appreciate the logic of a two stage sequence of donor involvement in promoting local 
savings and credit associations. In the first stage, donor support was focused on promotion, 
technical assistance, and training, with a long term resident advisor working closely with the 
VISACAs. No external funding was provided for on-lending. The objective was to promote 
properly remunerated local savings deposits as the exclusive base for on-lending, thereby 
ensuring local identity and local control and autonomy in decision making, both of which 
are essential ingredients for promoting responsible loan recovery. 
The second stage, some three to four years later, allows for some donor funding to 
be used for on-lending through the vehicle of 9 month or 1 year deposits. This expands the 
base for on-lending beyond the limits set by the local deposit base. More importantly, it 
extends term transformation into longer term loans than would be poss!ble with locally 
based term deposits. The loan activity that grows out of this action is untargeted and there-
fore blends into the generalized practices used for other loans. Still, there is little likelihood 
that these longer term loans would move substantially into agriculture if borrowers have to 
pay 40 to 60 percent annualized interest charges (depending on the VISACA). It is unlikely 
that any agricultural activity earns that kind of return in The Gambia An important caveat 
to this second stage is to limit the volume of outside funding for on-lending to no more than 
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15 to 20 percent of total lending sources. Otherwise, the image of local identity, local 
control and, most importantly, local savings could become jeopardized as a donor virus 
contaminates the portfolio with an entitlement or dole psychology, and borrowers "take the 
money and run." 
The next stage of the VISACA movement is the most challenging, namely, expanding 
the movement into a larger number of villages in several other regions of the country. This 
action could begin to create a network of VISACAs that, in effect, would generate scale, 
scope and spatial economies and possible linkages to the banking system. This would occur 
only if a second level regional federation would emerge that could play a role in 
intermediating between surplus and deficit units within the movement, become a lender of 
last resort, and a service center for auditing and other technical assistance. It may be 
premature to expect this to emerge in the immediate future. However, it is not an 
unreasonable long term objective as long as there are other regions in The Gambia that can 
generate the income streams for savings mobilization comparable to those generated by the 
Jahally-Pacharr project. 
The current discussion about setting up a regional training center for NGOs to 
expand the VISACA experiment to other regions is opportune and potentially promising. 
It is time for NGOs to sit down and discuss the lessons learned from the VISACA experi-
ence. It is also opportune to identify the information needed to design and launch new 
VISACA initiatives. Finally, it is pertinent to spell out the type and magnitude of start up 
(non-loan) subsidies that are needed to launch viable long term village banks. In this 
regard, heavy expenditures on literacy, numeracy and bookkeeping training are required in 
large part because the Gambian government has failed to invest in basic schooling in the 
countryside. 
The issue that surfaces at this point is whether an initiative of this scope and 
magnitude combined with other international donors would preempt the perceived role of 
TANGO currently envisioned in the rest of the NGO community in The Gambia. At the 
very least, it could represent a parallel effort emulating many of the roles and functions 
currently under discussion in TANGO. The contrasting operational philosophies between 
the VISACAs, on the one hand, and other NGO operators in The Gambia, on the other 
hand, perhaps have led to this separate independent stance. Nevertheless, it would be in 
the interest of TANGO officials to encourage the VISACAs from their current observer 
status, to advise the TANGO movement and play a decisive role in shaping TANGOs 
agenda. The VISACAs are the only entity in The Gambia that has created a viable, village 
based savings and credit movement. It would be wise for the TANGO to build on this 
experience and incorporate the VISACA group to play a meaningful role in designing 
TANGO's future. 
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Table V-1 Individual and Group (Karo) Membership on a Cumulative End of'Year Basis byVisaca and 
Gender from 1988 to March 1992. 
1988 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 0 0 0 0 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 22 1 17 40 
Village 4 0 0 0 0 
Village S 0 0 0 0 
Village 6 70 79 3 152 
TOTAL 92 80 20 192 
1989 
VISACA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 14 2 1 17 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 34 10 20 64 
Village 4 34 48 1 83 
Village S S1 61 s 123 
Village 6 81 129 s 215 
TOTAL 220 2SO 32 502 
1990 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 37 31 3 71 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 39 12 21 72 
Village 4 66 83 4 153 
Village S 133 132 s 270 
Village 6 85 134 6 225 
TOTAL 360 392 39 791 
1991 
VISACA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 73 61 4 138 
Village 2 68 82 8 158 
Village 3 Sl 17 21 89 
Village 4 106 102 8 216 
Village S 179 26S 7 4Sl 
Village 6 rn 149 7 253 
TOTAL S14 676 SS 1305 
1992 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 77 62 4 143 
Village 2 95 106 9 210 
Village 3 S2 17 21 90 
Village 4 112 106 8 226 
Village S 179 269 7 4SS 
Village 6 rn 156 7 260 
TOTAL 612 716 56 1384 
Source: VISACAfilcs. 
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Table V-2 Annual Profile of End of Year Total Membership for all VISACAs from December 1988 to 
Man:h 1992. 
1988 1989 1990 1991 March Growth 
1992 Multiple1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Village 1 0 17 71 138 143 8.4 
Village 2 0 0 0 158 210 
Village 3 40 64 72 89 90 1.4 
Village 4 0 83 153 216 226 2.7 
Village 5 0 123 270 451 455 3.7 
Village 6 152 215' 225 253 1.60 1.2 
Total 192 502 791 1305 1384 2.8 
Percent Change 161.S 57.6 65.0 6.1 
Source: Table ill-1. 
Note 1: The growth multiple was calculated as the ratio of column 5/column 2. 
Membership 
1378 
1184 
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214 ~ 
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F'igure V-1 
Individual and Group (Kafo) Membership Evolution 
by Gender from 1988 to March 1992 
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Table V-3 Share of VISACA's Membership in Overall Village Population as of December 1991. 
VISA CA 
Village 1 
Village 2 
Village 3 
Village 4 
Village 5 
Village 6 
Total 
Vtllage Population 
(1) 
491 
443 
547 
413 
1683 
897 
4056 
VISACA Membership 
(2) 
138 
158 
89 
216 
451 
253 
1J05 
Source: Data on village population were obtained from a CIDR report. 
% VISACA Membership 
(3) 
28.1 
35.7 
16.4 
52.3 
26.8 
28.2 
32.2 
Table V-4 
VISA CA 
Village 1 
Village 2 
Village 3 
Village 4 
Village 5 
Village 6 
TOTAL 
23 
Female Participation in the VISACAs' Cumulative Membership as or March 1992 and Growth 
Multiples for Male and Female Members from December 1989 to March 1992. 
March 1992 March 1992 Growth Multiple1 (March 
1992/December 1989) 
Total Membership % Female Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
143 43.4 55 31.0 
210 505 
90 18.9 15 1.7 
226 47.0 33 2.2 
455 59.1 3.1 4.4 
253 60.0 1.2 1.2 
1384 51.7 2.8 2.9 
Source: Table V-1. 
Note 1: The growth multiples are the ratio of total membership as of March 1992 to membership as of 
December 1989. 
Figure V-2 
Relative Sire of Membership by Gender in all VISACAs 
as of March 1992 
Source: Tables V-1 and V-3. 
(4%) 
Table V-5 Number of Deposit Accounts and Percent of Membership as Depositors for the Four Principal Deposit Accounts by VISACA, December 
1991. 
Number of Accounts and Percent Membership Holding These Accounts 
Current % 3 months % 6 months % 9 months % 
Account Membership Deposit Membership Deposit Membership Deposit Membership 
VISA CA Account1 Accounts1 Account1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 1 16 11.6 27 19.6 4 2.9 1 0.7 
Village 2 15 9.5 17 10.8 6 3.2 0 0.0 
Village 3 0 0.0 17 19.1 17 19.1 6 6.7 
Village 4 23 10.6 45 20.8 145 67.1 28 13.0 
Village 5 11 2.4 22 4.9 69 15.3 63 14.0 
Village 6 14 5.5 65 25.7 65 25.7 22 8.7 
TOTAL 79 6.1 193 14.8 306 23.4 120 9.2 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: The interest rate paid on all deposits was 20 percent in 4 VISACAs and 40% in 2 VISACAs. 
~ 
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Table V-6 Volume of Deposits (in Dalasis) Accumulated 'l1lrougb 'lilDe from the Inception of Each 
VISACA to December 1991 in the Four Prindpal Deposit Accounts by VISACA. 
Deposit Accounts1 
Current 3 Month 6MODth 9MODth Total 
VISA CA Account Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Village 1 14,765 40,141 3,200 5,000 63,106 
Village 2 4,312 5,335 2,700 0 12,347 
Village 3 0 2,~ 2,585 7,435 12,807 
Village 4 29,048 17,3(i0 48,338 15,625 110,371 
Village 5 14,471 7,065 25,216 38,532 85,284 
Village 6 32,9')9 19,913 52,921 9,945 115,778 
TOTAL 95,595 92,601 134,960 76,537 399,693 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: The annual interest rate OD term deposits were 20% and 40% depending OD the VISACA. 
Table V-7 
VISA CA 
Village 1 
Village 2 
Village 3 
Village 4 
Village 5 
Village 6 
TOTAL 
Relative Importance of the Volume of Deposits in the Four Principal Deposit Accounts 
Accumulated '11n'ough 'l1me from the Inception of F.acb VISACA to December 1991 by 
VISACA. 
Volume of Deposits(%) 
Current 3Month 6Month 9Month Total 
Account Deposit Deposit Deposit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
23.4 63.6 5.1 7.9 100.0 
34.9 43.2 21.9 0.0 100.0 
0.0 21.8 20.2 58.1 100.0 
26.3 15.7 43.8 14.2 100.0 
17.0 8.3 29.6 45.2 100.0 
285 17.2 45.7 8.6 100.0 
23.9 23.2 33.8 19.1 100.0 
Source: Table V-6. 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I 
! 
I ! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
r 
f 
i' ! 
I 
f 
' 
' I 
1 
I 
I 
( 
I 
I 
~ 
t 
! 
Table V-8 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Total Balance 
Growth 
Multiple2 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Total Balance 
Growth Multiple2 
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Outstanding Balances for all VISACAs Combined by the Four Principal Deposit Accounts, 
from 1988 to 1991. 
Current Accounts 3 month tmn deposits 6 month term deposits 
Average Average Average 
# Amount Balance! # Amount Balance! # Amount Balance! 
-- - -(1) 
. (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0 0 0.0 4 S,780 1,445.0 0 0 0.0 
1 1,.m 1,502.0 18 1,395 71.S 11 11,lSS 1,014.1 
18 2,040 113.3 38 12,34S 324.9 102 40,714 '399.7 
43 117,Sll 2,732.8 19 4,142 218.o 127 42,948 338.2 
62 lS,293 246.7 79 23,662 299.S 240 94'37 395.3 
43 7.8 1.1 3.0 11.S 3.9 
9 month tmn deposits Total 
# Amount Average BaJanc:el # Amount Average Balanc:e1 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
0 0 0.0 4 S,780 1,445.0 
1S 11,720 781.3 4S 25,772 572.7 
34 14,623 430.1 192 69,782 363.4 
SS 27,831 506.0 244 86,672 m.2 
104 54,174 S20.9 48S 188,006 387.6 
3.7 2.4 SA 3A 
Note 1: Average is obtained by dividing total volume by the number of accounts. 
2: Growth multiple is obtained by dividing total balance in 1991 by total balance in 1989. 
Table V-9 Volume of Outstanding Deposit Balances for All Four Deposit Accounts by VISACA from 1988 
to December 1991. 
1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 
Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding 
VISA CA Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits % Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
yillage 1 0 0 1270 6291 7561 4.0 
Village 2 0 0 0 6670 6670 3.5 
Village 3 250 570 1180 1935 3935 2.1 
Village 4 0 5920 30840 35415 72175 38.4 
Village 5 0 10417 17786 16715 44918 23.9 
Village 6 5530 8865 18706 19646 5Z147 28.1 
Total 5780 25712 fH1frl 86672 188006 100.0 
Source: VISACA files. 
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Figure V-3 
Share of Cumulative Outstanding Deposit Balances for 1988 through December 1991. 
llage 3 
llage 2 
llage 1 
(2%) 
(4%) 
(4%) 
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Table V-10 Total Value of Loans Issued, Average Loan Sbe In Dalasls, and Term Maturity (In Days) by 
VISACA from 1989 to 1991. 
1989 1990 1991 Total 
VISA CA No.of Total No.of Total No.of Total No.of Total 
Loans Value Loans Value Loans Value Loans Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 11 0 0 33 18,540 'Kl 25,986 120 44,526 
Village 'l!- 0 29 T/00 29 2,700 
Village 3 11 ZT10 7 1400 32 8930 so 13,100 
Village 4 62 4810 193 44,290 151 52,013 406 101,113 
Village 5 52 9320 101 29,980 234 70,0SO 3'K1 1()1),350 
Village 6 84 21,545 93 30,405 97 43,910 T/4 95,800 
Total 209 38,445 4'1:1 124,615 630 203,649 1,266 366,7()1) 
Average Loan Si7.e (in Dalasis)3 Average Term (in days)4 
1989 1990 1991 1989 1990 1991 
VISA CA Average Average Average Total Total 
Loan Loan Loan Ave. Average Average Average Ave. 
Si7.e Si7.e Si7.e Si7.e Term Term Term Term 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Village 11 562 299 371 85 157 137 
Village 'l!- 95 95 121 121 
Village 3 252 200 rJ9 262 'Kl 139 195 163 
Village 4 78 229 344 249 1()1) 134 170 145 
Village 5 179 297 299 283 167 152 ']fj1 l'Kl 
Village 6 256 3'1:1 453 350 129 151 138 140 
All VISACAs 184 292 323 290 131 138 176 156 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: No loans were granted in 1989 in Village 1. 
2: Village 2 was not yet in operation in 1989 and 1990. 
3: Average loan si7.e is obtained by dividing amount of loans issued by the number of loans issued. 
4: Average term is obtained by dividing total number of days associated with all loans issued by the total 
number of loans issued. 
....,,,.~,.,._....,,,,_""""-,,,_,_,.,,....,,...,_..._,,~,,--,~ 
Table V-11 Selected Indicators of Women's Access to VISACA Loans from 1989 through 1991 by VISACA. 
VISA CA Membership Female #of Loans % of members #of Females % of Female % of Loans that went to 
Members Issued with loans who received members who Women 
a loan received a loan (col 5/col 3) 
(col 5/col 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1991 
Village 1 138 61 87 63.0 39 63.9 44.8 
Village 2 158 82 29 18.4 17 '1ll.7 58.6 
Village 3 89 17 32 36.0 14 82.4 43.8 
Village 4 216 102 151 69.9 77 75.5 51.0 
Village 5 451 265 234 51.9 125 47.2 53.4 
Village 6 253 149 97 38.3 59 39.6 60.8 
TOTAL 1305 676 630 483 331 49.0 52.5 
1990 
O'I Village 1 71 31 33 46.5 14 45.2 42.4 N 
Village 2 
Village 3 72 12 7 9.7 1 83 143 
Village 4 153 83 193 126.1 106 127.7 54.9 
Village 5 270 132 101 37.4 47 35.6 46.5 
Village 6 225 134 93 413 54 403 58.1 
TOTAL 791 392 427 54.0 222 56.6 52.0 
1989 
Village 1 17 2 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Village 2 
Village 3 64 10 11 17.2 2 '1ll.O 18.2 
Village 4 83 48 62 74.7 34 70.8 54.8 
Village 5 123 61 52 423 28 45.9 53.8 
Village 6 215 129 84 39.1 42 32.6 50.0 
TOTAL 502 250 209 41.6 106 42.4 50.7 
Source: VISACA Files. 
Table V-12 Documentation of Loan Recovery by Number of Loans and by Volume of Loans by VISACA for all Loans Issued from 1989 Onwards 
and Due for Repayment through December 1992. 
Total Loans Issued as of Total Loans Issued and Due Loans Due and Repaid by Recovery Rate for Loans 
December 1991 by December 1991 December 1991 in% 
VISA CA No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Balances 
--(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 1 120 44,526 72 37,470 70 36,340 97.2 97.0 
Village 2 29 2,760 0 0 0 0 
Village 31 50 13,100 48 13,035 
Village 4 406 101,113 324 72,398 307 67,388 94.8 93.1 
Village 5 387 109,350 250 72,775 226 66,975 90.4 92.0 
Village 6 274 95,860 260 88,295 252 85,945 96.9 97.3 
Total 1,266 366,709 954 283,973 855 256,648 94.4 94.7 
t>.> 
Source: VISACA files. 0 
Note 1: No information was available on Village 3 loan repayment. 
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Table V-13 Basic Documentation of 11me Prolile of Loan Repayments in Terms or Number or Loans and 
Rates or Repayment for Total Number or Loans Issued and Due for Repayment from January 
1st 1989 1hrough December 31st 1991 by VISACA. 
A Number of Loans 
Indicator /Schedule Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4 Village 5 Village 6 Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Loans due 72 0 324 250 260 906 
2. Repaid on time 21 18 8 17 64 
3. Repaid ahead of 19 87 102 65 Z13 
time 
4. Repaid but ~ 25 132 67 103 3Z7 
than a month late 
5. Repaid but 1 to 3 5 61 30 46 142 
months late 
6. Repaid but more 0 9 10 20 39 
than 3 months late 
7. Undetermined 0 0 9 1 10 
lengthl 
B. Rates of Loan Repayment by T"DDe Profile of Repayments 
1. Prompt recovery 29.2 5.6 3.2 6.5 7.1 
rate (%)2 
2. Early recovery 26.4 26.9 40.8 25.0 30.1 
rate (%)3 
3. Less than a month 34.7 40.7 26.8 39.6 36.1 
arrears rate (% )4 
4. One to 3 months 6.9 18.8 12.0 17.7 15.7 
arrears rate (% )4 
5. More than 3 0.0 2.8 4.0 7.7 4.3 
months arrears 
rate (%)4 
6. Undetermined 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.4 1.1 
length recovery 
rate 
7. Total recovery 97.2 94.8 90.4 96.6 94.4 
rate (%)5 
Note 1: Undetermined length refers to loans with no due date listed in VISACA. files. 
2: Prompt recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid on time in line 2, panel A, 
by the number of loans due m line 1, panel A 
3: Early recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid ahead of time (line 3, panel 
A) by the total loans due (line 1, panel A). 
4: Recovery rates for less than one month m arrears, &om one to three months in arrears, etc. is based 
on the number of loans finally repaid during these specified periods (lines 4, 5, and 6 m panel A) over 
the number of loans due (line 1). 
5: Total recovery rate (line 7, panel B) is derived by adding up all the recovery rates estimated m lines 1-6, 
panel B. 
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Table V-14 Annual Rate of Return for the VISACA Portfolio by VISACA for the Calendar Year 1991. 
Average Monthly Average Monthly 
VISA CA Loan Balance Interest Earnings2 Monthly Rate of Yearly Rate of 
(in Dalasis) (in Dalasis) Return3 Return4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Village 1 8,038.0 149.1 1.9% 223% 
Village 21 
Village 3 5,2175 174.8 3.4% 40.8% 
Village 4 29,273.8 6323 2.2% 26.4% 
Village 5 38,000.4 775.6 2.0% 245% 
Village 6 19,665.8 4503 23% 275% 
All VISACAs 100,1955 2,182.1 2.2% 26.4% 
Source: VISACA. files. 
Note 1: None of the Village 2 loans were due in 1991. 
2: Average monthly interest earnings is the sum of monthly interest payments divided by 12. 
3: Monthly rate of return is column (2)/column (1). 
4: Yearly rate of return is column (3)*12. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL NE'IWORKS: 
THE SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN THE GAMBIA• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports on the micro and small scale enterprise sector in The Gambia. 
Our concern is focused on the sources of the financial services entrepreneurs draw upon in 
operating their businesses. These channels are comprised of the formal institutions 
providing services to a limited number of these entrepreneurs and the diverse informal 
channels servicing a much larger number of this ccinstituency. 
In our review, only one microenterprise program currently operates in the country 
through the Indigenous Business Advisory Service, (IBAS). This program provides training 
and financial services to microentrepreneurs. Although the World Bank had initiated an 
enterprise development project in The Gambia in 1988, the funds have not yet been utilized. 
Loans were to be channeled through banks who would borrow from the enterprise develop-
ment fund deposited in the Central bank at an interest rate equal to 3 percent below the 
T-bill rate. Banks would then on-lend at the prevailing market interest rate (currently about 
27 percent). The problem with this formula is obvious, with the T-bill rate between 18 and 
19 percent banks could access the World Bank enterprise fund only at 15 to 16 percent 
when regular time deposits were only costing the bank 12 percent The banks had no inter-
est in accessing a more expensive source of funds for on-lending. As a result, this enterprise 
development fund has not made any loans in the three year period since its inception. 
Consequently, IBAS is the only program in operation which has had made loans to . 
small scale entrepreneurs. The first section of this chapter reviews the progress of this 
program based on information collected from IBAS' records. The second part of the 
chapter reports on the findings of OSU's survey of micro and small scale enterprises 
undertaken in The Gambia in the spring of 1m. The purpose of the survey was to examine 
the relative importance of diverse formal and informal channels and agents that 
entrepreneurs draw upon for financial services. The results of this survey will close out our 
discussion of micro and small scale enterprise finance in The Gambia. 
• Special thanks are due to Mr. Benjamin Carr, Ms. Isatou Dea Sawane and Mr. Sherif Connteh who 
assisted in many ways to make our survey feasible. We would like to thank aJso Mr. John Sylva and Mr. Pa 
Mamoudou Cham at IBAS for their time and considerate cooperation in supplying us with the information we 
needed to analY7-C IBAS. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE MICROENTERPRISE PROGRAM IN THE GAMBIA: 
INDIGENOUS BUSINESS ADVISORY SERVICE (IBAS) 
1. lnstitutiona] BackifOUlld 
The Government of The Gambia set up the Indigenous Business Advisory Service 
(IBAS) in 1976 under the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development 
(MEPID) to assist the microenterprise sector. mAS continues to be a government depart-
ment presently under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment. The 
principal function of IBAS is to deal with employment creation and the development of 
small scale enterprises (SSEs) in The Gambia. This section provides an overview of this 
program and an assessment of the current portfolio and institutional performance. 
A Structure of the Institution 
Services are extended by mAS to entrepreneurs who operate SSEs and employ five 
or less employees. IBAS provides advisory and consultancy services, training packages, and 
financial assistance to small scale entrepreneurs. In addition to the head office in the 
Kombo area, IBAS operates 4 branch offices located in Farafenni, Bansang, Barra and 
Basse to service rural areas. Volunteer help from the ILO or the Peace Corps occasionally 
provides assistance to the current employees which make up a total of 22 professionals and 
27 support staff. The program is supported by the government although the intention has 
been for some time to make IBAS an autonomous institution. Program costs are reportedly 
750,000 dalasis on average per year. 
The general manager of IBAS reports directly to the permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment, and manages the three main departments at 
mAS. These departments are the advisory and extension services unit, training and research 
unit, and the credit control unit. The advisory and training facilities at mAS are acceSSible 
to all interested SSEs. Last year it was reported that a total of 250 SSEs were trained free 
of charge at the main offices of mAS. 
B. Administration Procedures 
Currently, there are about 600 active member clients registered with IBAS. The 
majority of these clients are engaged in manufacturing services, retail trade and horticulture 
produce marketing activities amoung others. Credit services, the principal objective of many 
members and the concern of most of the staff, are available to all entrepreneurs who take 
the initiative to request a loan from mAS. Typically, entrepreneurs fill out loan applications 
with the credit control officer where loan amounts are often negotiated. 
3 
The first step in the loan evaluation procedure is taken by the extension officers who 
visit the enterprise and assess the potential investment. Second, financial statements, namely 
an income and cash flow statement, are prepared to project the performance of the enter-
prise with the new investment plan. Third, the credit control staff review this information 
and make recommendations to the loan committee. The loan committee members then 
evaluate the loan proposals and makes the final decision accepting or rejecting the loan 
request. Loans are given for periods ranging between 2 to 3 years; however, monthly 
installments are generally due after the first month but in all cases before the end of 3 
months of disbursement. 
IBAS is currently ttying to recover many delinquent and defaulted loans. Thus, in 
the process of evaluating the performance of the current portfolio and the ability of the 
program to become viable and self sustaining, the following section will review the 
characteristics of this portfolio, followed by a detailed analysis of the performance of the 
portfolio and an assessment of the institution's performance. 
2. Current Portfolio 
A The Overall Portfolio 
Currently, IBAS administers three financing schemes drawing on three different 
sources of funds. These funds have been provided by donors and the government as grants 
and were designed to serve as revolving fund schemes. The two funds which were granted 
by donors are the European Economic Community (EEC) Fund and the United Nations 
Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). The third Fund was provided by the government as 
a Resettlement Program for Retrenched Civil Servants. A total of 4,955,290 dalasis was 
disbursed from the inception of the program to 1988 under the three schemes. These 
schemes have serviced a total of 433 borrowers (Table VI-1). The average loan size of the 
total portfolio is 011,444 and the average term is 27 months given at an average interest 
rate of 9.7 percent per annum. Some important differences exist, however, among the three 
sources of funds. Thus, characteristics of these three funding schemes will be discussed next 
in more detail. 
B. Characteristics of the Three Funding Schemes 
Table VI-1 presents an overview of some of the representative characteristics which 
describe the overall portfolio as well as each funding scheme. The EEC revolving fund 
scheme was initiated in 1986 and by 1988 had disbursed a total of 1,017,297 dalasis to 121 
borrowers. The UNCDF revolving fund scheme was initiated in 1985 and by 1988 had dis-
bursed a total of 2, 797,204 dalasis to 188 borrowers. The resettlement program for 
retrenched (i.e. laid-off) civil servants was initiated in 1987 and by 1988 had disbursed a 
total of 1,140,788 dalasis to 124 borrowers. Although a part of these loans were paid back 
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into the revolving fund schemes, no new loans have been disbursed within these programs 
· since 1988. 
IBAS was maintaining these accounts and working in collaboration with the Gambia 
Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) until 1991. The GCDB was in charge of dis-
bursing loans to borrowers based upon the recommendations made by IBAS personnel. It 
was reported that loans were granted at the set interest rate of about 11 percent per annum, 
where the bank had a 6 percent share of the interest charge and IBAS 5 percent. Seventy 
five percent of the loan amount was guaranteed by the government and 25 percent by the 
bank. 
a) Loan Size 
On the one hand, the average loan size under the EEC fund which amounts to 
08,407 is much smaller than the 014,878 average loan size under the UNCDF and 09,199 
average loan size under the government program. The spectrum of loans given under each 
source of funds, presented in Table VI-2, provides an additional insight into the differences 
in loan size and the concentration of small loans under the EEC program versus the 
UNCDF and the government programs. 
First, almost 20 percent of the loans given under the EEC scheme were below 03000, 
whereas the UNCOF had only 11 percent and the government program had a mere 4 
percent of their loans in this category. The EEC loans are basically concentrated in the first 
3 categories which cover loans up to 09000; about 12 percent of the loans fall in the range 
of 09000-12000 and another 12 percent fall in the range of 012000-15000. Only about 6 
percent of the EEC loans are above 015,000. The UNCDF loans are largely concentrated 
in the categories between 03000-12000 with only 1 percent in the range 012000-15000; 
however, almost 23 percent of the loans fall in the categories above 015,000. The 
government program loans, on the other hand, are mainly concentrated under 2 categories. 
First, 37 percent fall in the range of 06000-9000 and 41 percent fall in the range of 09000-
12000. About 11 percent of the loans fall below D6000 and another 11 percent fall in the 
categories 012000-25000. Thus, these different concentrations present large differences 
between these programs which probably explain in part the different performances of the 
three funding schemes. 
b.) Terms and Conditions 
Figures presented in Table VI-1 show that the average interest rates are highest for 
the EEC loans which amounted to 11.6 percent per annum whereas rates for the UNCDF 
and the government program loans were respectively 105 percent and 6.8 percent per 
annum. The average interest rate for the overall portfolio is 9. 7 percent. This is much less 
than the market interest rates in The Gambia during this time. These nominal interest rates 
are effectively negative in real terms because of the inflation rates ruling in The Gambia 
during the period 1985-1990. 
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Maturity periods ranged from one to three years. The average maturity period for 
the overall loans provided by IBAS from 1985 through 1988 is 27 months. However, the 
average maturity period varies by source of funds. Figures in Table 1 show that the EEC 
loans have the shortest average maturity of 23 months, followed by UNCDF loans of 
average maturity of 27 months and, third, the longest maturity of 33 months is given for the 
government loans. 
Almost 80 percent of the total portfolio was concentrated in the greater Banjul area. 
Personal guarantors were required and served as the typical collateral. Important political 
figures frequently served as personal guarantors. This feature induced substantial political 
intervention and probably explains some of the high default rates which will be discussed 
in a later section. 
c.) Gender Composition 
The group of borrowers is comprised of 67 percent male and 33 percent female 
entrepreneurs. However, wide differences exist among the programs. The EEC 
beneficiaries are made up of roughly 47 percent male and 53 percent female entrepreneurs, 
the UNCDF includes 64 percent male and 35 percent female entrepreneurs while the 
government program, reflects a strong male dominance with 91 percent male and 9 percent 
female entrepreneurs. This no doubt reflects the original gender imbalance in government 
service. Figures in Table VI-3 indicate a considerably larger average loan size for male 
borrowers (D13,111) than for female borrowers (D7,789). Larger average loan sizes for 
male borrowers are also associated with longer average maturity periods of 28 months versus 
25 months for female borrowers. Another component associated with larger loans for male 
borrowers is the larger arrears rate which equals 63 percent for male borrowers and only 
27 percent for female borrowers. 
d.) Sectoral Distribution 
Originally, the UNCDF scheme excluded entrepreneurs operating in retail trade. 
However, this condition was later changed when it was reported by IBAS officers that there 
was a high demand for loans by microentrepreneurs operating in this subsector. There were 
no other conditions imposed by donor targeting criteria. Table VI-4 presents the 
concentration of beneficiaries in services, manufacturing and agriculture in each program. 
Beneficiaries of the EEC program are almost equally divided between services (52 
percent) and manufacturing ( 48 percent). There are no agricultural enterprises under the 
EEC fund although it was not reported that this sector was explicitly excluded. Beneficiaries 
under the UNCDF program are concentrated, first, in the manufacturing sector (54 percent), 
second, in services sector (34 percent) and, third, in agriculture (9 percent). The 
government program records entrepreneurs operating enterprises mainly in the service 
sector (54 percent), some in agriculture (29 percent) and only a few enterprises in 
manufacturing (14 percent). 
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Sectoral distribution gender composition, terms and conditions, loan size and sources 
of funds are among the factors which explain the poor repayment performance of the overall 
portfolio as well as the large differences in repayment rates among the three schemes. 
These features are explained below. 
3. Performance of the Current Portfolio 
A The Amounts of Arrears 
Recovery rates registered in the three programs do not indicate a successful perfor-
mance. The arrears rate for the total portfolio is 44 percent; however, there exist large 
differences among the three schemes. Figures in Table VI-1 present the amounts and rates 
of arrears for each program. The highest arrears rate relative to the amounts disbursed are 
recorded for the government program (76.8 percent), followed by the UNCDF program (37 
percent) and, last, for the EEC program (27 percent). Many factors explain this behavior. 
We will, first, review the arrears distribution in the three programs and, later, examine a 
model to identify which factors are associated with the arrears rates. 
Table VI-5 presents the distribution of loans in arrears associated with each source 
of funds. The EEC program has the highest percentage (72 percent) of successfully repaid 
loans, with the UNCDF second (56 percent), and last the government program with a 
negligible 1 percent. Under the EEC program the concentration of loans in arrears is 
highest (16 percent) in the first arrears category (Dl-3000) with very small percentages of 
loans in the other larger size categories. The concentration of arrears under the UNCDF 
program exhibits a somewhat different pattern in that the highest percentage of loans in 
arrears (19.7 percent) falls in the first size category; however, roughly 25 percent of the 
loans are still in arrears in amounts above D3000 which are scattered among the rest of the 
larger loan size categories. Arrears under the government program are concentrated more 
visibly in the larger loan sizes compared with the other two programs. 
B. The Loan Repayment Model 
This section analyzes the repayment performance of loans disbursed by IBAS under 
the three lending programs. These programs constitute the active portfolio of IBAS and the 
repayment rate as of June 1991 indicates to a large extent the still fragile conditions of the 
institution. The literature on financial markets has examined loan repayment problems 
facing many financial institutions. Both loan and borrower characteristics are among the 
variables that explain these loan repayment rates. 
To identify the factors explaining loan repayment rates, a multiple regression model 
was estimated utilizing the available information on the loan and borrower characteristics. 
Loan size, interest rate, term maturity, and source of the funds were among the pertinent 
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information available on loan characteristics. Gender and sector of operation were among 
the pertinent features of the borrower. 
In our analysis, the repayment model is defined as: 
(1) 
ARREARATE=tio +a1LAMT+a.}R+a~T+a4GOY+a5UNCDF+a6GENDER+a.,AGR 
with the variables identified in Table VI-6. 
Results of the model are presented in Table VI-7. These results were generated 
using Ordinary Least Squares regression. They indicate a relatively high R-Square and F 
value. The relationships between the significant explanatory variables and the resulting loan 
arrears rate are as expected. 
The coefficient for the amount of loan granted (LAMT) is positively and significantly 
associated with the arrears rate. This implies that larger loans are in larger arrears, an 
unsurprising finding in the typical lending institutions in developing countries where the 
screening of borrowers is less important than political intrusions to favor larger borrower 
clientele. 
As expected, results show that longer maturity periods (MAT) are associated with 
larger arrears. Longer maturity periods involve a higher risk of moral hazard problems1 
and, thus, a higher chance of delinquency and default. Higher interest rates (IR) are also 
associated with higher arrears. Higher interest rates may be charged for riskier borrowers 
whose investment projects have a higher variance of net returns. However, riskier borrowers 
may introduce a larger percentage of defaulters because of adverse selection problems2 
where bad borrowers who cannot be distinguished in some cases from good borrowers have 
a higher probability to default. 
Two dummy variables, (GOV) and (UNCDF) were included to determine the 
variation between the three lending programs. Results show that the coefficient for the 
government program (GOV) is significant implying that borrowers under this program are 
associated with higher arrears rate than those under either the UNCDF or the EEC 
programs. 
Gender is not significant; however, this result is not surprising considering the high 
correlation coefficient between the variable identifying borrowers from the government 
1 Moral ha7.ard problems are associated with a borrower's unpredictable action at a later point leading to 
default which the lender cannot predict. 
2 Adverse selection problems are associated with a borrower's indeterminate type where a lender may select 
some bad borrowers from a pool of applicants and reject some good borrowers. 
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program and male entrepreneurs. Thus, the variable (GOV) is capturing the effect of the 
large number of male borrowers concentrated under the government program who are in 
large arrears rate. This relationship is also manifested between the variable (AGR) 
representing the sector of operation of the entrepreneur and borrowers from the government 
program who are largely concentrated in agriculture. The coefficient for (AGR) implies 
that the relationship between sector of operation and the arrears rate is insignificant These 
results confirm expectations that larger loans given for longer maturity periods lack adequate 
screening of borrowers and, thus, are associated with larger arrears. 
The institutional viability of the microenterprise program is largely dependent on loan 
recovery since its survival is linked to a revolving fund in which the only infusion of funds 
comes from loan repayments. The results reported here are not encouraging concerning the 
number of times these funds can revolve. One strategy to deal with this would be to charge 
interest rates that would allow the program to break even. This is explored in the following 
section reviewing the issue of estimating a risk premium to cover default. 
4. Institutional Performance 
Any financial institution or program must cover its total lending costs (administrative 
costs and the costs of funds) plus an allowance for bad debt or non-performing loans. This 
latter component can be estimated and incorporated into total lending costs through a risk 
premium for bad debt. Estimates of the risk premium can be derived using the formula 
below: 
r = [d/(1-d)] •(1 +a+c) 
where r = risk premium per dalasis lent; 
a = per unit administrative costs; 
c = per unit cost of funds; 
d = proportion of the portfolio in default (unrecoverable loans); 
(2) 
This measures the loss to the institution (program) brought on by the proportion of 
the portfolio that has fallen into default plus the administrative costs and deposit costs that 
were incurred in servicing these defaulted loans and are now permanently lost or 
irrecoverable. The premium that results from this estimation (r) is the rate that must be 
added to the institutions administrative and deposit costs to generate total lending costs. 
To highlight this relationship consider total lending costs as: 
TLC=a+c+r (3) 
where TLC = total lending costs (per unit of dalasis lent) and a, c and r are as defined 
above. 
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The administrative costs at IBAS have been reported to be roughly D750,000 per 
year. These funds are provided by the government as IBAS is still a government 
department. We will consider the estimates under the assumption that the bulk of the loans 
have been disbursed during two years, 1986-87, and considering conservatively that only 25 
percent of the material and personnel costs at IBAS reported above were being utilized to 
support this loan administration process. Thus, the per unit cost of funds (a) comes to 0.076 
of the disbursed loan portfolio denoted in Table VI-1. The cost of funds is practically zero 
since they were given as grants to support microenterprise development. The overall default 
rate was 44 percent as indicated earlier. 
Given these parameters, the risk premium is estimated to be 84 percent and total 
lending costs per daJasis lent is estimated to be 92 percent. 3 Admittedly no program would 
be able to charge an interest rate of 92 percent in The Gambia today. But the exercise 
above nevertheless serves a useful purpose by underscoring the severe financial 
consequences of a program whose default rate is 44 percent. Put differently, the interest 
rates charged (from 7 to 12 percent) were little more than a token gesture to price loans 
and come nowhere close to covering the losses incurred through default loans. The default 
rate that would be consistent with a 12 percent total lending costs needs to be only about 
4 percent for the program to break even. 4 Thus with the current performance there is no 
way the program could become viable. A large permanent subsidy is necessary for the 
program to function. 
Recent reforms, initiated in early 1992, were designed to reduce the deficiencies of 
the program. These allow IBAS to take over the loan administration of the revolving funds 
still available to the program through the loan recovery from past clients who honored their 
loan repayment obligation. Under these new reforms, loans are disbursed through the 
Banque International de Commerce et Industrie (BICI) rather than the GCDB (which has 
now terminated operations). The new loans are issued at a current interest rate of 14 
percent per annum, and IBAS is totally responsible for loan recovery. Average loan size is 
set at about 10,000 Dalasis given for a period of 2 to 3 years. Political guarantors have been 
eliminated and the new system legally obliges guarantors to pay off the borrower's debt in 
case of default. A precondition for loan approval is a signed contract which allows IBAS 
access to the guarantor's bank account in case of default. Disbursements are made by 
issuing a Local Purchase Order (LPO) to obtain input materials upon which IBAS makes 
a payment to the local supplier rather than disbursing cash directly to the borrowers. 
This new approach seems to have more strict requirements in order to discourage 
default. Recent progress has been made in collecting on delinquency in courts. Loans of 
3 The estimation is as follows: a=0.076; c=O; d=0.44; so that r=(0.44/0.56]*(1.076)=0.84 and total lending 
costs on a per unit basis is TLC=(0.076)+(0)+(0.84)=0.92. 
4 The estimation of the default rate d is carried out by using the formulas for risk premium (r) and total 
lending cost (TLC). Give TLC=0.12; a=0.076; c=O implies 0.044=(d/1-d)(1+0.075+c); so that d=O.o39. 
10 
D 20,000 or less can be handled now in the magistery court where foreclosure on default 
loans is faster than in the supreme court. This should expedite proceedings against 
defaulting borrowers. Without a substantial breakthrough dramatically reducing default the 
program will quickly expire. However, discouraging default, though strategic for survival, 
is only part of the problem. The administrative costs are still covered by the government, 
interest rates are below market rates and the remaining revolving funds that IBAS is 
administering have already eroded rapidly in volume because of the lamentable past 
repayment experience descn"bed above. In order to maintain its lending capacity, IBAS 
needs to be charging interest rates that not only should be positive in real terms to counter 
the eroding effect of inflation, but also high enough at least up to market rates to offset or 
reduce to some extent the losses inevitably associated with subsidized and targeted credit 
programs (i.e. poor loan recovery). Finally, administrative costs need to be reduced and 
organized to create a more cost efficient operation. It is true that IBAS has been designed 
to be a development and promotional program for microenterprises, however, in our 
previous calculations we have taken this into account by allocating only 25 percent of the 
overhead costs to the loan program and 75 percent to the development and promotional 
mission of IBAS. We feel that the agency could be more cost effective in its loan operation 
than it has been to date. To facilitate this, IBAS should be taken out from the main line 
ministry where it is currently operating, given a more autonomous state and the right to hire, 
and fire and reassign personnel outside the civil servants rules. This added flen"bility should 
prove more cost effective. 
However, this microenterprise program is only one channel serving the financial 
demands of micro and small scale enterprises in The Gambia. Entrepreneurs have found 
other channels to meet a part of their demand for financial services. These channels are 
the focus of the following section which reports on the OSU small scale enterprise survey 
undertaken in the spring of 1992. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MICRO AND SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE 
SURVEY 
1. Purpose of the Study 
The OSU small scale enterprise survey was undertaken in the manufacturing sector 
for three reasons. First, little is known about the characteristics of the small scale enterprise 
sector in The Gambia. Second, much less is known about the operations of small scale 
enterprises, and their contracts with suppliers and customers. Last, practically nothing is 
known about the sources of finance, and the financial contracts small scale entrepreneurs 
typically draw upon. Thus, this small scale enterprise survey was initiated to explore these 
issues and provide some answers to yet pending research questions regarding the financial 
transactions of small scale enterprises. 
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2. Overview of The Survey 
A survey of 153 small scale manufacturing enterprises was carried out by the OSU 
team of researchers in March and April of 1992. The surveyed enterprises were randomly 
selected in the greater Banjul area. This area includes the capital, Banjul, and the 
surrounding suburbs, the Kombos. This dynamic urban area was chosen because it is the 
only setting in the country in which one finds a large and diverse number of manufacturing 
enterprises that could provide information about the issues in question. 
The following sections present an empirical profile of selected characteristics of these 
enterprises. These include first economic and business characteristics of the small scale 
enterprise sample. Second, the relevant business history of the entrepreneurs in the sample 
is documented along with relevant socio-economic data on the entrepreneurs in the sample. 
This description concludes with a brief discussion of the sources of funds and saving 
channels reported by the entrepreneurs. 
A Economic and Business Characteristics 
The enterprise survey covered four subsectors in the manufacturing sector. These 
consisted of bakeries, both traditional and modern, metal workshops, tailoring workshops 
and tie-dye producers. Roughly, 40 enterprises were surveyed in each subsector. Table VI-8 
provides the breakdown of the share of the number of enterprises in each subsector in the 
sample. Figures in table VI-8 also show that these enterprises are operated similarly by 
owners (84 percent). Few enterprises are operated by managers (4 percent) and even fewer 
(12 percent) are rented by entrepreneurs who pay their landlords a fixed rent per month. 
The average value of physical assets was 0128,727. This value, however, varies 
especially by subsector. Modem bakeries have electrical equipment and ovens, where the 
average value of physical assets is 01,387,238. On the other hand, traditional bakeries, rely 
on manual mixing and clay ovens for baking purposes with the average value of their 
physical assets only reaching 04,306. Tailor workshops have electrical and manual 
machinery with an average value of physical assets equal to 032,638. Metal workshops also 
have electrical and manual machinery where the value of the machinery is somewhat less 
expensive as the average value of physical assets is only 09,186. However, tie-dye producers 
need only some basic tools for their production process and the calculated average value of 
these tools equaled the lowest level of all the subsectors, only 0626. 
The average number of employees in the surveyed enterprises was 5 persons; 
however, the range of employees was from 1 to 26 workers. Thus, the sample includes 
micro, small and a few medium scale enterprises. Some enterprises have been in business 
for as long as 30 years and others have been in operation for only a year. The average 
business has been in operation for 10 years and the average business experience for an 
entrepreneur before starting her /his business was 5 years. 
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B. Business History of the Entrepreneur 
Small scale enterprises frequently have been characterized as consisting of many 
unemployed workers who operate mostly in the informal sector. In our sample, however, 
Table VI-9 indicates that 78 percent of the enterprises are registered with the area or city 
council, a government department that grants entrepreneurs licenses to operate their 
businesses. Roughly half of the interviewed entrepreneurs (51 percent) were employees 
before they decided to start their own businesses. Another 33 percent were already involved 
in another private business and 16 percent started by working in the same line of business. 
Most entrepreneurs have started their own businesses (83 percent). A large share 
of those entrepreneurs who are operating existing businesses (17 percent) are either renting 
them, as pointed out earlier, or they have inherited the business. Interestingly, a small 
group of entrepreneurs (23 percent) operate a secondary business or hold a job at the same 
time as they run their enterprise. When asked about the reason they started their business, 
almost half (45 percent) responded that they wanted to become self-employed (Table VI-9). 
Roughly, one fourth (26 percent) have inherited the family business; physical assets, and 
most indicated they also inherited the line of business. A very small share of the entrepre-
neurs ( 4 percent) reported that they started the business because they perceived a good 
opportunity in operating an enterprise in their subsector of activity. Finally, only a small 
percentage of the entrepreneurs (8 percent) reported that there was no other work available. 
C. Socio-Economic Characteristics 
The socio-economic characteristics of the entrepreneurs recorded in the survey are 
gender, marital status, educational level, age and household size (Table VI-10). The gender 
composition of the sample is 29 percent female and 71 percent male entrepreneurs. 
However, like other characteristics of the enterprise, these percentages vary by subsector. 
The two subsectors of bakeries and metal workshops are absolutely dominated by men, 
which is not surprising in this typically traditional society. However, the two other 
subsectors of tailoring and tie-dye work have a mix of female and male entrepreneurs. The 
tailoring workshops were 58 percent female operated and 42 percent male operated 
enterprises. The tie-dye producers were 57 percent female and 43 percent entrepreneurs. 
Interestingly, even married entrepreneurs keep separate accounts from their spouse's 
accounts in The Gambia, like most other countries in Africa. In the sample, 83 percent of 
the entrepreneurs are married and 17 percent either single or divorced. The average age 
of the entrepreneur is 38 years and the average household size the entrepreneur is 
responsible for is 10 members. The lack of adequate education is evident in the sample in 
that only 14 percent of the entrepreneurs have completed their high school education, 27 
percent have had some schooling, and 59 percent are illiterate. 
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3. Silmificance of the Existing Financial Channels 
The sources of finance and savings channels entrepreneurs draw upon are various. 
They fall into informal and formal spheres. The informal channels that were found to 
prevail in The Gambia include family, friends, suppliers credit, customer advances, Osusu 
groups (Rotating Credit and Savings Associations, or RoSCAs), and moneykeepers. The 
formal channels include commercial banks and the IBAS microenterprise program. Figure 
VI-1 presents a comprehensive diagram of these channels summarizing the key findings that 
will be discussed in more detailed tables through the succeeding sections. Compared to the 
wide array of informal financial channels, the formal· channels seem rather scant and limited 
in the role they have played as financial intermediaries. 
We first look at the source of initial capital. Second, we documented those sources 
financing current operations. Sources of financing, like other characteristics, vary by 
subsector of operation. Tables VI-11 and VI-12 conclude our discussion by presenting the 
sources of funds and savings channels by subsector of operation. 
A Initial Capital 
Initial capital was provided from personal savings for most entrepreneurs (92.1) 
operating metal workshops (Table VI-11). Only a small share (7.9 percent) reported taking 
a loan from family members. In contrast, only 15.4 percent of the modem bakeries were 
launched from personal savings. The large majority of the entrepreneurs operating modem 
bakeries (76.9 percent) reported using formal loans to initiate their businesses. However, 
these loans were granted by their foreign suppliers who provided the equipment through 
offshore financing arrangements and the bakers acquired access to local bank guarantees 
in order to repay their loans in installments. 
On the other hand, 69 percent of the traditional bakers initiated their businesses as 
an investment from personal savings. A small share (11.5 percent) reported using family 
sources to get established and another 19.2 percent reported using supplier credit for the 
purchase of input materials to start their businesses. 
Tailoring workshops and tie-dye producers exhibit a similar trend in acquiring their 
initial capital. Roughly half of each group ( 48 percent in the case of tailoring and 55 
percent in the case of tie-dye) started their business with personal savings. Roughly, one 
fourth reported using family funds (34 percent and 27 percent respectively), a few reported 
taking loans from friends (5.6 percent and 25 percent respectively) and less than a handful 
in each subsector (2.8 percent and 25 percent respectively) acquired a formal loan. Some 
tie-dye entrepreneurs started with some assistance from their suppliers where 125 percent 
accounted for supplier credit as a source of financing to start the business. 
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These statistics indicate, first, the heavy reliance on personal savings as a source of 
:financing to start business ventures by the majority of the small scale entrepreneurs ( 65 
percent) in all four subsectors. Second, loans from family members contribute 25 percent 
of the initial start-up capital while loans from suppliers only amount to 3 percent. Last, 
formal loans constitute a mere 7 percent in which more than half was acquired from 
offshore :financial institutions and suppliers for initial capital. 
B. Sources of Financing Current Operations 
Sources of finance for the current operations include both informal and formal 
channels, although, again they are concentrated on the informal side. First, all 
entrepreneurs (100 percent) operating in the four subsectors reported that they use retained 
earnings as a source of :financing for their current operations (Table VI-11). 
Second, about 67 percent of the entrepreneurs in the four subsectors reported that 
they draw upon informal sources of finance from other enterprises, or family and friends in 
their current operations. A more detailed break-up of the shares of entrepreneurs 
borrowing from each particular source, and lending these sources, is presented in figure Vi-
l. The informal sources are more significant in the case of the tie-dye producers which is 
relatively less profitable than the other activities surveyed. A large share of the 
entrepreneurs in this subsector (85 percent) borrow on an informal basis for their 
businesses. Traditional bakers (69 percent) and entrepreneurs operating metal workshops 
(68 percent) draw upon informal sources for small and short term loans in their current 
operations. This source may not be as important in the case of tailoring and modem 
bakeries; however, it is still significant Roughly half of the entrepreneurs in each of these 
two subsectors (54 percent of the modem bakeries and SO percent of the tailoring) reported 
using informal sources of :financing in their current operation. 
Third, 62 percent of the entrepreneurs in the total sample reported using customer 
advances to finance their business operations. This channel of :financing is very significant 
in tailoring and metal workshops. Customer advances were a source of financing for 97 
percent of the entrepreneurs operating metal workshops and for 92 percent of the 
entrepreneurs operating tailoring workshops. Roughly half of the tie-dye producers received 
customer advances to finance their production. None of the bakers, neither modem nor 
traditional, reported drawing on customer advances for financing their operations. However, 
entrepreneurs in this subsector draw on other sources as will be revealed below. 
Fourth, supplier credit is evidently an important source of financing for some 
entrepreneurs. It was reported to be used by 32 percent of the total sample. It stands out 
in the case of bakeries, both modem and traditional where 85 percent and 81 percent of the 
bakers respectively reported frequent use of this source of finance in purchasing their input 
materials. A limited number of tailors and tie-dye producers reported using supplier credit 
(22 percent of the tailoring workshops and 27 percent of the tie-dye producers, see Figure 
VI-1 and Table VI-11). In the case of metal workshops, supplier credit is non-existent. This 
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may be explained by a lack of competition in the case of steel suppliers whereas in the case 
of flour suppliers there are many importers and wholesalers who use credit as a marketing 
facility to gain a competitive edge on their rivals. 
Fifth, and last, a total of 23 percent of the interviewed entrepreneurs have acquired 
formal finance for the purpose of operating their businesses. Subsector differences indicate 
that formal loans are significant in the case of the modem bakeries and much less significant 
in the other subsectors. A large share of the modem bakers ( 69 percent) reported acquiring 
formal loans in their business, whereas none of the traditional bakers did. Few of the 
entrepreneurs operating metal workshops (10 percent) or tie-dye producers (22 percent) 
have acquired formal loans and about 39 percent of the tailors reported using formal loans 
in their businesses. 
The sources of finance may be characterized in a ranking order starting with the most 
to the least utilized. First is retained earning as the overwhelming source; second are 
informal sources from other enterprises, family and friends; third comes customer advances; 
fourth is supplier credit; and last is formal finance. This preliminary ranking order falls in 
line with the pecking order theory (Cuevas; Myers). 
This theory argues that firms choose to finance investments from internally generated 
funds first because this represents the safest source of finance (ie. does not jeopardize their 
complete control of their business). This implies that external sources of finance come 
second since this introduces a potential threat to the complete owner control of the business. 
In case external finance is required, again, the safest sources are drawn upon first, with 
informal external sources preferred to formal external financing because they do not bold 
the threat of loosing the enterprise which might be required as collateral for a formal loan. 
Among informal sources, family, friends and fellow entrepreneurs come first, followed by 
customers and last of all suppliers. Suppliers frequently are in a position to take serious 
measures to collect on delinquent loans. This may involve losing a source of input supplies 
and even control over the firm. 
C. Saving Channels 
Entrepreneurs save. Even the low-income producers who earn very little nevertheless 
save sufficient amount of monetary savings to operate their businesses and take care of their 
household needs. Entrepreneurs in the sample were found to participate in different savings 
channels. Formal channels consisted of accounts in commercial banks. The informal 
channels are represented by osusu groups and moneykeepers. Table VI-12 presents the 
share of entrepreneurs saving with formal institutions, osusu groups and moneykeepers by 
subsector of operation. 
Among the most common saving channels are the commercial banks. Roughly half 
of the entrepreneurs held at least one account with one of the four commercial banks in the 
country (Figure VI-1). Not surprisingly, most of the entrepreneurs operating modem baker-
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ies (90.9 percent) held accounts with formal institutions. About 86 percent of the tailors and 
50 percent of the metal workers held deposits with these institutions. Roughly 35 percent 
of the tie-dye producers also held accounts with formal institutions; however, none of the 
entrepreneurs operating traditional bakeries held an account with commercial banks. 
Osusu groups are the second most widely used saving channel among the 
entrepreneurs in the sample. About 30 percent of the entrepreneurs reported participating 
in osusu groups (Figure VI-1). The concentration of osusu groups is largely in the 
traditionally female dominated professions of tailoring and tie-dye work. These groups are 
vecy rare among the male dominated professions of metal working and bakeries. Only a 
handful of entrepreneurs in these two latter subsectors participate in osusu groups, whereas 
roughly half the entrepreneurs in the two former subsectors ( 44 percent in tailoring and 65 
percent in the tie-dye area) participate in these groups. This is further evidence that women 
in Africa more commonly function in groups (Osusus and Kafos) than do men. No doubt 
this reflects their more precarious economic position and the likelihood that a group of 
similarly situated female colleagues offers them a better opportunity to cope with cash flow 
and related financial problems. Men, on the other hand, apparently feel less need to work 
or save through such groups. 
Moneykeepers are the safe guards of those entrepreneurs who do not keep deposits 
with formal institutions and do not participate with osusu groups (12 percent of the total 
sample; Figure VI-1). This trend is evident among the entrepreneurs operating traditional 
bakeries. Among the traditional bakeries interviewed in the sample, 38 percent keep 
deposits with moneykeepers. Vecy few tie-dye producers do so where osusu groups are vecy 
active. In the case of entrepreneurs operating modem bakeries and those operating 
tailoring workshops, who deposit largely with commercial banks, none reported keeping 
deposits with moneykeepers. Thus, moneykeepers would appear to service the lower income 
strata in our sample, especially among male entrepreneurs. 
In snmmacy, the wide array of savings channels and the different concentrations of 
entrepreneurs by subsector among these channels indicates a vecy important finding. 
Monetary savings are vecy important to entrepreneurs. Almost evecy entrepreneur has used 
at least one savings channel to keep her/his deposits as a means to manage their liquidity. 
IV. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Summazy of IBAS Pro&ram 
The IBAS microenterprise program of the mid to late 1980's recorded substantial 
defaults. As of June 1991, 44 percent of the total portfolio comprised of three separate 
donor funding sources were in default. Factoring this finding into a risk premium which in 
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turn was incorporated into total lending costs concludes that the program could only have 
broken even if it had charged interest rates as high as 92 percent to make up for the default 
losses. Such a measure was, of course, not feasible, but the dramatic results serve a useful 
purpose here by highlighting the severe financial shortcomings of the program and that the 
interest rates charged in the programs were mere token gestures at pricing loans to cover 
default losses. Such a program can only function through a substantial flow of subsidies 
from donors or the government since. loan recoveries are insufficient to maintain the 
revolving funds behind the program, or cover the costs incurred in servicing the program. 
Not surprisingly, high arrears were associated with large, long term loans as compared to 
other loan characteristics. 
2. Critiques and Recommendations 
In the face of these serious program deficiencies, recent attempts at program reforms 
were undertaken to improve program performance. IBAS has assumed complete 
responsibility for loan recovery, a function previously carried out with a guarantee program 
by the former GCDB. Political intervention in the allocation of funds have allegedly been 
lessened. Collateral in the form of a guarantor's bank account is presumably able to be 
assessed in the event of default. However, interest rates (14 percent) are still substantially 
below market rates (e.g. 20-26 percent), risk-prone longer terms loans are still emphasized, 
and administrative costs of the program are still covered by subsidies issued through the 
government's budget. It is unlikely that the program could even cover its costs with such 
a low interest rate (14 percent) even if the default problem is reduced substantially from its 
past high levels. 
A New Information System 
An important strategy to reduce the risks of default would be to introduce a loan 
tracking information system. This approach quickly identifies shortfalls in installment repay-
ments over amounts due for long term loans and then correlates this with loan properties 
and borrower characteristics. This contributes to risk management in two ways. First, one 
could immediately address the problem of default early in the history of the loan and 
immediately confront borrowers before any delinquent habits have been locked in place by 
inertia. Second, management could easily generate valuable information on the aggregate 
profile of loan arrears by borrower and loan type. This could create a risk/return profile 
by borrower type and business characteristics that could be used by loan officers evaluating 
new loan proposals. Such a system would allow IBAS to engage in more efficient risk 
management, thereby lowering its default losses and prolonging the life of its revolving 
funds. 
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B. Cost Effectiveness of the Program 
The issue for the government to face is whether the program is at least cost effective, 
i.e. whether it is economizing in the most efficient manner the budgeted resources per loan 
issued and recovered and secondly, whether there are a sufficient number of deserving non-
delinquent beneficiaries to justify the budgetary costs involved. In short, authorities would 
have to estimate the opportunity cost of using public monies in this fashion rather than in 
some alternative use recognizing that there is a substantial default problem in this loan 
program. 
C. One Time Only Loan Practice 
A controversial issue in the current IBAS program is the fact that a large majority 
of the borrowers are one time only clients. While there is no explicit restriction limiting 
borrowers to one loan, only a handful of entrepreneurs have received two loans in the 
current portfolio. IBAS authorities try to reach as large a number of microentrepreneurs 
as possible. They should be more interested in inculcating good loan habits over time and 
training their borrowers to manage financial flows in a sustained fashion with a more slowly 
growing clientele. The "one-shot" philosophy can develop a "turn-key" flavor in that the goal 
is to quickly allow the microentrepreneurs to buy some investment goods and then abruptly 
turn them loose to get on with business of production without any further access to finance 
from the program. This philosophy overlooks the equally important role that financial 
services should play in the process of modernizing small scale manufacturing activities. 
Once investment loans have been issued to a responsible borrower and her or his equipment 
is in place, smaller working capital loans could play a useful role in allowing 
microentrepreneurs to generate a higher stream of retained earnings for future investment. 
Another weakness of this single loan approach is the probable impact it has on loan 
recovery. Ha borrower does not gain a reward of continuing access to financial services 
through repaying his/her loan, then there is little incentive to do so. One suspects this may 
have played a role in the high arrears of the earlier programs descn"bed in this chapter. 
Given the fact that poor loan recovery quickly erodes a revolving fund, thereby hastening 
the end of the loan program, it would be in the interest of IBAS authorities to build more 
tangible incentives for loan repayment into their current program by permitting follow-up 
working capital loans to previous borrowers in good standing. In the end, IBAS would be 
servicing a smaller number of clients, but the program would be servicing these clients over 
a longer period of time with more sustained financial services (for those responsible borrow-
ers repaying their loans) thereby graduating them into more secure business growth in the 
future. At the same time, the revolving fund would not be eroded through negative incen-
tives creating poor loan recovery. In addition, IBAS gains additional valuable information 
on the borrowers performance that can allow it to screen its clientele more efficiently for 
future loan services. In conclusion, we recommend that IBAS continue working with the 
remaining volume of the revolving fund at their disposal to implement the above suggestions 
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for a trial period of one to two years. In the meantime, no new funding for credit should 
be permitted until results can be determined from these new program guidelines. 
3. Snmmazy of OSU Small Sca}e Enterprise Survey 
Finally, a random sample survey carried by the OSU team in Greater Banjul 
underscored many revealing operational characteristics and financial channels servicing 
micro and small scale entrepreneurs in the Gambia. One hundred and fifty three 
entrepreneurs were interviewed divided equally into four key subsectors: bakeries, metal 
workshops, tailors, and tie and dye producers. Most were owner-operated with an average 
of 5 employees and a modest physical asset base of D 128,727. A majority of these small 
scale operators were working for someone else before launching their own business. Most 
were illiterate (59 percent) with an average age of 38 years and were members of fairly 
large households (10 members on average). Seventy percent were men and about 30 
percent women entrepreneurs. Further, there was a distinct gender profile with female 
entrepreneurs accounting for a majority of the tailoring establishments and tie-dye 
operations unlike male operators who were predominant as bakers and metal workers. 
A substantial majority of these entrepreneurs launched their businesses with personal 
savings rather than with external loans. The single exception to this rule was the subset of 
modem bakers who received off-shore :financing for their equipment. All owner-operators 
drew heavily on retained earnings for their working capital. Next in order of priority was 
informal borrowing from family and friends. In third rank were advances from customers. 
These stood out in tailoring enterprises and metal workshops. Last in rank order was 
suppliers credit and formal loans. The former was most visible in the bakeries subsector 
and the later in the modem bakeries subsector. This descending rank order of funding 
sources follows the pecking order theory common to businesses in developed countries in 
which the safest source of finance (that does not jeopardize the entrepreneur's ownership 
control over her /his business), retained earnings, is used first, followed by various external 
sources in descending order of increased risk to the entrepreneur's control over her /his 
business. 
All operators used both formal and informal savings instruments with formal bank 
savings accounts standing out for the relatively modem bakeries and tailoring subsectors and 
informal group savings or moneykeeper services used by the other more traditional 
subsectors. Women entrepreneurs more commonly operated through group savings vehicles 
(Osusus) while traditional male operators used moneykeepers. 
Given the meager presence of formal loans through IBAS or through banks in this 
random sample of small scale operators, large expensive microenterprise programs can only 
hope to reach a very small subset of these producers. Therefore, it is all the more 
important to keep in mind that these producers can only be reached by more broad based 
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macroeconomic and trade policies. They are all universally impacted by any government 
regulations or policies that affect their costs or revenues such as tariffs, taxes, registration 
fees, access to foreign exchange, price controls, etc. Generally speaking the more open and 
liberalized the economy, the better the economic environment for microentrepreneurs. In 
conclusion, the recent liberalization of the Gambian economy has produced a more positive 
environment for such small scale operators. It is to be hoped that such policies continue 
and the transaction costs of registration and licensing be held at a minimum for these 
operations. 
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Table VI-1 Financial Indicators and Related Characteristics or the Indigenous Business Advisory Service 
(IBAS) Portfolio by Program Funding Source as or Juee 1991. 
Program 
EEC UNCDF Government Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Started 1986 1985 1987 
No. of Borrowers 121 188 124 433 
Male Borrowers 47% 64% 91% 67% 
Female Borrowers 53% 36% 9% 33% 
Disbursement1 1,017;19'7 2,797;11)4 1,140,788 4,955,290 
Amount Due1 1,261,763 3,557,591 1,345,512 6,164,867 
Total lnterest1 244,466 760$7 204,723 t.;l11},5n 
Av. Loan Sire1 8,407 14,879 9,200 11,444 
Av. Maturity (months) 23 27 33 27 
Av. Interest Rate (%) 11.6% 10.5% 6.8% 9.7% 
Arrears1 344,078 1,316,007 1,034,520 2,694,605 
Arrears Rate(%) 213% 37% n% 44% 
Source: Information derived from IBAS records. 
Note 1: All amounts are in Dalasis. 
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Table VI-2 Cumulative Distribution of Loan Amounts Granted by Procram Source of Funds as of June 
1991. 
Program 
EEC UNCDF Government Total 
Loan Amount 
Categories (in 
Dalasis) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0- 3000 23 (19.6) 21 (11.2) s (4.0) SS (113) 
3001- 6000 36 (29.7) 49 ('1:1.6) 8 (6.5) 101 (22.3) 
6001- 9000 24 (19.8) 44 (23.4) 46 (37.0) 123 (26.3) 
9001-12000 15 (12.4) 28 (14.9) Sl (41.0) 97 (21.7) 
12001 - 15000 14 (11~6) 2 (1.0) 9 (7.0) 12 (S.8) 
15001 - 25000 2 (1.5) 15 (8.0) s (4.0) 22 (S.O) 
25001 - 35000 1 (0.7) 4 (2.1) 0 (0.0) s (1.1) 
35001 - 45000 3 (2.5) s (2.6) 0 (0.0) 8 (1.8) 
45001 - 65000 0 (0.0) 8 (4.2) 0 (0.0) 9 (1.8) 
65001 - 85000 2 (1.5) 3 (1.6) 0 (0.0) s {1.1) 
85001 - 100000 0 (0.0) 6 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 6 (1.4) 
Above 100000 1 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 
Total Number 121 (100.0) 188 (100.0) 124 (100.0) 433 (100.0) 
of Loans (and 
percent) 
Source: Same as Table VI-1. 
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Table VI-3 Selected Characteristics or the Total IBAS Portfolio by Gender. 
Male Borrowers Female Borrowers 
(1) (2) 
Average Loan Si7.e (D) 13,111 7,789 
Average Maturity (months) 28 25 
Average Interest Rate(%) 9.8 9.4 
Arrears Rate (%) 63.1 26.8 
Source: same as Table VI-1. 
Table VI-4 Sectoral Dis1ribution or Enterprises Seniced by IBAS by Funding Source as or June 1991. 
Program 
EEC UNCDF Government Total 
Sector No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Services 63 (52%) 66 (35%) 67 (54%) 196 (45%) 
Manufacturing 58 (48%) 103 (55%) 18 (14%) 179 (41%) 
Agriculture 0 (0%) 18 (9.6%) 36 (29%) 54 (13%) 
TOTAL 121 (28%) 188 (43%) 124 (29%) 433 (100%) 
Source: same as Table VI-1. 
Table VI-S 
Amount of 
Arrears 
0 = Fully 
Repaid Loans 
1- 3000 
3001- 6000 
6001- 9000 
9001-12000 
12001 - 15000 
15001 - 25000 
25001 - 35000 
35001 - 45000 
45001 - 65000 
65001 - 85000 
85001 - 100000 
Above 100000 
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Distribution of Delinquent Loans by Range of Anears and Program Source of Funding as of 
June 1991. 
Program 
EEC UNCDF Government Total 
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
87 (72.0%) 105 (56.0%) 2 (L6%) 196 (45.0%) 
20 (16.5) 37 (20.0) 7 (5.6) 64 (14.8) 
3 (2.5) 9 (4.8) 22 (17.7) 34 (7.8) 
5 (4.1) 6 (3.2) 43 (34.7) 54 (12.5) 
1 (0.8) 5 (2.6) 34 (27.4) 40 (9.2) 
1 (0.8) 4 (2.1) 8 (6.4) 13 (3.0) 
0 (0.0) 5 (2.6) 8 (6.4) 13 (3.0) 
0 (0.0) 3 (1.6) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.7) 
1 (0.8) 3 (L6) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.9) 
1 (0.8) 3 (1.6) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.9) 
1 (0.8) 5 (2.6) 0 (0.0) 6 (1.4) 
1 (0.8) 3 (1.6) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.4) 
Source: same as Table VI-1. 
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Table VI~ Definition of Variables in the Loan Repayment Model. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ARREARATE Arrears Rate 
I.AMT Amount of Loan Granted1 
IR Nominal Interest Rate in Percent 
MAT Loan Period in Months 
GOV Source of Funds Dummy Variable; l=Govemment Program 
UNCDF Source of Funds Dummy Variable; 1= UNCDF Program 
GENDER Gender Dummy Variable; l=Male 
AGR Sector Dummy Variable; !=Agriculture 
Note 1: All values are in dalasis. 
Table VJ-7 Regression Coefficients for the Loan Repayment Model. 
Variable 
I.AMT 
IR 
MAT 
GOV 
UNCDF 
GENDER 
AGR 
F-Value 
Note 1: Amount in dalasis. 
N = 41.8 Observations 
• Significant at 1 percent level 
Arrears 
Coefficient 
(1) 
0.01 
3.22 
1.76 
74.44 
4.74 
-2.13 
2.68 
0.67 
127.401 
T-Ratio 
(2) 
7.CKJ• 
1235• 
7.85* 
17.54* 
1.46 
-0.71 
0.65 
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Table VI-8 Economic and Business Characteristics of Sample Finns in the Small Scale Enterprise 
Survey. 
Bakeries 
Metal Workshops 
Tailoring Workshops 
Tie-Dye 
Total 
Qwnership Structure 
Owners 
Managers 
Rental 
EstabJishment Profile 
Average Number of Years in Operation 
Average Years of Previous Experience 
Average Number of Current Employees 
Average Size of Physical Assets 
Source: Enterprise Survey. 
Number 
(1) 
39 
38 
36 
40 
153 
128 
6 
19 
Percent 
(2) 
25% 
25% 
24% 
26% 
100% 
84% 
4% 
12% 
10 years 
5 years 
5 
D 128,7rl 
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Table VI-9 Relevant Business History or Entrepreneurs in the Small Scale Enterprise Seney. 
Previous Employment 
Started with this Business 
Other Private Business 
Employee 
History of Business 
Original Owner 
Business Already Existed 
Reason for Beg in Private Business 
Self Employment 
Good Opportunity 
Family Business 
The only Profession he/she Knows 
No other Business was Available 
Source: Enterprise Survey 
16% 
33% 
51% 
83% 
17% 
45% 
4% 
26% 
16% 
8% 
Table VI-10 Socio-Economic Characteristics or the Entrepreneurs in the Small Scale Enterprise Survey. 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Marital Status 
Married 
Single/Divorced 
Education Level 
High School Graduate 
1-11 Years of High School 
Illiterate 
Average Age 
Average Household Si7.e 
Source: Enterprise Survey 
71% 
29% 
83% 
17% 
14% 
27% 
59% 
38 years 
lOmembers 
Figure VI-1 
Sources of Financing and Savings Channels Identified in the Small Scale Enterprise Survey 
M.:l.croenterpri.se 
Forma1 F.:l.nanc.:l.a1 
J:nst.:l.tut.:l.ons 
Off shore 
Banks Programs 
Forma1 sector 
:Informa1 sector 
Moneykeepers 
osusu 
Groups 
~o• epoej,ce 
14• 
1oane 
Off shore 
Supp1.1ers of 
Modern Baker.1.es 
•• 1oana 
10• 1oana o• 
Forma1 Sector 
·------------~ Micro and Smaii Scaie Enterprise 
(153 enterprises) J:nforma1 Sector 
•:a• &so• 
so• 
.111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
.&a• 
!Other Enterpr.:l.ses I 
'"" IFr.:l.ends] 
I Re1at.:l.ves I 
%: Share of entrepreneurs engaged in a financial contract (either receiving or granting loans or placing deposits or savings) with the identified 
economic agent. 
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Table VI-11 llistorical Sources of Capital and Current Funding Sources Reported In the Small Scale 
Enterprise Suney. 
Bakeries 
Metal Tailor Tie-Dye 
Modem Traditional Workshops Workshops Producers 
Initial Ca.lzit:al 
Personal Investment from Savings 15.4% 69.2% 92.1% 48% 55% 
Family 7.7% 11.5% 7.9% 34% 'ZT.5% 
Friends 0% 0% 0% 5.6% 2.5% 
Formal Loan 76.9% 0% 0% 2.8% 9.5% 
Supplier Loan 7.7% 19.2% 0% 0% 12.5% 
Sources Of Funds fm: Current 
0,perations 
Entrepreneurs Using Retained 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Earnings 
Entrepreneurs Using Informal 54% 69% 68% 50% 85% 
Loans 
Entrepreneurs Using Formal 59% 0% 10% 39% 22% 
Loans 
Entrepreneurs Using Supplier 85% 81% 0% 22% 'Z1% 
Credit 
Entrepreneurs Using Customer 0% 0% 97% 92% 50% 
Credit/ Advance 
Formal Loans 
Received a Loan in the Past Five 61.5% 0% 0% 29.6% 17.5% 
Years 
Received a Loan in the Past One 38.5% 0% 0% 11.4% 2.5% 
Year 
Ever Received a Loan 61.5% 0% 16% 47% 25% 
Source: Enterprise Survey. 
Note: % corresponds to percentage of the sample. 
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Table VI-12 Savings Channels Reported in the Small Scale Enterprise Survey. 
Bakeries 
Metal Tailor Tie-Dye 
Workshops Workshops Producers 
Modem Traditional 
Savin~ 
Share of Sample Entre-
preneurs With Deposits in 90.9% 0% 16% 47% 25% 
Formal Institution 
lnfQrmil! QrQg 
Entrepreneurs Participating in 0% 8% 5% 44% 65% 
Informal Groups 
Average Sae of Contn"bution 0 30 106 300 167 
(D) 
MQneykCCj>Cr 
Entrepreneurs Saving with 0% 38.5% 16% 0% 1.5% 
Moneykeeper 
Average si7.e of Deposit (D) 0 120 587 0 333 
Source: Enterprise Survey. 
Note: % corresponds to percentage of the sample. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMMODI1Y AND FINANCIAL FLOWS THROUGH THE MARKETING CHANNELS 
OF TIIE FERTILIZER SECTOR IN THE GAMBIA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985, the 
fertilizer sector in The Gambia has undergone a gradual process of liberalization. The 
evolving stages of privatization and liberalization of the sector relaxed legal barriers to entry 
and tried to encourage private entrepreneurs to perform four functions in the acquisition 
and distribution of inputs to final consumers: importing, wholesaling, retailing and re-
exporting.1 The response from private entrepreneurs has been limited to date, but the 
number of fertilizer trade channels has increased, and the participants within each trade 
channel have changed. 
Currently, the various stages of fertilizer trade including importation and distribution 
are conducted through multiple trade channels that increase the timely availability of 
fertilizer. These channels include heterogenous formal, semi-formal and informal 
participants who compete and collaborate with each other using diverse market technologies. 
The fertilizer trade involves a flow of financial services provided under different 
contract terms and conditions by diverse types of financial sources. The trade and financial 
channels are often intertwined promoting linkages among the heterogenous agents within 
and across trade channels. 
While the proliferation of trade channels indicates numerous sources of supply, the 
lethargic response from private entrepreneurs raises serious doubts about the 
competitiveness and profitability of the fertilizer trade.2 The continued involvement of the 
government in the sector through its special programs and the targeted programs of NGOs 
have distorted the fertilizer distribution system and have created market fragmentation. 
• We acknowledge with appreciation the valuable assistance provided by Mr. Gai (GCU), Mr. Christenssen 
(FAO), Mr. Soussier (AATG), Mr. Mukthara (RPE), Mr Dibba (JP), Mr. Brewis (GPMB), FAQ private dealers, 
and several farmers in conducting this study. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 The input market is composed of an array of sectors that involve trading in fertilizer, farm machinery and 
equipment, seeds and plant protection chemicals. This chapter is limited to the fertilizer sector. 
2 Chapter VIII reports on how the liberalization of commodity markets in 1985 has resulted in the active 
participation of private entrepreneurs and a contestable market for basic food commodities. 
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Fertilizer is thought to be an important input in increasing returns to the agricultural 
sector.3 If fertilizer is truly an important production input, it is important, therefore, to 
create a viable fertilizer system that will provide a wide access to fertilizers by farmers 
throughout the country. The disappointing performance of public sector fertilizer 
importation and distribution led policy makers to opt for a private sector alternative when 
it embarked on the ERP in 1985. Several issues need to be addressed, however, in order 
to understand how the private sector may respond to fertilizer privatization in the future. 
Can private entrepreneurs function as independent and potential alternative channels? 
What are the major constraints that restrict their active participation in the sector? Are any 
special incentives necessary to induce private entrepreneurs to provide an efficient 
marketing channel? What should be the role of the· government, NGOs, and international 
agencies in the sector? What role do financial markets need to play to support the 
development of a viable fertilizer distribution system? 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the fertilizer sector and from this analysis 
derive implications that can be used to formulate appropriate policies for the fertilizer 
sector. Specifically, the chapter: 
• describes the evolution of the fertilizer marketing system over time and documents 
the various types of formal, semi-formal and informal trade channels and participants 
that currently constitute the fertilizer sector; 
• explains the nature of the linkages that exist within and across the trade channels, 
and the heterogenous trade arrangements that facilitate the flow of fertilizers to 
farmers through various channels; 
• analyzes the formal and informal financial contracts that facilitate the flow of 
fertilizer; and 
• identifies the major constraints that still impede the development of a viable and 
competitive fertilizer marketing system. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The current Gambian fertilizer sector is composed of diverse types of formal, semi-
formal and informal agents or participants who compete and coordinate with each other to 
facilitate the flow of fertilizers through various channels to farmers.4 The flow of 
3 It has been estimated that 01 spent on fertilizers will increase benefits from agricultural production by 
02.67 to 03.08 (Braun et al., 1990). 
4 The terms agents and participants are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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commodities in a specific sector in a specific market through different channels involving 
hetero~ participants under a competitive institutional and regulatmy environment 
cannot be adequately analyzed by simply examining individual channels in isolation or 
through cross-section studies that only involve final consumers. However, a subsector 
approach that considers interactions, both competitive and complementary, among diverse 
agents and channels in a specific market is an appropriate methodological tool to examine 
a dynamic sector characterized by heterogenous participants. Therefore, this study 
employed a subsector approach (Boomgard, et al., 1986). 
The subsector approach follows the principals of the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) school of thought to examine the vertical integration that facilitates coordination 
among diverse types of agents and contracts.5 It is based on the concepts of verticality, 
coordination among channels, competition between channels, and leverage in a specific 
market engaged in production/ distribution. By focusing on a single market, the subsector 
approach helps identify the institutional relationships that affect competitive positions of the 
various channels, the ease of coordination among the channels and obstacles to growth in 
different channels (Boomgard et al., 1992). 
The research methodology employed in this fertilizer study can be summarized as 
follows: 
• The fertilizer sector was selected because of its importance in the input market, and 
because it has undergone important changes in its composition due to deregulation of the 
input markets. It is generally believed that the use of fertilizer contn"butes significantly to 
agricultural production. For example, Table VII-1 reports the FAO estimates of the impact 
of fertilizers on agricultural productivity. These estimates indicate a significant agricultural 
productivity response to fertilizer applications. While the value cost ratio is estimated to 
have declined over the past five years due to adverse input and ourit price ratios, the 
additional revenue from fertilizer use is still estimated to be positive. 
• The number, size, functions and type of formal and informal trade channels were 
identified, along with the principal participants involved in these diverse channels and the 
coordinating mechanisms in terms of contract terms and conditions that link the 
heterogenous participants within the channels. 
• Quantitative and qualitative data were collected through an examination of official 
records, field interviews with sector participants at various levels using systematic sampling 
procedures, and the direct observation of key operations by the research team. 
5 See Nabli and Nugent (1989) for further details on New Institutional Economics. 
6 The value cost ratio is calcuJated as a proportion relating the difference in crop revenue with and without 
fertili7.er use to the cost of fertili7.er. The FAQ estimates use data from yields obtained on fertili7.er demon-
stration plots and indicate the value added effect of chemical fertili7.er use under these controlled conditions. 
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• The competitiveness and coordination among various channels were examined to 
assess the implications of proposed changes in inter- and intra-channel relationships. 
It was discovered that the fertilizer sector includes heterogenous formal, semi-formal 
and informal agents operating through various channels to supply fertilizer to the final con-
sumers. For the purposes of this chapter, the formal participants were defined to include 
the PAO, the GCU, and government development projects.7 Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions (NGOs) and Registered Private Entrepreneurs (RPEs) were classified as semi-formal 
participants while Unregistered Private Entrepreneurs (UPEs)8 and informal groups like 
kafos were classified as informal participants.9 The informal participants operate indepen-
dently or link with formal participants to facilitate the flow of fertilizers to the consumers. 
The study carried out detailed interviews with four types of participants at all marketing 
levels: importers, wholesalers, retailers and final consumers. The importers and wholesalers 
were the GPMB, the GCU, the PAO, the GOG, the RPEs and the UPEs, while the retail 
distributors included the Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies (CPMS), the PAO 
supported Private Dealers Network (PDN), government projects, the RPEs, the NGOs, the 
UPEs and kafos. 
Table VII-2 presents the composition and size of the sample of market participants 
interviewed at all marketing levels in the fertilizer sector. The sample size at each level 
within the market channels was dictated by logistical reasons. While all importers and 
wholesalers were interviewed due to their small number, a stratified random sampling 
procedure was followed to choose retailers located in all five divisions of the country.10 
The choice of private fertilizer retailers affiliated with the F AO was based on geographic 
location, and previous performance and gender, while the choice of CPMS was based on 
geographic location and previous performance in input marketing (see Appendices VII-1 and 
VII-2 for a list of those sampled). Officials in government projects like the Jahally-Pacharr 
7 The government development programs include the Jahally-Pacharr Irrigated Rice Development Project 
(JP project), the Cotton Development Project (CDP) and the Upper River Division Irrigation Project (URDIP). 
8 The RPEs are licensed by the Department of Business and Commerce. The UPEs are unlicensed and 
usually operate in parallel markets. 
9 Kafos are informal groups of varying strengths and cohesiveness that are multifunctional in nature. These 
groups are homogenous in terms of members' age, ethnicity, heritage, gender and occupation but have various 
membership sizes. In general, members of farmer kafos cultivate a common plot of groundnuts, cereals or 
vegetables and contribute the sale proceeds to a common village fund. This village fund functions as an 
insurance substitute to primarily mitigate village level contingencies and, to a lesser extent, member 
contingencies. Some kaf os also undertake savings and credit activities on an organized basis (see Shipton in 
Adams and Fitchett, 1992, for further details). 
10 The five divisions are Western Division (WD), Lower River Division (LRD), MaCarthy Island Division 
(MID), North Bank Division (NBD) and Upper River Division (URD). 
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Rice Project (JP) and the Department of Agriculture were also interviewed along with 
officers in the NGO Action Aid, The Gambia {AATG).11 
To assess the extent of farmer access to the CPMS and to the F AO private dealers, 
a purposive sample of 14 villages was selected that were located in the market area of the 
sampled CPMS and FAO private entrepreneur stores (see Appendix VII-3 for a list of the 
sample villages). In these villages, several farmers and kafos were interviewed in groups 
using the rapid appraisal technique rather than using structured questionnaires that are 
usually administered to individuals. 
Some of the information needed for this study may be considered to be sensitive, 
especially for private entrepreneurs involved in importing and marketing fertilizer. For this 
reason, informal interviews were conducted with participants at all levels using unstructured 
questionnaires designed to gather qualitative data on the nature of operations, number and 
type of clients, sources of finance, type of competitors, and major constraints faced by the 
respondents. In addition, several official documents like annual reports, financial 
statements, consultant reports and government memorandums were consulted to gather 
quantitative data on the size of the sector, mode of operation and sources of finance. 
III. ANALYSIS 
1. The Fertilizer Sector 
During the late 1970s, the Government of The Gambia (GOG) gave high priority to 
increasing agricultural production through the adoption of modem technology. The use of 
agricultural inputs like modem seed varieties, chemical fertilizers and plant protection 
materials were stimulated to boost agricultural productivity. Government programs and 
agricultural extension services were, therefore, coordinated with international agencies like 
the Food and Agricultural Organization {FAO) to develop farmers' awareness about fertili-
zer use. A supply-leading strategy of input price subsidies was followed to raise the demand 
for production-augmenting chemical fertilizers. Fertilizer was distributed either free or at 
a retail price that represented only 15-30 percent of the actual CIF price.12 Consequently, 
fertilizer consumption increased as farmers responded to these subsidized prices. Table VII-
3 reports the FAO estimates of fertilizer consumption which amounted to only about 400 
tons of nutrients in 1972 but rose to 4,000 tons by 1980. During the 1980s, fertilizer use 
fluctuated widely, ranging from a peak of 4,500 tons in 1984 to a low of 1,645 tons in 1986. 
11 While AATG was the only NGO that distributes fertilizer, the JP was selected for logistical reasons as 
it was very active around Sapu, the sample area chosen for gathering data included in chapter V in this report. 
12 See GCU Annual Report, 1991. 
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The induced effect of subsidies on fertilizer consumption is shown in Table VIl-3 by the 
sharp decline in fertilizer consumption after 1984 when the government phased out subsidies 
and deregulated the fertilizer sector.13 
The growing fertilizer demand was met by government parastatals like the Gambia 
Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) and the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) in the early 
1980s. These parastatals, however, suffered from mismanagement leading to poor marketing 
services, and required huge government subsidies to sustain their operations (Clark, 1987). 
The country's increasing external debt problem in the early 1980s restrained continued go-
vernment support of the parastatals.14 Inadequate and inconsistent fertilizer policies along 
with incompetent management of the parastatals led to input market inefficiencies and esti-
mates of a reduction in agricultural production.15 The need for a more efficient and self-
sustaining fertilizer sector became obvious. Therefore, in June 1985, the government em-
barked on the ERP that suggested liberalization of the fertilizer sector to improve market 
efficiency through a competitive private sector. The fertilizer sector was deregulated, price 
subsidies were phased out and private entrepreneurs were encouraged to enter and compete 
in the sector. 
The implementation of the ERP has had a profound influence on the composition 
and market share of the various fertilizer trade channels. The deregulated policy 
environment aimed at promoting competition in the fertilizer sector through the active 
participation of private entrepreneurs. A competitive market system was expected to 
provide efficient alternative trade channels that would improve farmer access to fertilizer. 
While government parastatals were the sole participants in the fertilizer sector in the 
pre ERP period, a number of private entrepreneurs entered the market in the post ERP 
period. However, the response by private entrepreneurs to enter the fertilizer importing and 
wholesaling business has been limited due to capital constraints, uncertainty in the 
government's fertilizer policy, low profit margins compared to other commercial activities, 
high fertilizer carry-over, market risk, and a lack of entrepreneurial experience in fertilizer 
marketing.16 Therefore, the Department of Agriculture engaged in fertilizer importation 
on an emergency basis using Italian grants from 1986 to 1989. The fertilizer was distributed 
13 It is interesting to note that the sharp decline in fertilizer use after 1985 did not appear to affect yields 
of major crops such as groundnuts, maize and millet in a significant way. The reduction in yields in 1990-91 was 
due to severe droughts during the early crop production cycle. There are two possible explanations: (i) low 
output response to fertilizers, (ii) overuse of cheap fertilizers in pre ERP period. The implications of these 
observations will be discussed later. 
14 See Chapter I for details. 
15 It was estimated that the delay in fertilizer distribution in 1985 resulted in a reduction amounting to 10% 
of agricultural GDP (FAO, 1991). 
16 See FAQ, 1991. 
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to farmers through the GCU during 1986-87, and through the GCU and the FAQ with its 
network of private dealers selling to farmers since 1988.17 Consequently, following the 
ERP a number of heterogenous agents entered the fertilizer sector leading to a change in 
the composition of the marketing channels involved in fertilizer distribution. 
2. The Participants 
The fertilizer marketing system changed substantially following the ERP. Table VII-4 
presents the evolution of the marketing system from 1974 to 1991. The presence of multiple 
channels and participants in the post ERP fertilizer sector is obvious. While participation 
by private entrepreneurs was negligible before the ERP, there has been a limited response 
in the post ERP period. 
A Pre ERP Period 
Until 1985, there were no fertilizer production/mixing units in The Gambia. 
Therefore, the GPMB was exclusively entrusted with fertilizer importation through its 
London office. The volume of fertilizer imports is presented in Table VII-5.18 The 
imports were based on an estimate of national fertilizer demand provided by the 
Department of Agriculture. The GPMB also functioned as a wholesaler. The marketing 
margins and the retail price of inputs, which often involved subsidies, were determined by 
the GPMB in consultation with the government. Fertilizer retailing was primarily carried 
out by the GCU through its affiliated 86 Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies (CPMS) 
and several government projects. 
Private entrepreneurs were considered to be a viable alternative method to retail fer-
tilizer in the late 1970s. A pilot project was initiated in 1979 through funds from the F AO 
under the Fertilizer Marketing and Credit Assistance Project to incorporate private entre-
preneurs into fertilizer retailing. About 50 RPEs were used to distribute 204 tons of fertili-
zers. The program collapsed, however, due to a lack of government support and low profit 
margins for the traders.19 Nonetheless, a parallel market operated through UPEs. These 
UPEs were often involved in petty fertilizer import and export transactions through cross 
border trade, especially with Senegal. The direction of fertilizer flow was influenced by 
17 Because of the weak voluntary response by private entrepreneurs, FAO established a Private Dealer 
Network in 1988 to incorporate private entrepreneurs into fertilizer trading, especially at the retail level. 
18 The quantity of fertilizer imports in 1988 was low due to huge stocks carried from the previous years. 
19 The government supplied fertilizers at a subsidized rate immediately after introducing the private 
entrepreneurs (PEs) into the market, and the PEs could not compete without subsidization. The lack of 
commitment from the government towards the PEs discouraged them from continuing in the fertilizer market. 
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fertilizer price policies followed in The Gambia and Senegal. While there is no official 
documentation on the volume of fertilizer transacted through these informal channels, it was 
reported to be minimal. 
B. Post ERP period 
With the implementation of the ERP in 1986, the GPMB was divested of fertilizer 
importation. Import tariffs were lowered and price subsidies were discontinued in 1987 as 
shown in Table VII-6. While the subsidies ranged from 6 to 80 percent in the pre ERP 
period, they were gradually reduced to zero after 1986. In the post ERP period, fertilizer 
prices at the wholesale and retail level were based on world market prices. Private 
entrepreneurs were encouraged to actively participate in fertilizer imports, distribution and 
reexports. The volume of fertilizer imports and its distribution through various channels is 
presented in Table VII-5 and Table VIl-7.20 
a.) Importation of fertilizers 
Whereas the ERP reduced import tariffs and regulation which favored private entre-
preneurs, they were unable to engage in fertilizer importation reportedly due to capital con-
straints, access to foreign exchange, uncertainty in the government's fertilizer policy, low 
profit margins compared to other commercial activities, high carry-over and market risks due 
to slow turn-over, and a lack of marketing experience. Therefore, the Department of 
Agriculture imported fertilizer through grants from the Italian government during the 1986-
89 period. With the drying up of Italian grants in 1989, the GCU, the FAO, the GOG and 
a few RPEs (with the help of FAO) got involved in fertilizer importation. While there is 
anecdotal evidence on importation by UPEs through cross border trade with Senegal, it is 
difficult to quantify the volume transacted. 
b.) Wholesale Fertilizer Distribution 
The GPMB remained as the principal fertilizer wholesaler until 1987. With the 
divesture of the GPMB from the GCU coupled with the slow response from private 
entrepreneurs, the GCU and F AO assumed the responsibility of fertilizer wholesaling 
beginning in 1988. In that year, the fertilizer imported by the Department of Agriculture 
was auctioned off to the F AO and the GCU for wholesaling. 
c.) Retail Fertilizer Distribution 
The GCU was exclusively entrusted with primary level retailing during 1986 and 1987, 
and it utilized the CPMS and government development projects as secondary retailers. In 
1988, the FAO established a Private Dealer Network (PDN) network to act as its primary 
20 The differences in fertilizer imports and distribution were smoothed by inventories carried from previous 
years. 
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retailers, and the GCU became a farmer owned private cooperative with 54 affiliated CPMS 
to engage in retailing.21 Since 1988, the GCU used its affiliated CPMS while the FAQ 
channeled its fertilizer through its PDN, NGQs (AATG) and government programs at the 
primary retail level. Furthermore, kafos and an undocumented number of UPEs have also 
functioned as secondary retailers. The kafos, in general, were linked to FAQ private 
dealers, the NGQs, and the UPEs. 
d.) Reexport of fertilizers 
No official documentation exists on fertilizer reexports in The Gambia but a limited 
amount of fertilizer reexportation is known to exist among agents in informal trade channels 
involved in cross border trade. All importers interviewed expressed a need to reexport to 
neighboring countries to realize greater scale and scope economies in fertilizer trade. 
Indeed, reexports are a rational option considering the strategic geographic location of The 
Gambia and its liberal export and import tariff structure compared to neighboring countries 
like Senegal, Bissau, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, the cost of maintaining 
a large inventory is not economical if it only serves the limited demand of local consumers. 
The efficient flow of fertilizers through layers of heterogenous marketing agents 
within various trade channels requires a well knit organizational network that includes a 
good physical and financial infrastructure. The next section examines the operational 
practices of the various trade channels in the fertilizer sector. 
3. Fertilizer Trade and Financial Services Through Various Marketing Channels 
As discussed above, the liberalization of the fertilizer sector has led to an increase 
in the number of marketing agents and trade channels used to distribute fertilizer. Because 
of the ERP, farmers generally have a wider choice of fertilizer sources to satisfy their 
demand. 
The efficiency of fertilizer distribution is influenced by two important factors that 
were included in this study: (i) the availability of physical infrastructure facilities, and (ii) 
access to financial services. These factors can be seen in the operational systems of the var-
ious fertilizer marketing channels described in this section for the pre and post ERP periods. 
The participants within the various trade channels are described first followed by the terms 
and conditions of the financial contracts that link the diverse agents within a trade channel. 
21 The 86 CPMS that existed before 1988 were reduced to 56 CPMS after 1988 through mergers and the 
closure of a few non-performing CPMS. See Chapter III on the GCU for further details. 
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A Pre ERP period 
Fig. 1 illustrates the configuration of the fairly simple fertilizer trade channels that 
existed in the pre ERP period. The fertilizer sector was dominated by two channels: (i) the 
GPMB (Cl) at the import and wholesale level collaborating with the GCU at the retail 
level, and (ii) a number of UPEs (C2). 
a.) The GPMB Channel (Cl) 
The GPMB was a government parastatal primarily involved in buying, processing and 
exporting groundnuts. To increase groundnut production, it undertook the importation and 
wholesale marketing of agricultural inputs including fertilizers. Imports were based on ferti-
lizer demand estimated by the Department of Agriculture. After importing the product 
through the port of Banjul, the fertilizer was moved to seven GPMB and GCU storage de-
pots upcountry by The Gambia River Transport (GRT) company. The GCU with its wide-
spread network of 86 CPMS served as an ideal channel to distribute fertilizer at the retail 
level.22 The fertilizer was moved from GPMB and GCU depots to CPMS depots from 
which it was transported to the respective village branches for distribution to farmers and 
kafos. 
The fertilizer trade was financed by multiple financial sources using simple arrange-
ments at the various stages in the fertilizer channel. The importation and wholesale activi-
ties of GPMB were financed through revenue from groundnut exports.23 The primary 
retail activities of the GCU were financed by the GPMB, the GCDB and government 
programs. From 1972 to 1984, the GPMB sold fertilizer to the GCU by extending interest 
free credit lines. An annual interest rate of 21 percent was charged after 1984. The GCU 
purchased groundnuts from the farmers and sold them to the GPMB. Therefore, the 
repayment to the GPMB by the GCU was secured by direct deductions from the groundnut 
marketing proceeds of the GCU. The GCU was also financed through an overdraft facility 
extended by the GCDB from 1972 until 1985. While the interest rate charged by the GCDB 
on these overdrafts varied over the years, it was 9 percent/per year beginning in 1980.24 
In addition, donor funded projects such as the Jahally-Pacharr Rice Development Project 
provided interest free loans to the GCU beginning in 1983 to purchase fertilizer from the 
GPMB for distribution to farmers in their project areas. Beginning in 1985, the ADP II 
funds from the World Bank financed the GCU's fertilizer operations free of interest. The 
22 The CPMS are large farmer organizations frequently with a membership of over 1000 farmers serving a 
geographical area covering 10 to 15 villages. Each CPMS is sub-divided into village branches and each village 
branch has an elected committee that represents the village in the CPMS management committee. 
23 The GPMB purchased groundnuts from the GCU through loans from the Central Bank and processed 
them for export. 
24 The GCDB in turn obtained refinance funds from the Central Bank. 
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secondary fertilizer retail distribution by the CPMS was financed by the GCU at 13 
percent/per year beginning in 1980. The CPMS usually distributed fertilizer on credit at 17 
percent/per year to its final consumers at the same time that the government programs 
frequently supplied fertilizer on credit to farmers charging zero or very low interest rates 
(see Table VII-8 for details). 
The low interest rates charged were due in part to the non-profit objective followed 
by these various agents involved in the fertilizer sector. The primary objective of the GPMB 
and the GCU was output marketing. Therefore, the fertilizer trade was not considered to 
be a business venture; rather fertilizer distribution was used as a hidden subsidy to farmers. 
Furthermore, grants from international agencies were aimed at increasing fertilizer use to 
stabilize agricultural production. Consequently, the fertilizer sector was not self-sustainable 
and required huge subsidies from the government. Although Table VII-6 shows that fertili-
zer was distributed at a very low price up to 1985 by the parastatals, the flow was irregular. 
The inefficient distributional organization of the parastatals was partly responsible for these 
problems. 
b.) Umegistered Private Entrepreneurs (C2) 
While it was rarely documented, several UPEs were reported to be involved in 
fertilizer trade, especially in exporting fertilizer to Senegal through borders. Informal 
interviews with groups of farmers revealed that they were active in selling fertilizer to the 
Senegalese since the Gambian prices were lower than Senegalese prices. In the early 1980s, 
fertilizer prices were heavily subsidized in The Gambia compared to market prices in 
Senegal. The majority of the UPEs obtained their fertilizer from the GCU on credit and 
sold it to Senegalese. 
B. Post ERP period 
With the liberalization of the fertilizer sector, the configuration of the trade channels 
began to change. New trade channels and financial sources emerged with different terms 
and conditions. While domestic banks have been reluctant to finance fertilizer distribution 
activities, a number of external financial sources have been available from international 
agencies. 
a.) Trade Channels 
The current configuration of fertilizer trade channels is diagramed in Figure 2. It is 
led by the GCU (Cl), the FAO (C2), the RPEs (C3), the GOG (C4) and the UPEs (CS) 
that represent a diverse set of objectives.25 
25 See Chapters II, III and IV in this report for further details on the AATG, the GCU and the FAO, 
respectively. 
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i) The GCU Channel (Cl) 
After it was privatized into a private farmer cooperative in 1988, the GCU has made 
efforts to revitalize its organizational set-up for efficient input and output marketing. While 
the non-profit motive still remains, attempts are being made to run a sustainable marketing 
operation through its CPMS and village branches. Beginning in 1988, nonperforming CPMS 
were either merged or closed, the savings activity was discontinued, overstaffing was 
reduced, and strict guidelines for agricultural input credit operations were followed.26 
Consequently, the 86 CPMS were reduced to 54 which undertake output and input 
marketing, including fertilizer. 
After importing the fertilizer, the GCU transports it to the CPMS depots before the 
rainy season. The volume of fertilizer transported to each CPMS is based on its demand 
estimates and fertilizer availability at the GCU. The CPMS base their demand estimates 
on fertilizer requests received from their respective village branches that in tum solicit 
fertilizer loan applications from farmer members.27 
The GCU, despite the entry of other agents, still remains the primary trade channel 
in the fertilizer sector with a wide rural penetration through its CPMS network. Nearly 
10,000 farmers, mostly men, are estimated to have access to fertilizer through the GCU net-
work. Visits to 14 CPMS throughout the country revealed that while the GCU is yet to be 
vitalized as a cost efficient trade channel, it nonetheless has an infrastructure to function as 
a viable alternative fertilizer trade channel. The new village responsibility system was obser-
ved to revive member participation in the cooperative movement and create member aware-
ness about mismanagement within the GCU headquarters.28 The efficiency of the GCU 
is affected by macroeconomic policies, input and output price policies in The Gambia and 
Senegal, and natural calamities in the country which influence fertilizer demand by final 
consumers. 
ii) The FAO Channel (C2) 
The F AO has actively advocated the liberalization of the fertilizer sector and has en-
couraged participation of private entrepreneurs in its distribution networks. However, be-
26 The savings mobilization activity was reinitiated beginning 1991 on a pilot basis in 3 CPMS. 
v The fertilizer is often sold on credit to farmers. In 1990, 80% of the fertilizer was sold on credit through 
the CPMS (see Gai, 1991). 
28 The Village Responsibility System (YRS) was introduced in 1988, after the restructuring of the GCU. 
The YRS is based on village branch group lending system. Under YRS, each qualified village branch should 
form a committee of five members to screen individual member borrowers in the village, and to approve, 
disburse, supervise and recover loans from them. The purpose of the YRS is to incorporate the local decision 
making and credit disciplinary functions that exist in each village community into the loan programs to strengthen 
the management of the GCU (see Chapter III in this report for details). 
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cause of the lack of response from private entrepreneurs, the F AO assumed the role of an 
alternative fertilizer trade channel in 1988. While fertilizer importation was done by the 
GOG through Italian grants, wholesaling was done by the FAQ during 1988 and 1989 in 
addition to the GCU. With the drying up of the Italian Grants and with the inability of pri-
vate entrepreneurs to engage in fertilizer importation and wholesaling, the F AO also assu-
med the role of importer beginning in 1990. It imported fertilizer from Poland in 1990 and 
Senegal in 1991 using the trade connections of two RPEs, S. Madi in 1990 and Mukthara 
Ltd., in 1991. 
To develop a well knit retail network of private entrepreneurs as retailers, the F AO 
established a Private Dealer (PD) network in 1988. A total of 36 PDs, including 10 women, 
were selected throughout the country to serve as primary retailers.29 These FAQ backed 
PDs formed a Private Dealers Association (PDA) in 1989. The set of primary retailers for 
the FAQ is currently composed of 36 PDs in the PDA, 76 PDs serving nearly 5000 members 
of the Maize Growers Association (MGA), four Block Demonstration Villages (BD), two 
NGOs including Action Aid (AATG) and Women in Development (WID), and government 
programs such as Jahally-Pacharr rice development project (JP).30 
A total of 11 PDs of which 5 are women were interviewed for this study. The 
majority of women PDs sold fertilizer, especially on credit, to women's kafos and farmers 
guaranteed by women's kafos, while men PDs were observed to sell fertilizer on cash and 
credit to men. In general, the women's kafos and women farmers were vegetable growers 
while men cultivated groundnuts. Whereas the PDs increased access to fertilizer, the 
majority of them were limited by their lack of business experience and limited transport and 
storage facilities. The reported low profit margins and slow fertilizer tum-over provided 
poor incentives and did not cover the retail operational costs of the PDs. 31 
AA TG bought fertilizer from the F AO and distributed it to farmers in their service 
areas through kafos beginning in 1990. Interviews with a women's kafo in an AATG 
serviced village revealed that the AA TG distributed fertilizer to the kafo as a grant. 
However, the kafo had to sell the fertilizer to its members at a kafo determined price and 
had to form a village level revolving fund for future purchases of fertilizer. The fund was 
collected and deposited by the AATG in a formal institution, and the AATG held signatory 
power over those funds until a total of 2000 Dalasis per household was reached. After 
attaining the 2000 Dalasis per household, the funds were deposited in individual beneficiary 
accounts with the banks, and the beneficiaries were allowed to draw on it for fertilizer 
purchase in future. In addition, individual men and women farmers in three sample villages 
29 The selection of the PDs was supposed to be based on their infrastructure facilities to store and distribute 
fertilizer, their ability to deal with formal financial institutions, and their reputation in the community. 
30 The PDA is currently composed of 36 PDs, MGA and 4 BD villages. 
31 See Chapter IV for further details on the sample PDs. 
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reported receiving fertilizer as interest free loans from the AATG for a period of six months 
with the condition that a village revolving fund be formed to purchase fertilizer in future. 
The NGO, WID, supported by Women's World Banlc, began operations in 1992. 
WID intends to expand the women PDs network of the FAO and use these agents as their 
retailers. The FAO has selected and trained 6 women PDs to act as retailers for WID in 
the 1992-93 production season in addition to the existing 10 women PDs. The WID pro-
gram targets women kafos and women farmers engaged in rice, cereal, groundnut and 
vegetable farming. 32 
The Jahally-Pacharr rice development project obtains fertilizer from the FAO 
through the PDs operating in the MID-S division. The JP project then distributes the 
fertilizer to its members through village committees. The distribution is usually restricted 
to the growing of rice. The PDs of the MGA buy fertilizer from the FAO and distribute 
it among its 5000 members. The fertilizer used by demonstration farmers in four BD 
villages is directly supplied by the PDs operating in the neighboring areas. 
iii) The GOG Channel (C3) 
While the GOG was historically involved in fertilizer trading through parastatals 
before the ERP, its role in the present fertilizer sector is limited to a few government 
programs. Currently, the GOG through the Department of Agriculture is involved in 
fertilizer importation and wholesaling to support cotton growers and irrigation projects. The 
Cotton Development Project (CDP) and the Upper River Division Irrigation Project 
(URDIP) function as retailers to distribute fertilizer to farmers in project areas in MaCarthy 
Island and the Upper River Divisions. 
iv) Registered Private Entrepreneurs (RPE) Channel (C4) 
As noted above, the response to date from the RPEs to independently engage in 
fertilizer trading has been slow. The prospects of earning an acceptable long-term profit 
margin was too uncertain and subject to possible erosion due to unexpected government 
subsidized competition so that there has been reluctance to invest in the expensive 
wholesale function up to the present. 
In 1990-91, a RPE, S. Madi enterprises, entered the fertilizer sector to assist the FAO 
in fertilizer importation. 33 The S. Madi firm used its trade connections and physical 
infrastructure to import 500 tons of urea from Poland and delivered it to the provincial 
depots used by the F AO. In the 1991-92 season, another RPE, Mukthara Limited, imported 
fertilizer for the FAO from Senegal. The use of the RPEs as agents by the F AO to aid in 
32 See Chapters II and IV for details on the WID program. 
33 The S. Madi enterprise primarily specializes in rice, oil, flour and textile trading. 
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importing and wholesaling was recommended by the Tripatriate Review Mission (TRM) in 
1990. The TRM suggested a joint operation between the FAO and the RPEs at all levels 
of the fertilizer trade with FAO serving as a technical consultant and F AO revolving funds 
guaranteeing the RPE's trade operations. 
The positive experience by the RPEs in the past two trading seasons and the absence 
of government intervention in the election year of 1992 has encouraged more RPEs to 
consider entering the sector. In fact, the FAO was recently approached by three Lebanese 
RPEs for technical assistance in the fertilizer trade including importation and 
wholesaling. 34 
v) Unregistered Private Entrepreneurs (UPE) Channel (CS) 
The UPEs have always been an alternative fertilizer trade channel in The Gambia. 
They have been dynamic and their operations involve innovative trade procedures that are 
often considered illegal. Whereas the size and market share of the UPEs, and the trade and 
financial arrangements that facilitate their operations in the fertilizer sector are rarely 
documented, there is some evidence in the field of their active participation in the sector, 
especially through cross border trading with Senegal. · 
Informal interviews were carried out for this study with two UPEs who were not 
vertically or horizontally linked with each other in any trade channel. One was a fertilizer 
importer /wholesaler (hereafter UPE 1) and the other was a fertilizer retailer (hereafter 
UPE 2). While UPE 1 was primarily a wholesaler in rice, oil, sugar, cement, soap, etc., 
UPE 2 was primarily a retail operator dealing with the same commodities. UPE 1 imported 
urea from Senegal in 1991-92 and sold it to kafos and individual farmers in neighboring 
villages. UPE 2 bought urea and compound fertilizer from a UPE engaged in fertilizer 
importing/wholesaling, and sold it to individual farmers in two villages. 35 UPE 2 reported 
that his wholesaler imported urea from a UPE in Senegal using donkey carts through the 
countryside. Invariably, these two UPEs sold fertilizer only to those farmers with whom they 
had familial or long-term business relationships. 
In addition, a limited quantity of fertilizer was available in local weekly markets 
(lumos) that meet adjacent to Senegalese borders. The Senegalese UPEs generally bring 
fertilizer to these Gambian markets and sell it to individual farmers or Gambian UPEs. An 
informal survey by the F AO stated that the fertilizer sold in the lumos is of low quality and 
often was underweight. The farmers interviewed for this study, however, claimed that the 
fertilizer was of good quality and was cheaper than the fertilizer sold by the F AO and the 
34 Informal evidence suggests that these RPEs control two thirds of the rice market in The Gambia and have 
one of the largest private networks in the country to move over 60,000 tons of rice annually within and outside 
The Gambia (refer to Chapter VIII in this report). 
35 This fertilizer wholesaler also functions as a rice and oil wholesaler for UPE 2 since 1986. 
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GCU. For instance, the price of urea was D 90/50 Kg. in lun10s compared to D 135/50 Kg 
at FAO retailers in the 1991-92 season. Furthermore, urea was not available in the GCU 
network of CPMS during the 1991-92 season. 
vi) Consumers 
The farmers interviewed reported that they generally purchased their fertilizer either 
directly from primary retailers or from secondary retailers such as village branches of CPMS 
and kafos.36 The source of fertilizer supply reported by farmers was influenced by the 
gender of the farmer, the type of crops grown, and the price and convenience offered by the 
various sources. Indeed, market segmentation wa.S indicated by the observed source of 
fertilizer among various types of farmers. While the GCU was the major supplier of 
fertilizer to groundnut farmers, F AO women PDs were the principal suppliers to women and 
vegetable farms. Government programs were the primary suppliers of fertilizers to specific 
crops in their service areas despite the presence of various other supply sources. For 
example, the Jahally-Pacharr Rice Development project was the primary fertilizer retailer 
for rice farmers in the MID-S division, and the Cotton Development Program and the 
Upper River Irrigation Project were the major suppliers to cotton farmers in the Upper 
River Division. In general, FAO traders were active in villages that did not qualify for GCU 
fertilizer loans, and Action Aid was active in 2 villages that did not qualify for GCU and 
FAO trader loans.37 Therefore, in spite of the post ERP expansion of fertilizer marketing 
channels, because of this segmentation there is little significant evidence of multiple sources 
of fertilizer available for a farmer in a given village. 
A nationwide survey conducted by NASS covering 666 dabadas in 222 villages 
indicates that traders were a more frequent source of fertilizer supplies for groundnut 
farmers than was the GCU (Table VII-9).38 This result seems to be at odds with the 
reported source of fertilizer in the villages we sampled. While the comparability between 
this study and the NASS study is limited, the wide differences in the two sets of observations 
indicate some intervillage differences that need to be examined further. 
In general, while the farmers interviewed in this study were appreciative of the timely 
availability of fertilizers, they reported a concern about high fertilizer prices. Indeed, the 
36 This section is based on the informal interviews conducted for this study with groups of farmers from 14 
villages across the country. Since no structured questionnaire was used to quantify the details, the broad observa-
tions made here need to be interpreted with caution. 
~ The secondary status of FAO traders compared to GCU was due to the lower fertilizer prices offered by 
GCU during 1991-92 season. 
38 Dabada in Mandinka means an agricultural production unit. It is composed of all male members of a 
compound who pool their resources to farm or raise livestock. In general, members of extended families live 
within an enclosed compound. A compound also accommodates strange farmers (migratory labor attached with 
farms cultivated by the dabada) (see Judith Camey, 1990 for details). 
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declining value cost ratio reported in Table VII-1 was stated as one of the major reasons 
for the reduced use of chemical fertilizers in groundnut cultivation by the farmers. The 
majority of the groundnut farmers sampled reported that they used less than one third of 
the recommended dosage of chemical fertilizer in 1991-92. About half of these groundnut 
farmers, however, reported complementing chemical fertilizers with farm-yard manure. The 
NASS survey results confirm the above observations. Table VII-10 shows that only 11 
percent of the groundnut area was fertilized in 1991-92 compared to 15 percent in 1990-
91.39 The NASS data comparing 1990 and 1991 results suggested that the use of manure 
in groundnut cultivation was on the increase {Table VII-11). This trend could be due to the 
increase in chemical fertilizer prices. 
b.) Competition and Collaboration among Trade Channels 
Although there is a proliferation of fertilizer marketing channels, there is currently 
limited competition and coordination among them. It is important that the increase in trade 
channels be accompanied by increased competition and collaboration among the alternative 
channels in order for farmers to have a timely access to fertilizer. While existing trade 
channels tend to compete for market shares, it is not clear if they are sustainable in the pre-
sence of low fertilizer demand. Competition is often undermined by differences in social 
and economic objectives of the participants that introduces negative externalities into the 
system. For example, the targeting of fertilizer to women by WID and the distribution of 
fertilizer as a grant by the AATG has created artificial credit rationing and market segmen-
tation in the sector rather than a healthy market driven competition among sources for the 
same clients. 
There is, however, a limited amount of collaboration among the participants that 
helps exploit scale economies and comparative advantages to improve market efficiency. 
Scale economies can be realized at the importation level through lower surcharges and 
through the use of the local infrastructure to full capacity at the wholesale and retail levels. 
The use by the FAQ of the RPEs infrastructure to import fertilizer with fewer bureaucratic 
delays is a step in the right direction. At the same time, the FAQ establishment of retail 
level linkages through NGQs and RPEs removes the need for these smaller agents to import 
small quantities of fertilizers at high costs. It is also important to improve the coordination 
among various channels related to the financial arrangements used for the fertilizer trade. 
The next section discusses the nature of these financial arrangements. 
39 The figures in table 11 need to be interpreted with caution. There are obvious differences in these figures 
due to various sources. The PAO, 1992, reports that 60% of area under groundnuts was fertilized in 1991-92 
season. The differences underscore the lack of standard procedures in measuring the fertilizer use in The 
Gambia and the lack of reliable data on the fertilizer sector. 
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c.) Financial Arrangements 
The terms and conditions of the financial arrangements that facilitate the flow of 
fertilizer through the various trade channels are summarized in Table VII-12. The terms 
and conditions of these financial contracts are influenced by the source of the finance and 
the economic objectives of the agents involved. 
i) The GCU Channel 
The GCU fertilizer trade activities have been financed by ADP II grants since 1984 
in addition to the GPMB and the GCDB. In 1988, the GCU was privatized and the GCDB 
and the GPMB ceased to be creditors.40 A revolving fund was established through ADP 
II grants to finance fertilizer imports and wholesaling, and the credit activities of the GCU 
at the retail level through the CPMS.41 
The GCU has been the only source of finance for the retail operations of its CPMS 
network which in tum has traditionally been the major retail supplier of fertilizer through 
short-term credit to farmers.42 The GCU provided fertilizer to all affiliated CPMS 
irrespective of previous loan repayment performance until 1989 which led to poor repayment 
performance and erosion of the revolving fund. Therefore, strict procedures were 
implemented in the 1989-90 trade season to streamline the GCU's credit operations. GCU 
fertilizer credit was extended only to CPMS that recorded a 95 percent recovery rate on 
current loans from their clients, and to village branches that recorded a 95 percent recovery 
rate in current loans and loans in subsequent years from their member clients. A village 
branch lending system that shifts loan disbursement and loan recovery responsibility to 
village branches was implemented in 1988 on a pilot basis in five CPMS that qualified based 
on the 95 percent rule to improve GCU's management. This approach was extended to all 
qualified CPMS in 1989. In the 1991-92 trade season, of the 54 CPMS that were registered 
to perform groundnut buying activities, 43 CPMS, covering 518 village branches qualified 
for fertilizer loans from the GCU. Since the majority of the CPMS do not have their own 
funds to purchase fertilizer from the GCU on cash and since the bulk of the fertilizer 
distributed to consumers was on credit, the unqualified CPMS ceased fertilizer retailing. 
The CPMS on-lent fertilizers to qualified village branches that in tum functioned as 
secondary retailers to distribute fertilizer as 100 percent in-kind loans to farmers. 
40 All GCU loans outstanding with the GCDB prior to 1988 were paid by the government. 
41 It was difficult to obtain exact data on the volume of funds utilized by the GCU for the fertilizer trade 
in 1991-92. An amount of 8 million dalasis was reported from GCU's fertilizer trade operations in 1991 to be 
outstanding with ADP II revolving funds. Of this amount, roughly D 3.5 million were recovered by GCU from 
CPMS in 1991. Therefore, in the absence of other sources, it is expected that D 3.5 million may have been used 
for financing GCU's 1991-92 fertilizer operations. 
42 Nearly 80% of the fertilizer was sold on credit by 43 CPMS in the 1991-92 agricultural season (FAO, 
1992). 
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ii) The FAQ 
The F AO operation at the importation and wholesaling level is financed by a 
revolving fund established in 1988 through grants from the Danish Government. The 
Danish grants provided the seed money for the FAQ to purchase fertilizer auctioned by the 
GOG in 1988. The FAQ bought 2,000 tons of fertilizer at D5/50 Kg. and sold it through 
the PDA at D 70 per 50 kg to establish the revolving fund.43 The revolving fund has been 
used since then to finance the importation, wholesaling and retailing operations through the 
FAQ channel. In the 1990 and 1991 trade seasons, the FAQ used the two RPEs of S. Madi 
and Mukthara Ltd. as agents to import fertilizer. The RPEs financed their imports and 
delivery to provincial depots through lines of credit from commercial banks in London. The 
F AO revolving fund was used as a 100 percent guarantee to obtain the line of credit from 
the RPE's off-shore financiers who paid the fertilizer suppliers.44 This experience provides 
evidence that guarantee funds may help to induce more private sector participation in the 
fertilizer trade at the wholesale level and to encourage domestic banks to become actively 
involved in financing fertilizer marketing operations. 
At the primary retail level, the PDs and MGA receive fertilizer on credit from the 
FAQ at an 18 percent annual interest rate payable to the revolving fund. The AA TG buys 
fertilizer on cash from the FAQ through grants from England, while WID uses interest free 
loans from WWB and the JP project uses foreign grants to procure fertilizer on cash from 
the F AO to distribute to their clients. 
At the secondary retail level, the PDs can choose to extend fertilizer loans or sell on 
a cash basis to their final customers. The men PDs, in general, extend fertilizer credit to 
the majority of their clients. The majority of the women PDs sell fertilizer on cash and 
extend credit on a selective basis to women's kafos and women farmers guaranteed by 
women's kafos. While the explicit interest was 18 percent per year, the PDs were allowed 
to mark-up the retail price to realize profits. In general, the price of fertilizer sold on credit 
was higher than the price of fertilizer sold on cash. The mark-up contributed to about 5-10 
percent of profit margins on cash sales but varied based on loan repayment performance for 
sales on credit. The AATG distributed fertilizer as a grant to kafos in their service areas. 
However, the kafos had to sell the fertilizer to their members at a kafo determined price 
and form a village level revolving fund for the future purchase of fertilizer. The AATG 
intends to charge an annual interest of 12 percent to kafos beginning in 1992-93. The JP 
and CDP projects charge 11 percent per year to their consumers. 
43 The fertilizer was auctioned off by the GOG to liquidate huge stocks carried over from the Italian grants 
in 1986. 
44 See Figure IV-1 in Chapter IV for details. 
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iii) GOG 
The GOG operations are generally financed through external grants. 
iv) RPEs 
The RPEs involvement in the fertilizer sector is fairly recent and is in collaboration 
with the F AO. In the 1990 and 1991 trade seasons, the FAO used two RPEs, S. Madi and 
Mukthara Ltd., to import fertilizer. The RPEs financed their imports and delivery to 
provincial depots through lines of credit from commercial banks in London. The FAO 
revolving fund was used as a guarantee to obtain the line of credit. 
v) UPEs 
Our interviews with the UPEs revealed that generally they are self financed or obtain 
funds through informal credit markets to conduct their trade operations. A limited amount 
of trader finance through UPE wholesalers is available. Price markups instead of explicit 
interest are used to finance these operations. The UPEs extended credit only to their long-
term clients and charged an implicit interest rate of 18 percent for 6 months. 
vi) Final Consumers 
The majority of farmers interviewed reported that they purchased fertilizer. on credit 
from the GCU followed by the FAO, government programs, the NGOs and informal 
sources.45 The terms and conditions, however, varied with the source of fertilizer. In 
general, loans were taken for a period of six months with no down payment or explicit 
collateral requirements. However, the GCU implicitly linked its loans with groundnut 
marketing, and women PDs from the F AO required guarantees from kafos. While the GCU 
charged an annual interest of 21 percent, the PDs from F AO charged 18 percent, and the 
Jahally-Pacharr rice development project charged 11 percent. A limited amount of inter-
and intra-household borrowing of fertilizer based on reciprocity was also observed. 
The above discussion indicates the emergence of segmented markets due to variations 
in the terms and conditions used to finance fertilizer at the retail level. The government 
and NGO channels offer below market interest rates on loans in contrast to the F AO-PDN 
and GCU network which has tried to meet a market standard. Therefore, there is no level 
playing field here and this will likely delay the emergence of a full blown private fertilizer 
sector in The Gambia. 
45 Very few sample farmers reported buying chemical fertilizer for cash or for a small down payment, 
perhaps because they had the option of using credit. In the absence of any credit, it is likely that the number 
of farmers buying fertilizers on a cash basis would rise substantially if yield response and prices are favorable. 
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IV. CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEVEWPMENT OF THE FERTILIZER SECTOR 
The policies and programs of the Gambian government during the last two decades 
have contributed to a dramatic expansion in the use of and demand for fertilizer. The 
liberalization of the fertilizer sector with the implementation of the ERP has resulted in an 
increase in the channels for fertilizer distribution. There are no formal barriers to entry on 
the supply side so new entrepreneurs can enter and compete in fertilizer marketing. As a 
result, the sector currently includes multiple supply channels that compete and collaborate 
with each other at various stages in the importation and distribution of fertilizer. 
Serious problems exist in the sector, however, and the country does not yet have an 
efficient, reliable fertilizer marketing system that can provide wide access to fertilizer. The 
purpose of this section is to summarize the current major strengths and weaknesses of the 
system, and identify the most important constraints that limit development of the sector. 
1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current System 
The strengths and weaknesses of the various fertilizer distribution channels are 
summarized in Table VII-13. On the positive side, the supply system is fairly well developed 
with the network that includes the widespread GCU system and the F AO sponsored PDs. 
The physical infrastructure for transporting and storing fertilizer exists at the wholesale and 
retail levels in this network. Linkages have been developed for the importation of fertilizer 
stocks. There appears to be a significant number of farmers that have had some experience 
with fertilizer use and are potential customers for a privatized fertilizer sector. 
There are substantial weaknesses in the current system, however, and some of them 
present formidable challenges for the future development of the sector. The first is the 
fairly small total fertilizer demand in the country. Five thousand tons of fertilizer nutrients 
represents a small market, and it was reported that few foreign sources of fertilizer want to 
bother with the small volume of exports required to satisfy total demand. The domestic 
distribution system is still inadequate. The GCU and the NGOs have the desire, but not 
the capacity at this time, to provide a large number of farmers with a regular fertilizer 
supply. The private sector also faces problems. For the several reasons discussed below, 
it is difficult to clearly estimate future demand under a completely privatized system. The 
uncertainties about the future role of the GCU, the government, and the donors create an 
unfavorable environment for private traders to enter the sector and develop the 
infrastructure and distribution network rc:quired for full privatization. The possibilities of 
local financing for fertilizer imports and distribution are uncertain, given the situation of the 
financial system as described in Chapter I. Whereas private traders can access off-shore 
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financing for importing rice, sugar and textiles,46 the fertilizer trade has been dependant 
on grants, not loans. Moreover, the difficulty in loan recovery experienced by the GCU and 
the FAO PDs demonstrate that these channels have not yet developed adequate expertise 
to make and recover fertilizer loans. Therefore, while domestic banks have financed 
groundnut trading, they have been reluctant to finance the fertilizer trade. Therefore, 
whereas government failure during the past few years led to the need to privatize the 
fertilizer sector, market failure now impedes the full development of a privatized system. 
With the drying up of foreign grants, it is essential to encourage a more active role for 
private entrepreneurs and to analyze the possible financial and other constraints that impede 
their full participation. The following section outlines some of these constraints. 
2. Constraints Faced by Private Entrepreneurs 
The constraints faced by private entrepreneurs can be summarized as (1) difficulties 
in predicting fertilizer demand, (2) questionable profitability of the fertilizer business due 
to difficulties in achieving economies of scale and scope, and (3) financial constraints. 
A Problems in predicting fertilizer demand 
An important problem facing anyone interested in fertilizer in The Gambia is the 
difficulty in forecasting future demand because past usage is a poor predictor of the future. 
Private entrepreneurs respond to market signals. Their success depends on their ability to 
forecast market demand and identify opportunities to make an investment and generate a 
profit in that market. However, fertilizer demand in The Gambia is quite unpredictable for 
several reasons. 
The past consumption of fertilizer under a system of heavy government intervention 
does not provide a good base from which to predict future demand in a privatized system. 
Fertilizer demand has been manipulated through price subsidies and grants, and has not had 
to adjust to market signals. The data presented on fertilizer consumption show no clear 
patterns of demand relative to fertilizer prices, so there is little validity in predicting demand 
based on past market trends. Indeed, there is no study that really measures fertilizer 
demand in The Gambia. Static estimates that do not incorporate risk and uncertainty have 
led to overestimates of fertilizer demand. For instance, the FAO estimated a requirement 
of 24,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizer for the 1991-92 season based on the estimated 
area under cultivation and the assumption that 80 percent of the farmers use at least 60 
percent of the recommended dosage of chemical fertilizer. However, only 2,190 tons of 
chemical fertilizer were sold through the GCU, FAO, GOG and RPEs networks in 1991-92 
(FAO report, 1992). The low fertilizer consumption was assumed to be due to declining 
46 See Chapter VIII in this report. 
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agricultural profitability that resulted in an upward shift in the demand for manure and a 
downward shift in the demand for chemical fertilizers. 
The future demand for fertilizer by farmers will depend on four variables: 1) fertilizer 
prices, 2) the yield response of current and future varieties to fertilizer applications, 3) crop 
prices, and 4) financial terms and conditions for buying fertilizer. Furthermore, farmers 
must make their decisions about fertilizer adoption while facing three sets of uncertainties: 
1) uncertainty about production conditions, especially rainfall, 2) uncertainty about market 
trends in fertilizer and crop prices, and 3) uncertainties about future government and donor 
policies and programs that may affect fertilizer supplies and prices, credit availability and 
cost, and access to product markets. 
a.) Fertilizer prices and subsidies 
Future prices are unknown but the government is committed to reduce and/ or 
eliminate subsidies. The prices reported in Table VII-6 after 1987 give an indication of how 
fertilizer prices rose when subsidies were removed. The value cost ratios presented in Table 
VII-1 also give an indication of how declining price ratios will discourage fertilizer 
consumption if the price trend continues. 
b.) Yield response 
A complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this study but some 
uncertainties encountered in our research need to be discussed. The FAO data in Table 
VIl-1 based on fertilizer demonstration plots show a significant, though declining, return 
from fertilizer use on several crops, presumably due to price changes rather than a decline 
in yield response. If these data are indicative of farm level response, it would be logical to 
expect a correlation between the wide swings reported in Table VII-3 in fertilizer 
consumption and average crop yields reported in Table VII-14. However, no such 
correlation seems to exist. How can this apparent discrepancy be explained? 
First, there may be considerable problems with the quality of the data that are 
unknown to us. Second, the large subsidies of a few years ago may have encouraged the 
overuse of fertilizer so that some recent cutbacks can be absorbed with little effect on yields. 
Third, there may be enough carry-over of nutrients so that reductions in application are not 
immediately translated into yield declines. Fourth, the percentage of farmers regularly using 
fertilizer may be much lower than is believed, as suggested by the NASS data in Table VII-
10, so that the wide usage of manure as reported in Table VII-11 may be relatively more 
important than fertilizer in explaining yields. This implies that there are many factors that 
may mask the impact of fertilizer use when analyzing aggregate yields. Fifth, the preoccupa-
tion with groundnuts in the country may cause analysts to overlook the important shifts in 
cropping that have occurred and the role that fertilizer may have played in these shifts. The 
data in Table VII-14 show fairly significant increases in harvested area for maize, and early 
and late millet in recent years, in contrast to a stagnant or perhaps slight decline in the 
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harvested groundnut area. If this new crop area is on land with marginal fertility, the large 
frequency of fertilizer use reported for these crops in Table VII-11 may have served to 
maintain rather than increase average yields.47 Sixth, the yield response on groundnuts 
may have deteriorated if as reported the quality of seed has declined in recent years. 
Although we cannot answer the questions of yield response, the substitutability of ma-
nure, and the trends in usage of this fertilizer substitute, they demonstrate part of the pro-
blem faced in projecting demand. If in fact yield response is low, future fertilizer demand 
will be low in a privatized system operating without subsidies. Furthermore, our impression 
is that The Gambia does not have the type of agronomic research system that is likely to 
discover or adapt varieties in the near future that are likely to be more fertilizer responsive. 
c.) Groundnut prices 
The analysis presented in previous chapters outlined the problems faced in the 
groundnut sector, including the issue of cross border trade with Senegal. The ability of the 
government to resolve the several problems of this sector will have a significant impact on 
demand for fertilizer since this important crop still represents the largest amount of crop 
area. 
d.) Credit for fertilizer purchases 
There are no data available to document how many farmers regularly obtain fertilizer 
on credit. The impression is that few farmers pay 100 percent cash for fertilizer. 
Furthermore, some of the fertilizer loans have been provided at zero or low interest rates. 
The delinquency and default rates that appear to exist in the CPMS and FAO PD networks, 
coupled with past loan writeoffs, suggest that many loans were converted into grants through 
nonrepayment. Unquestionably, a privatized system will be reluctant to provide as much 
credit for fertilizer either through bank loans to farmers or through fertilizer sales on credit 
by retailers. Furthermore, both banks and retailers will have to charge higher rates and will 
have to do a better job in loan recovery if the fertilizer system is to become self-sustaining. 
These changes will affect fertilizer consumption in two ways for farmers who lack liquidity 
to pay cash for their inputs: the effective cost of fertilizer will rise for creditworthy farmers 
who will continue to qualify for loans, while some farmers will reduce their purchases 
because they will no longer qualify for credit. 
e.) Uncertainty about government and donor programs 
The past heavy involvement in the fertilizer sector creates uncertainty in the private 
sector today. Although the government appears to be moving out of fertilizer importation 
and distribution, private entrepreneurs reported their suspicion about the probability of the 
~ See Appendix VII-4 for fertilizer recommendations and requirements for various crops. 
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government and donors permitting the private sector to be solely responsible for the fertili-
zer trade. The private sector is concerned that any perceived fertilizer shortages or high pri-
ces would cause panic so that subsidized fertilizer would be imported and dumped into the 
market after private traders had invested in their fertilizer imports' and distribution systems. 
B. Profitability of the Fertilizer Trade 
a.) Economies of scale and profitability 
The difficulty in predicting demand complicates any estimation of total market size 
and the optimal number of firms needed in the sector to achieve economies of scale from 
the fertilizer trade.48 Consequently, incomplete information about aggregate market size, 
possible number of competitors, and market share leads to uncertain estimates of 
profitability for any participant in the fertilizer sector. 
b.) Economies of scope for existing trading firms 
The existing private entrepreneurs already engaged in trading other commodities 
(such as those discussed in Chapter VIIl that import rice, cooking oil, and flour) would be 
obvious candidates to enter the fertilizer trade. Since they already have international trade 
linkages, have experience in importing, have facilities and wholesaling/retailing networks, 
and have some equity capital and access to credit, it is possible that they would experience 
economies of scope by adding fertilizer to the commodities they sell. Economies of scope 
exist when one multiproduct firm can more cheaply provide a product or service than ano-
ther firm that specializes in it. The ability to realize economies of scope through product 
diversification would then. become a barrier for new firms to enter the fertilizer sector. 
Economies of scope are achieved through reduced costs due to product complemen-
tarily. The recent participation in the PAO fertilizer market by importers of food commodi-
ties suggest that these firms may already perceive that there are product complementarities 
by expanding into fertilizer. But the capacity of these firms to include fertilizer within the 
set of products currently being sold may be limited by the special characteristics of the 
fertilizer sector. These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter VIII but are highlighted 
here. As discussed above, the volume of total domestic fertilizer demand is small and the 
reexport trade has been insignificant. The volume of other commodities these traders sell 
is quite large, however, due in part to their large reexport trade. Furthermore, the sales 
turnover is much faster and there are few domestic substitutes that customers can tum to 
if prices of these basic food commodities rise. These traders currently finance many of their 
48 Anecdotal evidence suggests that at current market prices a minimum of 500 metric tons of fertilizer 
needs to be imported per transaction because (i) surcharges levied on shipping declines with increases in 
quantities imported, (ii) costs involved in producing/mixing the type of compound fertilizer consumed in The 
Gambia (8-24-24) declines with increases in quantitites produced. Based on the above estimates, the fertilizer 
sector allows for very few firms in the market since the fertilizer consumption in 1991-92 was about 2190 tons. 
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commodity imports through short-term letters of credit obtained offshore but, as discussed 
below, financial arrangements for the fertilizer sector may have to be different. 
c.) Barriers to entry for new firms 
For new entrepreneurs not currently engaged in commodity trading, entry into the 
fertilizer trade is constrained by high fixed costs involved in building a physical infrastructure 
and distribution system in the face of great uncertainty about demand, government and 
donor policies, and access to finance. Even though competition may be greater, the business 
prospects for beginning to trade consumer goods may appear more profitable and less risky, 
especially for entrepreneurs with limited capital and business experience. 
C. Financial constraints 
a.) Offshore fertilizer loans 
As described in Chapter VIII, the existing large scale food commodity traders use 
offshore financial facilities to finance their imports, but this has not been the case with the 
fertilizer trade. Fertilizer trading requires relatively longer term loans and involves a slower 
turnover commodity compared to food commodities. Therefore, the typical offshore 
suppliers who usually offer 30 to 90 day letters of credit would need to devise appropriate 
financial instruments that match the term structure required in fertilizer trading.49 It is not 
clear if the reputation built up by existing traders with their offshore creditors is transferable 
to other offshore lenders that may specialize in financing the fertilizer trade, or if these 
offshore financial sources are accessible to new Gambian entrants into the fertilizer sector. 
If not, alternative sources of finance would need to be found among domestic banks. 
b.) Making retail loans for fertilizer 
The financial technology required to facilitate fertilizer retail lending needs to be 
developed in The Gambia and cannot be a simple duplication of the methods used to 
finance trading of other commodities. Both the existing commodity traders and any new 
entrants into the fertilizer trade need to recognize the differences between trading fertilizer 
and food commodities. Fertilizer trading requires longer term loans (six to nine months for 
the typical crop season) than made for food commodities and involves higher lending risks 
due to production and policy uncertainties. Longer term loans increase moral hazard 
problems for the creditors (i.e. borrowers engage in unsound business practices after 
receiving a loan) at the farmer/consumer level. By granting shorter term supplier credits 
and having frequent contact with their customers because of the high sales turnover of other 
49 For instance, the two private food importers of Mukthara and S. Madi enterprises used the FAQ's 
revolving funds as a guarantee to obtain offshore loans to finance fertilizer imports for FAQ. They, however, 
did not engage in wholesale and retail distribution for the FAQ, perhaps due to their lack of access to offshore 
financing for a longer period of time. 
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commodities, food traders are able to more easily monitor the loans made and avoid loan 
losses. For the fertilizer trade, the traders need to develop lending procedures that will 
permit them to screen their borrowers better and that will ensure good loan repayment for 
longer term loans. This may require designing appropriate incentives and penalties to 
discourage loan nonrepayment. It may also involve developing input-product linkages or 
other types of interlinked contracts frequently found in Asia to reduce information problems 
and enhance borrower screening. This type of interlinkage may already exist for some PDs 
that sell fertilizer along with basic food commodities to their clients. The borrowers of 
fertilizer loans may be more inclined to repay if they face a cutoff in their supply of food 
commodities when they fail to repay their fertilizer loans. Interlinkages may also exist when 
crop buyers sell fertilizer on credit to farmers with the condition that the loan amount is 
automatically deducted from the crop proceeds. One of the problems that traders face in 
The Gambia is that either they do not engage in crop trading so they cannot develop these 
interlinkages, or when they do buy crops they cannot be assured that farmers will actually 
deliver their crop to them. Other buyers (including the Senegalese) may offer better prices 
or farmers may choose to sell to other buyers precisely to avoid loan payment. 
c.) Cost of borrowed funds 
The comparative cost of borrowed funds influences entry into the fertilizer sector and 
the nature of the competitive conditions that will emerge. Entrepreneurs that can borrow 
more cheaply have a cost advantage compared to their competitors. As is shown in the 
Chapter VIII, the large private food commodity importers possess good collateral and have 
access to cheaper offshore sources of loans. This is not the case for medium and small scale 
or new firms that have to rely on the more expensive domestic financial market because 
they have not established their creditworthiness. Furthermore, the informal financial 
markets are better equipped to make small short term high interest consumption loans that 
are expensive for business ventures. These financial barriers to entry into the fertilizer 
sector need to be addressed in order to strengthen the privatization program. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter examined the evolution of the fertilizer sector in The Gambia from the 
early 1970s up to the present. Two points stand out in this analysis: fertilizer consumption 
increased dramatically up to the mid 1980s, then stagnated; and the marketing channels have 
become more complex and diverse. Although the private sector has played a more promi-
nent role in recent years, the country is a long way from having a reliable self-sustaining pri-
vatized fertilizer sector that provides regular access to a large number of farmers. It is 
difficult to forecast or proscribe the future configuration of the sector given the large 
number of developments that are taking place in restructuring groundnut processing and 
marketing, in restructuring and strengthening the GCU (see Chapter III), in the rapid 
expansion of the NGOs (see Chapter 11), in restructuring the FAO dealer network (see 
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Chapter IV), and in the efforts of the government and the donors to create a more vibrant 
private sector. 
A more prominent role for the private sector is not likely to develop because of the 
implementation of some governmental plan or program for fertilizer.50 Rather it is likely 
to occur through trial and error by private businessmen attempting to make a profit in an 
uncertain environment. The government and donors need to identify the few strategic 
actions they can take to facilitate the process of change, then step back and monitor 
developments. There appear to be four sets of activities that can be undertaken to facilitate 
privatization of the fertilizer sector. They are identified and briefly described below. 
• Make a clear commitment to get the government, donors and NGOs out of the 
business of importing and distributing fertilizer.51 Private entrepreneurs will not undertake 
risky and expensive investments if they think that they might be destroyed by the unexpected 
dumping of cheap fertilizer into the market as can occur when a well-intentioned donor 
panics because of supposed inadequate supplies or high prices. Occasional shortages and 
high prices need to be expected as a privatized fertilizer sector works out the wrinkles in 
importation and distribution. The private sector is likely to "sit on the sidelines" until it is 
certain of the commitment to privatize the sector. So far, the entrepreneurs are not yet 
convinced enough to risk investing large amounts of their own capital. 
• Improve the yield response of important crops. The uncertainties surrounding yield 
response that were discussed above need to be clarified. If, as appears to be the case, yield 
response is low for many crops, then the problems need to be identified and solved. In a 
regime with reduced fertilizer subsidies, a necessary condition for fertilizer use is that the 
yield response must be high enough to compensate for production and marketing risks. This 
is a logical task for donors to undertake because they have ready access to foreign scientists 
and research centers with the expertise to deal with the problem. 
• Improve product pricing and access to markets. This is a large topic and is beyond 
the scope of this study. Suffice to say that completion of the reforms of the groundnut sec-
tor and any other action that improves access to markets and the prices received by farmers 
will stimulate fertilizer demand and improve the conditions for privatized fertilizer trade. 
• Stimulate domestic lending to the fertilizer sector with a guarantee fund for fertilizer 
loans. 52 The analysis presented in Chapter I demonstrated that there are substantial 
resources in the domestic banks to finance the fertilizer sector. As the private demand for 
fertilizer loans begins to expand, however, the learning process that the domestic banks will 
50 Chapter IV includes a discussion about the possible future role for the government in the fertilizer sector. 
51 See Chapter IV for a further discussion of this issue. 
52 A more complete discussion of a guarantee fund is presented in Chapter IV. 
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have to go through in serving this sector may be accelerated by a guarantee fund that 
reduces the risk to the bank of incurring a loss due to a bad fertilizer loan. The liquidity 
of the banks eliminates the justification for donor funds for on-lending but foreign resources 
could play a strategic role in sharing the risk and expense of operating the guarantee and 
thereby reduce the financial constraints that private sector firms may face. 
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Table VII-1 Productivity and Value Cost Ratio of Fertilizer Use on Major Crops, 1985 and 1991. 
Crops Production (Tons/Ha) Value Cost Ratio1 
Without With Based on 1985 Based on 1991 
Fertilizer Fertilizer Prices Prices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groundnut 1.27 1.64 8.5 2.5 
Maize 1.17 2.09 2.9 2.3 
Early Millet 1.09 1.88 4.1 2.9 
Sorghum 0.97 1.52 2.7 2.8 
Rice (Upland) 1.09 2.04 5.4 1.4 
Source: FAQ. 
Note 1: Value Cost Ratio (VCR) is calculated as a ratio of the value added with fertilizer use relative to the cost 
of fertilizers. Data are based on experimental trials. 
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TableVII·2 Number anti 'l)pe of Participants Sampled, by Location ID the Fertilber Marketing Claaln. 
Marketing Level Participants 
Participant type NameofParticipants/l'ype Population Sample 
of Institution Sae si7.e 
I. Importers and International Agency Food and Agricultural 1 1 
Wholesalers Organization (FAO) 
Privatized Cooperative Gambia Cooperative Union 1 1 
(GCU) 
Government of the Department of Agriculture 1 1 
Gambia (GOG) 
Registered Private Mukthara Ltd. and S. Madi 2 2 
Entrepreneurs (RPEs) 
Unregistered Private Confidential NA 1 
Entrepreneurs (UPEs) 
n. Retailers RPEs Private Dealer Network 1 12 
(PDN) with 36 members (36 members) members 
Non-governmental L Action Aid, The 2 2 
Organi7.ations (NGOs) Gambia (AATG) 
2. Women in Development 
(WID) 
Government Programs Jahally-Pacharr Rice 1 1 
Development Project (JP) 
Cooperative Societies 1. Cooperative Produce 54 12 
Marketing Societies 
(CPMS) 
2. Women's Horticultural 2 1 
Societies (WHS) 
UPEs Confidential NA 1 
Informal Farmer's kafos NA 8 
Groups (IFG) 
m. Consumers Farmers Groups of Farmers NA l3 
NA : Not available 
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Table VII-3 Fertilizer Consumption in The Gambia, 1972-90. 
Consumption Nutrients (tons) 
Year N P205 :KiO Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1972 69 348 417 
1973 220 540 760 
1974 219 708 927 
1975 141 659 800 
1976 575 U26 1801 
1977 700 1549 2249 
1978 494 1110 1604 
1979 1033 1953 2986 
1980 1355 2520 135 4010 
1981 1440 1940 135 3515 
1982 935 1340 140 2415 
1983 1370 1600 60 3030 
1984 1765 2570 225 4560 
1985 610 705 470 1785 
1986 825 685 135 1645 
1987 595 690 425 1710 
1988 685 1245 135 2065 
1989 1626 1198 1051 3875 
1990 1132 897 897 2926 
Source: FAO, 1992. 
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Table VII-4 Profile of Fertilizer Agents by Marketing Levels during Pre and Post Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) Periods. 
Trade Functions 
Years Importer Wholesaler Primary Retailer Secondary Retailer 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre ERP 
1974-1985 1. GPMB 1. GPMB 1.GCU 1. CPMS 
2. UPEs 2. UPEs 2. UPEs 2. Kafos 
Post ERP 
1986-87 1. GOG: Italian Grants 1. GPMB 1.GCU 1. CPMS 
2. UPEs 2. UPEs 2. UPEs 2. Kafos 
3. Government 
Programs 
1988-89 1. GOG (Italy)1 1.GCU 1. CPMS 1. Village Branches 
2. UPEs 2.FAO 2.PDN of CPMS 
3. UPEs 3. NGO: Action Aid 2. Kafos 
4. Government Programs 
5. UPEs 
1990 1. PAO (Poland) 1.FAO 1.PDN 1. Village Branches 
2. GOG (Italy) 2.GOG 2. Government Programs ofCPMS 
3. RPEs 3.GCU 3. CPMS 2. Kafos 
4. UPEs 4. UPEs 4. NGO: Action Aid 
5. UPEs 
1991 1. PAO (Senegal) 1.FAO 1.PDN 1. Village Branches 
2. GCU (Senegal) 2.GOG 2. Government Programs ofCPMS 
3. GOG (Senegal) 3.GCU 3. CPMS 2. Kafos 
4. RPEs (Senegal) 4. RPEs 4. NGO: Action Aid 
5. UPEs 5. UPEs 5. UPEs 
Source: GCU, PAO, AATG. 
GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; GCU: Gambia Cooperative Union; PAO: Food and Agricultural 
Organization; GOG: Government of the Gambia; RPE: Registered Private Entrepreneurs; UPE: 
Unregistered Private Entrepreneurs; NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations; PDN: Private Dealers 
Network 
Note 1: Name of the country from where fertilizer was imported is given in parenthesis. 
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Table VII-5 Volume of Fertilizer Imported into The Gambia, Pre and Post ERP, by Participant and 
Fertilizer Type, 1980-1991. 
Fertilizer Type 
Years Participant1 SSJ>2 Compound3 Urea Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(in Metric tons) 
Pre ERP 
1980 GPMB 6960 4385 148 11493 
1981 GPMB 7200 3690 673 11563 
1982 GPMB 7370 5415 NA 12785 
1983 GPMB NA 2854 NA 2854 
1984 GPMB 7497 3030 2555 13082 
1985 GOG 5986 6518 9962 22466 
Post ERP 
1986 GOG 3000 1500 1000 5500 
1987 GOG 1500 3000 0 4500 
1988 GOG 0 0 30 30 
1989 GOG 0 6453 1559 8012 
1990 FAO (0) (1165) (1000) (2165) 
RPEs (0) (0) (500) (500) 
GOG( CDP) (0) (800) (100) (900) 
Total4 0 1965 1600 3565 
1991 FAQ (0) (1000) (0) (1000) 
GCU (0) (500) (0) (500) 
RP Es (0) (100) (0) (100) 
GOG( CDP) (0) (607) (0) (607) 
WID (0) (0) (1000) (1000) 
Total4 0 2'lJJ7 1000 3207 
Source: FAO, GCU. 
Note 1: GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; FAQ: Food and Agricultural Organization; GCU: Gambia 
Cooperative Union; GOG: Government of the Gambia; RPE: Registered Private Entrepreneurs; CDP: 
Cotton Development Project; WID: Women in Development 
2: SSP: Single Super Phosphate 
3: Compound fertilizer contain NPK in the following proportions: 
1980-82: 20-20-0; 1983: 26-14-0; 1984: 18-46-0; 1985-88: 15-15-15; 1989-90: 8-24-24 by GCU,RPE and 
FAO, and 14-23-14 by CDP. 
4: This does not include fertilizer imported through unregistered private entrepreneurs (UPE) due to data 
limitations. 
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Table VII-6 Fertilizer Prices in The Gambia, 1980-89, in Dalasis per Ton. 
Type of Official Subsidy3 
Year Fertilizer CIF Wholesale Retail1 Retail Price2 Subsidy % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1980 SSP 278 378 411 104 '307 75 
UREA 508 615 648 'lfJ7 381 59 
20-20-0 501 608 641 133 508 80 
1981 SSP 209 280 298 108 190 64 
UREA 520 591 6()C) 419 190 31 
20-20-0 434 505 523 135 388 74 
1982 SSP 291 461 472 140 332 70 
UREA 520 724 735 239 496 68 
20-20-0 548 755 7(J6 194 572 75 
1983 SSP 291 399 435 160 275 63 
UREA 520 (J62 698 253 445 64 
'lfJ-14-0 538 682 718 245 473 (J6 
1984 SSP 485 521 524 270 254 49 
UREA 803 839 846 370 476 56 
18-46-0 917 953 956 370 586 61 
1985 SSP 385 525 6'30 520 110 18 
UREA 500 640 745 700 45 6 
15-15-15 505 645 750 600 150 20 
1986 SSP 903 1043 1148 700 448 39 
UREA 1001 1141 1246 10'30 216 17 
15-15-15 1246 1386 1491 1140 351 24 
1987 SSP 680 800 840 840 0 0 
UREA 968 1095 1160 1160 0 0 
15-15-15 1040 1168 1220 1220 0 0 
1988 SSP 680 800 840 840 0 0 
UREA 968 1095 1160 1160 0 0 
15-15-15 1040 1168 1220 1220 0 0 
1989 SSP 680 800 840 840 0 0 
UREA 1'lfJO 1480 1540 980 560 36 
8-24-24 1540 1760 1820 1120 700 39 
1990 UREA 1571 1961 2200 2200 0 0 
8-24-24 1869 2160 2400 2400 0 0 
1991 UREA(FAO) 2450 2700 2800 2800 0 0 
8-24-24 (PAO) 2950 3100 3200 3200 0 0 
8-24-24 (GCU) NA NA 2400 2700 0 0 
14-23-14 NA NA 2800 'lfjOQ 200 7 
(CDP) 
Source: PAO. PAO: Food and Agricultural Organization; GCU: Gambia Co-operative Union; CDP: Cotton 
Development Project. 
Note 1: Actual retail price. 
2: Price paid by the consumer. 
3: Gives % of fertilizer price subsidized by the government at consumer level. 
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Table VII-7 Volume of Fertilizer Distributed, 1988-92. 
Participants1 
Total 
Year Fert. Type GCU FAO GOG AATG RP Es consumed2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(in metric tonnes) 
1988-89 SSJ>3 1147 0 NA NA 0 
NPK4 339 0 NA NA 0 
UREA 154 0 NA NA 0 
TOTAL 1640 0 NA NA 0 
1989-90 SSP 42 0 NA NA 0 
NPK 478 1550 NA NA 0 
UREA 43 610 NA NA 0 
TOTAL 563 2160 NA NA 0 
1990-91 SSP 9 0 0 NA 0 
NPK 605 1165 800 NA 0 
UREA 58 803 100 NA 500 
TOTAL 672 1968 900 NA 500 
1991-92 SSP 0 0 0 0 0 
NPK 634 570 587 NA 100 
UREA 0 197 0 NA 0 
TOTAL 634 767 587 102 100 2190 
Source: FAO, GCU, AATG. 
Note 1: GCU: Gambia Cooperative Union; FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization; GOG: Government of 
The Gambia; AA TG: Action Aid, The Gambia; RPEs: Registered Private Enterprises. 
2: The data on total fertilizer consumed are not available except for 1991-92. 
3: Single Super Phosphate. 
4: Refers to all compound fertilizers with varying combinations of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. 
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Table VII-8 Terms and Conditions of Financial Arrangements in the Fertilizer Sector in the Pre ERP 
Period. 
Terms and Conditions 
Marketing Annual 
Years Level Participant2 Creditor Int. rate Collateral 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1980-84 Importer GPMB Self-finance1 and 0 Assets 
Central Bank 
1980-84 Wholesaler GPMB Self-finance1 0 Assets 
1985 Importer and GPMB Italian Grants 0 None 
wholesaler 
1980-83 Primary GCU GCDB 9 Assets 
retailer GPMB 0 Product market links 
1984 Primary GCU GCDB 17 Assets 
retailer GPMB 21 Product market links 
ADPil 0 None 
1985-86 Primary GCU GCDB 21 Assets 
retailer GPMB 18 Product market links 
ADPil 0 None 
1980-86 Secondary CPMS GCU 13 Loans outstanding and 
retailer product market links 
Govt. Grants 0 None 
programs 
1980-86 Consumers Farmers CPMS 17 Product market links 
Govt. programs 0 or None 
lower 
Source: PAO, GCU. 
Note 1: Financed through groundnut sales. 
2: GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; GCU: Gambia Cooperative Union; CPMS: Cooperative 
Produce Marketing Societies. 
3: GCDB: Gambia Commercial & Development Bank; ADPII: Agricultural Development Program II 
initiated by the World Bank. 
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Table VII-9 Percent of Groundnut Farmers Purchasing Compound Fertilizer by Source of Purchase and Regional Division in The Gambia, 1991.1 
Division 
Western 
North Bank 
Lower River 
MID-North 
MID-South 
Upper River 
The Gambia 
#CPMS2 
(1) 
7 
18 
4 
5 
6 
2 
42 
Coops in Cash 
(2) 
100 (0) 
14 (41) 
0 (13) 
0 (6) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
3 (8) 
Source: NASS 91 (NADC/DOP /MOA); GCU; FAO. 
Interpret the figures as follows: 
Coops with Credit 
(3) 
0 (0) 
82 (41) 
02 (13) 
17 (44) 
57 (0) 
0 (0) 
19 (13) 
Trader #FAQ PE's3 Family Member Other4 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
0 (50) 8 0 (0) 0 (50) 
4 (14) 4 0 (0) 0 (5) 
70 (25) 2 28 (13) 0 (38) 
83 (38) 2 0 (6) 0 (6) 
28 (0) 1 15 (0) 0 (0) 
95 (88) 3 5 (7) 0 (5) 
71 (62) 20 6 (6) 0 (11) 
Fertilizer used in groundnut fields in the Western Division was all bought with cash from co-operative unions, while in the North Bank Division 
only 14% was bought with cash from the same source. 
Note 1: Figures in parentheses refers to corresponding estimates in 1990. 
2: Gives number of CPMS qualified to supply input loans in 1991-92. 
3: Gives number of private dealers affiliated with FAQ who qualified to give input loans in 1991-92. 
4: Other refers to moneylenders, friends and relatives from other villages. 
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Table VII-10 Percent of Area Using Fertilizer by Regional Division and Crop, 1991.1 
Division Coarse Grains Groundnut Swamp and Upland Rice 
Western 
North Bank 
Lower River 
MID-North 
MID-South 
Upper River 
The Gambia 
(1) 
21 (15) 
45 (51) 
46 (33) 
17 (44) 
39 (44) 
51 (34) 
36 (39) 
Source: NASS 91 (NADC/DOP /MOA) 
Interpret as follows: 
(2) (3) 
14 (8) 8 (9) 
5 (12) 3 (16) 
13 (15) 11 (4) 
6 (~8) 0 (0) 
12 (5) 2 (0) 
23 (30) 0 (11) 
11 (15) 5 (6) 
In Western Division fertilizer was applied on 21 % of total Coarse Grain area, 14% of Groundnut area 
and 8% of Swamp and Upland Rice area. 
Note 1: Figures in parentheses refers to corresponding estimates in 1990. 
Table VII-11 Percent of Area Fertilized in The Gambia, by Crop and Type of Fertilizer, 1991.1 
Crop Manure SSP Compound Urea 
Maize 61 (59) 4 (2) 46 (43) 15 (13) 
Early Millet 50 (45) 4 (2) 42 (49) 3 (7) 
Late Millet 33 (23) 3 (8) 59 (55) 9 (22) 
Sorghum 61 (36) 0 (3) 37 (43) 3 (31) 
Coarse Grains 52 (41) 3 (4) 44 (48) 6 (18) 
Upland Rice 20 (4) 4 (11) 7 (9) 62 (55) 
Swamp Rice 15 (43) 6 (0) 41 (42) 24 (22) 
Upland and Swamp Rice 18 (24) 5 (6) 23 (26) 44 (39) 
Groundnut 22 (13) 24 (27) 46 (53) 9 (8) 
Retail price ('92) paid by D45/bag D135-145/bag D90-130/bag 
consumers2 
Source: NASS 91 (NADC/DOP /MOA); PAO; GCU. 
Note: Since more than one type of fertilizer may be used in the same plot, totals may exceed 100%. 
1: Figures in parentheses refers to corresponding estimates in 1990. 
2: One bag = 50 kg; compound refers to 18-24-24 used on groundnuts. 
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Table VII-12 Terms and Conditions of Financial Arrangements in Fertilizer Sector by Market Level, Agents 
and Creditors during Post ERP Period. 
Terms and Conditions 
Annual 
Channel Marketing Level Participant Creditor int.rate Collateral 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GCU Import and Wholesale GCU ADPil (World 0 None 
Bank) 
Primary retailer CPMS GCU 16 Outstanding loans, 
product market links 
Secondary retailer Village CPMS 21 Outstanding loans, 
Branches product market links 
Consumers Farmers Village Branches 21 Product market links, 
social links 
FAO Importation and FAO Grant & Women's 0 None 
Wholesaling World Bank (WWB) 
Primary Retailers PDs PAO 18 None 
JP,AATG Cash sale 
MGA PAO 18 None 
BD PDs 18 Group guarantee 
WID FAOfWWB NA NA 
Secondary retail Kafos PDs 18 Group guarantee 
AATG 0 (12% Group guarantee 
from 1992) 
WomenPDAs WIDfWWB 18 FAO guarantee 
Consumers Farmers PDs 18 Legal protection 
JP 11 Social links 
MGA 18 Members 
BD 18 Demonstration farmers 
Legal protection 
PDs (thru'kafo) 18 Peer pressure 
AATG (thru' kafo) 9 (15% 
from 1992) 
GOG Import, Wholesale GOG Grants 0 none 
Primary Retail CDP, URDIP Grants 0 NA 
Consumers Farmers CDP 11 NA 
URDIP 
RPE Import and Wholesale RP& LC from London NA FAO revolving fund as 
bank guarantee 
UPE Import, wholesale, UP& Informal credit Variable Social and business links 
Retail markets 
Consumers Farmers Informal credit Variable Social and business links 
markets, UP& 
NA: Not available. 
Source: GCU, FAO, OSU survey. 
Table VII-13 
Channel 
(1) 
Cl-GCU 
C2-FAO 
C3-RPEs 
C4-GOG 
C5-UPEs 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Fertilizer Marketing Agents and Major Constraints Faced by The Market Channels. 
Strengths 
(2) 
•Wide coverage; national penetration 
•Established physical infrastructure 
•Commendable recent performance 
•Product linkages facilitating contract enforcement 
•Experience in fertilizer marketing 
•Increased community participation through improved 
marketing strategies 
•Competitive prices for fertilizer and loans 
•Large involvement by private entrepreneurs 
•Wide coverage through private entrepreneur retail 
networks 
•Economies of scale through horizontal integration 
with other channels 
•Established reputation with foreign suppliers of 
fertilizers 
•Competitive fertilizer and loan prices 
•Established links with government and parastatals to 
use infrastructure facilities 
•Competitive 
•Specialized in trading activities 
•Less formalities in marketing and financial 
procedures 
•Reputation to import fertilizer 
•Large manpower and physical infrastructure 
•Ability to mobilize funds to finance marketing 
operations 
•Highly flexible operations 
•Innovative in designing contracts to mitigate lending 
risks 
•Efficient use of collateral substitutes to enforce 
contracts 
Weaknesses 
(3) 
•Restricted access to non-groundnut farmers and women 
•Fragile management 
•Highly centralized operations 
•Poor image due to past performance 
•Dependence on external grants; sustainability of the 
program 
oLess developed financial instruments to deal with unlinked 
loans 
•Less produce diversification 
•Dependence on external grants 
•Paternalistic attitude towards private entrepreneurs 
•Less rigorous screening in choice of private entrepreneurs 
•No insistence on equity of collateral from private 
entrepreneurs; creates moral hazard problems 
•No credit-product linkages 
•Sustainability of the program is questionable 
•Lack of expertise in fertilizer trading 
•Limited amount of financial and physical infrastructure 
•Lack of experience in supplying fertilizer loans; less 
developed financial instruments to deal with farmer credit 
•Highly centralized operations 
•Usually less efficient due to low incentive structures 
•Low repayment records for fertilizer loans 
•Subsidized loans 
•Highly scattered and adhoc operations 
•Small scale operations 
•Lack of links with other channels 
Constraints 
(4) 
•Financial constraints; lack of domestic 
and off-shore financial sources 
•Manpower constraint; limited trained 
personnel to assist in marketing and 
financial activities 
•Lack of infrastructure for undertaking 
value added activities like processing, etc. 
•Non specialized in fertilizer marketing 
•Uncertainties in government policies 
impeding the encouragement of private 
entrepreneurs 
•Financial and physical infrastructure 
•Slow tum-over and low profitability of 
fertilizer trade compared to other 
commodity trade 
•Uncertainty of government policies 
•Market size is small 
•Difficulty in achieving economies of 
scale and scope 
•Highly dependent on external grants 
•Financial Constraints 
•Physical infrastructure constraints 
•Lack of legal protection 
~ 
43 
Table VII-14 Area, Yield and Production of Major Crops, 1979/80 to 1991/92. 
Year 
1979/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
Groundnut 
Harv'd 
Area1 Yield1 Output1 
(1) (2) (3) 
67.8 
68.9 
80.7 
95.0 
97.2 
91.4 
585 
80.4 
95.0 
94.8 
86.1 
895 
795 
987 
874 
1,349 
1,594 
1,171 
1,150 
1,296 
1,373 
1,263 
1,038 
1,509 
832 
1,054 
66.9 
60.2 
108.9 
151.4 
113.8 
105.1 
75.8 
110.4 
120.0 
98.4 
129.9 
745 
84.2 
Swamp Rice 
Harv'd 
Area Yield Output 
(4) (5) (6) 
10.3 
17.3 
22.3 
22.9 
10.2 
6.2 
7.3 
9.7 
12.4 
14.0 
9.2 
9.8 
10.2 
1,699 
1,462 
1,251 
1,293 
1,n5 
1,435 
1,603 
1,320 
1,008 
1,429 
1,250 
1,224 
1,228 
175 
25.3 
27.9 
29.6 
18.1 
8.9 
11.7 
12.8 
125 
20.0 
115 
12.0 
125 
Upland Rice 
Harv'd Harv'd 
Area Yield Output Area 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
4.9 
15 
4.2 
4.3 
3.3 
15 
3.1 
3.8 
1.6 
3.8 
3.4 
3.2 
2.2 
531 
1,200 
1,119 
953 
788 
1,467 
1,161 
1,132 
875 
1,026 
824 
750 
1,048 
26 
1.8 
4.7 
4.1 
2.6 
2.2 
3.6 
4.3 
1.4 
3.9 
2.8 
2.4 
2.3 
5.4 
5.9 
7.6 
9.4 
6.9 
9.2 
16.7 
11.1 
13.0 
12.7 
105 
11.3 
17.3 
Maize 
Yield Output 
(11) (12) 
1,222 
1,068 
1,645 
1,809 
1,232 
1,359 
1,587 
1,559 
1,185 
1,220 
1,343 
1,204 
1,179 
6.6 
6.3 
125 
17.0 
85 
125 
265 
17.3 
15.4 
155 
14.1 
13.6 
20.4 
Sorghum Early Millet Late Millet 
Year 
1979/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
Harv'd 
Area 
(13) 
11.6 
14.3 
11.9 
16.3 
6.9 
7.3 
12.8 
8.8 
9.0 
8.2 
9.7 
13.1 
12.6 
Yield 
(14) 
759 
958 
1,076 
963 
1,029 
1,123 
906 
1,023 
733 
878 
1,103 
626 
963 
Output 
(15) 
8.8 
13.7 
12.8 
15.7 
7.1 
8.2 
11.6 
9.0 
6.6 
7.2 
10.7 
8.2 
12.2 
Harv'd 
Area 
(16) 
1.7 
6.0 
11.4 
13.6 
14.1 
19.2 
35.4 
32.2 
31.4 
30.2 
40.6 
39.3 
46.1 
Yield 
(17) 
1,000 
900 
1,272 
1,243 
1,021 
1,193 
1,215 
1,205 
1,217 
1,116 
936 
919 
1,076 
Output 
(18) 
1.7 
5.4 
145 
16.9 
14.4 
22.9 
43.0 
38.8 
38.2 
33.7 
38.0 
36.1 
49.7 
Harv'd 
Area 
(19) 
9.3 
11.6 
11.6 
16.0 
11.1 
13.7 
145 
12.6 
12.9 
135 
12.1 
125 
10.2 
Yield 
(20) 
753 
853 
1,267 
1,050 
1,034 
1,139 
800 
984 
884 
1,059 
1,050 
864 
805 
Output 
(21) 
7.0 
9.9 
14.7 
16.8 
11.7 
15.6 
11.6 
12.4 
11.4 
14.3 
12.7 
10.8 
8.2 
Source: National Agricultural Sample Survey, various years, Department of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture 
(NASS/DOP /MDA). 
Note 1: (Harvested area in '000 of ha; Yield in kg/ha; Output in '000 of ton. 
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Figure VII-1 
Configuration of the Fertilizer Trade Channels in the Pre ERP Period 
Agents/Channels 
Importers 
Wholesalers 
Primary 
Retailers 
Secondary 
Retailers 
Consumers 
Notes: 
1) D Formal Channel 
v Informal Channel 
Channel 1 (Cl) Channel 2 (C2) 
GPMB UPE 
GPMB 
Farmers and Kafos 
2) GPMB: Gambia Produce Marketing Board; CPMS: Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies; JP: 
Jahally-Pacharr Irrigated Project; UPE: Unregistered Private Entrepreneurs. 
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Figure VII-2 
Configuration of the Fertilizer Trade Channels in the Post ERP Period (1990-92 Situation) 
Agents/Channels Cl C2 
Importers 
Wholesalers GCU 
Primary 
Retailers I CPMS 
! 
Secondary Village 
Retailers Branch 
Consumers Farmers 
Notes: 
1) vm.. Consumed at Kafo level and/or sold to Kafo members 
2) o Formal Channel 
o Semi-formal Channel 
v Informal Channel 
C3 C4 cs 
3) GCU: Gambia Cooperative Union; CPMS: Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies; FAO: Food and 
Agricultural Organization; RPE: Registered Private Entrepreneurs; WID: Women in Development; JP: 
Jahally-Pacharr Irrigated Rice Project; PDA: Private Dealers Association; MGA: Maize Growers 
Association; AATG: Action Aid, The Gambia; GOG: Government of The Gambia; CDP: Cotton 
Development Project; URDIP: Upper River Division Irrigation Project; UPEs: Unregistered Private 
Entrepreneurs 
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Appendix Table VII-1 List of Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies Sampled for the Study. 
No. Division No. Villages Name of the Villages 
(1) (2) (3) 
1 Western Division 3 Sukuta, N' demban, Brikamma 
2 Lower River Division 2 Burong, Kwinella 
3 North Bank Division 3 Njawara, Njabakunda, Dipakunda 
4a. MaCarthy Island Division 3 Brikama-Ba, Bansang, Kudang 
(South) 
4b. MaCarthy Island Division 2 Dingarai, Njau 
(North) 
5 Upper River Division 1 Fatoto 
TOTAL 14 
Appendix Table VII-2 Sample of Private Dealers (Affiliated with FAO) Interviewed for the Study. 
No. Division Male Participants: Female Participants: 
Name of Village Name of Village 
(1) (2) (3) 
1 Western Division None Sukuta, 
Faraba-Banta 
2 Lower River Division Burong None 
3 North Bank Division Munyagen Farrafenni, Bakindik 
4a. MaCarthy Island Division Bansang, Madina-Umfally 
(South) Brikama-Ba 
4b. MaCarthy Island Division None None 
(North) 
5 Upper River Division Basse, None 
Fatoto 
TOTAL 6 5 
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Appendix Table VII-3 Name and Location of Samples Villages where Farmers/Kafos were Interviewed. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4a. 
4b. 
5 
TOTAL 
Division 
(1) 
Western Division 
Lower River Division 
North Bank Division 
MaCarthy Island Division 
(South) 
MaCarthy Island Division 
(North) 
Upper River Division 
No. Villages Name of the Villages 
(2) (3) 
3 Sukuta, N'demban-Jola, Besse 
2 Burong, Kwinella1 
3 Panneh-ba, Foddakunda, Dipakunda, 
Kerr-Gumbo, Bakalar 
3 Boraba 
2 Dingarai 
1 Fatoto 
14 
Note 1: Kwinella was also selected to serve as a sample for Action Aid. 
Appendix Table VII-4 Fertilizer Recommendations and Requirements in The Gambia. 
Recommended Dosages Requirement kg/ha 
N P205 KiO NPk Urea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Groundnut 8 24 24 40 
Millet 54 24 24 20 20 
Sorghum 54 24 24 20 20 
Maize 81 36 36 60 60 
Rice 77 24 24 20 30 
Cotton 58 36 36 
Vegatables 81 36 36 60 60 
Others 54 24 24 66 66 
Source: FAO, 1992. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
COMMODITY AND FINANCIAL FWWS 
IN FOOD COMMODITY MARKETS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The service sector in the Gambian economy, as is typical in most developing 
countries, accounted for the largest share of total gross domestic product in 1990/91, 
followed by agriculture and then industry (Table VIII-1). Among the different subsectors 
under services, the most significant is trade which accounts for 25 percent of the GDP. The 
strategic location of The Gambia has stimulated trading activity to meet the growing 
domestic demand and to service the reexport trade to neighboring countries. The total 
population of The Gambia, which was estimated at 809,000 in 1988 (Jabara, 1990), 
consumes only a small share of total imports. Traders are heavily dependent upon the 
reexport trade which expanded greatly in the 1970s when Gambia maintained an open trade 
policy while neighboring countries increased tariffs to limit imports. This trend was even 
more evident under the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) which implemented trade 
liberalization policies in The Gambia. These measures contributed to a near doubling of 
the contribution of trade in commodities other than groundnuts to GDP from 9.8 percent 
in 1974/75 to 17.4 percent in 1988/89 (Jabara, 1990). 
This large trading activity involves large amounts of imports which filter through a 
complex wholesale and retail network. This network consists of a large number of economic 
agents managing the flow of commodities through the three principal stages of marketing: 
importation, wholesaling and retailing. Each group of importers, wholesalers and retailers 
perform certain functions and operate according to a set of practices shaped by their 
objectives and constraints. 
Food commodities represent the largest import item in The Gambia (Table VIII-2). 
Food items constituted about 36.1 percent of total imports which amounted to US $179 
million in 1988-89 (AID, 1991; Jabara, 1990). These commodities are mainly rice, flour, 
sugar, tobacco, tea and cooking oil. The relative share of monthly household expenditures 
on food items was estimated at 63 percent on average for both urban and rural households 
(Jabara, 1991). Rice is the most important food item in the Gambian diet representing 
about 40 percent of the daily caloric consumption for an adult, whereas grains and grain 
products add about 10 percent (Jabara, 1991). The two important food commodities of rice 
and flour will be analyzed in this chapter. 
• We would like to thank all the traders who participated in our study and helped us understand how they 
run their businesses. Many thanks to Mr. Benjamin Carr for his assistance. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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The objective of this chapter is to examine the operations and linkages of traders 
involved in importing, wholesaling and retailing key consumption commodities. This inquiry 
will allow us to: first, sketch the activities of these traders who are among the most 
important economic agents in The Gambia as noted by the contribution of trade in 
commodities to GDP in Table vm:.1; second, identify the nature of the financial services 
traders demand and the sources of financing they draw upon; third, assess the role that 
formal financial institutions play in financing the trade of these commodities; and fourth, 
explore the feasibility of an expanded role for these private traders in the fertilizer trade. 
The next section of this chapter presents the methodology of the study. The third 
section discusses the commodity flows and the downstream market linkages by the various 
traders from importation to final consumer. The fourth section describes the financial 
contracts associated with each stage of the commodity market from importers to retailers. 
The significance of the different financial instruments in the trade network is discussed in 
the fifth section while the last section presents lessons learned and implications for the 
fertilizer sector. 
II. METHODOWGY 
1. Subsector Analysis 
The subsector analytical methodology was chosen for this study. It facilitates the 
study of vertical (upstream-downstream) ]#lkages in the distribution/production of 
commodities among the different economic agents (Boomgard et al.). Furthermore, it helps 
to identify the constraints affecting the different economic units and the appropriate means 
for intervention into the market. 
In analyzing the trader network handling the flow of commodities, the subsector 
approach reveals important insights into their vertical linkages, network coordination and 
competition in the market place. By conducting a survey of key traders operating at 
different levels of the marketing chain along with a number of end users, a considerable 
amount of information can be collected about the flow of commodities and the nature of 
the financial contracts associated with these flows. 
2. Data Collection 
Private entrepreneurs and especially large commodity traders are generally reluctant 
to give quantitative information to researchers who are not well known to them. On the 
other hand, they often take great pride in their successes and frequently enjoy discussing 
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their businesses in a general way. This situation presents a formidable challenge to 
researchers who need quantitative data to analyze economic problems. One way to reduce 
the data problem is to obtain as much information as possible from the traders, then check 
their responses and collect additional information from their customers. This procedure 
involves collecting information from both sides of an economic transaction, i.e. buyer and 
seller, lender and borrower. In this way it is possible to compile qualitative data with some 
quantitative information about the traders' operations, the primary trade channels that exist 
for a commodity and the economic agents involved, the important mechanisms used in the 
flow of commodities from original source to final end users, and some of the most important 
constraints faced from the prospective of the current participants in the market. 
The process of data collection for this study followed the procedure outlined above. 
Structured questionnaires were avoided in order to not create suspicion with the 
interviewees. Rather lengthy interviews following a general outline were conducted by the 
researchers with selected entrepreneurs involved in the food commodity trade. The group 
of importers selected for interviews was identified from the list obtained from the port 
authorities, which included only three names, so additional importers were chosen based 
upon the referrals of persons in The Gambia knowledgeable about the sector. The group 
of wholesalers and retailers selected for interviews was chosen through a random walk in 
the market places where they are concentrated. Since the total number of importers is 
small, these wholesalers and retailers all did business with one or another of the _importers 
interviewed. The interviews were conducted by a research team that had already spent 
several weeks in the country learning about the economy, the business environment and 
trading activities so the interviewers could engage in substantive discussions with the 
interviewees and not accept casual answers to complex issues. 
A total of 12 traders constitute the sample for this study (Table VIII-3). These 
include 7 importers, 3 wholesalers and 2 retailers. The 7 importers are among the largest 
importers of flour and rice in the country; therefore, the information obtained describes the 
operations of most of the trade in these two commodities at this time. The wholesalers and 
retailers have smaller size operations but it was felt that they are fairly representative of the 
sector. 
The other set of data used in this study was information collected in a survey of 
manufacturing enterprises in four subsectors. As described in chapter six, roughly 40 
enterprises were interviewed in each subsector which included tailoring, tie-dye production, 
metal-working and bakeries. Data from the subgroup of 39 bakeries that constitute the 
customers of the wholesalers and retailers who sell flour are used in the latter part of this 
chapter to complete the analysis of the flow of commodities to the end users. 
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III. COMMODITY FLOWS AND VERTICAL LINKAGES 
This section of this chapter is composed of three parts. The first part presents a 
description of the markets for the different commodities, the nature of the commodities, 
their perishability and frequency of turnover for traders, and a description of the marketing 
system, facilities, infrastructure and transportation systems in The Gambia. The second part 
involves an identification of the principal agents in the trading network, and their functions 
and linkages. The third part consists of an analysis of how commodities reach the end users 
or final customers. 
1. Markets 
Most of the commodities imported into The Gambia come from Western Europe, 
namely UK, Germany, France and Italy, Southeast Asia, especially China and Thailand, and 
other Asian countries such as Pakistan. Trade in The Gambia is concentrated in and 
around the capital, Banjul, which is the point of entry for imports and where the few major 
importers and many of the wholesalers conduct their business. A large but unknown 
percentage of the imported commodities are re-exported to neighboring countries in West 
Africa, especially Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Mali. Some wholesalers are 
located in the rural areas and distribute to the different local markets. Commodities reach 
the end users throughout the country mostly through the small retail shops which are spread 
throughout the different local markets and neighborhoods. 
A Products 
The high demand for consumer items and the lack of barriers to enter in new product 
markets, especially for existing traders, increases the competition among these traders and 
presents some opportunities for them to diversify in handling more than a single commodity. 
Traders, in general, are involved in simultaneously trading more than one food commodity 
as well as other consumer goods. The economies of scale and scope and the reduced risk 
from diversification yield cost effective results that induce traders to adopt these patterns 
of handling various commodities. New products with a large demand present incentives for 
traders to include them in their operations. 
Some traders switch commodities over time depending on market demand and the 
opportunities they perceive. The flexibility which traders gain by this strategy of switching 
among different commodities suggests this is a type of insurance against future trade shocks, 
such as unexpected shortages and price increases. The two principal commodities that 
constitute the bulk of the food consumption items are rice and flour. These commodities 
will be reviewed in detail in their trade channels from their origin of supply until they reach 
the final end users. 
5 
a.) Flour 
Flour constitutes an important food ingredient in the Gambian diet because of the 
consumption of bread. The domestic consumption plus the large demand for the reexport 
trade are met almost solely from imports. Flour given to The Gambia as food aid last 
reported for 1987 was a negligible 300 tons (Jabara, 1990). 
The amounts of flour imported into The Gambia were reported to sum up to or 
perhaps exceed 120,000 tons in 1990/91.1 Hence, the commercial imports of flour represent 
about 99 percent of the total local consumption. Shipments are typically ordered from 
Western Europe every 15 to 30 days since flour cannot be stored for long periods and is 
more liable to spoil than rice. 
b.) Rice 
Rice is the principal staple food in the Gambian diet. Rice is grown in many rainfed 
parts of the country but the local production on 16,160 hectares in 1990/91 amounted to 
21,000 tons which does not meet the local demand (GOTG, 1992). The Jahally Pacharr 
program officers estimate that the total local production meets about 30 percent of the total 
local consumption.2 Food aid last reported for 1987 amounted to 12,000 tons so this leaves 
a significant amount of rice that is imported (Jabara, 1990). 
Rice imports were estimated, based on the reports of the major importers, to total 
approximately 200,000 tons in 1990/91. This implies that one third of these imports 
constitute roughly 70 percent of the total local consumption and the other two thirds are 
reexported to neighboring countries. Rice shipments are made every few months since rice 
inventories can be carried for relatively long periods of time. 
B. Distribution 
The marketing system in The Gambia combines highly sophisticated techniques with 
simple ones. The importation of commodities is facilitated by the efficient 
telecommunication system and the port facilities. However, while the international 
telecommunication system is first rate, communication with the interior is still not well 
developed. The Banjul port is fairly efficient except for occasional congestion during the 
peak import-export season in June (AID 1991). Although the international airport has 
adequate facilities, most of the food commodities are imported via ocean vessels. 
River transport has lost its significant role in being the major distribution channel for 
goods from The Gambia to other West African countries. River boats are used mainly for 
1 Estimate based on reported figures by the major importers interviewed. 
2 Estimate based on anecdotal reference. 
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carrying merchandise across the river from the south bank, where the port is located, to the 
north bank where it filters into Senegal. Although river transport was reported by one 
trader to be more efficient and cost effective than road transport for distribution to 
wholesalers around the country, very few traders actually move their goods to the interior 
via river boats. 
Many of the roads around the country are not paved but trucks are the common 
means of carrying goods throughout The Gambia as well as across the border. The 
traditional donkey carts called "Kouskous" are still a popular customary means of carrying 
goods around Banjul and among the villages up country. 
2. Economic Agents 
The marketing system analyzed in this chapter is represented in Figure VIII-1. The 
principal economic agents in the trade network are identified in the diagram as: foreign 
suppliers, brokers, importers, wholesalers, reexport traders, retailers, enterprises and 
households. Our analysis focuses mainly on the agents in The Gambia; however, we will 
discuss their links with foreign suppliers. Each economic agent has a set of functions which 
are defined by his/her position in the marketing channel; in some cases, certain functions 
overlap and/ or are carried out by more than one agent simultaneously. 
A Importers 
The leading supply channel in The Gambia is the importers. The number of agents 
in this group is not large, particularly considering only those currently dealing ~th major 
food commodities. As mentioned, the port records identified only 3 active importers; 
however, 7 major active importers of rice and flour were identified in the survey. The scale 
of operation at this stage in the marketing channel is large due to the need to capitalize on 
scale economies to sustain the viability of the transactions. It is expected that these traders 
also enjoy scope economies by using their established facilities and access to financial 
services, and reducing their risks through diversification into different consumption items. 
All the importers who are Gambian and Lebanese-Gambian entrepreneurs have been 
in the trade business for a considerable time and mostly inherited their businesses from their 
families. Thus, they have well established relationships with suppliers and clients and a 
considerable amount of information economies about market transactions. They can usually 
draw upon a large working capital which is basically the firm's equity. 
Typically, these traders import the sacks of commodities in containers via ships from 
foreign sources either directly from the suppliers or through brokers. The traders engage 
in importation on a regular basis, handle the port requirements and custom clearances, and 
store the merchandise in their depots until they are sold. The commodities are sold in large 
and small wholesale quantities which vary from a few hundred tons to just a few tons. 
Hence, these traders assume the roles of both importers and wholesalers. Their clients are 
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the reexport traders, smaller wholesalers / large retailers and medium scale enterprises, such 
as bakeries in the case of flour (Table VIII-4). 
The seven major importers interviewed included three of the largest flour importers 
and five of the largest rice importers with one importer engaged in trading both 
commodities. 
a.) Flour Importers 
Among the three flour importers interviewed, one reported imports of 6000 
tons/month, another reported imports of about 1000 tons/month and a third indicated that 
he imports about 300-400 tons/month. One of the three has been importing directly from 
the same supplier in Germany for the past five years. The other two traders indicated that 
they deal with brokers in London who ensure the quality of the consignment and handle all 
the arrangements with the different suppliers. One trader, importing through an 
intermediary, indicated that the total cost of importing a ton of flour amounts to D4258/ton, 
whereas another trader, importing directly from the supplier, reported that the cost amounts 
to D2760/ton (based on the estimate of Dl38/50kg/bag and 20bags/ton) which includes 
shipping and handling. These figures indicate a wide price range which represents the cost 
of involving the intermediary. 
Two of the flour importers transport some of their stock all the way to the interior 
and sell to wholesalers and retailers. One trader loads up to 60 tons in 1-2 trucks he owns 
twice every month and sells the flour in the interior. Another trader owns a river vessel 
which docks at two locations in Farafeni and Kaur and sells mostly to Senegalese traders. 
The reexport channel is a very significant outlet for importers who deal with many 
reexport traders. It was reported by one of the major importers that almost 2/3 of the 
imported flour in The Gambia is reexported to neighboring countries. 
A third group of customers who buy from importers are the medium scale bakeries. 
Each of the thirteen medium scale bakeries interviewed reported purchasing between 200-
400 bags of flour per month which amounts to a total consumption of 10-20 tons of flour per 
month for each bakery. This group will be discussed further in the section elaborating on 
end users. 
b.) Rice Importers 
Prior to the ERP in 1985, GPMB officials reported that they were the sole importer 
for rice. The dissolution of that monopoly in the process of abolishing government control 
over some prices presented traders with an opportunity to get involved in rice importation. 
Many importers who were already importing other commodities prior to ERP had the 
advantage of owning the infrastructure and the access to financial markets so they could 
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immediately seize the opportunity. One trader reported that he entered the market when 
he managed to get working capital to start his business. 
A total of five rice importers were interviewed. One of the interviewed traders 
implied that importing jointly with others is most efficient and, thus, he imports with two 
other traders. He reported that last year their imports equaled 150,000 tons. The other 
four importers interviewed work independently and the amounts they handle vary from 
50,000 tons/yr to 20,000 tons/yr. Most of these traders handle other food and non-food 
commodities as well. Three out of the five importers reported that they order their stock 
through brokers located in London or Paris. Rice is typically purchased in US dollars. 
Very large shares of the imported stocks are reexported to neighboring countries. 
These shares have been reported to amount to 70 percent and 90 percent in some cases. 
Hence, the reexport channel is an important market which helps importers to enjoy scale , 
economies. 
Rice is transported to the interior, and filters across the borders, through the numer-
ous small wholesalers who purchase from the importers. Only one importer indicated that 
he transports rice, as well as other commodities, via river boats and sells to wholesalers and 
retailers up country. Another importer owns about 15 trucks used to transport rice to the 
interior. 
A profitable market niche that one of the importers has found exists in exchanging 
rice for cashew nuts in Guinea Bissau, which represents a typical barter transaction. Almost 
80 percent of the rice he sells there is exchanged on the basis of lkg rice for lkg of cashew 
nuts, and only 20 percent of the farmers prefer to pay for the rice in cash. Profits result for 
the trade from the price difference as lkg of cashew nuts is about three times the price of 
lkg of rice. 
B. Wholesalers 
The second major category of agents in the supply channel are wholesalers. The role 
of wholesaling is sometimes assumed by a few importers who also sell to smaller wholesalers 
as discussed above. However, the typical wholesalers described in this section represent 
numerous entrepreneurs who buy solely from importers and not from foreign sources. This 
group is largely dominated by Mauritanians and a few Gambians. The wholesalers normally 
deal with one or two importers because they build a strong customer-supplier relationship 
which has some advantages with regards to financing their purchases as will be discussed 
later. Most of the wholesale activity is concentrated in Banjul where the importers are 
located. 
Three wholesalers were interviewed, two located in Banjul and one in the interior. 
The role assumed by these traders in the marketing channel is to operate as small scale 
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wholesalers and large scale retailers. Their major clients are small scale reexport traders, 
small local retailers, small scale enterprises and households (Table VIII-4 ). 
Most wholesalers, like most importers, deal with more than one commodity, such as 
rice, flour, sugar and oil, to diversify their portfolio. Diversification ensures some degree 
of expected returns associated with a lower risk in case there are any sudden changes in 
prices. Wholesalers are also dictated by the types of commodities importers handle. 
Wholesalers typically buy in large quantities and stock up inventories in their warehouses. 
It was reported that some wholesalers occasionally make very large profits from their 
inventories when shortages arise in the local market. 
The quantities purchased by wholesalers vary from month to month. One trader 
reported that he buys about 15 tons of rice per month and another reported amounts that 
vary between 70 to 100 tons per month. Another trader indicated that his purchases may 
vary from 200 to 5000 bags of total food items, i.e. flour, rice and sugar per month. 
In general, transportation costs are handled by the wholesalers. The estimated 
purchase price of rice reported by one of the traders was 0142/bag which he sells at 
D 150 /bag. It is not clear if that is the wholesale or retail price since he engages in some 
retailing as well; however, the wholesale price is normally less than the retail price. The 
major customers of wholesalers are retailers, small scale reexport traders and a few small 
scale manufacturing enterprises. 
C. Retailers 
Retailers constitute the third and last category of agents in the trading channel. The 
role of retailers is assumed by the small wholesalers/large retailers discussed above, as well 
as by the small retailers. The latter group is represented by the small comer shops in the 
local markets and neighborhoods which carry many consumer items including rice, flour, 
sugar and cooking oil. 
Two retailers were interviewed for this survey. These retailers buy from several 
suppliers, often from the larger wholesalers and occasionally from the importers. One of 
these retailers reported that he buys from the suppliers in Banjul for a total of 020,000-
25,000 /month and transports the goods by truck or bus to Bangsang, in the interior, where 
his shop is located. 
Typically, retailers buy in amounts ranging from 10 to 20 bags at each purchase. A 
bag of rice, for example, is purchased for 0140 in Banjul and sold for 0160 in Bangsang. 
The other retailer who is located in Banjul reported that he buys a total of 300 bags in each 
purchase of the different commodities, flour, rice and sugar. Consumers often purchase 
their supplies on a daily basis from the retail shops. 
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3. End Users 
Households and manufacturing enterprises constitute the local end users in The 
Gambia. Households and small scale manufacturing bakeries are the two major types of 
clients who buy from retailers {Table VIII-4). As mentioned earlier, the medium scale 
bakeries buy mostly from importers and occasionally from wholesalers. 
A Households 
The total population of The Gambia was estimated at 809,000 in 1988 (Jabara, 1990). 
The local production of rice meets only a small portion of total local demand and no wheat 
is produce in the country so there is a large dependency on imported rice and flour. 
Consumers rely heavily on these items for their daily consumption intake. Hence, 
households constitute the principal domestic consumers for these imported food items. The 
other group of end users is the manufacturing enterprises in the food processing industry. 
B. Manufacturing Enterprises 
Small and medium scale enterprises purchase some of the food items for processing 
purposes. As a part of a small scale enterprise survey, a group of 39 bakeries were 
interviewed in a sample totaling 153 enterprises.3 In the bakeries subsector, 13 were 
classified as modem and 26 as traditional bakeries based on the type of equipment they 
utilize. Both types of bakeries only produce bread but the types differs because of the 
different mixing techniques and recipes. 
Modem bakeries are medium scale enterprises which utilize electrical equipment and 
ovens, have an average value of assets equal to Dl,387,239 and employ on average 14 
workers. The type of bread these bakeries produce is similar to the french loaf "Baguet" 
which is a little different from the type produced in the tradition bakeries. The traditional 
bakeries fall in the category of small scale enterprises which utilize traditional clay ovens 
that burn wood, have an average value of assets equal to 04,306, rely on manual mixing of 
bread dough and employ on average 4 workers. The type of bread these bakeries produce 
is from a thicker dough and bas a saltier taste. 
The principal input material that all bakeries purchase is flour. The amount of flour 
purchased depends on the size of the bakery. Typically, the modem bakeries that purchase 
flour frequently from importers and occasionally from wholesalers require between 200 to 
400 bags of flour per month. They usually purchase once or twice a month. 
3 See chapter six for a complete description of the total sample. 
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On the other hand, the traditional bakeries require between 1 to 2 bags of flour per 
day. These bakeries purchase frequently from retailers, as often as every day, and occasion-
ally from wholesalers when they buy in larger amounts. These requirements measured per 
month and per day reflect the frequency at which the different bakeries buy flour. 
IV. METHODS OF FINANCING COMMODI1Y FWWS 
Commodities are typically purchased for cash, or through a letter of credit, or sold 
based on the arrangements agreed to in a typically verbal financial contract drawn between 
the principal-supplier and agent-client. Credit sales are relatively more common than cash 
sales in the importation and wholesaling of commodities. This is partly due to the large 
quantities handled at these stages in the commodity flow. 
Suppliers credit is very common among suppliers and their clients. This type of 
credit exists at the different stages of commodity importation, wholesaling and retailing. 
Supplier credit typically involves a financial contract directly between the supplier and 
customer in most cases, while a letter of credit involves the participation of a financial 
intermediary. These different cases are discusses below. 
1. Financial Contracts for Importation 
Importers reported that they normally finance their merchandise purchases through 
a letter of credit rather than paying directly in cash. The financing of commodities 
purchased from foreign suppliers normally involves a bank or non-bank financing company. 
One trader reported that he obtains a letter of credit arranged by his suppliers and referred 
to that facility as supplier credit. 
Importers commonly hold bank accounts with both local and foreign banks. The 
local bank accounts are used for financing local expenses, while the foreign banks are used 
for financing the large operations of commodity imports. Importers maintained that the 
local banks are not competitive enough in setting their conditions for a letter of credit to 
attract clients who seek offshore financing. Some traders have overdraft facilities at the 
local banks which are normally secured by physical assets. 
The definition, terms and conditions associated with the letters of credit used for 
commodity importation are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
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A Definition 
The typical financial contract drawn between the local importers in The Gambia and 
foreign suppliers involves the use of a letter of credit (L/C). This financial instrument 
drawn at a bank entails "a bank's guarantee of payment, indicated by a document that 
describes the handling of a specific transaction." (Koch, p. 695), that is the document 
specifies the contract terms and duties of all parties. These parties are the importer, the 
importer's bank, the supplier (exporter) and the supplier's (exporter's) bank. Typically, the 
importer sends a purchase order to the supplier and an L/C application to his bank. The 
importer's bank makes the payments to and handles all the transactions with the supplier's 
bank and sends the shipping documents to the importer so he can receive the goods at the 
port. Finally, the importer fulfills the payment requirement at the maturity of the L/C. 
All the importers interviewed reported using letters of credit with foreign banks for 
financing their imports. They indicated that maturities range from 30 to 120 days to allow 
them enough time to receive the goods being shipped and inspect them before the L/C 
matures. One of the justifications they gave for using offshore financing was that the local 
banks require a 100 percent deposit up front to grant a letter of credit which is a very 
restrictive condition. In their use of foreign banks, however, traders may be required to 
deposit only 25 percent to 75 percent. One importer reported that although he is willing 
to make 100 percent deposit, to avoid paying interest charges, he still deals with foreign 
banks because of their efficiency in operations and to avoid foreign exchange problems. 
Another important point for importers is the access to foreign exchange which they 
need to purchase commodities. Rice is normally traded in US dollars and flour was 
reported to be purchased in French Francs. This factor influences traders to seek foreign 
financial institutions and reduce the exchange cost of converting loans to dalasis and back 
to foreign currency when they need to pay for imports. The problem with the local banks 
is that they do not allow foreign currency to be maintained in their accounts so all deposits 
or transfers are automatically converted to dalasis. Thus, importers keep their foreign 
currency accounts with offshore banks. 
An important consideration when assessing the traders use of offshore financing is 
the fact that most of them have been customers of foreign banks for a long time before the 
ERP when the domestic financial markets and foreign exchange were unstable. These 
traders have already established some credibility with offshore financial institutions and have 
reduced a large part of the information costs for their lenders and, thus, reduced their own 
transactions costs. In light of these circumstances, and even after the liberalization of the 
financial markets in The Gambia under the ERP, there have been few incentives for traders 
to shift their financial transactions to the local banks. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter I, 
the banks have found other profitable ways to use their resources rather than make loans 
to traders. 
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B. Terms 
A letter of credit, like other financial instruments, is granted under some terms and 
conditions. In some cases, importers deal only with brokers who handle the financial 
arrangements with the banks or financing companies and thus, the importers may not know 
much about the details of the transaction. Importers in The Gambia reported that they 
typically draw letters of credit with maturities ranging from 30 to 120 days with most using 
a 60 day letter of credit. This facility allows traders to sell their commodities, collect 
payments from their customers and settle their letters of credit at maturity. 
C. Size 
None of the importers reported the size of the letters of credit they obtain. However, 
it is usually sufficient to cover an entire shipment which varies from one trader to another. 
As an example, a letter of credit needed to finance 6000 tons of flour would amount to 
about 14 million dalasis (about US $1.5 million), and a letter of credit to finance 350 tons 
of flour would amount to about 840,000 dalasis (about US $98,000). Traders also use 
several letters of credit to finance various shipments of different commodities during the 
same period. 
D. Interest Rate and Implicit Charges 
Interest rates charged on letters of credit were reported to be around 1 percent per 
month. In addition, the financial institution usually charges a 2-5 percent service fee. 
Established traders have been involved in this type of transaction with offshore financial 
institutions for a long time. They do not have to include high transaction costs above what 
would be expected to have access to this type of facility. This may not be true for new 
entrants into the market who would need to establish contact with foreign banks or resort 
to using the expensive local banks. 
E. Collateral Requirements and Substitutes 
Collateral was reported to be a requirement by foreign financial institutions when 
opening a letter of credit. This collateral could be in the form of an account with the bank 
or a term deposit as one trader indicated. As mentioned earlier, foreign banks require a 
25-75 percent deposit to open a letter of credit, whereas the local banks require a 100 
percent deposit. The local banks typically ask for physical assets, such as the title deed on 
property, to grant a loan or overdraft facility. 
Collateral substitutes play a role in the formal markets as well. Bankers grant their 
trustworthy customers credit facilities when they know that customers are able to pay back 
from their business activities (other accounts). It is probable that foreign banks share 
information on the credit history of their customers and, hence, banks have access to 
sufficient information to make their decisions. 
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F. Delinquency and Default 
Interviewing bank customers is not the ideal way to obtain information on delinquent 
or bad loans. However, since importers operate in the formal financial market and deal 
with foreign banks, delinquent or bad loans would not be expected to be significant except 
for bankrupt or dissolved traders. Importers cannot afford to be on bad terms with their 
foreign financial intermediaries because it would have severe effects on their accessibility 
to offshore financial markets. 
2. Financial Contracts for Wholesalin~ 
Commodity wholesaling is conducted by both importers and wholesalers. Consumer 
commodities, particularly food items, are imported in large quantities by multiple traders 
implying a large degree of competition. Supplier credit is often used as a tool to facilitate 
the marketing of these commodities .. In periods when stocks are high, suppliers grant credit 
under fairly easy terms. When supplies are scarce, the terms are tougher. One importer 
reported giving credit to build a group of regular customers at the time when he was new 
and later reduced the amount of credit supplied when he became more established in the 
market. 
Importers and wholesalers reported selling both in cash and on credit especially to 
their regular customers. Credit sales amount to more than half of the total sales at times. 
Eighty five percent of the medium scale bakeries (modem) which purchase on wholesale 
basis reported that they purchase flour on credit from their suppliers (Table VIII-6). For 
those who had received formal loans for their businesses, most of these loans consisted of 
bank guarantees for the off-shore supplier loans they received when purchasing equipment. 
Only one small wholesaler reported that he prefers to acquire a loan from the bank 
and purchase from importers in cash. Thus, supplier credit is the most typical type of 
financial contract observed among all traders involved in wholesaling and the entrepreneurs 
purchasing on a wholesale basis. 
A Definition 
Suppliers credit is extended by importers and wholesalers to their well known 
customers. Importers and wholesalers indicated that it usually takes up to a year or two to 
get to know customers and judge if they are creditworthy or not. The suppliers credit 
contract typically involves a downpayment at the time of purchase and the promise of paying 
the balance due by a particular date. Clients frequently complete the payment, acquire a 
new consignment of goods and request suppliers credit again. 
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B. Term 
Suppliers credit is typically extended for a period of a few days up to a few weeks. 
The maturity is often determined by the frequency at which clients purchase from their 
suppliers. Small quantities are usually sold on terms which extend from a few days to a few 
weeks, whereas large quantities are often sold on terms which range from a few weeks up 
to a couple of months. 
C. Size 
Credit at the wholesale level is given in large and small amounts. On the one hand, 
large amounts of credit cover the price of a few hundred bags of flour or rice representing 
many thousands of dalasis in value. On the other hand, small amounts of credit cover the 
price of few dozen bags of flour or rice representing a few thousand dalasis. In periods 
when stocks are high, larger amounts of credit are extended at fairly easy terms; however, 
when stocks are scarce credit is also limited and terms are harder. 
D. Interest and Implicit Charges 
Suppliers did not acknowledge charging explicit interest rates. This is not surprising 
or uncommon in a Muslim society where Islamic rules are important. Wholesale traders in 
The Gambia deal with many Mauritanian and Senegalese traders who are Muslims, so 
explicit interest rates cannot be charged. However, traders do recover the cost associated 
with supplier credit to sustain their economic viability. The typical practice is to mark up 
the price when selling on credit while discounts were often reported ranging from 2.5 
percent to 5 percent, when selling for cash. Thus, the higher price represents an implicit 
interest rate when selling on credit. 
E. Collateral Requirements and Substitutes 
Collateral was not an explicit requirement reported by any of the wholesalers 
interviewed. The established supplier-client relationship and personal confidence serve as 
collateral substitutes. These collateral substitutes carry immense weight, especially in the 
small trading community in The Gambia where a trader's reputation is highly regarded. In 
some cases, wholesalers reported that they sometimes took risks by selling on credit to some 
foreign reexport traders who they did not know very well. 
F. Delinquency and Default 
Wholesalers reported that delinquency in repayment occurs on occasions. A few 
incidences of default were reported which were written off as bad loans. However, these 
problems did not seem to be a primary concern for any of the traders because they reported 
that these losses were not a serious business problem. 
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3. Financial Contracts for Retailing 
Commodity retailing involves the frequent sale of small quantities of goods to a large 
number of customers. The customers of retailers, both households and small scale 
manufacturing enterprises, constitute the end users of the consumption goods. The large 
number of customers served introduces information asymmetries. Asymmetric information 
results because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems which are associated with 
unknown types of customers because of the difficulties in screening and unpredictable 
behavior of some because of the difficulty in monitoring by the suppliers. Therefore, to 
avoid these problems, retailers typically demand cash. However, suppliers credit is also 
granted to regular trust-worthy customers. Some of the traditional bakeries interviewed 
reported that they often deposit some of their cash with retailers who offer money-keeping 
services (Table VII-7). One of the two retailers interviewed reported that he extends cash 
loans as well as in kind loans. 
All the bakeries interviewed reported that they often offer supplier credit to regular 
customers. Eighty one percent of all the small scale bakeries interviewed which purchase 
their flour from retailers reported that they received suppliers credit and only 18 percent 
reported paying in cash (Table VIIl-6). The terms and conditions for these contracts are 
discussed below. 
A. Definition 
Suppliers credit provided in commodity retailing is similar to that found in whole-
saling. The retailer-customer credit contract typically involves a downpayment at the time 
of purchase of the commodity and a promise to complete payment by an established due 
date. Customers frequently complete the payment, acquire more goods, and request credit 
again. 
B. Term 
One of the differences between wholesale-supplier credit and retailer-supplier credit 
is the term of the loan. For example, the small scale bakeries reported that the term ranged 
from one day to a few days. 
C. Size 
The size of the retailer credit contract also differs from the wholesaler loans. The 
retailer's scale of operation has a direct bearing on the amount of commodities that can be 
sold on credit. Typically, small scale enterprises and households have access to one or two 
bags of flour or rice on credit. Thus, the amounts of these loans do not exceed a few 
hundred dalasis. 
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D. Interest and Implicit Charges 
Retailers sell goods on credit without an explicit interest charge. One of the two 
retailers interviewed reported that he gives discounts when selling in cash, although the 
other retailer refused to acknowledge that he charges any type of interest. Nevertheless, the 
bakers interviewed reported that they often receive price discounts of about 2-5 percent if 
they pay in cash. 
E. Collateral Requirements and Substitutes 
No collateral was reported to be required for retailer loans by either of the two 
retailers. The bakers likewise reported that they pledged no collateral when they purchased 
flour on credit. Retailers typically know their regular customers very well by nature of 
geographic proximity. Thus, personal relationships and confidence play a large role as 
collateral substitutes in these transactions. 
F. Delinquency and Default 
Retailers did not report having any difficulties with their customers in terms of loan 
repayment and arrears. The proximity factor is probably the significant element in this 
relationship since any defaulters are not too far away from the small retailer who is literally 
around the comer. The consequences for default would be too severe for the customers to 
bear because that would eliminate future chances of gaining access to supplier credit. 
V. FINANCIAL CONTJR.ACTS USED IN COMMODITY TRADING 
Table VIII-5 presents a summary of the typical financial contracts used at each stage 
in the marketing channel of commodity importation, wholesaling and retailing. Figure VIII-
2 also presents a sketch of these contracts. The general terms and conditions describing 
these contracts are discussed in the following sections. 
1. Formal Financial Contracts 
The formal financial contracts are mainly represented by the standard letter of credit 
utilized by all of the importers. This financial instrument is obtained from foreign financial 
institutions under competitive conditions. Among the terms and conditions that characterize 
a letter of credit are the competitive interest rates of 1 percent per month, service charges 
of 2-5 percent, short tem1 ~tructure of 30-120 days and collateral requirements of a 25-75 
percent deposit. · 
18 
The most significant advantage of this financial instrument is the flexibility it provides 
traders in the importation of commodities. Traders have a high tu.mover of commodities 
and, thus, require large amounts of working capital to finance their purchases. In addition, 
importers find that this ~cial instrument is an acceptable and convenient means to pay 
their suppliers. Hence, a letter of credit seems to be an adequate financial instrument for 
meeting the demands of most importers. 
The interesting featµre in the Gambian markets is that the letter of credit that 
importers utilize in their operations is acquired from foreign financial institutions. The 
domestic financial institutions provide occasional loans and overdraft facilities which traders 
use to pay their local expenses. But the principal financial contract that is vital for the 
importation of commodities is dependent on foreign financial markets. It is also important 
to point out that most of the modem bakeries imported new mixing equipment and ovens 
using formal loans obtained from offshore suppliers and financial institutions. 
2. Informal Financial Contracts 
The significant fonri of informal contract used for commodity trading is suppliers 
credit. This financial contract is predominant in the wholesaling and retailing of commodi-
ties. The contract is an informal one between the suppliers and their customers, such as 
importers and wholesalers, wholesalers and retailers, and retailers and final consumers. 
The terms and conditions for suppliers credit are largely informal. These contracts 
are characterized by implicit interest rate charges of 2-5 percent per month on average, a 
very short-term term of 1-60 days, and collateral substitutes in the form of supplier-customer 
relationship. 
A particular point which is suggestive of the typical reciprocity factor in informal 
contracts is the mutual benefit to both parties in continuing the supplier-customer 
relationship. This association insures the advantage of information economies for both 
supplier-principals and customer-agents. On the part of the suppliers, extending credit 
secures customer-outlets for their commodities. On the part of the customers who get 
access to credit, they establish credible informational records with their suppliers who offer 
a source of financing for commodity trade. 
There exist some similarities and differences between the informal suppliers credit 
and the formal letter of credit. The similarities arise first from the fact that almost all the 
customers draw upon this financing to purchase their commodities and second, each is 
specifically drawn to finance the particular commodity shipment being acquired. The 
differences exist, first, in the nature of the contracts. A letter of credit involves a formal 
contract between a financial institution and a borrower, whereas suppliers credit is typically 
a verbal agreement between the supplier and his customer. Other differences include the 
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term of the contract, size, interest rates and implicit charges, and default (Table VIII-5). 
Generally, each agent in the marketing channel is able to grant credit to his customers in 
amounts much smaller than the amount of credit he received from his supplier and for a 
shorter period of time. The importer who acquires a line of credit for 30-120 days can offer 
suppliers credit for 7-60 days to wholesalers who in-turn offer retailers credit for 1-30 days. 
The term of these contracts is important because it is probably associated with the 
repayment ability of the agents at each stage. These sources of finance represent the two 
most important sources for the tables in these food marketing channels. 
3. Access to Financial Markets 
Access to domestic financial markets does not seem to be a problem for affluent 
traders who are predominantly importers and large wholesalers. These traders hold 
sufficiently large deposits with the local banks and can meet the collateral requirements 
needed to acquire access to commercial loans when demanded. However, even these 
traders reported that they do not draw heavily upon the local banks for credit, because of 
the high interest rates. Another restriction that importers reported is the local banks 
demand of 100 percent deposit when opening a letter of credit. 
On the other hand, importers who have access to offshore financial markets where 
they also hold large deposits, can draw upon these sources for lines of credit to meet their 
short term working capital demands. The competitive nature of foreign financial markets 
increases the probability that traders are charged reasonably competitive prices for the 
financial service they obtain. 
The problem existing that importers face in dealing with the local banks does not 
seem to be one of access but rather of lack of competition. The terms and conditions for 
domestic financial services are harsher than those obtained in the foreign markets. Since 
the large scale importers have had access for a long term to offshore financial markets, 
there is little incentive for them to deal with the local banks which seem satisfied to earn 
income in ways other than lending to traders. 
Small wholesalers and retailers, who constitute the other classes of traders, have little 
access to credit from the domestic financial institutions which they often referred to as the 
"useless banks". Although some traders deposit with the local banks, the main barriers these 
traders face are the reported high interest rates and lack of collateral. These barriers to 
access lead these traders to self-select themselves and look for other channels to access 
financial services, particularly credit. These small wholesalers and retailers rely mostly on 
the informal loans they obtain from their suppliers. Once they establish a working 
relationship with and gain the confidence of their suppliers, they gain access to these 
informal loans. 
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It is clear that financial market segmentation exists in The Gambia. On the one 
hand, importers have access to both domestic and foreign financial markets. But they 
choose to deal mainly with the offshore financial institutions. On the other hand, the 
wholesalers and retailers did not report any association with foreign financial institutions, 
had only a limited access to the domestic financial institutions and relied mainly on the 
informal suppliers credit. 
4. Market Efficiency 
The overall performance of the domestic financial system was analyzed in the earlier 
chapters of this report. What remains to be discussed here is the degree to which the 
existing financial channels provide the services required to maintain a dynamic flow of 
commodities in the Gambian trade sector. 
Market efficiency is measured by the number and amount of the formal and informal 
financial services that exist and their relative cost structures. The letters of credit drawn 
from foreign sources seem to be working efficiently for importers in The Gambia. The large 
number and volume of these contracts as well as their prices indicate that they are cost 
effective. Likewise, the large number of transactions and the large volumes of funds 
involved in informal suppliers credit and the implicit prices attached to these transactions 
seem to suggest that they are a cost effective means to facilitate commodity trading. This 
suggests that suppliers credit could probably be used to finance the trade of other 
commodities. 
On the other hand, the amount of services, especially loans, that the domestic formal 
financial institutions are providing is insignificant by comparison. About half of the small 
scale enterprises surveyed, 2.s reported in Chapter VI, have deposit accounts in the domestic 
banks. Most large importers, wholesalers, and retailers also have local deposit accounts. 
But only a small percent of these traders and the small scale enterprises received loans from 
the banks. Moreover, most of the large scale importers obtained most of their financing 
offshore. Therefore, the domestic banking system mobilizes deposits from these 
entrepreneurs but makes few loans to them. This is reflected in the data reported in 
Chapter I which shows the large amount of investments made by banks in government T-
bills. The nature and efficiency of formal financial intermediations is questionable given this 
pattern of domestic resource mobilization and lending. 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FERTILIZER SECTOR 
The analysis conduct;ed on the food commodity trade has provided information about 
the importation and distribution of these commodities, and the financial arrangements that 
facilitate this trade. It provides important lessons about how the system operates and allows 
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us to speculate about how these traders may respond to the possibility of becoming more 
actively involved in the privatization of the fertilizer sector. The purpose of this section is 
to summarize the important lessons learned about the food commodity trade and identify 
the issues that will affect the ability and desire of these traders to expand into fertilizer. 
With the liberalized market environment in The Gambia, in which private trading 
has become more dynamic, food commodities, and especially flour and rice, are being 
imported and sold in large quantities and apparently at competitive prices. The existence 
of multiple agents at each level of the marketing channel contributes to competition. Part 
of the dynamism and efficiency is due to the large reexport trade which allows the traders 
to achieve large scale operations. 
The financial contracts associated with the flow of commodities seem to be working 
fairly efficiently and the prices and interest rates for financial services are reasonably 
competitive. Offshore banks and suppliers credit provide most of the liquidity in the system 
because of the lethargic response of the domestic banking system. If the large importers 
could not access offshore funds, they would be faced with paying higher costs from domestic 
banks, while small and medium size firms without proven records of loan repayment would 
probably find it difficult to obtain loans at all. 
The large private traders have accumulated experience and knowledge over time in 
their trading activities. They have market contacts, storage and transportation facilities, 
knowledge about international trading, and established relations with offshore financial 
institutions. As noted in Chapter VII, two firms have been involved with fertilizer imports 
for the FAO. Given that the government and donors are trying to privatize the marketing 
of agricultural imports, especially fertilizer, a logical question is whether or not and under 
what conditions the traders of food commodities would expand into fertilizer. Several things 
learned in the course of this study allow us to speculate about the possibilities of this 
occurring. 
There are important differences and similarities between food commodities and 
fertilizer that affect the private sector response to the fertilizer sector in The Gambia. They 
can be grouped into possibilities for a) scale economies, b) scope economies, and c) access 
to finance. 
1. Scale Economies 
The food commodity trade operates on a fairly large scale but there are several limits 
to the scale of operations in the fertilizer sector. 
• The total volume of domestic fertilizer demand is much smaller than for food 
commodities, as discussed in Chapter VII. 
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• The production cycle for crops for which fertilizer would be used is much longer than 
the shorter-term consumption cycle for food commodities, so there is a slower turnover of 
inventory. Therefore, sellers have fewer contacts with buyers and have less opportunity to 
monitor their businesses. 
• There is great uncertainty about reexport demand for fertilizer. Fertilizer has been 
imported into The Gambia from Senegal. It is unclear what conditions would be required 
in neighboring countries for The Gambia to serve as an entrepot for regional fertilizer 
imports. 
• The amounts of food aid entering The Gambia with potential distortionary effects 
on prices is fairly small. However, the subsidized role of the government and donors has 
been very large in the fertilizer sector; therefore, the possibility of their future involvement 
creates considerable uncertainty for private traders who would be unable to complete 
against a subsidized public sector distribution channel. 
• The demand for food commodities that are important staples in The Gambia diet is 
likely to be quite inelastic. . As a result, cons-ymption is prob~bly fairly stable, , even when 
prices change. On the other hand, manure may be a fairly good substitute for chemical 
fertilizer or farmers may simply not use fertilizer if the price rises too much. Therefore, the 
quantity of fertilizer demand (i.e. sales) may become quite volatile in a privatized market 
if prices fluctuate widely as may occur in the international market, in which The Gambia 
is clearly a price taker. · 
These five factors suggest that private traders will find it difficult to achieve scale 
economies in the fertilizer trade and this will make them cautious about investing in it, 
especially if they expect that there may be several agents competing for a small market. 
2. Scope Economies 
H food traders decide to enter the fertilizer trade, there are four factors that suggest 
they might achieve scope economies. 
• The dealers could probably use many of their existing transportation and warehousing 
facilities for fertilizer if they have sufficient capacity, or even reduce their food trade if 
profits were sufficient to justify using more facilities for fertilizer. 
• The trade linkages established between importers, wholesalers, and retailers in the 
food trade may be used for the fertilizer business. Retailers in villages and towns are 
accustomed to selling a variety of products and they may find it profitable to handle 
fertilizer and acquire it from the same channels as their food commodities. 
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• The large scale importers may be able to use their recognized creditworthiness with 
offshore financial institutions to acquire needed letters of credit and working capital for the 
fertilizer trade. 
• The food traders with multiproduct businesses have the flexibility of shifting among 
commodity lines and therefore may be able to make a profit and survive better in a dynamic 
market than a undiversified, single produce a fertilizer business. 
3. Financing the business 
Food traders have established ways to finance their businesses which appear to be 
reliable and reasonably priced. There are several differences with the fertilizer trade, 
however, that may make it difficult to transfer these same techniques to the fertilizer 
business. These problems may exist either a) in the acquisition of capital for the business, 
or b) in the granting and recovery of credit given to customers. 
• As shown in this chapter, the large scale importers finance their businesses generally 
with short-term offshore letters of credit. Because of the rapid sales turnover, they can sell 
their stock on credit to their customers, yet get repaid in time to pay their credit obligations. 
The crop production season is several months long, however, so credit given to customers 
for fertilizer must be for a longer term. This means that the importer must get longer term 
credit which may not be as readily available or may be more expensive even from offshore 
sources. If they do not get longer term credit, there will be a mismatch in term structure: 
a trader would borrow short but would provide longer term suppliers credit to 
wholesalers/retailers who would provide seasonal credit to farmers. Interest charges (or 
foregone discounts) for credit sales would have to be higher for fertilizer credit to 
compensate for the larger interest expense. 
• It is more risky for wholesalers to make loans to retailers or retailers to make loans 
to their customers (farmers) for longer term fertilizer credit than for shorter term food 
commodity credit. They do not see their customers as frequently, cannot monitor their 
activities as well, and cannot as effectively use the threat of cutting off future loans (and 
therefore access to the commodities) if current loans are not repaid. This problem is 
somewhat less severe if the agent making the fertilizer loan also sells food commodities to 
the same customer. Then access to food loans can be made conditional on good repayment 
of fertilizer loans. 
• Fertilizer loans are made for an inherently risky farming activity which is several 
months in duration. The size of the typical fertilizer loans made by a retailer to a farmer 
is likely to be larger than a food loan. The capacity to repay the fertilizer loan may be 
dependent on agricultural production, while the food consumption loan may be paid from 
any source of household income. If the retailer must cut off future credit because of 
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nonrepayment of past credit, his total loss will likely be higher on a fertilizer than a food 
loan. This higher probability of a large loss makes credit sales of fertilizer riskier for the 
retailer than food credit sales. This is similarly true for suppliers credit at all levels in the 
fertilizer trade channel. 
• The repayment of fertilizer loans made to farmers in some countries is facilitated 
through input-output linkages. For example, food processors, traders, cooperatives, etc. 
purchase farm commodities· so they deduct the cost of fertilizer advanced from the purchase 
price of the commodities acquired. Unless the food commodity traders in The Gambia 
begin to acquire farm products, they will not be able to develop these types of linkages. 
This analysis suggests that agents at all levels in the food commodity trade channels 
may enjoy some economies of scope if they expand into the fertilizer sector. But problems 
of smaller scale and more complicated financial arrangements may discourage them from 
doing so. New specialized fertilizer traders would experience problems in all three areas, 
and it is unclear if they would enjoy any major offsetting advantages. 
There is little that policymakers can do outside of direct subsidies or granting a ferti-
lizer monopoly to some dealer that will improve the prospects for privatizing the fertilizer 
trade under the particular circumstances faced by The Gambia. The best recommendation 
is to create a guarantee fund, as described in Chapter VII, that will increase the probability 
that private traders who decide to enter this risky business will have reasonable access to 
working capital. This analysis also suggests that the outcome of the current efforts to re-
structure the GCU and the groundnut processing industry will have a crucial bearing on the 
future of the fertilizer sector. The agents, private or cooperative, that procure and process 
farm commodities will have the best chance of successfully developing the fertilizer trade. 
25 
REFERENCES 
AID, Critical Issues for American Investors in Gambia,, Multinational Strategies, Inc. in 
association with IAABAT-ANDERSON Inc., October 1991, 25 pgs. 
Boomgard, James J., Stephen P. Davis, Steven J. Haggblade, and Donald C. Mead, "A 
Subsector Approach to Small Enterprise Promotion and Research," GEMINI 
Working Paper No. 10, January 1991. 
Central Bank of The Gambia, Annual Report. 1990/1991. 
Jabara, Cathy, Economic Reform and Poverty in The Gambia: A Survey of Pre- and Post-
ERP Experience, Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program, Monograph 8, 
Washington, D.C., December 1990. 
J abara, Cathy L, Marjatta Tolvanen, Mattias K.A Lundberg, and Robey Wadda, "Incomes, 
Nutrition, and Poverty in The Gambia: Results from the CFNPP Household Survey," 
Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program, Washington, D.C., July 1991. 
Koch, Timothy W., Bank Management, The Dryden Press, New York, 1988. 
27 
Table VIII-1 Gross Domestic Product.1 
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 
AGRICULTURE 
Groundnuts 
Other Crops 
Livestock 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
INDUSTRY 
Manufacturing 
Construction2 
Electricity & Water 
SERVICES 
Trade 
Groundnut Trade 
Other Trade 
Hotels & Restaurants 
Transport & Communication 
Real Estate & Business Services 
Government Services 
Other Services3 
G.D.P. at Factor Cost 
Indirect Taxes (net) 
G .D .P. at Constant mkt. Prices 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia, Annual Report, 1990/1991. 
Note 1: In millions of dalasis at constant 1976/77 prices. 
2: Includes mining, which is very limited. 
1990/1991 
Millions of Dalasis Percent 
(1) (2) 
109.67 20.45 
26.69 4.98 
45.71 8.52 
24.24 4.52 
2.97 0.55 
10.06 1.87 
65.33 12.18 
32.13 5.98 
30.10 5.62 
3.10 0.58 
361.15 67.36 
147.06 27.43 
9.50 1.80 
137.56 25.65 
24.61 4.59 
84.98 15.85 
33.04 6.15 
56.50 10.54 
14.96 2.79 
536.15 100.00 
71.85 
608.00 
3: Includes banking and insurance; imputed bank service charges; personal and household services; social, 
recreational and related services. 
28 
Table VIII-2 The Gambia: Composition of Imports, 1988/1989. 
ITEM 
IMPORT GOODS 
Food and Live Animals 
Beverages and Tobacco 
Crude Materials 
Minerals and Fuel 
Animal and Vegetable Oils 
Chemicals 
Manufactured Goods 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Unclassified 
Other Nonfactor Services 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
Source: Jabara, 1990. 
Millions of Dollars 
(1) 
130.1 
40.3 
6.6 
1.3 
9.5 
2.0 
9.2 
33.1 
26.3 
1.8 
49.0 
179.3 
Percent 
(2) 
100.0 
31.0 
5.1 
1.0 
7.3 
1.5 
7.1 
25.4 
20.2 
1.4 
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Table VIII-3 Survey of Economic Agents Managing the Flow of Commodities. 
Economic Agent Number of Interviews Commodities 
(1) (2) 
Importers/Wholesalers 7 Flour/Rice 
\Vholesalers/Retailers 3 Flour /Rice 
Retailers 2 Flour/llice 
Bakeries 39 Flour 
Table VIII-4 Types of Traders and their Customers. 
Type of Trader Principal Customers 
------------------------------------------------~ 
Importers 1. Reexport Traders 
2. \Vholesalers 
3. Medium Scale Enterprises 
\Vholesalers 1. Retailers 
2. Small Scale Reexport Traders 
3. Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises 
Retailers 1. Households 
2. Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises 
30 
Table VIII-S Characteristics of the Financial Contracts Used in Food Commodity Trading. 
Characteristics of the Financial 
Contract 
Type of Contract 
Type of Financial Market 
Term of Loan 
Size of Loan 
Interest Rate 
Fees or Implicit Charges 
Collateral / Substitutes 
Delinquency Rate 
Default Rate 
Source: OSU survey 
Importation 
(1) 
Letter of Credit 
Formal 
30-120 days 
D 840,000 -
14,000,000 
1% per month 
2-5% 
25-75% cash up-front 
None reported 
None reported 
Contracts for: 
Wholesaling Retailing 
(2) (3) 
Supplier Credit Supplier Credit 
Informal Informal 
7-60 days 1-7 days 
D 7,000 - 50,000 D50-500 
0 0 
2-5% 2-5% 
supplier - supplier -
customer customer 
relationship relationship 
Few cases Few cases 
reported reported 
Few cases Few cases 
reported reported 
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Table VIII-6 Sources of Finance Reported in the Small Scale Enterprise Sample. 
Type of Finance 
Initial Capital 
Personal Investment from Savings 
Family 
Friends 
Formal Loans 
Supplier Loans 
Sources Of Funds 
Entrepreneurs Using Retained Earnings 
Entrepreneurs Using Informal Loans 
Entrepreneurs Using Formal Loans 
Entrepreneurs Using Suppliers Credit 
Entrepreneurs Using Customer 
Credit/ ~dvance 
Formal Loans 
Received a Loan in the Past Five Years 
Received a Loan in the Past One Year 
Ever Received a Loan 
Source: See Chapter VI. 
Modem 
(1) 
15.4% 
7.7% 
0% 
76.9% 
7.7% 
100% 
54% 
59% 
85% 
0% 
61.5% 
38.5% 
61.5% 
Bakeries 
Traditional 
(2) 
69.2% 
11.5% 
0% 
0% 
19.2% 
100% 
69% 
0% 
81% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
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Table VIII-7 Savings Channels Reported in the Small Scale Enterprise Sample. 
Savings 
Share of Sample Entrepreneurs With Deposits in Formal Institutions 
Informal Groups 
Entrepreneurs Participating in Informal Groups 
Average Size of Contribution (D) 
Moneykeeper 
Entrepreneurs Saving with Moneykeeper 
Average size of Deposit (D) 
Source: See Chapter VI. 
Bakeries 
Modem Traditional 
(1) (2) 
90.9% 0% 
0% 8% 
0 30 
0% 38.5% 
0 120 
33 
Figure VIII-1 
Flow of Commodities in the Food Marketing Channels 
Foreign Suppliers 
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Traders Enterprises 
WHOLESALERS/ l 
Retailers 
RETAILERS 
and Shopkeepers 
Households Small Scale 
Enterprises 
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FigunVUl-2 
Fmancial Flows in the Food Marketing Channels 
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APPENDIX 
Roster of Individuals and Institutions Consulted 
during Field Work on this Study 
Government Agencies 
E. Brewis, Managing Director, Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) 
Momodou A Ceesay, Assistant Director of Post Office 
Papa A Cham, Head Agro-Industries Development Unit, Investment Promotion Division, 
National Investment Board 
Sene Darbbo, Director, Jahally-Pachar Rice Project 
Mr. Dibba, Assistant Director, Jahally-Pachar Rice Project 
J anneh Ike, Statistician, Department of Livestock Services 
Sana M. Jabang, Agricultural Input Office, Department of Agricultural Services 
Gabriel D. Mendy, Senior Compliance Officer, Social Security and Housing Finance 
Corporation 
Alieu M. N'Gum, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
Sam Njie, Principle Management Officer, Human Resources Division, National Investment 
Board 
John Sylva, Director, Indigenous Business Advisory Service 
International Organizations I Contractors 
Andrew T. Adam, HIID Project, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
Phk. Henrick Bechtel, Technical Advisor, IF AD, Rome 
John N. Butt, Price Waterhouse, Washington, D.C. 
Bernd Buttemeir, Evaluation Officer, FAQ, Rome 
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S.E. Christensen, FAQ Fertilizer Project 
D.J. Clifford, Animal Production Officer, International Trypanotolerance Centre 
Ann Duval, World Bank Consultant for WID project 
Amira Ghanim, President, Association of Gambian Entrepreneurs 
William A Hargus, Animal Scientist, University of Wisconsin, Gambia Agricultural 
Research and Diversification Project (GARD) 
Musa Jawneh, National President, Association of Farmers, Educators and Traders 
Ned Jewett, CMI Consultants, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
Lisbeth Junker, FAQ Fertilizer Project 
Frank W. Kooistra, University of Wisconsin, Gambia Agricultural Research and 
Diversification Project (GARD) 
Charles Mann, lilID Project, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
Pirkko Poutiainen, Programme Officer, UNDP 
Caroline Robb, Poverty Alleviation Programme, UNDP 
Babou Sarr, Division of Human Resource Development, UNDP 
Emmet Schulte, University of Wisconsin, Gambia Agricultural Research and Diversification 
Project, (GARD) 
Balla Silla, Project Manager, Credit Support System for Women, UNDP 
Ammadou Sowe, Field Officer, F AO Fertilizer Project 
Denise Williamson, World Bank, Consultant for Gambia 
Sarah Adams, USAID, Banjul 
Philip Decosse, USAID, Banjul 
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Donald Drga, USAID, Banjul 
Oren E. Whyche, Private Sector Development Advisor, REDSO /Abidjan 
Fred Witthans, USAID, Banjul 
Banking 
David Able-Thomas, Manager, International Bank for Commerce and Industry 
J. Kofi Agyekumhene, Chief Technical Adviser, Agricultural Credit Unit, Central Bank 
Momodou Clarke Bajo, General Manager, Central Bank 
Calum I. Buchanan, Managing Director, Standard Chartered Commercial Bank 
Edward E. Fillingham, Senior Advisor, Central Bank 
Momodou Foon, APEX funds, Central Bank 
M.J.A. Knight, Managing Director, Meridien Bank Gambia Limited 
Robert Maddox, Technical Advisor to GCDB 
Nuha Marenah, Manager, Loan Recovery Department, GCDB 
Abdou AB. Njie, Governor, Central Bank 
Alhaji Tafsir Samba Alieu Njie, General Manager, Continent Bank, Ltd. 
Raddy Njie, Manager, Banking Supervision Department, Central Bank 
Pa Macoumba Njie, Commercial Manager, Gambia Commercial and Development Bank 
Ltd. 
Ian Roxton, Advisor, Banking Supervision Department, Central Bank 
David Thwaites, Managing Director, Gambia Commercial and Development Bank 
Graham Yates, Deputy Manager, Standard Chartered Bank Gambia Limited 
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Trader /Private Sector 
Farouk Ayad, Manager, Textard Co. Ltd., Textile Importer 
Mamadou Bah, PAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Alb. Falley Baldeh, PAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Saikou Baldeh, PAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Antoine Banna, Manager, George Banna & Co., Textile/Food Commodities 
Mamodou Benta, Daadema, Flour Importer 
Reynold Carrol, HORTMARC Ltd. 
Momodou A Ceesay, Managing Director, Gambia Horticultural Enterprises 
El Hadj Karam.a Cessay, Rice Wholesaler /Retailer 
Amadu Fall, Rice Retailer 
C.O. Fall, Groundnut Trader 
Baboucar B. Gai, Commercial Manager, Gambia Cooperative Union Ltd. (GCU) 
Isatou Jack, HORTMARC Ltd. 
Amadou M. Jallow, General Manager, Yams Agricultural Enterprise Ltd. 
Musa J allow and Samballa J allow, Private Trader 
Alh. M. Jammeh, Groundnut Trader 
Tider Janka, PAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Madam Job, Fruit and vegetable buying agent, major buyer for Senegambia Hotel 
Ebrima Jobe, Groundnut Trader 
Fotou Jobe, PAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Sheriff John, Groundnut Trader 
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M.H. Kebbeh, Director, Amdalaye Trading Enterprises, Ltd. 
Mohammad Kebbah, Rice, Oil Importer/Wholesaler (Honorary Counsel of Pakistan) 
Hans W. Kemper, Purchasing Manager, Senegambia Hotel 
Binta Khan, Coordinator, Women's Horticultural Cooperative, Gambia Cooperative Union 
Ltd. (GCU) 
Mamodou Kally, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Saikou Komma, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Kebba Kora, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
M.M. Marong, Groundnut Trader 
Hassib W. Massry, Manager, T. Massry Co. Ltd. 
Alieu A M. MBoge, Rice Importer, President of Gambia Chamber f Commerce and 
Industry, Honorary Consul of the Kingdom of Thailand 
Sayed Moukhtara, Moukhtara Holding Co. Ltd. 
J. Najiib, Groundnut Trader 
A.B. Dandeh Njie, Tanji Farm 
B.M. Njie, Njie & Sons, Rice Importer and Wholesaler 
Mohammed Njie, Manager, Musa Njie & Sons, Flour 
Dr. Lamin Sabo, Gambia Export and Trading Company 
Mariamma Saine, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Suruwa Sanyang, F AO Fertilizer Dealer 
Hadday Secca, F AO Fertilizer Dealer 
Jim Secca, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Rohit Shah, Radville Farms Ltd. 
\ 
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Momodou Singateh, Deputy General Manager, Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) 
Pa Sinyang, Financial Controller, Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) 
Sidy Sugufara, Rice Wholesaler /Retailer 
Karamo Trerra, Credit Officer, Gambia Cooperative Union Ltd. (GCU) 
Bassamah Waggeh, FAO Fertilizer Dealer 
Mammadou Waggah, Private Trader for Rice and Fertilizer 
NGOs/PVOs 
Mariama Ashcroft, Gambia Women's Finance Association 
Brooks E. Crichlow, Assistant Representative, Catholic Relief Services 
Dodou Darbo, Executive Secretary, AFET 
Burang Goree-Ndiaye, Executive Secretary, TANGO (The Association of NGOs) 
Helmi Govers, UNV, Programme Officer, TANGO (The Association of NGOs) 
Musa Jawneh, Association of Farmers, Educators and Traders (AFET) 
Chuga M.K Joof, Coordinator, National Association of Credit Unions of the Gambia 
(NACUG) 
Mrs. Maria tou Loum, WISDOM 
Jean-Fran~ois LeGrand, Technical Advisor of Village Savings and Credit Associations 
(VISACAs), Sapu 
Nimal Martinus, Program Director, WorldView International Foundation 
Aminatta L.R. N'Gum, Chairperson, Gambia Women's Finance Association (GWFA) 
Solomon J.E. Owens, Projects Supervisor, Catholic Relief Services 
Mr. Samoo, Credit Officer, GWF A 
Jeffrey D. Saussier, Deputy Director, Action Aid 
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Aboubacry Tall, Field Office Director, Save the Children, USA 
Fatounata Tambafang, Treasurer, Gambia Women's Finance Association (GWFA) 
Gladwin Williams, Consultant to TANGO 
